Necessity, control, and the divine command theory

The simplest Divine Command Theory is one which identifies rightness with being commanded or willed by God. Two clear and appealing arguments for this theory turn on the idea that laws require a lawgiver, and the idea that God is sovereign or omnipotent. Critical examination of these arguments reveals some fundamental principles at odds with the Divine Command Theory, and yields some more penetrating versions of traditional objections to that theory. This paper is dedicated to the memory ofPhilip L. Quinn, in honor of his long and generous service to the profession of philosophy, the discipline of philosophy of religion, and for his kind and uncommonly helpful comments on this paper.     

Evolutionary ethics and moral theory

Conclusion This example, like the others, demands further discussion. My conclusion must therefore remain modest: an agent-neutral theory of our moral competence is not biologically implausible. Agent-centered rules like tit-for-tat, prerogatives, special obligations, and duties not to harm others might be best regarded as belonging to the theory of moral performance rather than the theory of moral competence. For biologists who may think otherwise, the general argument of this essay is that any claims to the contrary must be based on more empirically well-developed theories of our moral competence and moral performance.More adequate theories of both kinds are worth developing, even if by themselves they determine nothing about how we ought to live our lives. Biology may help us understand the broad taxonomical categories of moral performance. It may also explain why, at the deepest levels of our moral thinking, we so easily slide into agent-neutral ways of reasoning. But how we ought to live our lives is something that must be determined by social experiment and moral argumentation. Discoveries regarding the empirical nature of morality cannot be made independently of the actual workings of our moral competence, which is itself only one factor in broader social and psychological processes that are capable of leading human beings down any number of more or less morally laudable paths.

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On ethics in personal construct theory

Abstract

In personal construct theory, people interpret the world in unique ways. Constructions are subjective representations rather than objective truths. This means that our ethical constructions are (a) potentially wrong, if there is an external moral reality we cannot access, or (b) no more inherently defensible than others’ ethical constructions, if all notions of “right” and “wrong” are personally constructed. Constructions promoting violence, hatred, and intolerance are as viable as those promoting peace, love, and acceptance. To overcome this ethical quandary individuals must create meaningful ethical constructions and have faith in them. This is difficult because, as constructivists, we see each person's constructions as legitimate and our own world views as merely constructions, themselves. Implications for moral righteousness are discussed.     

Satisfactory accounts of divine creation

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - Multiverse theorists provide controversial, unique but unified accounts of divine creation that result in the Anselmian God creating a best world....     

The antinomy of divine necessity

This paper arose out of a discussion of a paper, Necessity and Explanation, presented by Robert Prévost (University of Texas at Arlington) at the Spring 1986 meeting of the North Texas Philosophical Association. An earlier version was presented to the 1987 meeting of the Society for Philosophy of Religion. I particularly want to thank Professor Billy Joe Lucas (Manhattanville College) for his very helpful comments on that earlier draft.     

History and theory in "applied ethics"

Robert Baker and Laurence McCullough argue that the "applied ethics model" is deficient and in need of a replacement model. However, they supply no clear meaning to "applied ethics" and miss most of what is important in the literature on methodology that treats this question. The Baker-McCullough account of medical and applied ethics is a straw man that has had no influence in these fields or in philosophical ethics. The authors are also on shaky historical grounds in dealing with two problems: (1) the historical source of the notion of "practical ethics" and (2) the historical source of and the assimilation of the term "autonomy" into applied philosophy and professional ethics. They mistakenly hold (1) that the expression "practical ethics" was first used in a publication by Thomas Percival and (2) that Kant is the primary historical source of the notion of autonomy as that notion is used in contemporary applied ethics.     

The deadlock of absolute divine simplicity

In this article, I explain how and why different attempts to defend absolute divine simplicity fail. A proponent of absolute divine simplicity has to explain why different attributions do not suppose a metaphysical complexity in God but just one superproperty, why there is no difference between God and His super-property and finally how a absolute simple entity can be the truthmaker of different intrinsic predications. It does not necessarily lead to a rejection of divine simplicity but it shows that we may consider another conception of divine simplicity compatible with some metaphysical complexity in God.     

On the limits of divine power

This paper considers the question of whether there are truths independent of God's power. It defends a traditional conception of divine power, according to which God's power does not extend to logically necessary truths, such as those of logic and mathematics, against Cartesian voluntarism, here taken as the doctrine that every truth falls within the compass of God's creative will. The paper argues that the voluntarist position is internally inconsistent. It concludes that if God is an absolute, unconditioned reality, then there must be truths that are independent of God's power.     

On the autonomy of the divine

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

The incoherence of divine possibility constructivism

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - Before God created did God have ideas in mind for particular things, kinds of things, properties of things, particular events, and laws of nature?...