Sprachverstehende maschinen

In this paper the author tries to disentangle some of the problems tied up in John Searle's famous Chinese-room-argument. In a first step to answer the question what it would be for a system to have not only syntax, but also semantics the author gives a brief account of the functioning of the language understanding systems (LUS) so far developed in the framework of AI research thereby making clear that systems like Winograd's SHRDLU are indeed doing little more than mere number crunching. But things would be entirely different, the author argues, if the database of a LUS were built up by the system itself via some perceptual component-at least, if this perceptual component had the capacity to distinguish objects having a certain property F from objects which do not. For in this case the system could store an internal representation of the fact that the object has the property F in its database if and only if the object in fact has that property. And this would be a good basis for calling such a system a genuine LUS. But Searle has objected to a very similar account of J. Fodor that nothing could be further from true language understanding. The reason for this complaint seems to be that Searle holds the view that a true LUS must e.g., know that the word hamburgers refers to hamburgers and that he moreover claims that this knowledge must be explicit or that the system must be aware of the reference of hamburgers to hamburgers. The author argues that this is asking too much. For it seems plausible to say that a system is able to understand e.g., the word hamburger even if it has only implicit knowledge of the fact that hamburger refers to hamburgers in the sense that it has the capacity to tell hamburgers from non hamburgers and the capacity to bring the word hamburger together just with objects of the former kind.     

Accepting inconsistencies from the paradoxes

It has been proposed that the law of non-contradiction be revised to permit the simultaneous truth and falsity of the key sentences of the logical paradoxes, e.g., This sentence is false. In an attempt to show to what extent this bizarre suggestion of inconsistent models or truth-value gluts is a coherent suggestion it is proved that a first-order language for number theory can be semantically closed by having its own global truth predicate under some non-standard interpretation and thus that it actually can contain the Liar sentence. It is proved that in this interpretation the Liar sentence is both true and false, although not every sentence is.     

Paradox,truth and logic part I: Paradox and truth

Conclusion The discussion of the semantics of inconsistent truth theories now comes to a pause. The preceding is of course but a sketch; many interesting questions remain to be answered. The second part of this essay, however, will not seek to answer them. Rather, I will turn to the discussion of the proof theory of truth theory: the local and global logic of truth.Under the first heading, I show how to replace the inductive construction of models with an appropriate infinitary proof theory, and relate this on the one hand to the so-called dependence approach to inductive truth theories (Davis, 1979; Yablo, 1982) and on the other to van Fraassen's fact semantics for relevance logic.Under the second heading, I offer formals systems which capture the inferences valid in all approximate models. Not surprisingly, these turn out to be relevant logics.With formalism in hand, I discuss finally the extent to which the gap and/or glut approach can in fact be said to solve the paradoxes; that is, to allow us to say that the very language we are speaking is of the sort described in our theory.     

Gender Discrimination and the Workplace: An Examination of Rational Bias Theory

Previous research concerning the rationalbias theory of workplace discrimination has beenconfined largely to narrow student samples. This studyextends that work with an experimental-survey design in which employed participants were asked bothhow others respond to conditions classically elicitingrational bias discrimination, and how they believepeople behave in their own firms. Participants were 148 men and 158 women (88.6% Caucasian, 4.6%Hispanic, 4% Asian, and 2.8% other racialidentification) with graduate business degrees from apublic university. Results show evidence of continuingdiscrimination, and support the theory predicting rational biasgender discrimination in the workplace. Gender ofrespondent and locus of control (defined by Spector'sWork Locus of Control scale) are also shown to be related to rational bias discrimination.Suggestions are made for further development and testingof rational bias theory.     

Truth,Sentential Non-Compositionalit,and Ontology

The paper attempts to clarify some fundamental aspects of an explanationof the concept of truth which is neither deflationary nor substantive.The main aspect examined in detail concerns the ontological dimension of truth, the mind/language-world connection traditionally associated with the concept of truth. It is claimed that it does not make sense to defend or reject a relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension so long as the kind of presupposed or envisaged ontology is not made explicit and critically examined. In particular, it is shown that generally an objectual ontology is – often only implicitly – presupposed, i.e., an ontology admitting objects (substances), properties, relations, sometimes also facts, events, and the like. The paper demonstrates that such an ontology derives from the Principle of Semantic Sentential Compositionality and that this principle should be rejected. It introduces instead the Principle of Semantic Sentential Contextuality (or Context Principle) as the semantic basis of a new ontology, an ontology of primary states of affairs. After sketching such an ontology, it is shown that the relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension becomes intelligible.     

Before refraining: Concepts for agency

A structure is described that can serve as a foundation for a semantics for a modal agentive construction such as sees to it that Q ([ stit: Q]). The primitives are Tree,,Instant, Agent, choice. Eleven simple postulates governing this structure are set forth and motivated. Tree and encode a picture of branching time consisting of moments gathered into maximal chains called histories. Instant imposes a time-like ordering. Agent consists of agents, and choice assigns to each agent and each moment in Tree a set of possible choices, where each possible choice is a set of histories. All of these ingredients are referred to in the semantics suggested for [ stit: Q]. The most complex part of the discussion is the motivation for the definition of what it means for a typically non-terminating chain of moments jointly to witness the truth of [ stit: Q] at a moment.The paper begins with an informal account of the Refref conjecture, which says that the only way to refrain from refraining from seeing to something is to see to it. The paper ends with a consideration of an argument of Prior's that in a certain sense contemplation and action are inconsistent.     

Untersuchungen über Zusammenhänge zwischen drei Leistungsfaktoren und Antworten auf Fragebogenitems

Zusammenfassung 90 Oberschüler beantworteten 214 Fragebogenitems und bearbeiteten 41 Leistungsaufgaben, die zusammen drei in einer faktorenanalytischen Untersuchung von Jäger gefundene Faktoren repräsentieren. Die Zusammenhänge zwischen Fragen- und Aufgabengruppen wurden korrelations- und faktorenanalytisch untersucht. Die Leistungen in den den Faktor Anschauungsgebundenes Denken repräsentierenden Aufgaben korrelierten positiv mit durch Fragebogenitems definierten Verhaltensdimensionen Hinwendung zum Konkreten und Wohlbefinden-Emotionale Stabilität-Leistungszuversicht. Die Leistungen in Einfallsreichtum und Produktivität korrelierten positiv mit Überlegenheitsgefühl-Leistungszuversicht-Emotionale Stabilität-Wohlbefinden, sowie mit Spontaneität, Selbständigkeit und Flexibilität. Die Leistungen in einem dritten Faktor, der Tempo-Motivation bei einfach strukturierten Aufgaben benannt werden könnte, korrelierten positiv mit Soziale Zuwendung-Extraversion und scheint darüberhinaus mit einem Merkmal kompensatorischer Leistungsehrgeiz in Beziehung zu stehen. Die Ergebnisse werden diskutiert und Hypothesen zur Überprüfung und Ausweitung der Befunde formuliert.

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Summary 90 subjects answered 214 questionnaire and 41 ability test items, tbe latter representing three factors found by Jäger in an extensive factor analytic investigation. The relations between all the variables were analyzed by correlational and factor analytic methods. It was found that the ability called vision-related thinking is positively correlated with questionnaire-defined behavioral dimensions called reality orientation and well-being-emotional stability-achievement confidence. The ability fluency and productivity is positively correlated with superiority feeling-achievement confidence-emotional stability-well-being, with spontaneity, independence, and flexibility. Speed-motivation in simple tasks is positively correlated with social participation-extraversion and seems to be related to a trait called compensatory achievement orientation. The findings are discussed and hypotheses for subsequent test and extension formulated.

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Wir danken Herrn Dr. A. O. Jäger für die freundliche Erlaubnis, Aufgaben und Ergebnisse aus seiner Forschungsarbeit vor deren Veröffentlichung zu verwerten. Herrn Dipl.-Math. P. Schnell vom Deutschen Rechenzentrum in Darmstadt für die Durchführung der Berechnungen, unseren Kollegen, den Dipl.-Psychologen K. Althoff, Ch. Balzert, K. D. Stoll und P. Wolff für freundliche Mithilfe, nicht zuletzt unseren Vpn für ihren Einsatz und den Herrn Oberstudiendirektoren Jung, Hadamar, Dr. Keller, Montabaur, und Sauer, Limburg, für die Erlaubnis zur Durchführung der Untersuchungen an ihren Schulen.     

Proto-Semantics for Positive Free Logic

This paper presents a bivalent extensional semantics for positive free logic without resorting to the philosophically questionable device of using models endowed with a separate domain of non-existing objects. The models here introduced have only one (possibly empty) domain, and a partial reference function for the singular terms (that might be undefined at some arguments). Such an approach provides a solution to an open problem put forward by Lambert, and can be viewed as supplying a version of parametrized truth non unlike the notion of truth at world found in modal logic. A model theory is developed, establishing compactness, interpolation (implying a strong form of Beth definability), and completeness (with respect to a particular axiomatization).     

Approximate truth

Conclusion The technical results presented here on continuity and approximate implication are obviously incomplete. In particular, a syntactic characterization of approximate implication is highly desirable. Nevertheless, I believe the results above do show that the theory has considerable promise for application to the areas mentioned at the top of the paper.Formulation and defense of realist interpretations of science, for example, require approximate truth because we hardly ever have evidence that a particular scientific theory corresponds perfectly with a portion of the real world. Realists need to assert, then, that evidence for a theory is evidence for its approximate truth, not its truth (see [3] and [18]). Approximate truth is, however, a vague notion, and specification of quantity terms and of a sense of approximation are needed to make precise applications of it. Suitability of both vocabulary and sense of approximation depend on the subject matter, and their selection is a partly empirical matter that raises complex issues. In light of the number of common inferences which are not continuous, realists also need to be concerned about indiscriminate use of deductive logic to derive consequences from approximately true theories. These issues will be considered further in a future paper.Approximate truth also has potential application in areas of artificial intelligence that require inference from inaccurate data. In the qualitative physical theories of de Kleer and Brown [6], for example, qualitative values are derived by partitioning the real numbers into regions. Inferences leading from inside to outside a region must be identified and avoided, and approximate implication and continuity may prove useful in doing this. More generally, growing use of predicate logic as a programming language invites application of the theory of approximate truth as a symbolic substitute for numerical evaluation of computation errors. This too will be the subject of a future paper.Thanks to R. Boyd, A. Garfinkel, H. Hertz, P. Solomon, P. Suppes, S. Weissman, and anonymous referees for advice and criticism.     

Review

Summary Whatever conception of moral philosophy one subscribes to, it is of interest from every standpoint to determine whether and to what extent even exclusively self-interested individuals are prepared to constrain themselves in a way which can be considered moral. Since self-interest is de facto a very strong motive in decisions and behavior, such analyses are significant in two respects. First, they can show how and within which bounds a moral disposition is justifiable even when lacking, e.g., benevolence, a special moral sense, a sense of (objective) value, or any disposition to construct a veil of ignorance, viz. in order to compute an average social utility. In this regard, a kind of minimal morality can be founded on just the assumption that individuals are strictly self-interested, as N. Hoerster (1983) has shown. Secondly such analyses can sharpen one's eyes for those situations in which moral obligations are possibly incurred (and which perhaps even rational egoists may desire), but which cannot really guide behavior in the face of strong self-interest. In this regard, insight into strategies for avoiding or ameliorating problematic situations may be won.     

Amazing grace: The near-death experience as a compensatory gift

This paper illustrates the apparently providential timing and the healing character of near-death experiences (NDEs) and NDE-like episodes, through four case histories of persons whose lives, prior to their experiences, were marked by deep anguish and a sense of hopelessness. Spiritually, such case histories suggest the intervention of a guiding intelligence that confers a form of amazing grace on the recipient. Methodologically, these reports point to the importance of taking into account the person's life history as a context for understanding the full significance of NDEs and similar awakening experiences. The article ends with a retrospective account of a childhood NDE in which the big secret of these experiences is disclosed.We who are about to die demand a miracle. W. H. Auden (cited in Grosso, 1985)     

Knowledge of proofs

If proofs are nothing more than truth makers, then there is no force in the standard argument against classical logic (there is no guarantee that there is either a proof forA or a proof fornot A). The standard intuitionistic conception of a mathematical proof is stronger: there are epistemic constraints on proofs. But the idea that proofs must be recognizable as such by us, with our actual capacities, is incompatible with the standard intuitionistic explanations of the meanings of the logical constants. Proofs are to be recognizable in principle, not necessarily in practice, as shown in section 1. Section 2 considers unknowable propositions of the kind involved in Fitch's paradox:p and it will never be known thatp. It is argued that the intuitionist faces a dilemma: give up strongly entrenched common sense intuitions about such unknowable propositions, or give up verificationism. The third section considers one attempt to save intuitionism while partly giving up verificationism: keep the idea that a proposition is true iff there is a proof (verification) of it, and reject the idea that proofs must be recognizable in principle. It is argued that this move will have the effect that some standard reasons against classical semantics will be effective also against intuitionism. This is the case with Dummett's meaning theoretical argument. At the same time the basic reason for regarding proofs as more than mere truth makers is lost.I am much indebted for comments to Lars Bergström, Per Martin-Löf, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Fredrik Stjernberg, Dag Westerståhl and Tim Williamson. I owe even more to the many seminars about truth and meaning, led by Dag Prawitz, at the philosophy department of Stockholm University. These were especially intense in the mideighties, when I was a graduate student.     

Reformatory blame

It is argued that blame is an ambiguous and misused term leading to ineffective, harmful consequences, such as hate, guilt, revenge (retaliation, or retribution), or punishment for its own sake. A clarification of blame is given by showing that it is an open-context, value term and, so, meaningless in itself. For intelligibility, it must be reduced to naturalistic and pragmatic terms. The definition almost universally given is based on the fallacious beliefs that (1) we can change the past, and (2) we can have done otherwise than we did. But can here is seen also to be used in a pseudo-scientific and subjunctive, rather than in a factual sense. It is shown that retributive blame makes no sense because, as Marcus Aurelius said, we must accept what is and we can only do what is within our power. We cannot change past behavior, but we can try to change present behavior. For effectiveness and intelligibility, we are forced to substitute rehabilitative blame for retributive blame. Thus, in the prevention and elimination of such negative emotions as guilt, inferiority, hatred, revengefulness, a thorough understanding of the term blame is required.     

Grafting Modalities onto Substructural Implication Systems

We investigate the semantics of the logical systems obtained by introducing the modalities and into the family of substructural implication logics (including relevant, linear and intuitionistic implication). Then, in the spirit of the LDS (Labelled Deductive Systems) methodology, we "import" this semantics into the classical proof system KE. This leads to the formulation of a uniform labelled refutation system for the new logics which is a natural extension of a system for substructural implication developed by the first two authors in a previous paper.     

Distinctions between subgroups of asthmatic children: Parental reactions to experimental separation

Parental reactions to experimental separation were analyzed for two groups of asthmatic children, those for whom behavioral factors were judged highly relevant to asthma and those for whom such factors appeared unimportant. The former group of 13 (predicted positives) had shown a highly significant improvement in asthma during separation from their families; the latter group of 12 (predicted negatives) had not. Coding of standardized interviews conducted around the time of separation disclosed that parents (mothers, especially) of predicted positives scored significantly higher than parents of predicted negatives on such scales as fussing over the child at the time of leave taking, missing child, experiencing pain and discomfort during the separation, being anxious over child's welfare, etc. Psychological test data did not discriminate between the parents' or childrens' groups as clearly as the more focused separation interviews but the test results were consistent with interview differences. The separation elicited very strong emotional reactions from several mothers.This study was supported by United States Public Health Service Grant No. HD01060 from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development. Kirk Brady, John Means, loan Muser, and Claire Purcell contributed to data collection and/or data analysis.     

Making sense of ‘on denoting’

The widely held assumption about what motivated On Denoting is irreconcilable with Russell's position shortly beforehand; but discarding it leaves one with a carefully worked out solution whose problem is missing. The real motivation is to be found in a notoriously obscure passage in OD, in which Russell exposes a decisive (though easily overlooked) flaw in his former theory of denoting; a flaw which also cripples Frege's theory of sense and reference. A comprehensive account of this passage is the chief concern of the present paper. Recognizing the critical role of this argument of Russell's leads to a more credible account of his argumentation in that essay. It also suggests that the fundamental standpoint underlyingThe Principles of Mathematics remains intact. In this light, the appropriation of OD to the philosophy of language may be misguided.     

Expressive completeness in modal language

Conclusion The logics of the modal operators and of the quantifiers show striking analogies. The analogies are so extensive that, when a special class of entities (possible worlds) is postulated, natural and non-arbitrary translation procedures can be defined from the language with the modal operators into a purely quantificational one, under which the necessity and possibility operators translate into universal and existential quantifiers. In view of this I would be willing to classify the modal operators as disguised quantifiers, and I think that wholehearted acceptance of modal language should be considered to carry ontological commitment to something like possible worldsConsidered as two languages for describing the same subject matter, modal and purely quantificational languages show interesting differences. The operator variables of the purely quantificational languages give them more power than the modal languages, but at least some of the functions performed by the apparatus of operator variables are also performed, in a more primitive and less versatile way, by actuality operators in modal languages.A final note. Quine has written much on the inter-relations of quantifiers, identity, and the concept of existence. These, he holds, form a tightly knit conceptual system which has been evolved to a high point of perfection, but which might conceivably change yet further.²⁹ He has also dropped hints about the possibility of a simpler, primitive or defective version of the system, in which the quantifiers are not backed up in their accustomed way by the concept of identity. He has dubbed the resulting concept a pre-individuative concept of existence, or a concept of entity without identity. What would a pre-individuative concept of existence be like? Quine has sometimes suggested that one might be embodied in the use of mass nouns, but the identity concept is used in connection with stuff as well as with things: is that the same coffee that was in the cup last night? I would submit that modality provides a better case. In view of the comparative weakness of modal languages, compared to the explicitly quantificational ones Quine takes as canonical, there is surely a sense in which the concept of existence embodied in that disguised existential quantifier, the possibility operator, is a defective one. And as we have seen, one of the differences between modal operators and explicit quantifiers is that modal operators cannot be joined with the identity predicate in the way quantifiers with operator variables can. Surely, then, there is a sense in which ordinary speech, as opposed to the metaphysical theorizing of a Leibniz or a David Lewis, conceives of possible worlds as entities without identity.As should become obvious on reading it, this paper is inspired by the work of David Lewis, particularly his classic Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic, Journal of Philosophy 7, March 1968. I would like to thank Lewis and the referee for this journal for encouragement and advice. An earlier version of the paper was formulated in terms of Lewis's counterpart theory rather than in terms of individuals being in more than one world, but, since I considered only the case in which the counterpart relation was an equivalence, I Felt that the added complexity was not justified. Doing things in a counterpart-theoretic framework does produce two new classes of sentences of the non-modal language which lack translations in the modal: speaking of the properties individuals have simpliciter rather than of those they have at a world allows us to discuss relations obtaining between individuals in different worlds (e.g. the longer than relation obtaining between actual yachts and their counterparts), and the assumption that no individual is in more than one world allows a tricky way of asserting that there are at most n worlds without using the identity predicate between terms for worlds. Otherwise, given the assumption that the counterpart relation was an equivalence with at most one member of each equivalence class being in each world, the transition from the counterpart theoretic framework to the current one was perfectly straightforward.     

Belief change as change in epistemic entrenchment

In this paper, it is argued that both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation, and an axiomatic characterization of this operation is given. Unlike most belief revision operations, the one developed here can handle both multiple belief revision and iterated belief revision.The authors are thankful to John G. Bennett, Henry E. Kyburg, Jr., Norman Foo, Pavlos Pepas, Maurizio Pagnucco, Bob Hadley, members of the Knowledge Systems Group at the University of Sydney and participants of the AI'93 workshop on Belief Revision: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice at Melbourne where a version of this paper was presented, for their suggestions. The authors also express their gratitude to the two anonymous referees for Synthese for their excellent comments and suggestions. Of course it is only the authors that are responsible for the errors that remain.     

On regular modal logics with axiom □ ⊤ → □□ ⊤

This paper is devoted to showing certain connections between normal modal logics and those strictly regular modal logics which have as a theorem. We extend some results of E. J. Lemmon (cf. [66]). In particular we prove that the lattice of the strictly regular modal logics with the axiom is isomorphic to the lattice of the normal modal logics.The results in this paper were reported at Logic Colloquium '87 in Granada.     

On the ontology of branching quantifiers

Conclusion Still, some may still want to say it. If so, my replies may gain nothing better than a stalemate against such persistence, though I can hope that earlier revelations will discourage others from persisting. But two replies are possible. Both come down, one circuitously, to an issue with us from the beginning: whether the language of the right side of (10) is suspect. For if (10) is to support instances for (6) which are about objects, that clause must itself be about objects. (These would be ones assigned by variants of I it mentions to constants it mentions.) Yet Barwise and I would call it implicitly about functions. Ironically, the discussion surrounding (10), hoping to settle that issue, could only do so if the issue were already settled, revealing decisively the ontology of (10). If irritating, this is also inevitable, given the Tarskian spirit of the ensivioned semantics for QLB.A second reply begins by noting that a QLB semantics which implies (10) cannot simply be assumed. Even a QL semantics augmented to imply (11) is not trivial to frame, as I will let readers confirm. On the QLB project, Barwise comments thus:It is not possible to explain the meaning of an essential use of branching quantification ... inductively, by treating one quantifier at a time in a first-order fashion. Some use of higher-type abstract objects is essential. (BQE75)But believers in a modest ontology for QLB can claim a non sequitur here. For (10), as they read it, succeeds without mentioning abstract objects, though not in the one quantifier at a time way which Barwise rightly finds impossible. This is not yet to say the same about a QLB semantics implying (10). But that too can be said, as it happens, with as good a conscience as with (10). A suitable treatment can begin by somehow linearizing non QL sentences like (6). Still assuming prefixes whose rows each consist, speaking loosely, of n universal quantifiers followed by a single existential, we could simply line up these rows in any order, with unique deconcatenatability being assured. From then on, it gets both tedious and complex. A full syntax is essential, and some surprising categories arose in mine. I will spare readers all details, except to say that one can indeed treat one quantifier at a time, if not in first-order fashion: schematic rules for treating n quantifiers at once can be eschewed. Unsurprisingly, heavy use is made of the depending only on idiom seen in (10). Nor does it surprise me that this semantics can succeed, with that idiom available. Roughly, if open talk about functions works in a semantics for QLF, what I read as implicit talk about them should work in a semantics for QLB.So even from a bare sketch, we can see that this new semantics settles nothing. It just leads back to the stalemate. Barwise and I will read crucial clauses as talking implicitly about functions, but this general charge against an idiom is equally deniable wherever the idiom occurs: in a reading for (6), say, or in the metalanguage can hardly repress a motherhood slogan: better dead than obscurely read. But that just denies the denial, unhelpfully. A better comment is the reminder that the claim stays alive only in a form which no one has ever imagined for it. The QLB quantifiers that cannot be shown not to range over objects are not the items anyone would ever have pointed to in illustrating the unkillable claim.

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