Prescriptivism and akrasia

Philosophical Studies -     

Self-knowledge and commitments

In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes—called “commitments”—has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can’t remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order for a constitutive account properly to explain authority, it has to take a rather dramatic constructivist turn, which makes it suitable as an explanation of self-knowledge only for a limited class of mental states.     

Self-knowledge and scepticism

Donald Davidson has argued that most of our beliefs must be true and that global scepticism is therefore false. Davidson's arguments to this conclusion often seem to depend on externalist considerations. Davidson's position has been criticised, however, on the grounds that he does not defeat the sceptic, but rather already assumes the falsity of scepticism through his appeal to externalism. Indeed, it has been claimed that far from defeating the sceptic Davidson introduces an even more extreme version of scepticism according to which we cannot even know the contents of our own minds. This paper argues that these criticisms are mistaken and that Davidson does indeed have grounds to argue that scepticism is false. The externalism that figures in Davidson's antisceptical arguments is shown to be merely an element in Davidson's overall holism according to which the very possibility of having beliefs that could be true or false depends on most of those beliefs being true and their contents known.     

Dependency, self-criticism, and depressive attributional style

Dependency and self-criticism have been proposed as independent factors in depression. Investigated whether depressive individuals characterized by dependency and self-criticism, respectively, differ with regard to internality of causal attributions for negative events. Sixty psychiatric outpatients completed the Depressive Experiences Questionnaire, the Beck Depression Inventory, the semantic differential, and the Attributional Style Questionnaire. Dependency and self-criticism correlated positively with internality and with each other (p less than .0001). Findings did not support the specificity of dependency and self-criticism as subtypes of depression.     

Epistemic akrasia and higher-order beliefs

Philosophical Studies - According to the Fragmentation Analysis, epistemic akrasia is a state of conflict between beliefs formed by the linguistic and non-linguistic belief-formation systems, and...     

Weakness of will and akrasia

Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions, and I have done the same for akratic actions. How well does this view of mine fare in the sphere of weakness of will? Considerably better than Holton’s view. That is a thesis of this article. The article’s aim is to clarify the nature of weak-willed actions.     

Making sense of akrasia

There are two extreme poles in the literature on akrasia. Internalists hold that it’s impossible to act intentionally against your better judgment, because there’s a necessary internal relation between judgment and intentional action. To the contrary, externalists maintain that we can act intentionally against our better judgment, because the will operates independently of judgment. Critics of internalism argue that it fails a realism test—most people seem to think that we can and do act intentionally against our better judgment. And critics of externalism argue that it flirts with incoherence by severing the intimate link between judgment and action. Drawing on resources from phenomenology, the cognitive sciences, analytic action theory, and recent “hybrid models” of skilled action, I argue that one route beyond this theoretical impasse is to understand akrasia as a form of skillful pre-reflective intentional action. This strategy, I argue, preserves the internalist insight that there is indeed an intimate relation between judgment and intentional action; and it also confirms the externalist claim that this relation is defeasible, but it does so without falling into incoherence.     

A puzzle about epistemic akrasia

In this paper I will present a puzzle about epistemic akrasia, and I will use that puzzle to motivate accepting some non-standard views about the nature of epistemological judgment. The puzzle is that while it seems obvious that epistemic akrasia must be irrational, the claim that epistemic akrasia is always irrational amounts to the claim that a certain sort of justified false belief—a justified false belief about what one ought to believe—is impossible. But justified false beliefs seem to be possible in any domain, and it’s hard to see why beliefs about what one ought to believe should be an exception. I will argue that when we get clearer about what sort of psychological state epistemic akrasia is, we can resolve the puzzle in favor of the intuitive view that epistemic akrasia is always irrational.     

Self-knowledge and the KK principle

I argue that a version of the so-called KK principle is true for principled epistemic reasons; and that this does not entail access internalism, as is commonly supposed, but is consistent with a broad spectrum of epistemological views. The version of the principle I defend states that, given certain normal conditions, knowing p entails being in a position to know that you know p. My argument for the principle proceeds from reflection on what it would take to know that you know something, rather than from reflection on the conditions for knowledge generally. Knowing that you know p, it emerges, is importantly similar to cases of psychological self-knowledge like knowing that you believe p: it does not require any grounds other than your grounds for believing p itself. In so arguing, I do not rely on any general account of knowledge, but only on certain plausible and widely accepted epistemological assumptions.     

Self-knowledge, Externalism, and Skepticism: Brian P. McLaughlin

In recent years, some philosophers have claimed that we can know a priori that certain external world skeptical hypotheses are false on the basis of a priori knowledge that we are in certain kinds of mental states, and a priori knowledge that those mental states are individuated by contingent environmental factors. Appealing to a distinction between weak and strong a priority, I argue that weakly a priori arguments of this sort would beg the question of whether the skeptical hypothesis under assessment is true, and that the prospect of a sound strongly a priori argument of this sort seems dim.
'It still remains a scandal to philosophy... that the existence of things outside of us... must be accepted merely on faith, and that, if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.'
(Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason)     

Self-knowledge defenses to self-threats

We examined whether people use both shifts in the spontaneous self-concept (self-knowledge content) and in self-concept clarity (self-knowledge structure) to defend against salient self-threats, and identified relevant moderators of this process. In Study 1, women emphasized relational self-aspects in response to mortality salience, compared to men. In Study 2, high self-esteem individuals showed more polarized self-knowledge after mortality salience, while in Study 3 they became faster in their self-categorizations when faced with uncertainty, and more consistent and faster in their self-categorizations when faced with isolation, relative to those with low self-esteem. In the discussion, we focus on how these outcomes can be interpreted as meaning maintenance, clarify the role of self-esteem, and offer directions for future research.     

Child maltreatment, non-suicidal self-injury, and the mediating role of self-criticism

We examined the relation between child maltreatment and non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI). Participants were 86 adolescents who completed measures of child maltreatment, self-criticism, perceived criticism, depression, and NSSI. Analyses revealed significant, small-to-medium associations between specific forms of child maltreatment (physical neglect, emotional abuse, and sexual abuse) and the presence of a recent history of NSSI. Emotional and sexual abuse had the strongest relations with NSSI, and the data supported a theoretical model in which self-criticism mediates the relation between emotional abuse and engagement in NSSI. Specificity for the mediating role of self-criticism was demonstrated by ruling out alternative mediation models. Taken together, these results indicate that several different forms of childhood maltreatment are associated with NSSI and illuminate one mechanism through which maltreatment may be associated with NSSI. Future research is needed to test the temporal relation between maltreatment and NSSI and should aim to identify additional pathways to engagement in NSSI.     

Self-knowledge: An expanded view

This paper argues for a more extensive study of self-knowledge. From the cognitive perspective, self-knowedge is a critical component of personality. Until quite recently, however, the study of self-knowledge has been narrowly conceived, focusing primarily on how individuals describe their roles and characteristic behaviors. Yet individuals also have knowledge about their preferences and values, their goals and motives, and their rules and strategies for regulating behavior. These dynamic aspects of self-knowledge are significant because they can be importantly revealing of future behavior. The content and organization of self-knowledge is important first because it indicates which domains of behavior are regarded as the most self-relevant. It is in these domains that the strongest links between personality and behavior will be observed. Second, self-knowledge cognitively represents desired and undesired states for the self, as well as specific ideas about how to realize or avoid these states. It thus indicates the likely course of behavior in self-relevant domains. A number of recent research efforts can be intepreted as explorations of self-knowledge. These are briefly reviewed and integrated to provide a general outline for an expanded view of self-knowledge.