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1.
Rauprich O 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2008,29(1):43-71
The notion of common morality plays a prominent role in some of the most influential theories of biomedical ethics. Here,
I focus on Beauchamp and Childress’s models in the fourth and fifth edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics as well as on a revision that Beauchamp proposed in a recent article. Although there are significant differences in these
works that require separate analysis, all include a role for common morality as starting point and normative framework for
theory construction in combination with a coherence theory of moral justification. I defend to some extent the existence and
empirical significance of common morality, as delineated by Beauchamp and Childress in different versions, but criticize its
normative role. It is neither convincing as a moral foundation nor well compatible with a standard coherentist justification.
I suggest that the authors should give up the foundational account for a more modest account of common morality as resource
of well-established moral insights and experiences, which have proved generally valid but neither sufficient nor infallible.
Beauchamp’s latest proposal appears as a step in this direction; indeed, it may be the beginning of the end of his common-morality
theory.
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Oliver RauprichEmail: |
2.
Ronald A. Lindsay 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2009,30(1):31-43
Even if there is a common morality, many would argue that it provides little guidance in resolving moral disputes, because
universally accepted norms are both general in content and few in number. However, if we supplement common morality with commonly
accepted factual beliefs and culture-specific norms and utilize coherentist reasoning, we can limit the range of acceptable
answers to disputed issues. Moreover, in the arena of public policy, where one must take into account both legal and moral
norms, the constraints on acceptable answers will narrow the extent of reasonable disagreement even further. A consideration
of the debate over legalization of assisted dying supports this claim.
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Ronald A. LindsayEmail: |
3.
We have two aims in this paper. The first is negative: to demonstrate the problems in Bernard Gert’s account of common morality,
in particular as it applies to professional morality. The second is positive: to suggest a more satisfactory explanation of
the moral basis of professional role morality, albeit one that is broadly consistent with Gert’s notion of common morality,
but corrects and supplements Gert’s theory. The paper is in three sections. In the first, we sketch the main features of Gert’s
account of common morality in general. In the second, we outline Gert’s explanation of the source of professional moral rules
and demonstrate its inadequacy. In the third section, we provide an account of our own collectivist needs-based view of the
source of the role-moral obligations of many professional roles, including those of health care professionals.
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Andrew AlexandraEmail: |
4.
John D. Arras 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2009,30(1):11-30
In this commentary, I critically discuss the respective views of Gert and Beauchamp–Childress on the nature of so-called common
morality and its promise for enriching ethical reflection within the field of bioethics. Although I endorse Beauchamp and
Childress’ shift from an emphasis on ethical theory as the source of moral norms to an emphasis on common morality, I question
whether rouging up common morality to make it look like some sort of ultimate and universal foundation for morality, untouched
by the dialectics of time and reflective equilibrium, was an equally good move. As for Gert’s magisterial conception of common
morality, I conclude that certain elements of his system are controversial at best and woefully inadequate at worst. He has
a tendency to find in common morality what he himself put there, and his highly restricted conception of duties of assistance
strikes this reader as ad hoc, inadequately defended, and unworthy of a project whose goal is to lessen the amount of misery
in the world.
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John D. ArrasEmail: |
5.
6.
George Sher 《Philosophia》2008,36(2):223-226
In his response to my essay “Out of Control,” Neil Levy contests my claims that (1) we are often responsible for acts that
we do not consciously choose to perform, and that (2) despite the absence of conscious choice, there remains a relevant sense
in which these actions are within our control. In this reply to Levy, I concede that claim (2) is linguistically awkward but
defend the thought that it expresses, and I clarify my defense of claim (1) by distinguishing my position from attributionism.
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George SherEmail: |
7.
John Lemos 《Philosophia》2006,34(1):85-93
In this article it is assumed that human goodness is to be judged with respect to how well one does at practical reasoning. It is acknowledged that (1) there is a difference between moral practical reasoning (MPR) and prudential practical reasoning (PPR) and (2) what these would recommend sometimes conflict. A distinction is then made between absolute PPR and relative PPR and it is argued that doing well at absolute PPR is always consistent with MPR. It is also argued that since it is more reasonable to assess prudential practical rationality in terms of the absolute standard than the relative standard, there is no conflict between the demands of MPR (morality) and PPR (self-interest).
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John LemosEmail: |
8.
Mark Moyer 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(3):299-322
The fission of a person involves what common sense describes as a single person surviving as two distinct people. Thus, say
most metaphysicians, this paradox shows us that common sense is inconsistent with the transitivity of identity. Lewis’s theory
of overlapping persons, buttressed with tensed identity, gives us one way to reconcile the common sense claims. Lewis’s account,
however, implausibly says that reference to a person about to undergo fission is ambiguous. A better way to reconcile the
claims of common sense, one that avoids this ambiguity, is to recognize branching persons, persons who have multiple pasts
or futures.
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Mark MoyerEmail: |
9.
Stacy Lee Burns 《Human Studies》2009,32(2):109-131
This paper examines the intersection of technical law and common sense reasoning in small claims arbitration, a distinctive
and increasingly prevalent kind of legal work. Following (Garfinkel, Ethnomethodology’s program: Working out Durkheim’s aphorism, 2002), the study explores the “reform of technical reason” and what a “just outcome” means by focusing on the arbitration of actual
small claims cases and how technical-legal and non-technical/informal resources are brought into alignment to produce dispute
resolution. The arbitrator elicits discussions that establish consensual and commonplace formulations of “the case,” formulations
that foreshadow its disposition as technical matters of law. The research demonstrates how formal structures of equity, evenhandedness,
and decisions without bias have their production in vivo, and how a just and fair course becomes a “just outcome.”
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Stacy Lee BurnsEmail: |
10.
A. D. Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(2):197-212
This paper considers the claim that perceptual experience is “transparent”, in the sense that nothing other than the apparent
public objects of perception are available to introspection by the subject of such experience. I revive and strengthen the
objection that blurred vision constitutes an insuperable objection to the claim, and counter recent responses to the general
objection. Finally the bearing of this issue on representationalist accounts of the mind is considered.
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A. D. SmithEmail: |
11.
Anna Bjurman Pautz 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):147-156
There seems to be a perfectly ordinary sense in which different speakers can use an empty name to talk about the same thing.
Call this fictional coreference. It is a constraint on an adequate theory of empty names that it provide a satisfactory account of fictional coreference.
The main claim of this paper is that the pretense theory of empty names does not respect this constraint.
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Anna Bjurman PautzEmail: |
12.
Jon Tresan 《The Journal of Ethics》2009,13(1):51-72
‘Internalism’ is used in metaethics for a cluster of claims which bear a family resemblance. They tend to link, in some distinctive
way—typically modal, mereological, or causal—different parts of the normative realm, or the normative and the psychological.
The thesis of this paper is that much metaethical mischief has resulted from philosophers’ neglect of the distinction between
two different features of such claims. The first is the modality of the entire claim. The second is the relation between the
items specified in the claim. In part one I explain this distinction and the problems neglecting it may cause. In part two
I show that it has been neglected, and has caused those problems, at least with respect to one version of internalism. That
is judgment internalism, which claims that moral beliefs are necessarily related to pro- or con-attitudes; e.g., that if you
believe you ought to x you must have some motivation to x. The considerations standardly adduced in favor of judgment internalism
support only a version which lacks the metaethical implications typically attributed to it, at least so far as anyone has
shown. Proponents and opponents of judgment internalism fail to realize this because of their neglect of the modality/relation
distinction. I illustrate by considering discussions of judgment internalism by Russ Shafer-Landau, Simon Blackburn, James
Dreier, David Brink, and others.
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Jon TresanEmail: |
13.
Richard Fumerton 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):67-76
In this paper I argue that there is no viable alternative to construing our knowledge and justified belief as resting on a
foundation restricted to truths about our internal states. Against Williamson and others I defend the claim that the internal
life of a cognizer really does constitute a special sort of cognitive home that is importantly different from the rest of
what we think we know and justifiably believe.
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Richard FumertonEmail: |
14.
Kurt Mosser 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):1-20
Kant’s reputation for making absolutist claims about universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of experience
are put here in the broader context of his goals for the Critical philosophy. It is shown that within that context, Kant’s
claims can be seen as considerably more innocuous than they are traditionally regarded, underscoring his deep respect for
“common sense” and sharing surprisingly similar goals with Wittgenstein in terms of what philosophy can, and at least as importantly
cannot, provide.
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Kurt MosserEmail: |
15.
Lisa Warenski 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):403-426
This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a priori is understood in
a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical
indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted
in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori accords with
the naturalist’s commitment to scientific methodology in that it allows for apriori-justified claims to be sensitive to further
conceptual developments and the expansion of evidence. The fallibilist apriorist allows that an a priori claim is revisable
in only a purely epistemic sense. This modal claim is weaker than what is required for a revisability thesis to establish
empiricism, so fallibilist apriorism represents a distinct position.
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Lisa WarenskiEmail: |
16.
17.
Anna Mahtani 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):171-180
Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is
unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through.
The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject
two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.
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Anna MahtaniEmail: |
18.
Patricia Sheridan 《Sophia》2007,46(3):263-275
Hutcheson’s theory of morality shares far more common ground with Clarke’s morality than is generally acknowledged. In fact,
Hutcheson’s own view of his innovations in moral theory suggest that he understood moral sense theory more as an elaboration
and partial correction to Clarkean fitness theory than as an outright rejection of it. My aim in this paper will be to illuminate
what I take to be Hutcheson’s grounds for adopting this attitude toward Clarkean fitness theory. In so doing, I hope to bring
to light an otherwise unexpected continuity between moral sense theory and the moral rationalism to which it is usually opposed,
and, in so doing, draw attention to the anti-sceptical realism that lies at the heart of both accounts.
相似文献
Patricia SheridanEmail: |
19.
Andrew Reisner 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):257-272
In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e.
the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative,
but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons
for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of a strict variety remains the default view
in much of the debate concerning normative reasons for belief. Strict versions of evidentialism are inconsistent with the
view that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief.
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Andrew ReisnerEmail: |
20.
Shai Frogel 《Argumentation》2009,23(3):397-408
Chaim Perelman invokes the idea of “universal audience” for explaining the nature of philosophical argumentation as rational
rhetoric. As opposed to this view, centuries before Perelman, Socrates argues that philosophy should be conducted as a dialogue
between concrete individuals with very specific qualities. The paper presents these different views in order to claim that
the philosopher addresses neither a universal audience nor a particular other, but mainly and essentially the philosopher
herself/himself. This brings to light the problem of self-deception as a central problem of philosophical thinking. In posing
this view the paper uses Nietzsche’s definition of “the will to truth” as the will not to deceive, not even myself.
相似文献
Shai FrogelEmail: |