The influence of power on the information search, impression formation, and demands in negotiation

Based on work by Fiske (1992), we argue that power differences influence information search strategies during negotiation. Experiment 1 showed that negotiators with less power ask more diagnostic than leading questions, and more belief-congruent than incongruent questions, when facing a competitive rather than cooperative partner. Experiment 2 suggested that this result was caused by stronger accuracy and impression motivation among less powerful negotiators. Experiment 3 showed that belief-congruent rather than incongruent questions produce more positive impressions during negotiation. And when less powerful negotiators are asked leading questions about their willingness to cooperate (compete), they responded with lower (higher) demands. The results are discussed in terms of a motivated information-processing model of negotiation.     

Time pressure and closing of the mind in negotiation

Research on time pressure (TP) in negotiation has considered strategic choice (demands and concession making) but largely ignored information processing. Based on Lay Epistemic Theory ([Kruglanski, 1989]) it is hypothesized that TP reduces motivation to process information systematically, and the time needed to negotiate an agreement, and that it produces greater reliance on cognitive heuristics when placing demands, and less integrative agreements. Two studies revealed that effects of time constraint on information processing in negotiation were due to higher need for cognitive closure under high TP. Study 1 also showed that negotiators use stereotypes about the opponent as a heuristic cue more under high rather than low TP. Study 2 revealed that negotiators under high TP were less likely to revise their unfounded fixed-pie perceptions during negotiation and, therefore, reached less integrative agreements. Implications for motivated information processing in negotiation are discussed.     

The interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations: a motivated information processing approach

Three experiments tested a motivated information processing account of the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations. In Experiment 1, participants received information about the opponent's emotion (anger, happiness, or none) in a computer-mediated negotiation. As predicted, they conceded more to an angry opponent than to a happy one (controls falling in between), but only when they had a low (rather than a high) need for cognitive closure. Experiment 2 similarly showed that participants were only affected by the other's emotion under low rather than high time pressure, because time pressure reduced their degree of information processing. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that negotiators were only influenced by their opponent's emotion if they had low (rather than high) power. These results support the motivated information processing model by showing that negotiators are only affected by their opponent's emotions if they are motivated to consider them.     

Unfixing the fixed pie: a motivated information-processing approach to integrative negotiation

Negotiators tend to believe that own and other's outcomes are diametrically opposed. When such fixed-pie perceptions (FPPs) are not revised during negotiation, integrative agreements are unlikely. It was predicted that accuracy motivation helps negotiators to release their FPPs. In 2 experiments, accuracy motivation was manipulated by (not) holding negotiators accountable for the manner in which they negotiated. Experiment 1 showed that accountability reduced FPPs during face-to-face negotiation and produced more integrative agreements. Experiment 2 corroborated these results: Accountable negotiators revised their FPPs even when information exchange was experimentally held constant. Experiment 2 also showed that accountability is effective during the encoding of outcome information. Negotiators appear flexible in their reliance on FPPs. which is consistent with a motivated information-processing model of negotiation.     

The Impact of Alcohol on Negotiator Behavior: Experimental Evidence1

Business‐related drinking is an important organizational and managerial activity with particular relevance to the negotiation process. This paper investigates the influence of a moderate amount of alcohol on negotiator behavior and negotiated outcomes. We conducted 2 negotiation studies involving inebriated and sober participants, and found that inebriated negotiators used more aggressive tactics, made more mistakes, and reached less integrative agreements than did sober negotiators. Across both studies, we found that inebriated negotiators were unaware that alcohol had affected their negotiations.     

Early words that work: When and how virtual linguistic mimicry facilitates negotiation outcomes

We hypothesized that in online, virtual formats, negotiators receive better outcomes when mimicking their counterpart's language; furthermore, we predicted that this strategy would be more effective when occurring early in the negotiation rather than at the end, and should also be effective across both independent and interdependent cultures. Results from two experiments supported these hypotheses. Experiment 1 was conducted in Thailand and demonstrated that negotiators who actively mimicked their counterpart's language in the first 10 min of the negotiation obtained higher individual gain compared to those mimicking during the last 10 min, as well as compared to control participants. Experiment 2 replicated this effect in the United States (with Dutch and American negotiators) and also showed that trust mediated the effect of virtual linguistic mimicry on individual negotiation outcomes. Implications for virtual communication, strategic mimicry, and negotiations are discussed.     

Creative People Create Values: Creativity and Positive Arousal in Negotiations

Most negotiations are ill-structured situations, and the ability to identify novel options is likely to be crucial for success. This study, therefore, examined how creativity impacts negotiation processes and outcomes, and how this effect is moderated by positive arousal. The negotiators’ creative personality and their state of positive arousal were measured before they participated in a simulated negotiation, with the results demonstrating that the level of creativity in negotiation dyads was positively related to the negotiators’ joint outcome. Negotiators in high creativity dyads searched for more information by asking questions about priorities and were less narrowly focused by providing fewer single-issue offers than negotiators in low creativity dyads. Positive arousal did not affect outcome directly, but moderated the effect of creativity on joint outcomes; the effect of creativity was strongest under high levels of positive arousal. The discussion section emphasizes that future research may find creativity to have even more of a positive effect when negotiations become more complex.     

Negotiators' bargaining histories and their effects on future negotiation performance

In 2 studies the authors show that the quality of deals negotiators reach are significantly influenced by their previous bargaining experiences. As predicted, negotiators who reached an impasse on a prior negotiation were more likely either to impasse in their next negotiation or to reach deals of low joint value compared to those who had reached an initial agreement. Notably, the impact of past performance on subsequent deals was just as strong for negotiators who changed partners on the 2nd occasion. Results highlight the role of bargaining histories as significant predictors of negotiation behavior. Moreover, they suggest that, at least in some cases, negotiations should be conceptualized as interrelated exchanges rather than separable incidents.     

回报谨慎对谈判过程和谈判结果的影响

回报谨慎是人们害怕在人际关系中被他人利用的一种信念。研究考察了回报谨慎对谈判者的动机倾向、谈判行为及谈判结果的影响。184人组成92个两人小组参加了一项模拟商业谈判,谈判前研究者成功地进行了回报谨慎的操纵,谈判结束后,参加谈判的人完成谈判协议和谈判后问卷。研究者假设,低回报谨慎的谈判者比高回报谨慎的谈判者在谈判中更可能持有合作倾向、更多地与谈判对手分享信息,研究者还预测回报谨慎与谈判双方的联合收益以及谈判后对谈判对手的看法都有关系。研究结果支持了上述假设。研究对从事商业谈判的人具有实际意义。     

Power, propensity to negotiate, and moving first in competitive interactions

Five experiments investigated how the possession and experience of power affects the initiation of competitive interaction. In Experiments 1a and 1b, high-power individuals displayed a greater propensity to initiate a negotiation than did low-power individuals. Three additional experiments showed that power increased the likelihood of making the first move in a variety of competitive interactions. In Experiment 2, participants who were semantically primed with power were nearly 4 times as likely as participants in a control condition to choose to make the opening arguments in a debate competition scenario. In Experiment 3, negotiators with strong alternatives to a negotiation were more than 3 times as likely to spontaneously express an intention to make the first offer compared to participants who lacked any alternatives. Experiment 4 showed that high-power negotiators were more likely than low-power negotiators to actually make the first offer and that making the first offer produced a bargaining advantage.     

The more (complex), the better? The influence of epistemic motivation on integrative bargaining in complex negotiation

Negotiating about a larger number of issues is often argued to enhance the potential for integrative bargaining. However, the enhanced complexity may also make negotiators more susceptible to bias, making it less likely for them to reach win–win agreements. We argue that epistemic motivation, the motivation to hold accurate perceptions of the world, provides a key to solve this paradox. In a negotiation experiment we manipulated complexity by having participants negotiate about 6 or 18 issues and we manipulated epistemic motivation by making participants process‐accountable or not. Under low complexity, there was no effect of epistemic motivation on created value. Under high complexity, however, negotiators with high epistemic motivation created more value than negotiators with low epistemic motivation. Thus, negotiating about larger numbers of issues was only beneficial for negotiators if they were motivated to think deeply and thoroughly. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hong Kong Versus U.S. Negotiations: Effects of Culture,Alternatives, Outcome Scales,and Mediation1

This study investigates the effects of culture, BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement), outcome scales, and mediation on negotiation outcomes. Six hundred three subjects from 2 countries (288 from Hong Kong and 315 from the United States) participated in 2-party negotiations that were either mediated or observed by a third party. In these negotiations, the Hong Kong negotiators obtained higher joint outcomes than did their U.S. counterparts. Also, in both Hong Kong and the United States, negotiators with a high BATNA obtained larger individual outcomes than did those with a low BATNA. Finally, mediation resulted in higher joint outcomes than did no mediation and had a stronger effect in US. (vs. Hong Kong) negotiations.     

An Evaluation of Two Mediation Techniques,Negotiator Power,and Culture in Negotiation1

This study examines the effects of 4 factors in a mediated transfer‐pricing negotiation: (a) the mediator's suggestion that negotiators have concern for the other (opposing) negotiator; (b) the mediator's proposal of moderate goals; (c) negotiator power; and (d) culture. In the simulated negotiations that were mediated by a corporate official, participants were 374 subjects from Hong Kong and the United States. Negotiators obtained lower joint outcomes when urged by the mediator to show concern for the other than when not given this admonition. When the mediator proposed moderate (vs. high) goals, the negotiators received lower joint outcomes but had a higher opinion of the mediator. While we expected negotiator power (equal vs. unequal) to interact with suggested concern for the other, it did so only for the negotiators' individual outcomes. Finally, culture produced a main effect: Hong Kong negotiators obtained higher joint outcomes than did their U. S. counterparts.     

走向双赢:动机倾向和信息分享质量在整合性谈判过程中的作用

研究的主要目的是考察谈判组的动机倾向、信息分享数量和质量、对优先考虑事项和利益一致事项的判断准确性和联合收益之间的关系,以及信息分享质量在谈判过程中的重要性。采用一对一的买卖式谈判任务,由226名被试组成113个谈判组进行面对面的谈判。结果表明,动机倾向、信息分享数量和质量以及谈判双方对优先考虑事项的判断准确性都对联合收益有显著影响,而且信息分享质量比信息分享数量更有预测力。中介作用分析结果显示,信息分享质量在动机倾向和联合收益之间起完全中介作用,对优先考虑事项的判断准确性在信息分享质量和联合收益之间起部分中介作用。研究揭示了整合性谈判的整个过程,验证了信息分享质量在谈判过程中的重要作用。     

Market forces,negotiator frames and transaction outcomes

Although implicit framing differences have been advanced as an explanation of the buyers advantage, two necessary preconditions must be met to sustain this model: a demonstration that negatively-framed negotiators are advantaged in negotiations and that buyer role labels invoke a negative frame. A modification of Neale, Northcraft, Magliozzi and Bazerman s (1986) simulation created a role-neutral setting in which positively-framed negotiators bargained against negatively-framed negotiators, thus testing the first of these preconditions. Experiment 1 found no differences in the outcomes of positively- and negatively-framed negotiators, a finding that could be attributed to relatively low market competitiveness. A second experiment, by creating power imbalanced negotiation markets, sought to increase market distributiveness and strengthen framing effects. Results showed that both high power and negatively-framed negotiators were significantly advantaged, providing conditional support for the implicit framing model, However unlike role, frame interacted with power suggesting that the two variables are not functionally equivalent. These findings are interpreted to suggest that factors other than implicit framing differences account for the buyers advantage. More generally these results suggest that frame is responsive to situational variables and that such variables, by influencing negotiation processes, mediate the relationship between negotiator frames and negotiation outcomes.     

Expectancy Disconfirmation and Negotiator Reactions Across Negotiation Episodes

In the negotiation literature, relatively little attention has been paid to the impact of negotiator goals and expectancy disconfirmations on negotiator behaviors and affective outcomes. We found that negotiators with larger negative expectancy disconfirmations were less satisfied; set lower targets for a subsequent negotiation; and were more likely to settle with the other party in the second negotiation, rather than requiring third-party imposition of a settlement. Those negotiators who settled had more positive feelings and perceptions about the negotiation and set higher targets for a third negotiation. Further, negotiators who experienced repeated high levels of negative expectancy disconfirmation also experienced the greatest decrements in their feelings and perceptions across negotiation episodes. Implications of study findings for future research are discussed.     

The prospect of negotiating: Stress, cognitive appraisal, and performance

Despite a significant literature on the impact of stress on performance in achievement settings, little is known about whether and how stress might matter for would-be negotiators. In two studies, we investigate how bargainers cognitively appraise a looming negotiation, whether its prospect is stressful and what the consequences are for performance. Individuals who appraised a prospective negotiation as a threat experienced more stress ahead of a negotiation, and reached lower quality deals compared to those who had appraised a challenge. Results from a follow-up experiment showed that would-be negotiators who had appraised a threat behaved more passively and were less likely to use tough tactics compared to those who appraised a challenge. Those who appraised a threat also had relatively inaccurate perceptions of their partners’ priorities and interests, which undermined their outcomes. The outcome advantage for those who appraised a challenge was limited to negotiations that contained integrative potential.     

The Impact of Conflict Issues on Fixed-Pie Perceptions, Problem Solving, and Integrative Outcomes in Negotiation

It is argued that a negotiator's fixed-pie perception, cooperative motivation, problem-solving behavior, and integrative outcomes are influenced by the content of the negotiation—the conflict issue. Negotiation involves conflicting interests, conflicting ideas about intellective problems, or conflicting ideas about evaluative problems. Study 1 showed that individuals in a negotiation about interests have a stronger fixed-pie perception and have a lower cooperative motivation than individuals in an evaluative negotiation, with intellective negotiations taking an intermediate position. Study 2 showed that individuals in a negotiation about interests made more trade-offs and reached higher joint outcomes than individuals in an intellective or evaluative negotiation. Study 3 replicated this finding in a field study. The studies bridge insights from negotiation research and decision-making research and show that the conflict issue has important effects on the negotiation process.     

The three faces of Eve: Strategic displays of positive,negative, and neutral emotions in negotiations

In a series of laboratory experiments, we tested the influence of strategically displaying positive, negative, and neutral emotions on negotiation outcomes. In Experiment 1, a face-to-face dispute simulation, negotiators who displayed positive emotion, in contrast to negative or neutral emotions, were more likely to incorporate a future business relationship in the negotiated contract. In Experiment 2, an ultimatum setting, managers strategically displaying positive emotion were more likely to close a deal. This effect was mediated by negotiators’ willingness to pay more to a negotiator strategically displaying positive versus negative emotions. In Experiment 3, display of positive emotion was a more effective strategy for gaining concessions from the other party in a distributive setting. Negotiators made more extreme demands when facing a negotiator strategically displaying negative, rather than positive or neutral, emotions. Implications for strategic display of emotion in negotiations are discussed.