How (far) can rationality be naturalized?

The paper shows why and how an empirical study of fast-and-frugal heuristics can provide norms of good reasoning, and thus how (and how far) rationality can be naturalized. We explain the heuristics that humans often rely on in solving problems, for example, choosing investment strategies or apartments, placing bets in sports, or making library searches. We then show that heuristics can lead to judgments that are as accurate as or even more accurate than strategies that use more information and computation, including optimization methods. A standard way to defend the use of heuristics is by reference to accuracy-effort trade-offs. We take a different route, emphasizing ecological rationality (the relationship between cognitive heuristics and environment), and argue that in uncertain environments, more information and computation are not always better (the ??less-can-be-more?? doctrine). The resulting naturalism about rationality is thus normative because it not only describes what heuristics people use, but also in which specific environments one should rely on a heuristic in order to make better inferences. While we desist from claiming that the scope of ecological rationality is unlimited, we think it is of wide practical use.     

How can Ethnomethodology be Heideggerian?

The purpose of this paper is to begin to try to understand the extent to which ethnomethodology (EM) might be informed by some concepts and ideas from the work of the philosopher Martin Heidegger. This is done in two parts. The first looks at Heidegger's later work and compares his conception of the ontological difference with Garfinkel's work on the difference between EM and formal sociological analysis (FA). The second part turns to Heidegger's earlier work (around Being and Time) and works through a number of affinities between the analysis of Dasein and ethnomethodological versions of everydayness.     

Olfaction in utero: can the rodent model be generalized?

In this article we discuss five requirements that theoretically must be fulfilled for transnatal chemosensory learning to occur in three placental species, the rat, the sheep, and the human, viz. (1) minimum or partial maturity of nasal chemoreceptor systems, (2) efficient odorivector compounds in the fetal environment, (3) the ability to memorize chemosensory information across birth, (4) perinatal continuity in chemical signals, (5) neonatal ability to detect air-borne odorants previously experienced in the aquatic environment. A substantial body of data is reviewed for the rat, in which fetal chemosensation is now firmly established. The less studied ovine perinate also shows preliminary evidence of nasal chemoreception and of postnatal retention of prenatally experienced odorants. Concerning the human species, we discuss extensive anatomical data supporting nasochemoreception in utero, but as yet no direct or indirect functional demonstration is provided. Furthermore, the strongest evidence of odorivector compounds in amniotic fluid is from human data. The results presented allow generalization of chemosensory functioning in utero in the species considered.     

How bad can a good enough parent be?

Almost everyone accepts that parents must provide a good enough upbringing in order to retain custodial rights over children, but little has been said about how that level should be set. In this paper, I examine ways of specifying a good enough upbringing. I argue that the two dominant ways of setting this level, the Best Interests and Abuse and Neglect Views, are mistaken. I defend the Dual Comparative View, which holds that an upbringing is good enough when shortfalls from the best alternative upbringing in terms of the child's interests are no more significant than the parents' interest.     

How many locations can be selected at once?

The visual system uses several tools to select only the most relevant visual information for further processing, including selection by location. In the present study, the authors explored how many locations can be selected at once. Although past evidence from several visual tasks suggests that the visual system can operate on a fixed number of 4 objects or locations at once, the authors found that this capacity varies widely in response to the precision of selection required by the task. When the authors required precise selection regions, only 2-3 locations could be selected. But when the selection regions could be coarser, up to 6-7 locations could be selected. The authors discuss potential mechanisms underlying the selection of multiple locations and review the evidence for fixed limits in visual attention.     

How far can attraction-caused misalignment account for the Morinaga misalignment effect?

Summary When a line (the pointer) is collinear with a dot, the addition of a second line (the induction line) contiguous with the dot or near it may cause the pointer to appear to be collinear with a point further along or nearer to the induction line. The geometrical relations upon which this effect, which we call attraction-caused misalignment, depends have been studied with the Obonai and Wundt-Loeb (Hotopf, 1981; Hotopf & Brown, 1988) figures. Drawing upon the studies of misalignment in the Morinaga figure carried out by Restle (1976), Day, Bellamy, and Norman (1983), and Day and Kasperczyk (1985), as well as upon two new experiments, we show that misalignment in the Morinaga figure is also attraction-caused misalignment, as previously defined. We conclude with a discussion of a number of theories that aim at accounting for attraction misalignment.     

How can a stereotype inconsistency bias be encouraged in communication?

This study aimed to investigate what conditions can lead to a bias for communicating stereotype inconsistent (SI) information, relative to stereotype consistent (SC) information. Sixty‐three undergraduate university students (22 males, 41 females; M_age = 21.25) read a story about an Arab man who exhibited characteristics consistent and inconsistent with the stereotype of Arab men. The story was transmitted through 21 three‐person communication chains; each participant rewrote the story from memory for the next person in the chain to read, with only the first participant in each chain reading the original story. As hypothesized, when a surprising category conjunction was formed by pairing the primary stereotype (Arab men) with a secondary stereotype of a contradictory nature (kindergarten teachers), SC information was circulated less than SI information. This was also the case when a causal explanation was provided that accounted for the unexpected SI information. Findings indicate the potential of techniques that elicit cognitive elaboration of SI information to encourage an SI bias in communication, and show promise for exploring ways to reduce the impact of negative stereotypical information in the long term.     

How many parameters can a model have and still be testable?

A standard rule of thumb states that a model has too many parameters to be testable if and only if it has at least as many parameters as empirically observable quantities. We argue that when one asks whether a model has too many parameters to be testable, one implicitly refers to a particular type of testability, which we call quantitative testability. A model is defined to be quantitatively testable if the model's predictions have zero probability of being correct by chance. Next, we propose a new rule of thumb, based on the rank of the Jacobian matrix of a model (i.e., the matrix of partial derivatives of the function that maps the model's parameter values onto predicted experimental outcomes). According to this rule, a model is quantitatively testable if and only if the rank of the Jacobian matrix is less than the number of observables. (The rank of his matrix can be found with standard computer algorithms.) Using Sard's theorem, we prove that the proposed new rule of thumb is correct provided that certain “smoothness” conditions are satisfied. We also discuss the relation between quantitative testability and reparameterization, identifiability, and goodness-of-fit testing.     

How many faces can be processed during a single eye fixation?

The purpose of our study was to estimate the perceptual span for facial information: how many faces can be processed during a single eye fixation. We used a visual-search task, in which the targets and distractors were facial photographs. The task of the observer was to search for and identify a target face in an array of faces. We measured the time needed for one search--threshold search time--by using a multiple-alternative staircase method. The threshold represents the duration of stimulus presentation at which the probability of correct responses was 79%. The array size was varied from 2 x 2 to 8 x 8 faces. Simultaneously with the performance measurements we measured eye movements with a video eye tracker. We found that threshold search time increased with increasing set size nearly linearly. The number of fixations also increased linearly from unity at the smallest set size to about fifteen at the largest set size. The result of 2 x 2 faces during a single fixation gave an estimate of 4 faces for the perceptual span. If, on average, only half of the elements had to be scanned for finding the target, 15 fixations at the largest set size (8 x 8) gave another estimate of 2.13 faces. The mean fixation duration was around 200 ms. Thus, the results suggest that 2-4 faces can be processed during one fixation of about 200 ms.     

How autonomous can art be?: Philosophical remarks on photorealism and postmodern-aesthetics

A slightly different German version of his article has been published in D. Kamper and W. v. Reijen (eds.), Die unvollendete Vernunft: Moderne versus Postmoderne (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1987), pp. 403–426.     

The computer psychiatrist: How far have we come? Where are we heading? How far dare we go?

The use of computers in psychiatry and psychology is reviewed. It is noted that computers are already being used successfully for consultation, interviewing, and continuing education. Issues related to the usage of computers in mental health are discussed. Guidelines for future work in the area are suggested.     

How can psychotherapists influence psychiatry?

Summary

This paper is based on an invited contribution to the first APP conference on psychoanalytic psychotherapy services in Europe. I was asked to address the question “How can psychotherapists influence psychiatry?” within the overall title for the half-day session of “Psychiatry and Psychodynamics: Towards integration or splitting”. As a background to later discussion I began with a historical sketch of how we had arrived at the current situation in the UK with a specialty of psychotherapy, both separate from and yet still within psychiatry. I argued the need for a separate specialty to protect the space needed for psychotherapy in the face of the inevitable polarisations that occur within psychiatry. Some of the tensions between the different points of view are likened to those between masculine and feminine roles. This specialty might eventually emerge into or foster a new profession of psychotherapy but will still need to negotiate its position in relation to psychiatry.