Explorations in the social contagion of memory

Four experiments examined social influence on the development of false memories. We employed the social contagion paradigm: A subject and a confederate see scenes and then later take turns recalling items from the scenes, with the confederate erroneously reporting some items that were not present in the scenes; on a final test, the subject reports these suggested items when instructed to recall only items from the scenes. The first two experiments showed that the social contagion effect persisted when subjects were explicitly warned about the possibility that confederates' responses might induce false memories and when they were tested via source-monitoring tests that explicitly gave the choice of attributing suggested items to the other person. Levels of false recall and recognition increased with the number of times the misleading information was suggested (Experiment 3), and subjects were more likely to incorporate the erroneous responses of an actual confederate on a recognition/source test as compared with those of a simulated confederate (Experiment 4). Collectively, the data support the claim that false memories may be transmitted between people and reveal critical factors that modulate the social contagion of memories.     

Correcting socially introduced false memories: The effect of re-study

This study examined whether participants could utilize re-study and perceptual elaboration to correct erroneous suggestions from their partner in the social contagion of memory paradigm. Participants studied household scenes and then collaboratively recalled the scenes with a confederate who interjected erroneous items. Before completing subsequent individual recall and recognition tests, participants were allowed to re-study the original items and/or to generate perceptual details of the items. Across two experiments, participants who re-studied the original material were less likely to incorporate the confederate's misleading suggestions. Re-study reduced false recall and recognition and increased veridical recall and recognition (Experiment 1) and the effect was especially pronounced with longer re-study episodes (Experiment 2). Items generated on the perceptual elaboration test offered no corrective benefit above and beyond the effects of re-study. These data demonstrate that participants can rely on self-initiated correction processes engaged during re-study to reduce socially suggested false memories.     

Reducing the Misinformation Effect Through Initial Testing: Take Two Tests and Recall Me in the Morning?

Initial retrieval of an event can reduce people's susceptibility to misinformation. We explored whether protective effects of initial testing could be obtained on final free recall and source‐monitoring tests. After studying six household scenes (e.g., a bathroom), participants attempted to recall items from the scenes zero, one, or two times. Immediately or after a 48‐hour delay, non‐presented items (e.g., soap and toothbrush) were exposed zero, one, or four times through a social contagion manipulation in which participants reviewed sets of recall tests ostensibly provided by other participants. A protective effect of testing emerged on a final free recall test following the delay and on a final source‐memory test regardless of delay. Taking two initial tests did not increase these protective effects. Determining whether initial testing will have protective (versus harmful) effects on memory has important practical implications for interviewing eyewitnesses. © 2015 The Authors. Applied Cognitive Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social Contagion in Competitors Versus Cooperators

The current study examined social contagion—or the spreading of memories from individual to individual—in two different social contexts: Competition and Cooperation. Participants were provided with words (Experiments 1A and 1B) or scenes (Experiment 2) to study. After study, participants were randomly divided: Half were given a competitive context, and the other half, a cooperative context. Then, in the paired recall phase, each participant took turns with a confederate partner in recalling the previously studied items. On a subsequent test, participants had to report the items that were recalled on the pair recall phase, in addition to who had recalled that item. The results showed that competitors, as compared with cooperators, were more likely to focus on other people's memories, and surprisingly, the same difference obtained for false memories. Essentially, people who are primed with a competitive context were more easily ‘infected’ by memories, true or false. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The influences of partner accuracy and partner memory ability on social false memories

In this study, we examined whether increasing the proportion of false information suggested by a confederate would influence the magnitude of socially introduced false memories in the social contagion paradigm Roediger, Meade, & Bergman (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 8:365–371, 2001). One participant and one confederate collaboratively recalled items from previously studied household scenes. During collaboration, the confederate interjected 0 %, 33 %, 66 %, or 100 % false items. On subsequent individual-recall tests across three experiments, participants were just as likely to incorporate misleading suggestions from a partner who was mostly accurate (33 % incorrect) as they were from a partner who was not at all accurate (100 % incorrect). Even when participants witnessed firsthand that their partner had a very poor memory on a related memory task, they were still as likely to incorporate the confederate’s entirely misleading suggestions on subsequent recall and recognition tests (Exp. 2). Only when participants witnessed firsthand that their partner had a very poor memory on a practice test of the experimental task itself were they able to reduce false memory, and this reduction occurred selectively on a subsequent individual recognition test (Exp. 3). These data demonstrate that participants do not always consider their partners’ memory ability when working on collaborative memory tasks.     

Ageing stereotypes influence the transmission of false memories in the social contagion paradigm

ABSTRACT

These experiments are the first to investigate the impact of confederate accuracy, age, and age stereotypes in the social contagion of memory paradigm. Across two experiments, younger participants recalled household scenes with an actual (Experiment 1) or virtual (Experiment 2), older or younger confederate who suggested different proportions (0%, 33% or 100%) of false items during collaboration. In Experiment 2, positive and negative age stereotypes were primed by providing bogus background information about our older confederate before collaboration. Across both experiments, if confederates suggested false items participants readily incorporated these into their own memory reports. In Experiment 1, when no age stereotype was primed, participants adopted similar proportions of false items from younger and older confederates. Importantly, in Experiment 2, when our older confederate was presented in terms of negative ageing stereotypes, participants reported less false items and were better able to correctly identify the source of those false items.     

Memory conformity and the perceived accuracy of self versus other

Here, we demonstrate that the decision to conform to another person’s memory involves a strategic trade-off that balances the accuracy of one’s own memory against that of another person. We showed participants three household scenes, one for 30 s, one for 60 s, and one for 120 s. Half were told that they would encode each scene for half as long as their virtual partner, and half were told that they would encode each scene for twice as long as their virtual partner. On a subsequent two-alternative-forced choice (2AFC) memory test, the simulated answer of the partner (accurate, errant, or no response) was shown before participants responded. Conformity to the partner’s responses was significantly enhanced for the 30-s versus the 60- and 120-s scenes. This pattern, however, was present only in the group who believed that they had encoded each scene for half as long as their partner, even though the short-duration scene had the lowest baseline 2AFC accuracy in both groups and was also subjectively rated as the least memorable by both groups. Our reliance on other people’s memory is therefore dynamically and strategically adjusted according to knowledge of the conditions under which we and other people have acquired different memories.     

Picture memory: How the action schema affects retention

When an action scene is viewed, an action schema guides the formation of an episodic representation. Within episodic memory, items of high relevance to the theme of the action schema are represented in a prototypical form closely connected to the action theme. In contrast, items of low relevance are represented in detail but their representation is unconnected to that of the action. The action schema is used as a retrieval framework for both recalling and recognizing whether or not an item was depicted in a scene (i.e., item presence), but is not used for recognition of figurative detail (i.e., item appearance). Four experiments confirmed these hypotheses. Children, aged 7- and 9-years, and adults organized pictured scenes around themes from action schemata. The appearance of high relevant items was recognized poorly, while their presence was recalled well. Memory for the presence of high relevant items surpassed that for low relevant items even when recognition of item names was assessed. Conversely, the appearance of low relevant items was recognized accurately, but memory for their presence was difficult to retrieve.     

Now you see it; now you don't: inhibiting recall and recognition of scenes

Postevent misleading information can distort people's memories by altering and adding scenes. But can you also inhibit the retrieval of information from memory? In two studies we show that postevent information can make memory for a scene less accessible. In both studies participants first saw an event (e.g. a restaurant scene displayed in slides, or a drunk‐driving incident shown via a video clip). Later they were shown the same event without a critical scene and were told either to use this to generate a story (Experiment 1) or to imagine the event (Experiment 2). Finally they were tested. Relative to controls, this postevent omission led to fewer people reporting the critical scene in free recall and in recognition. Thus, we demonstrated that it may be possible to inhibit memories. This finding has important implications for eyewitness testimony and the recovered memory debate. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Me Too!: Social modelling influences on early autobiographical memories

To investigate the malleability of early memories, 200 participants were asked to describe their earliest memories. Before doing so, approximately half were exposed to confederates who described very early memories such as their first steps or a second birthday party, while others were asked only to think about their earliest memories for two minutes before beginning writing. Participants who were exposed to confederate very early memories produced memories that were nearly a year younger on average than the memories reported by controls (2.99 years vs. 3.96 years). Additionally, when participants in the memory discussion condition were asked about an early event that a confederate had recounted they were more confident than controls that they could recall the event in their own lives. These results indicate that autobiographical memories for early events are quite susceptible to social influence and that simply hearing the very early memories of others can alter autobiographical memory. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Selective memory retrieval can impair and improve retrieval of other memories

Research from the past decades has shown that retrieval of a specific memory (e.g., retrieving part of a previous vacation) typically attenuates retrieval of other memories (e.g., memories for other details of the event), causing retrieval-induced forgetting. More recently, however, it has been shown that retrieval can both attenuate and aid recall of other memories (K.-H. T. B?uml & A. Samenieh, 2010). To identify the circumstances under which retrieval aids recall, the authors examined retrieval dynamics in listwise directed forgetting, context-dependent forgetting, proactive interference, and in the absence of any induced memory impairment. They found beneficial effects of selective retrieval in listwise directed forgetting and context-dependent forgetting but detrimental effects in all the other conditions. Because context-dependent forgetting and listwise directed forgetting arguably reflect impaired context access, the results suggest that memory retrieval aids recall of memories that are subject to impaired context access but attenuates recall in the absence of such circumstances. The findings are consistent with a 2-factor account of memory retrieval and suggest the existence of 2 faces of memory retrieval.     

Monitoring memory errors: The influence of the veracity of retrieved information on the accuracy of judgements of learning

The current study examined the degree to which predictions of memory performance made immediately or at a delay are sensitive to confidently held memory illusions. Participants studied unrelated pairs of words and made judgements of learning (JOLs) for each item, either immediately or after a delay. Half of the unrelated pairs (deceptive items; e.g., nurse–dollar) had a semantically related competitor (e.g., doctor) that was easily accessible when given a test cue (e.g., nurse–do_ _ _r) and half had no semantically related competitor (control items; e.g., subject–dollar). Following the study phase, participants were administered a cued recall test. Results from Experiment 1 showed that memory performance was less accurate for deceptive compared with control items. In addition, delaying judgement improved the relative accuracy of JOLs for control items but not for deceptive items. Subsequent experiments explored the degree to which the relative accuracy of delayed JOLs for deceptive items improved as a result of a warning to ensure that retrieved memories were accurate (Experiment 2) and corrective feedback regarding the veracity of information retrieved prior to making a JOL (Experiment 3). In all, these data suggest that delayed JOLs may be largely insensitive to memory errors unless participants are provided with feedback regarding memory accuracy.     

The effect of memory schemata on memory and the phenomenological experience of naturalistic situations

Two experiments document the effect of memory schemata in naturalistic situations. Participants in both experiments watched a short videotaped lecture in which the instructor enacted several schema‐consistent actions (e.g. writing on a whiteboard) and schema‐inconsistent actions (e.g. smoking a cigarette). Following the videotaped lecture, participants completed a recognition test and rated the phenomenological content of their memories. In both experiments, memory was more accurate for schema‐inconsistent actions than for schema‐consistent actions. Participants also indicated that their memories of schema‐inconsistent actions were more vivid than schema‐consistent actions. Interestingly, in Experiment 2, the false memory rate for typical items increased across both 48‐hour and one week retention intervals. These results have important implications for the processes of normal human memory in everyday situations. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social influence and children's event recall and suggestibility

The present study sheds light on interactions between cognitive and social factors affecting children's memory performance and suggestibility in event recall tasks. We examined 251 children, aged 8, 9 and 10 years, and applied a well-known paradigm from social psychology, that is, the social influence of misleading questions was experimentally manipulated through the presence and answering behaviour of an adult confederate. Children's answers about the content of a previously watched film to misleading questions, their accurate statements in their subsequent free recall, as well as performance in a recognition test were assessed. The design also included two control conditions, one in which children answered misleading questions without an adult confederate, and a second one in which no misleading interview was administered but only free recall and recognition. The results document large recall and suggestibility differences between the conditions. Participants of the strong social influence condition answered more conformably to misleading questions and showed a larger effect of memory contagion in recognition. Moreover, there were strong age-related increases in the ability to rely on one's own recollection rather than parroting the confederate's answers. Strong social influence also differentially affected the occurrence of false statements in free recall and errors in the recognition test depending on the children's age.     

False and veridical collaborative recognition

Participants who witness an event and later receive post-event information that omits a critical scene are less likely to recall and to recognise that scene than are participants who receive no post-event information (Wright, Loftus, & Hall, 2001). The present study used the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, in which participants study lists of semantic associates (e.g., hot, snow, warm, winter) that commonly elicit false memories of critical non-presented words (e.g., cold), to determine whether omitting information from a second presentation decreases memory for both presented and non-presented information. Participants were presented with a list of the semantic associates of six non-presented words. For half the participants, this list was presented a second time with the semantic associates of one of the non-presented words omitted. As expected, participants were less likely to recall and to recognise the presented words when they had been omitted from the second presentation. Omission also decreased the rate at which non-presented words were recalled, although false recognition of these words was not reduced. These results suggest that false recognition may be particularly difficult to attenuate and that post-event omission may be more detrimental to memory accuracy than previously thought.     

The effects of initial testing on false recall and false recognition in the social contagion of memory paradigm

In three experiments, participants studied photographs of common household scenes. Following study, participants completed a category-cued recall test without feedback (Exps. 1 and 3), a category-cued recall test with feedback (Exp. 2), or a filler task (no-test condition). Participants then viewed recall tests from fictitious previous participants that contained erroneous items presented either one or four times, and then completed final recall and source recognition tests. The participants in all conditions reported incorrect items during final testing (a social contagion effect), and across experiments, initial testing had no impact on false recall of erroneous items. However, on the final source-monitoring recognition test, initial testing had a protective effect against false source recognition: Participants who were initially tested with and without feedback on category-cued initial tests attributed fewer incorrect items to the original event on the final source-monitoring recognition test than did participants who were not initially tested. These data demonstrate that initial testing may protect individuals’ memories from erroneous suggestions.     

Omitting details from post-event information: are true and false memory affected in the same way?

Participants who witness an event and later receive post-event information that omits a critical scene are less likely to recall and to recognise that scene than are participants who receive no post-event information (Wright, Loftus, & Hall, 2001). The present study used the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, in which participants study lists of semantic associates (e.g., hot, snow, warm, winter) that commonly elicit false memories of critical non-presented words (e.g., cold), to determine whether omitting information from a second presentation decreases memory for both presented and non-presented information. Participants were presented with a list of the semantic associates of six non-presented words. For half the participants, this list was presented a second time with the semantic associates of one of the non-presented words omitted. As expected, participants were less likely to recall and to recognise the presented words when they had been omitted from the second presentation. Omission also decreased the rate at which non-presented words were recalled, although false recognition of these words was not reduced. These results suggest that false recognition may be particularly difficult to attenuate and that post-event omission may be more detrimental to memory accuracy than previously thought.     

Variations in processing resources and resistance to false memories in younger and older adults

The influence of available processing resources on the resistance to false memories (FMs) for lists of semantically related items associated with a non-presented critical lure was examined in younger and older adults. Reducing the available resources at encoding in younger adults (Experiments 1 and 2) led to a performance similar to that of older adults (i.e., higher rates of FMs in addition to reduced rates of correct recall). However, increasing the available resources (Experiments 2 and 3) led to improvements in the rates of correct recall in both age groups and decreased the probability of FMs in younger adults, although warnings had to be added in older adults to obtain similar effects on FMs. Parallel influences on a post-recall test asking participants to report items that they had thought of but did not recall were also found. The influence of available cognitive resources for memory accuracy is also discussed with respect to activation-monitoring (e.g., McDermott & Watson, 2001) and fuzzy-trace (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2002) accounts of age-related increased in false memories.     

False working memories? Semantic distortion in a mere 4 seconds

False memories are well-established, episodic memory phenomena: Semantically related associates are confidently and erroneously remembered as studied items. We report four experiments yielding similar effects in a working memory paradigm. Four semantically related words were retained over a brief interval. Whether or not the interval was filled with a math verification task, semantically related lures were mistakenly recognized as members of the memory set and took longer to reject than did unrelated negative probes. In a short-term recall task, semantic intrusions exceeded other errors (e.g., phonemic). Our results demonstrate false memory effects for a subspan list when a mere 4 sec was given between study and test. Such rapid semantic errors presumably result from associative processing, may be related to familiarity-based proactive interference in working memory, and are consistent with recent models that integrate short- and long-term memory processes.