Hindsight bias from 3 to 95 years of age

Upon learning the outcome to a problem, people tend to believe that they knew it all along (hindsight bias). Here, we report the first study to trace the development of hindsight bias across the life span. One hundred ninety-four participants aged 3 to 95 years completed 3 tasks designed to measure visual and verbal hindsight bias. All age groups demonstrated hindsight bias on all 3 tasks; however, preschoolers and older adults exhibited more bias than older children and younger adults. Multinomial processing tree analyses of these data revealed that preschoolers' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them substituting the correct answer for their original answer in their recall (a qualitative error). Conversely, older adults' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them forgetting their original answer and recalling an answer closer to, but not equal to, the correct answer (a quantitative error). We discuss these findings in relation to mechanisms of memory, perspective taking, theory of mind, and executive function.     

The impact of spatiotemporal sampling on time-to-contact judgments

When motion in the frontoparallel plane is temporally sampled, it is often perceived to be slower than its continuous counterpart. This finding stands in contrast to humans' ability to extrapolate and anticipate constant-velocity motion. We investigated whether this sampling bias generalizes to motion in the sagittal plane (i.e., objects approaching the observer). We employed a paradigm in which observers judged the arrival time of an oncoming object. We found detrimental effects of time sampling on both perceived time to contact and time to passage. Observers systematically overestimated the time it would take a frontally approaching object to intersect their eye plane. To rule out artifacts inherent in computer simulation, we replicated the experiment, using real objects. The bias persisted and proved to be robust across a large range of temporal and spatial variations. Energy and pooling mechanisms are discussed in an attempt to understand the effect.     

Taking a naïve other's perspective to debias the hindsight bias: Did it backfire?

Hindsight bias is a phenomenon that occurs when outcome knowledge interferes with the ability to accurately recall judgments made in a previous, naïve state. Also known as the “knew it all along” bias, we aimed to diminish the bias by having individuals take the perspective of a naïve other, as a way of encouraging acceptance that they had, in fact, not known it all along. Adult participants were given blurry-to-clear images incrementally until they were able to identify the object and were then re-presented with the same sequence of images and asked to make a judgment about when they had identified the item correctly the first time. They were also asked to judge when they thought a naïve peer (Experiments 1 and 2), or a naïve child (Experiment 2) could identify the objects. Results showed a robust hindsight bias in all perspectives, and sporadic success at eliminating the bias. When taking the perspective of a naïve peer, there were failures and successes; when taking the perspective of a naïve child, there was an ultra-debiasing, or a reverse hindsight bias. However, did the manipulation backfire? We conclude that while the manipulation of thinking like a naïve child may have eliminated the bias, participants seemed to use an “adults know best” rule rather than accepting past naivete for themselves.     

The "saw-it-all-along" effect: demonstrations of visual hindsight bias

The authors address whether a hindsight bias exists for visual perception tasks. In 3 experiments, participants identified degraded celebrity faces as they resolved to full clarity (Phase 1). Following Phase 1, participants either recalled the level of blur present at the time of Phase 1 identification or predicted the level of blur at which a peer would make an accurate identification. In all experiments, participants overestimated identification performance of naive observers. Visual hindsight bias was greater for more familiar faces--those shown in both phases of the experiment--and was not reduced following instructions to participants to avoid the bias. The authors propose a fluency-misattribution theory to account for the bias and discuss implications for medical malpractice litigation and eyewitness testimony.     

Giving Meaning to Movement: A Developmental Study

Recently, researchers have been investigating the effects of kinematics stimulus properties on pattern perception and recognition. However, the stimulus properties that are used to discriminate animate from inanimate objects have received relatively little attention. Earlier research has indicated that the external movement of artificially generated objects is perceived as animate by observers of all ages. In this investigation, children in Grades 1,4, and 7 and university adults were asked to describe what they saw after viewing computer-generated displays of two circular objects that exhibited variations of external and internal movement. We predicted that observers would incorporate and integrate the salient kinematic properties of the objects in a display into a coherent narrative and that their ability to achieve matches among the properties of objects in a display and the properties of objects described in the narrative would increase with age. Moreover, because of their relative insensitivity to the actual properties of objects in the display, we predicted that younger observers would make more animate attributions for nonmoving objects and fewer animate attributions for moving objects than would older observers. The result supported these predictions.     

Developmental changes in colour constancy in a naturalistic object selection task

When the illumination falling on a surface change, so does the reflected light. Despite this, adult observers are good at perceiving surfaces as relatively unchanging—an ability termed colour constancy. Very few studies have investigated colour constancy in infants, and even fewer in children. Here we asked whether there is a difference in colour constancy between children and adults; what the developmental trajectory is between six and 11 years; and whether the pattern of constancy across illuminations and reflectances differs between adults and children. To this end, we developed a novel, child-friendly computer-based object selection task. In this, observers saw a dragon's favourite sweet under a neutral illumination and picked the matching sweet from an array of eight seen under a different illumination (blue, yellow, red, or green). This set contained a reflectance match (colour constant; perfect performance) and a tristimulus match (colour inconstant). We ran two experiments, with two-dimensional scenes in one and three-dimensional renderings in the other. Twenty-six adults and 33 children took part in the first experiment; 26 adults and 40 children took part in the second. Children performed better than adults on this task, and their performance decreased with age in both experiments. We found differences across illuminations and sweets, but a similar pattern across both age groups. This unexpected finding might reflect a real decrease in colour constancy from childhood to adulthood, explained by developmental changes in the perceptual and cognitive mechanisms underpinning colour constancy, or differences in task strategies between children and adults.

Highlights

• Six- to 11-year-old children demonstrated better performance than adults on a colour constancy object selection task.
• Performance decreased with age over childhood.
• These findings may indicate development of cognitive strategies used to overcome automatic colour constancy mechanisms.

     

Fluency misattribution and visual hindsight bias

We tested a fluency-misattribution theory of visual hindsight bias, and examined how perceptual and conceptual fluency contribute to the bias. In Experiment 1a observers identified celebrity faces that began blurred and then clarified (Forward baseline), or indicated when faces that began clear and then blurred were no longer recognisable (Backward baseline). In surprise memory tests that followed, observers adjusted the degree of blur of each face to match what the faces looked like when identified in the corresponding baseline condition. Hindsight bias was observed in the Forward condition: During the memory test observers adjusted the faces to be more blurry than when originally identified during baseline. These same observers did not show hindsight bias in the Backward condition: Here, they adjusted faces to the exact blur level at which they identified the faces during baseline. Experiment 1b tested a combined condition in which faces were viewed in a Forward progression at baseline but in a Backward progression at test. Hindsight bias was observed in this condition but was significantly less than the bias observed in the Experiment 1a Forward condition. Experiments 1a and 1b provide support for the fluency-misattribution account of visual hindsight bias: When observers are made aware of why fluency has been enhanced (i.e., in the Backward condition) they are better able to discount it, and as a result show reduced or no hindsight bias. In Experiment 2, observers viewed faces in a Forward progression at baseline and then in a Forward upright or inverted progression at test. Hindsight bias occurred in both conditions, but was greater for upright than inverted faces. We conclude that both conceptual and perceptual fluency contribute to visual hindsight bias.     

Fluency misattribution and visual hindsight bias

We tested a fluency-misattribution theory of visual hindsight bias, and examined how perceptual and conceptual fluency contribute to the bias. In Experiment 1a observers identified celebrity faces that began blurred and then clarified (Forward baseline), or indicated when faces that began clear and then blurred were no longer recognisable (Backward baseline). In surprise memory tests that followed, observers adjusted the degree of blur of each face to match what the faces looked like when identified in the corresponding baseline condition. Hindsight bias was observed in the Forward condition: During the memory test observers adjusted the faces to be more blurry than when originally identified during baseline. These same observers did not show hindsight bias in the Backward condition: Here, they adjusted faces to the exact blur level at which they identified the faces during baseline. Experiment 1b tested a combined condition in which faces were viewed in a Forward progression at baseline but in a Backward progression at test. Hindsight bias was observed in this condition but was significantly less than the bias observed in the Experiment 1a Forward condition. Experiments 1a and 1b provide support for the fluency-misattribution account of visual hindsight bias: When observers are made aware of why fluency has been enhanced (i.e., in the Backward condition) they are better able to discount it, and as a result show reduced or no hindsight bias. In Experiment 2, observers viewed faces in a Forward progression at baseline and then in a Forward upright or inverted progression at test. Hindsight bias occurred in both conditions, but was greater for upright than inverted faces. We conclude that both conceptual and perceptual fluency contribute to visual hindsight bias.     

The own-age bias in face recognition: a meta-analytic and theoretical review

A large number of studies have examined the finding that recognition memory for faces of one's own age group is often superior to memory for faces of another age group. We examined this own-age bias (OAB) in the meta-analyses reported. These data showed that hits were reliably greater for same-age relative to other-age faces (g = 0.23) and that false alarms were reliably less likely for same-age compared with other-age faces (g = -0.23). Further meta-analyses of measures of signal detection demonstrated that, although no difference in response criterion was evident (g = -0.01), discriminability was reliably better for same-age compared with other-age faces (g = 0.37). As well, children, younger adults, and older adults exhibited superior discriminability for same-age compared with other-age age faces. Thus, the OAB appears to be a robust effect that influences the accuracy of face recognition. Theoretical accounts of the OAB have generally suggested that it reflects more extensive, recent experiences with one's own age group relative to other-age groups. Additional analyses were supportive of this account as the OAB was present even for groups (e.g., older adults) that had prior experiences as members of another age group. However, the most comprehensive account of the OAB will also likely invoke mechanisms suggested by social-cognitive theories.     

Age Differences in Processes Underlying Hindsight Bias: A Life-Span Study

Hindsight bias is the tendency to overestimate one’s prior knowledge of a fact or event after learning the actual fact. Recent research has suggested that age-related differences in hindsight bias may be based on age-related differences in inhibitory control. We tested whether this explanation held for 3 cognitive processes assumed to underlie hindsight bias: recollection bias, reconstruction bias, and the tendency to adopt newly acquired knowledge as old. We performed a typical hindsight-bias study with 9-year-olds, 12-year-olds, young adults, and older adults. Participants first gave numerical judgments to difficult almanac questions. They later received the correct judgments for some of the questions while trying to recall their own earlier judgments. To experimentally test the impact of inhibitory control, the correct judgment was presented either in a weak or in a strong manner that was difficult to ignore. Hindsight bias was larger in the strong condition than in the weak condition and followed a U-shaped life-span pattern with young adults showing the least hindsight bias in line with an inhibitory-control explanation. Yet, the mixture of underlying processes differed considerably between age groups, so inhibitory control did not suffice as a sole explanation of age differences.     

Late talkers show no shape bias in a novel name extension task

By 2½ years of age, children typically show a shape bias in object naming – that is, they extend object names mostly to new instances with the same shape. The acquisition of a shape bias is related to a marked increase in the rate of object name learning. This study asks whether, conversely, children who do not readily acquire new object names lack a shape bias. Twelve 2- to 3-year-old ‘late talkers’– children whose total vocabularies rank below the 30th percentile for their age – were compared with age-matched children with larger vocabularies in a novel object name extension task. The controls extended novel names across novel objects with the same shape. The late talkers showed no group perceptual bias, but many individuals extended novel names across objects with the same surface texture. The implications of the results both for the role of attentional biases in object name learning and for the etiology of some late talking are discussed.      

The development of visual short-term memory for multifeature items during middle childhood

Visual short-term memory (VSTM) research suggests that the adult capacity is limited to three or four multifeature object representations. Despite evidence supporting a developmental increase in capacity, it remains unclear what the unit of capacity is in children. The current study employed the change detection paradigm to investigate both the capacity and nature of the representations of VSTM in 7-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults. Two experimental conditions were used to compare memory performance for single-feature objects with that for multifeature objects. Results provided further and more convincing evidence for a developmental increase in VSTM. Furthermore, the “loading up” of features in the multifeature condition was found to incur no significant performance deficit in all age groups. These findings are explained in terms of a developmental increase in the number of integrated multifeature object representations in VSTM.     

Object identification in preschool children and adults

We introduce computer-based methodologies for investigating object identification in 3- to 5-year-old children. In two experiments, preschool children and adults indicated when they could identify degraded pictures of common objects as those pictures either gradually improved or degraded in clarity. Clarity transformations were implemented in four ways: blurring, decreasing the picture's physical size, decreasing the pixel signal-to-noise ratio, and cropping. In Experiment 1, all age groups correctly identified objects at a more degraded state when those objects began moderately, as opposed to very, degraded and then clarified. This finding supports the notion that previous perceptual hypotheses interfere with object identification (i.e. the perceptual interference effect). In Experiment 2, children, but not adults, overestimated their ability to recognize objects in a degraded state when the object's identity was given to them beforehand. This suggests that for young children knowledge of the object's true identity cannot be ignored when evaluating their current perceptions. This is the first demonstration of the perceptual interference effect in children. We discuss both methodological and theoretical implications of the findings for research on object perception and theory of mind.     

Test sample selection by preschool children: Honoring diversity

In a test of an inductive inference, preschool children's selection of objects was examined. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds selected diverse objects first in sequential selections; in Experiment 2, adults and 4-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, made similar selections under the same conditions. A defective object led subjects in all age groups to test a similar object. In Experiment 3, 4-year-olds chose to test a pair of dissimilar objects rather than a pair of similar objects, but 3-year-olds did not. Three-year-olds' selections were independent of diversity. In Experiment 4, we attempted to emphasize the diversity of objects for 3-year-olds. Their first task was to select an object that was the same as or different from a target object. The subjects responded correctly in this task but did not prefer to test diverse objects. Experiment 5 showed that neither 3- nor 4-year-olds have a bias to select nondiverse objects in a nontest context. The findings indicate that children as young as 4 years old value diverse evidence in induction.     

Hindsight bias and outcome-consistent thoughts when observing and making service provider decisions

Two studies examined the relationship between hindsight bias and corresponding open-ended thoughts for decisions in a service provider setting. Perspectives of those observing and making decisions were examined. In study 1, business students who learned the results of a financial advisor’s stock purchase showed the traditional hindsight effect regardless of outcome favorability, and produced heightened outcome-consistent thoughts. In contrast, study 2 participants were asked to make (rather than to observe) a purchase decision. They produced hindsight bias and consistent thoughts only when their decision outcomes were favorable. Relative to observers, those acting as the service provider (a) showed more bias when outcomes were favorable, and (b) showed less bias when outcomes were unfavorable. Discussion focuses on hindsight implications in service provider decision-making settings.     

A developmental shift in processes underlying successful belief-desire reasoning

Young children's failures in reasoning about beliefs and desires, and especially about false beliefs, have been much studied. However, there are few accounts of successful belief-desire reasoning in older children or adults. An exception to this is a model in which belief attribution is treated as a process wherein an inhibitory system selects the most likely content for the belief to be attributed from amongst several competing contents [Leslie, A. M., & Polizzi, P. (1998). Developmental Science, 1, 247-254]. We tested this model with an ‘avoidance false belief task’ in which subjects predict the behavior of a character, who wants to avoid an object but who is mistaken about which of three locations it is in. The task has two equally correct answers—in seeking to avoid the location where she mistakenly believes the object to be, the character might equally go to the location where the object actually is, or to the remaining empty location. However, the model predicts that subjects will prefer one of these answers, selecting the object's actual location over the empty location. This bias was confirmed in a series of five experiments with children aged between 4 and 8 years of age. A sixth experiment ruled out two rival explanations for children's biased responding. Two further experiments found the opposite bias in adults. These findings support one selection model as an account of belief-desire reasoning in children, and suggest that a different model is needed for adults. The process of selecting contents for mental state attributions shows a developmental shift between 8 years of age and adulthood.     

Development of visuo-haptic transfer for object recognition in typical preschool and school-aged children

Object recognition is a long and complex adaptive process and its full maturation requires combination of many different sensory experiences as well as cognitive abilities to manipulate previous experiences in order to develop new percepts and subsequently to learn from the environment. It is well recognized that the transfer of visual and haptic information facilitates object recognition in adults, but less is known about development of this ability. In this study, we explored the developmental course of object recognition capacity in children using unimodal visual information, unimodal haptic information, and visuo-haptic information transfer in children from 4 years to 10 years and 11 months of age. Participants were tested through a clinical protocol, involving visual exploration of black-and-white photographs of common objects, haptic exploration of real objects, and visuo-haptic transfer of these two types of information. Results show an age-dependent development of object recognition abilities for visual, haptic, and visuo-haptic modalities. A significant effect of time on development of unimodal and crossmodal recognition skills was found. Moreover, our data suggest that multisensory processes for common object recognition are active at 4 years of age. They facilitate recognition of common objects, and, although not fully mature, are significant in adaptive behavior from the first years of age. The study of typical development of visuo-haptic processes in childhood is a starting point for future studies regarding object recognition in impaired populations.     

Object–Color Associations in Preschool Children’s Drawings

This study examines children’s abilities to identify a color-specific object by associating it with a given color. During the experimental sessions in preschool classrooms, 156 children aged 3–5 years were engaged in a drawing and coloring task. The experiment investigated whether the color of the object drawn by the child was congruent to the color that he/she had previously chosen. The results showed that children older than four years of age used object color knowledge to associate the given color with an object, suggesting that children acquire this ability at the same age that they learn to choose a typical color from a color-specific object. The developmental model of object representations is discussed on the basis of these results.