Mission: Impossible? On Empirical-Normative Collaboration in Ethical Reasoning

During the 1980s, empirical social sciences and normative theory seemingly converged within ethical debates. This tendency kindled new debates about the limits and possibilities of empirical-normative collaboration. The article asks for adequate ways of collaboration by taking a closer look at the philosophy of science of empirical social sciences as well as normative theory development and its logical groundings. As a result, three possible modes of cooperation are characterized: first, the empirical assessment of conditions that actually necessitate the translation of normatively derived basic principles into practice rules; second, the empirical assessment of conditions for application of a moral norm which are formulated by bridging principles; third, the empirical assessment of social practice which allows (a) to measure whether adopted norms actually are implemented in practice or not and (b) to encounter new moral problems which are in need of ethical guidance. Finally, the article defends a symbiotic position in Weaver’s and Trevino's triad of possible approaches to empirical-normative collaboration in ethics.     

Disregarding Preliminary Information When Rating Job Applicants' Performance: Mission Impossible?1

Firms allocate considerable resources to test job applicants' skills and to ensure that hiring decisions are nondiscriminatory. Interpreting selection output in light of preliminary information may undermine the impartiality of personnel selection decisions. In this study, human resource managers were presented preliminary information about a candidate's performance and asked to rate him according to a detailed assessment‐center report of his performance. We examined several interventions for reducing reliance on preliminary information: retrieving assessment‐center information, generating a rating model, or both. Participants (N = 167) excluded preliminary information from the interventions, but relied on it when rating the candidate. The documented failure to control for the effects of preliminary information on subsequent judgments can contribute to improved selection procedures.     

Impossible objects∗

This paper deals with the Meinong‐Russell controversy on nonsubsistent objects. The first part notes the similarity of certain contemporary semantical developments to Meinonj;'s theory of nonsubsistent objects. Then it lays out the major features of Meinong's famous theory, considers Russell's objections to same and Meinong's counter‐objections to Russell, and argues that Russell's well‐known argument fails. However, it is possible to augment Russell's argument against Meinong with sound Russellian principles in such a way that it presents at least a strong inclining reason against Meinong's theory of impossible objects.     

An Impossible Possibility? Jewish Barthianism in Interwar Germany

In this essay I examine the Jewish reception of Karl Barth's theology in Germany of the 1930s. This I do through an analysis of a disputed exploration into the possibilities and limitations of the theological principles of dialectical theology for the formulation of a Jewish theology that took place at the time. The publication of Karl Barth's Römerbrief (1919, 1922) generated a great stir among Christian circles in Germany. Profoundly challenging the fundamental assumptions of liberal theology, Barth's ‘dialectical theology' was quickly recognized as an epoch‐making work. But the impact of Barth's theology exceeded its Christian readership. As a corresponding disillusionment of liberal theology in its Jewish version took place among Jews, Barthianism presented itself as a compelling theological model offering a profound rejoinder to the spiritual needs of Jews as well. Yet alongside the recognition of the potentially constructive engagement with Barth's radical thought for a rejuvenated articulation of Jewish theology, Jewish thinkers similarly acknowledged the many challenges and difficulties such a theological encounter implied from a Jewish point of view, thereby projecting their understanding of the Jewish‐Christian difference.     

Fostering a Spirituality That Can Transform Mission?

To be moved by the Spirit into transforming discipleship, we need to know how to make ourselves available to God to receive God's gifts. We also need to practise discernment regarding what gives life and what does not. This paper considers themes for the 2018 Mission Conference, including money, love, and prayer. Examples, parables, and illustrations are given from experience and the practice of missionary discipleship. There is a particular emphasis on means of grace and the spiritual disciplines outlined by St. Ignatius of Loyola. The conclusions point to a focus on prayer in the planning, preparation, and programming for the 2018 Conference.     

Politics and Church: Byproduct or Central Mission?

One of the more intriguing paradoxes that has developed in mainline Protestantism over the last 30 years is that mainline clergy have become more politically active. Since the public politicking of mainline clergy in the late 1960s generated storms in the churches, why would clergy become more politically active over time? In this article, we adopt the theoretical structure of a benefit exchange between leaders and members initiated by Mancur Olson. We seek to determine the extent to which church members' appetites for political action by the clergy are shaped by a satiating selective benefit exchange or are driven largely by political compatibility. We propose that because of continued political disagreement between clergy and church members and considerable disapproval of clergy involvement in politics by church members, clergy politicking is allowed largely by the satisfaction of a selective benefit exchange.     

What Is Music? Is There a Definitive Answer?

Philosophers frequently defend definitions by appealing to intuitions and contemporary folk classificatory norms. I raise methodological concerns that undermine some of these defenses. Focusing on Andrew Kania's recent definition of music, I argue that the way in which it has been developed leads to problems, and I show that a number of other definitions of interest to philosophers of art (and others) run into similar problems.     

Is identity illusory?

Certain of our traits are thought more central to who we are: they comprise our individual identity. What makes these traits privileged in this way? What accounts for their identity centrality? Although considerations of identity play a key role in many different areas of moral philosophy, I argue that we currently have no satisfactory account of the basis of identity centrality. Nor should we expect one. Rather, we should adopt an error theory: we should concede that there is nothing in reality corresponding to the perceived distinction between the central and peripheral traits of a person.     

What Is Terrorism?

ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is not to try to formulate the meaning the word ‘terrorism’has in ordinary use; the word is used in so many different, even incompatible ways, that such an enterprise would quickly prove futile. My aim is rather to try for a definition that captures the trait, or traits, of terrorism which cause most of us to view it with moral repugnance. I discuss the following questions: Is the historical connection of terrorism with terror to be preserved on the conceptual level, or relegated to the psychology and sociology of terrorism? Does mere infliction of terror qualify as terrorism, so that we can speak of non-violent terrorism? If terrorism is a type of violence, does it have to be against persons, or should violence against property also count? In what sense can terrorism be described as indiscriminate violence? Should we use the word only in a political context? In such a context, can we speak of ‘state terrorism’, or should the word be restricted to actions not sanctioned by law? Is the terrorist necessarily oblivious to moral considerations, as those who define terrorism in terms of antinomianism imply? My answers to these questions lead up to the following definition: terrorism is the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they otherwise would not take.     

Is Imagination Introspective?

The literature suggests that in sensory imagination we focus on the imagined objects, not on the imaginative states themselves, and that therefore imagination is not introspective. It is claimed that the introspection of imaginative states is an additional cognitive ability. However, there seem to be counterexamples to this claim. In many cases in which we sensorily imagine a certain object in front of us, we are aware that this object is not really where we imagine it to be. So it looks as if in these cases of imagination, we are aware of the mere appearance of the imagined object, and hence introspection is a constitutive part of imagination. In this article, I address this contradictory state of affairs and argue that we should classify at least some forms of sensory imagination as introspective. For this purpose I use the appearance-reality distinction as a central notion for introspection. I also defend the thesis of introspective imagination against the objection that young children imagine without yet understanding the concept of experience.     

Is Evidence Normative?

Philosophia - This paper defends the view that in a certain sense evidence is normative. Neither a bit of evidence nor the fact that it is evidence for a certain proposition is a normative fact,...     

Is cognition seasonal?

The idea that our mental life is more sluggish in winter is apparently seductive. This article reviews the evidence for the claim that there is a seasonal cycle in human cognition. Several methodologies have been used with participants such as over-wintering scientists in Antarctica, residents of polar regions, and patients with seasonal psychopathology and there is no clear tendency for cognition to be impaired in winter. Some large-scale public health studies report seasonality of cognition but are inconsistent regarding when in the year there is a peak and trough. Claims that human cognition has an annual cycle should be regarded as speculative and the burden of proof must be borne by anyone inclined to claim that such a cycle exists. An analysis of the influence of some key studies shows that their results are misleadingly cited and that there is resistance to the null conclusion.     

Is Multiculturalism Discriminatory?

Res Publica - Many political theorists are multiculturalists. They believe that states ought to support and accommodate minority cultures, even if they disagree about when such support and...     

Is identity non-contingent?

I present a novel argument against the non-contingency of identity. I first argue that the necessity of distinctness is intimately connected with numerous paradoxes of recombination. In particular, I argue that those who reject the necessity of distinctness have natural solutions to various paradoxes of recombination which have plagued the metaphysics of modality. Moreover, I argue that adding the necessity of distinctness to modest, paradox-free assumptions is sufficient to reinstate the paradoxes. Given that identity is non-contingent only if distinctness is necessary, I suggest this constitutes new evidence against the non-contingency of identity.     

What Is Ineffable?

In this essay, I argue, via a revision of Freud's notions of primary and secondary process, that experiences of resonant form lie at the root of many serious ineffability claims. I suggest further that Western European culture's resistance to the perception of resonant form underlies some of its present crises.