The role of a guessing strategy in the Bransford-Franks paradigm

Within the framework of the Bransford-Franks paradigm, variations of two memory models and a guessing strategy hypothesis were evaluated using concepts that differed in the number of atomic units each contained (‘concept size’). Results showed that, though the precise patterns of recognition for concept size were not completely consistent with any of the explanations, the changes in the patterns across concept size agreed with the guessing strategy hypothesis. It was argued that the subject's interpretation of the guessing strategy is likely to be a similar but simpler version of the experimenter-theorist's formal model, with the consequence that, while less sensitive to the finer details of the formal model, it will still reflect coarser differences.     

Response-time evidence for mixed memory states in a sequential-presentation change-detection task

Response-time (RT) and choice-probability data were obtained in a rapid visual sequential-presentation change-detection task in which memory set size, study-test lag, and objective change probabilities were manipulated. False “change” judgments increased dramatically with increasing lag, consistent with the idea that study items with long lags were ejected from a discrete-slots buffer. Error RTs were nearly invariant with set size and lag, consistent with the idea that the errors were produced by a stimulus-independent guessing process. The patterns of error and RT data could not be explained in terms of encoding limitations, but were consistent with the hypothesis that long retention lags produced a zero-stimulus-information state that required guessing. Formal modeling of the change-detection RT and error data pointed toward a hybrid model of visual working memory. The hybrid model assumed mixed states involving a combination of memory and guessing, but with higher memory resolution for items with shorter retention lags. The work raises new questions concerning the nature of the memory representations that are produced across the closely related tasks of change detection and visual memory search.     

Clear evidence for item limits in visual working memory

There is a consensus that visual working memory (WM) resources are sharply limited, but debate persists regarding the simple question of whether there is a limit to the total number of items that can be stored concurrently. Zhang and Luck (2008) advanced this debate with an analytic procedure that provided strong evidence for random guessing responses, but their findings can also be described by models that deny guessing while asserting a high prevalence of low precision memories. Here, we used a whole report memory procedure in which subjects reported all items in each trial and indicated whether they were guessing with each response. Critically, this procedure allowed us to measure memory performance for all items in each trial. When subjects were asked to remember 6 items, the response error distributions for about 3 out of the 6 items were best fit by a parameter-free guessing model (i.e. a uniform distribution). In addition, subjects’ self-reports of guessing precisely tracked the guessing rate estimated with a mixture model. Control experiments determined that guessing behavior was not due to output interference, and that there was still a high prevalence of guessing when subjects were instructed not to guess. Our novel approach yielded evidence that guesses, not low-precision representations, best explain limitations in working memory. These guesses also corroborate a capacity-limited working memory system – we found evidence that subjects are able to report non-zero information for only 3–4 items. Thus, WM capacity is constrained by an item limit that precludes the storage of more than 3–4 individuated feature values.     

The effects of payoffs and prior probabilities on indices of performance and cutoff location in recognition memory

We compared the effects of payoffs and prior probability levels on indices of performance and cutoff location in recognition memory. The performance indices considered were d’ from signal-detection theory and two corrections for guessing from simple threshold models. Shifts in cutoff location of comparable size were found for changes in priors and payoffs. The existence of a memory load and the inclusion of feedback did not affect the extent of shifts in cutoff location. Priors affected the corrections for guessing but did not affect d’. These results indicate that d’ remains the preferred index of performance and that the corrections for guessing are not criterion-free measures. The problem of finding an index of recognition performance appropriate for comparing recall and recognition is discussed, as are alternative explanations for conservative cutoff placement.     

Inconsistency effects in source memory and compensatory schema-consistent guessing

The attention–elaboration hypothesis of memory for schematically unexpected information predicts better source memory for unexpected than expected sources. In three source-monitoring experiments, the authors tested the occurrence of an inconsistency effect in source memory. Participants were presented with items that were schematically either very expected or very unexpected for their source. Multinomial processing tree models were used to separate source memory, item memory, and guessing bias. Results show an inconsistency effect in source memory accompanied by a compensatory schema-consistent guessing bias when expectancy strength is high, that is, when items are very expected or very unexpected for their source.     

Does Belief Have an Aim?

The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) the fact that rational beliefs are supported by the evidence and (3) the fact that we cannot form beliefs `at will. I argue that the truth-aim hypothesis cannot explain any of these facts. In this respect believing differs from guessing since the hypothesis that guessing aims at the truth can explain the three analogous features of guessing. I conclude that, unlike guessing, believing is not purposive in any interesting sense.     

Agency affects adults', but not children's, guessing preferences in a game of chance

Adults and children have recently been shown to prefer guessing the outcome of a die roll after the die has been rolled (but remained out of sight) rather than before it has been rolled. This result is contrary to the predictions of the competence hypothesis (Heath & Tversky, 1991 ), which proposes that people are sensitive to the degree of their relative ignorance and therefore prefer to guess about an outcome it is impossible to know, rather than one that they could know, but do not. We investigated the potential role of agency in guessing preferences about a novel game of chance. When the experimenter controlled the outcome, we replicated the finding that adults and 5- to 6-year-old children preferred to make their guess after the outcome had been determined. For adults only, this preference reversed when they exerted control over the outcome about which they were guessing. The adult data appear best explained by a modified version of the competence hypothesis that highlights the notion of control or responsibility. It is proposed that potential attributions of blame are related to the guesser's role in determining the outcome. The child data were consistent with an imagination-based account of guessing preferences.     

Resources masquerading as slots: Flexible allocation of visual working memory

Whether the capacity of visual working memory is better characterized by an item-based or a resource-based account continues to be keenly debated. Here, we propose that visual working memory is a flexible resource that is sometimes deployed in a slot-like manner. We develop a computational model that can either encode all items in a memory set, or encode only a subset of those items. A fixed-capacity mnemonic resource is divided among the items in memory. When fewer items are encoded, they are each remembered with higher fidelity, but at the cost of having to rely on an explicit guessing process when probed about an item that is not in memory. We use the new model to test the prediction that participants will more often encode the entire set of items when the demands on memory are predictable.     

大学生对穷人的消极刻板印象及猜测偏向

主要考察大学生对穷人的消极刻板印象及猜测偏向。实验1中的两个单类内隐联想测验结果与前人研究基本一致：虽然被试对穷人热情的评价相对积极,但总体上认为穷人低能力、低热情。实验2通过源监测任务发现,在忘记特质词来源的情况下,被试倾向于猜测消极特质词来自贫困者,积极特质词来自小康者。研究不仅证实了大学生对穷人的消极刻板印象,而且进一步发现大学生存在对穷人的消极猜测偏向。     

Evaluating the contributions of task expectancy in the testing and guessing benefits on recognition memory

Recently, we have shown that two types of initial testing (recall of a list or guessing of critical items repeated over 12 study/test cycles) improved final recognition of related and unrelated word lists relative to restudy. These benefits were eliminated, however, when test instructions were manipulated within subjects and presented after study of each list, procedures designed to minimise expectancy of a specific type of upcoming test [Huff, Balota, & Hutchison, 2016. The costs and benefits of testing and guessing on recognition memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 42, 1559–1572. doi:10.1037/xlm0000269], suggesting that testing and guessing effects may be influenced by encoding strategies specific for the type of upcoming task. We follow-up these experiments by examining test-expectancy processes in guessing and testing. Testing and guessing benefits over restudy were not found when test instructions were presented either after (Experiment 1) or before (Experiment 2) a single study/task cycle was completed, nor were benefits found when instructions were presented before study/task cycles and the task was repeated three times (Experiment 3). Testing and guessing benefits emerged only when instructions were presented before a study/task cycle and the task was repeated six times (Experiments 4A and 4B). These experiments demonstrate that initial testing and guessing can produce memory benefits in recognition, but only following substantial task repetitions which likely promote task-expectancy processes.     

The dynamics of fidelity over the time course of long-term memory

Bayesian models of cognition assume that prior knowledge about the world influences judgments. Recent approaches have suggested that the loss of fidelity from working to long-term (LT) memory is simply due to an increased rate of guessing (e.g. Brady, Konkle, Gill, Oliva, & Alvarez, 2013). That is, recall is the result of either remembering (with some noise) or guessing. This stands in contrast to Bayesian models of cognition while assume that prior knowledge about the world influences judgments, and that recall is a combination of expectations learned from the environment and noisy memory representations. Here, we evaluate the time course of fidelity in LT episodic memory, and the relative contribution of prior category knowledge and guessing, using a continuous recall paradigm. At an aggregate level, performance reflects a high rate of guessing. However, when aggregate data is partitioned by lag (i.e., the number of presentations from study to test), or is un-aggregated, performance appears to be more complex than just remembering with some noise and guessing. We implemented three models: the standard remember-guess model, a three-component remember-guess model, and a Bayesian mixture model and evaluated these models against the data. The results emphasize the importance of taking into account the influence of prior category knowledge on memory.     

The distinction between intuition and guessing in the SRT task generation: A reply to Norman and Price

We (Fu, Dienes, & Fu, 2010) investigated the extent to which people could generate sequences of responses based on knowledge acquired from the Serial Reaction Time task, depending on whether it felt subjectively like the response was based on pure guessing, intuition, conscious rules or memories. Norman and Price (2010) argued that in the context of our task, intuition responses were the same as guessing responses. In reply, we argue that not only do subjects apparently claim to be experiencing different phenomenologies when saying intuition versus guess, but also intuition and guess responses are associated with different behaviors. We found that people could control the knowledge when generating responses felt to be based on intuition but not those felt to be pure guessing. We present further evidence here that triplets associated with intuition but not guessing were also processed fluently.     

Metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements: The role of perceived differences in item recognition

This research investigated the hypothesis that metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements are based on the recognition or nonrecognition of an event together with perceived or expected differences in the recognizability of events from different sources. The hypothesis was tested with a multinomial source-monitoring model that allowed separation of source-guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items. Experiments 1A and 1B manipulated the number of item presentations as relevant source information and revealed differential guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items, with a bias to attribute unrecognized items to the source associated with poor item recognition. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated the findings with a manipulation of presentation time and extended the analysis to subjective differences in item recognition. Experiments 3A and 3B used more natural source information by varying type of acoustic signal and demonstrated that subjective theories about differences in item recognition are sufficient to elicit differential source-guessing biases for recognized and unrecognized items. Together the findings provide new insights into the cognitive processes underlying source memory decisions, which involve episodic memory and reconstructive tendencies based on metacognitive beliefs and general world knowledge.     

Metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements: the role of perceived differences in item recognition

This research investigated the hypothesis that metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements are based on the recognition or nonrecognition of an event together with perceived or expected differences in the recognizability of events from different sources. The hypothesis was tested with a multinomial source-monitoring model that allowed separation of source-guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items. Experiments 1A and 1B manipulated the number of item presentations as relevant source information and revealed differential guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items, with a bias to attribute unrecognized items to the source associated with poor item recognition. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated the findings with a manipulation of presentation time and extended the analysis to subjective differences in item recognition. Experiments 3A and 3B used more natural source information by varying type of acoustic signal and demonstrated that subjective theories about differences in item recognition are sufficient to elicit differential source-guessing biases for recognized and unrecognized items. Together the findings provide new insights into the cognitive processes underlying source memory decisions, which involve episodic memory and reconstructive tendencies based on metacognitive beliefs and general world knowledge.     

Guessing Strategies, Aging, and Bias Effects in Perceptual Identification

In the typical single-stimulus perceptual identification task, accuracy is improved by prior study of test words, a repetition priming benefit. There is also a cost, inasmuch as previously studied words are likely to be produced (incorrectly) as responses if the test word is orthographically similar but not identical to a studied word. In two-alternative forced-choice perceptual identification, a test word is flashed and followed by two alternatives, one of which is the correct response. When the two alternatives are orthographically similar, test words identical to previously studied items are identified more accurately than new words (a benefit) but tests words orthographically similar to studied words are identified less accurately than new words (a cost). Ratcliff and McKoon (in press) argue that these are bias effects that arise in the decision stage of word identification. We report five experiments that examined the alternative hypothesis that these bias effects arise from postperceptual guessing strategies. In single-stimulus perceptual identification, repetition priming benefits were equally great for young and older adults who claimed to use deliberate guessing strategies and those who did not (Experiment 1). In contrast, only groups of young and older people who claimed to deliberately guess studied words in a two-alternative forced-choice task (Experiments 2 and 5) showed reliable benefits and costs. Costs and benefits were abolished in the two-alternative forced-choice task when a very long study list was used, presumably because the increased retrieval burden made the use of deliberate guessing strategies less attractive (Experiment 3). Under conditions similar to those of Experiment 3, repetition priming was observed in single-stimulus perceptual identification (Experiment 4). These results are consistent with the view that costs and benefits in the forced-choice perceptual identification task arise from deliberate guessing strategies but that those in the single-stimulus task do not. The possibility that the observed relationship between strategy reports and priming effects reflects erroneous postexperimental assessments of strategies by participants is also considered.     

ON REPORTING RECOLLECTIVE EXPERIENCES AND "DIRECT ACCESS TO MEMORY SYSTEMS"

Abstract— Strack and Förster (1995) showed that, unlike remember responses, know responses in recognition memory were influenced by manipulating response bias. We describe and experiment that replicated theirs but additionally allowed subjects to report guesses. Only guess responses were influenced by this manipulation. Response bias had no effects on either know or remember responses. This outcome suggests that manipulating response bias influence know responses only when guessing is encouraged but not reported as such. More-over, though know responses reflected memory for the study events, guess responses did not.     

Expression of nonconscious knowledge via ideomotor actions

Ideomotor actions are behaviours that are unconsciously initiated and express a thought rather than a response to a sensory stimulus. The question examined here is whether ideomotor actions can also express nonconscious knowledge. We investigated this via the use of implicit long-term semantic memory, which is not available to conscious recall. We compared accuracy of answers to yes/no questions using both volitional report and ideomotor response (Ouija board response). Results show that when participants believed they knew the answer, responses in the two modalities were similar. But when they believed they were guessing, accuracy was at chance for volitional report (50%), but significantly higher for Ouija response (65%). These results indicate that implicit semantic memory can be expressed through ideomotor actions. They also suggest that this approach can provide an interesting new methodology for studying implicit processes in cognition.     

Sequential dynamics in visual short-term memory

Visual short-term memory (VSTM) is thought to help bridge across changes in visual input, and yet many studies of VSTM employ static displays. Here we investigate how VSTM copes with sequential input. In particular, we characterize the temporal dynamics of several different components of VSTM performance, including: storage probability, precision, variability in precision, guessing, and swapping. We used a variant of the continuous-report VSTM task developed for static displays, quantifying the contribution of each component with statistical likelihood estimation, as a function of serial position and set size. In Experiments 1 and 2, storage probability did not vary by serial position for small set sizes, but showed a small primacy effect and a robust recency effect for larger set sizes; precision did not vary by serial position or set size. In Experiment 3, the recency effect was shown to reflect an increased likelihood of swapping out items from earlier serial positions and swapping in later items, rather than an increased rate of guessing for earlier items. Indeed, a model that incorporated responding to non-targets provided a better fit to these data than alternative models that did not allow for swapping or that tried to account for variable precision. These findings suggest that VSTM is updated in a first-in-first-out manner, and they bring VSTM research into closer alignment with classical working memory research that focuses on sequential behavior and interference effects.     

Priming guesses on a forced-recall test

The forced-recall paradigm requires participants to fill all spaces on the memory test even if they cannot remember all the list words. In the present study, the authors used that paradigm to examine the influence of implicit memory on guessing--when participants fill remaining spaces after they cannot remember list items. They measured explicit memory as the percentage of targets that participants designated as remembered from the list and implicit memory as the percentage of targets they wrote but did not designate as remembered (beyond chance level). The authors examined implicit memory on guessing with forced recall (Experiment 1), forced cued recall with younger and older adults (Experiment 2), and forced free and cued recall under a depth-of-processing manipulation (Experiment 3). They conclude that implicit memory influences guesses of targets in the forced-recall paradigm.     

Memory impairment and source misattribution in postevent misinformation experiments with short retention intervals

The four experiments reported here provide evidence that (1) misleading postevent suggestions can impair memory for details in a witnessed event and (2) subjects sometimes remember sug-gested details as things seen in the event itself. All four experiments used recall tests in which subjects were warned of the possibility that the postevent information included misleading sug-gestions and were instructed to report both what they witnessed in the event and what was men-tioned in the postevent narrative. Recall of event details was poorer on misled items than on control items, and subjects sometimes misidentified the sources of their recollections. Our re-sults suggest that these findings are not due to guessing or response biases, but rather reflect genuine memory impairment and source monitoring confusions.