A tale of two methods

Simulations (both digital and analog) and experiments share many features. But what essential features distinguish them? I discuss two proposals in the literature. On one proposal, experiments investigate nature directly, while simulations merely investigate models. On another proposal, simulations differ from experiments in that simulationists manipulate objects that bear only a formal (rather than material) similarity to the targets of their investigations. Both of these proposals are rejected. I argue that simulations fundamentally differ from experiments with regard to the background knowledge that is invoked to argue for the “external validity” of the investigation.     

STRONG INTERIORITY AND (TRADITIONAL) THEISM: WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?

Central to Spinozism is the thesis that the immanence of the Divine Substance in the cosmos (in natural objects) is – like the immanence of the dancer in the dance –maximal or total. Just as the dance consists entirely of the dancer in aesthetically‐stylized motion, so the domain of nature is nothing in addition to God in cosmic guise. Accordingly, natural objects constitute modes of God. Hence, Spinozism and (traditional) theism are obviously irreconcilable. For it is indispensable to theism that the immanence of God in the cosmos is not maximal; rather, that natural objects are distinct from the Divine Substance. Now it has standardly been presupposed by theists (and many others) that natural objects could not be distinct from God without being ontologically exterior to God; thus, that theism would readily collapse into Spinozism if the cosmos was interior to the Divine Substance. It seems to me that this is a long‐standing mistake. After demonstrating that there is probative warrant for maintaining that theism requires the interiority of natural objects to God, there is shown to be more than adequate justification for denying that this necessitates the collapse of theism into Spinozism.     

MIND‐INDEPENDENCE DISAMBIGUATED: SEPARATING THE MEAT FROM THE STRAW IN THE REALISM/ANTI‐REALISM DEBATE

The notion of mind‐independence plays a central role in the contemporary realism/anti‐realism debate, but the notion is severely ambiguous and consequently the source of considerable misunderstanding. In this paper, four kinds of mind‐independence are distinguished: ontological, causal, structural, and individuative independence. Appreciating these distinctions entails that one can reject the individuative independence of the natural world, and still maintain that the natural world is causally and structurally independent of us. This paper argues that so‐called anti‐realists, especially Rorty, Putnam, and Goodman, are not opposed to the causal and structural independence of the natural world, as is frequently alleged, but rather its individuative independence. An acceptance of these points will hopefully put an end to the prevalence of strawmen in the debate, and focus attention on meatier issues.     

Characteristic sounds facilitate visual search

In a natural environment, objects that we look for often make characteristic sounds. A hiding cat may meow, or the keys in the cluttered drawer may jingle when moved. Using a visual search paradigm, we demonstrated that characteristic sounds facilitated visual localization of objects, even when the sounds carried no location information. For example, finding a cat was faster when participants heard a meow sound. In contrast, sounds had no effect when participants searched for names rather than pictures of objects. For example, hearing “meow” did not facilitate localization of the word cat. These results suggest that characteristic sounds cross-modally enhance visual (rather than conceptual) processing of the corresponding objects. Our behavioral demonstration of object-based cross-modal enhancement complements the extensive literature on space-based cross-modal interactions. When looking for your keys next time, you might want to play jingling sounds.     

Reference to numbers in natural language

A common view is that natural language treats numbers as abstract objects, with expressions like the number of planets, eight, as well as the number eight acting as referential terms referring to numbers. In this paper I will argue that this view about reference to numbers in natural language is fundamentally mistaken. A more thorough look at natural language reveals a very different view of the ontological status of natural numbers. On this view, numbers are not primarily treated abstract objects, but rather ‘aspects’ of pluralities of ordinary objects, namely number tropes, a view that in fact appears to have been the Aristotelian view of numbers. Natural language moreover provides support for another view of the ontological status of numbers, on which natural numbers do not act as entities, but rather have the status of plural properties, the meaning of numerals when acting like adjectives. This view matches contemporary approaches in the philosophy of mathematics of what Dummett called the Adjectival Strategy, the view on which number terms in arithmetical sentences are not terms referring to numbers, but rather make contributions to generalizations about ordinary (and possible) objects. It is only with complex expressions somewhat at the periphery of language such as the number eight that reference to pure numbers is permitted.     

A CULTURAL DIFFERENCE IN VISUAL MEMORY: ON LE VOIT,ON NE LE VOIT PLUS

Further to the debate between Kearins (1978) and Drinkwater (1978), visual memory skills of Aboriginal and white Australian children were examined using Drinkwater's version of Kim's game with desert Aboriginal and rural white children. Older children remembered more than younger ones, and Aboriginal children recalled more natural objects than white children. There was no difference between the groups in recall of manufactured objects, nor between recall of manufactured and natural objects within each group. Aboriginal children remembered significantly more objects overall than white children when the task was first administered. On a second occasion, after a procedure designed to orient children towards the use of predominantly visual rather than verbal memorising strategies, there was no significant difference between the groups.     

Aquinas on Natural Law and the Virtues in Biblical Context Homosexuality as a Test Case

Marriagelike homosexual relationships expose a division among ethicists following Aquinas. Those emphasizing natural law may call such relationships unnatural; those emphasizing the virtues may approve of relationships fostering love and justice. Natural law, the virtues, and homosexuality all show up in Aquinas's Commentary on Romans —untranslated and hardly cited. Romans 1:18 opens a discussion of justice. Verse 20 provides Aquinas's chief warrant for natural law. Verse 26 applies virtue and law to "the vice against nature." But Aquinas's account also depends on Paul as an exemplar of virtue and on Aquinas's high regard for the Bible. Aquinas deploys natural law as a mode of biblical exegesis, not an alternative to it. In the De potentia , Aquinas considers how to proceed when nature and Scripture seem to conflict. The account does not settle, but rather makes more room for, dispute.     

Ontological categories guide young children's inductions of word meaning: object terms and substance terms

Three experiments assessed the possibility, suggested by Quine (1960, 1969) among others, that the ontology underlying natural language is induced in the course of language learning, rather than constraining learning from the beginning. Specifically, we assessed whether the ontological distinction between objects and non-solid substances conditions projection of word meanings prior to the child's mastery of count/mass syntax. Experiments 1 and 2 contrasted unfamiliar objects with unfamiliar substances in a word-learning task. Two-year-old subjects' projection of the novel word to new objects respected the shape and number of the original referent. In contrast, their projection of new words for non-solid substances ignored shape and number. There were no effects of the child's knowledge of count/mass syntax, nor of the syntactic context in which the new word was presented. Experiment 3 revealed that children's natural biases in the absence of naming do not lead to the same pattern of results. We argue that these data militate against Quine's conjecture.     

ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

This paper attempts to formulate dynamics based on clinical material from family sessions rather than based on individual reconstruction. It is believed that the identified adolescent patient regresses with narcissistic symptoms because, in the struggle for independence, he upsets the family equilibrium. The parents emerge from their adolescence with low self-esteem and the need for the support of external objects. The adolescent's separateness from the family recreates the problem for the parents and prevents his individual growth as well as his separation from the family.     

How do humans group non-rigid objects in multiple object tracking?: Evidence from grouping by self-rotation

Previous studies on perceptual grouping found that people can use spatiotemporal and featural information to group spatially separated rigid objects into a unit while tracking moving objects. However, few studies have tested the role of objects’ self-motion information in perceptual grouping, although it is of great significance to the motion perception in the three-dimensional space. In natural environments, objects always move in translation and rotation at the same time. The self-rotation of the objects seriously destroys objects’ rigidity and topology, creates conflicting movement signals and results in crowding effects. Thus, this study sought to examine the specific role played by self-rotation information on grouping spatially separated non-rigid objects through a modified multiple object tracking (MOT) paradigm with self-rotating objects. Experiment 1 found that people could use self-rotation information to group spatially separated non-rigid objects, even though this information was deleterious for attentive tracking and irrelevant to the task requirements, and people seemed to use it strategically rather than automatically. Experiment 2 provided stronger evidence that this grouping advantage did come from the self-rotation per se rather than surface-level cues arising from self-rotation (e.g. similar 2D motion signals and common shapes). Experiment 3 changed the stimuli to more natural 3D cubes to strengthen the impression of self-rotation and again found that self-rotation improved grouping. Finally, Experiment 4 demonstrated that grouping by self-rotation and grouping by changing shape were statistically comparable but additive, suggesting that they were two different sources of the object information. Thus, grouping by self-rotation mainly benefited from the perceptual differences in motion flow fields rather than in deformation. Overall, this study is the first attempt to identify self-motion as a new feature that people can use to group objects in dynamic scenes and shed light on debates about what entities/units we group and what kinds of information about a target we process while tracking objects.     

The Concept of Miracle

The concept of miracle has often been regarded as irreconcilable with the concept of natural law. But this contradiction applies only to an understanding of a miracle as a break of natural law. Such a violation would destroy the assertion of natural law, because its universal claim does not permit exceptions. However, the idea of miracle need not be conceived in this way, though it has often been done since medieval times. Augustine thought of miracles simply as unusual events that contradict our accustomed views of the course of nature but not nature itself. According to that definition of miracle, no contradiction of natural laws need be assumed. It is sufficient to regard unusual occurrences as "signs" of God's special activity in creation.     

Ambiguity in perception and experimentation

Bruno and Cutting (1988) varied four monocular cues to perceived depth in a factorial design. Subjects judged the distance between test objects. Given main effects in the analysis of variance, the authors concluded that the perceivers integrated the four different sources of information, as opposed to simply selecting a single source. Given no interactions in the analysis of variance, the authors concluded that the integration process was additive rather than multiplicative. The ambiguity inherent in Bruno and Cutting's experiments and analyses is discussed. As presented, their results did not provide evidence for integration of depth cues or evidence for additivity, independence, and parallel processing of the cues. An additional analysis of the distribution of the rating judgments given by their subjects, however, provides some evidence for integration of the cues. The fuzzy logical model of perception (FLMP) is extended to describe perceptual recognition of depth. The model assumes independence of the cues during feature evaluation and a nonadditive integration process in which the least ambiguous cues have the greatest impact on the judgment. The FLMP is contrasted with a model assuming additivity of the cues. Because both models describe the results equally well, it remains for future researchers to provide definitive tests between the models.     

Icebreakers: Environmentalism and Natural Aesthetics

ABSTRACT What have natural aesthetics and environmentalism in common? Not much if the former deals with nature as if it were an artwork or a gallery of art objects, or if the latter grounds the protection of nature in consequentialist terms. Suppose, however, one adopts a non-consequentialist environmentalism which, further, stakes out a primary view of nature as terrain rather than as habitat; i.e., a view which is not biocentric (life-centred), let alone anthropocentric. This environmentalism is rooted in the belief that we are prima facie bound not to interfere in any of the world undefined by culture whether or not it supports life. There is a reason forbidding us from strip-mining the far side of the moon, say, even though no habitat is thereby destroyed, nor is there any blight creating visual offence to those immediately affected. To furnish the reason for such an ‘acentric’environmentalism, one needs a natural aesthetic. Why? By elimination, because the stock appeals grounding any moral stance—to rights or interests or happiness or autonomy—are unavailable. The ‘subject’of an acentric environmentalism is insensate. But an ‘acentric’aesthetic seems even more curious than its environmentalist dependent. It would entail an aesthetic viewpoint indifferent to human scale and perspective, the very factors which underwrite any cultural aesthetic. So, is such an aesthetic possible? The barest glimpse of how it might look concludes this paper.     

Intentionality and Presence: On the Intrinsic Of-ness of Consciousness from a Transcendental-Phenomenological Perspective

This paper discusses the nature of consciousness?? intrinsic intentionality from a transcendental-phenomenological viewpoint. In recent philosophy of mind the essentially intentional character of consciousness has become obscured because the latter is predominantly understood in terms of ??qualia?? or the ??what-it-is-like-ness?? of mental states and it is hard to see why such subjective ??feels??, of all things, could bestow states with objective reference. As the paper attempts to demonstrate, this is an inadequate understanding of consciousness, which should instead be defined in terms of presence. Consciousness essentially takes place as presence-of, i.e., consists in something coming to appearance. This presence-of is not only a fundamental, irreducible phenomenon, but also in a radical sense un-naturalisable. Naturalism only knows ??nature??, as the world of objects, and the question of intentionality then seems to be how certain inner-worldly objects can be ??representations?? of other inner-worldly objects. In fact, no object is ever intrinsically ??about?? anything. This is exclusively the nature of subjectivity qua consciousness, which is not an object alongside other objects but rather exists as the manifestation of objects.     

Attention to overlapping objects: detection and discrimination of luminance changes

Selective attention to 1 of 2 overlapping objects was assessed in a cuing paradigm. Participants detected or identified targets that appeared in 1 of 6 possible target locations (3 on each object). Significant cuing effects for the simple detection of such targets using both reaction time and sensitivity measures of performance were found. Cuing effects were consistently greater when the participants were required to identify some aspect of the target even when the tasks (detection vs. identification) were equated for overall performance level. These differences in cuing effects between tasks were much reduced if the target locations were no longer grouped into 2 objects. It is suggested that identical stimuli can elicit differing attentional mechanisms depending on task type (rather than task difficulty) and that these mechanisms differ in the nature of the representation of the visual world.     

BLOCKING THE PATH FROM VAGUENESS TO FOUR DIMENSIONALISM*

There is a general form of an argument which I call the ‘argument from vagueness’ which attempts to show that objects persist by perduring, via the claim that vagueness is never ontological in nature and thus that composition is unrestricted. I argue that even if we grant that vagueness is always the result of semantic indeterminacy rather than ontological vagueness, and thus also grant that composition is unrestricted, it does not follow that objects persist by perduring. Unrestricted mereological composition lacks the power to ensure that there exist instantaneous objects that wholly overlap persisting objects at times, and thus lacks the power to ensure that there exists anything that could be called a temporal part. Even if we grant that such instantaneous objects exist, however, I argue that it does not follow that objects perdure. To show this I briefly outline a coherent version of three dimensionalism that grants just such an assumption. Thus considerations pertaining to the nature of vagueness need not lead us inevitably to accept perdurantism.     

The Mathematical Event: Mapping the Axiomatic and the Problematic in School Mathematics

Traditional philosophy of mathematics has been concerned with the nature of mathematical objects rather than events. This traditional focus on reified objects is reflected in dominant theories of learning mathematics whereby the learner is meant to acquire familiarity with ideal mathematical objects, such as number, polygon, or tangent. I argue that the concept of event—rather than object—better captures the vitality of mathematics, and offers new ways of thinking about mathematics education. In this paper I draw on two different but related theories of event articulated in the philosophies of Alain Badiou and Gilles Deleuze to argue that the central activity of ‘problem solving’ in mathematics education should be recast in terms of a problematic of events.     

The Relativity Of Color

C. L. Hardin led a recent development in the philosophical literature on color in which research from visual science is used to argue that colors are not properties of physical objects, but rather are mental processes. I defend J. J. C. Smart's physicalism, which claims that colors are physical properties of objects, against this attack. Assuming that every object has a single veridical (that is, nonillusory) color, it seems that physicalism must give a specification of veridical color in terms natural to physics, independently of our interests. Hardin argues that since physicalism doesn't give us any such specification of veridical color, this view is false. However, this argument assumes a mistaken account of veridical color. I show physicalism can appeal to an alternative account, according to which veridical color is characterized in terms of favored conditions of perceptual access, independently of any specification of the physical nature of color.     

Kant on animal and human pleasure

Feeling, for any animal, is a faculty of comparing objects or representations with regard to whether they promote its vital powers (pleasure) or hinder them (displeasure). But whereas these comparisons presuppose a species-concept in non-rational animals, nature has not equipped the human being with a universal principle or life-form that would determine what agrees or disagrees with it. As humans, we must determine our mode of life for ourselves. Contrary to other interpretations, I argue that this places the human capacity for pleasure and displeasure outside of nature and in a realm of spirit.     

Feature and Configuration in Face Processing: Japanese Are More Configural Than Americans

Previous work suggests that Asians allocate more attention to configuration information than Caucasian Americans do. Yet this cultural variation has been found only with stimuli such as natural scenes and objects that require both feature‐ and configuration‐based processing. Here, we show that the cultural variation also exists in face perception—a domain that is typically viewed as configural in nature. When asked to identify a prototypic face for a set of disparate exemplars, Japanese were more likely than Caucasian Americans to use overall resemblance rather than feature matching. Moreover, in a speeded identity‐matching task, Japanese were more accurate than Americans in identifying the spatial configuration of features (e.g., eyes). Together, these findings underscore the robustness of culture’s influences on cognition.