How serious are common childhood fears? II. The parent's point of view

In an earlier study [Muris, P., Merckelbach, H., Mayer, B., & Prins, E. (1999). How serious are common childhood fears? Behaviour Research and Therapy, in press.], the severity of common childhood fears was explored by means of a structured child interview measuring specific phobias as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. It was found that in a substantial minority of the children, specific fears reflect clinically significant phobias. The present study examined further the connection between childhood fears and specific phobias by interviewing children's parents. The Diagnostic Interview Schedule for Children was administered to the parents of 160 children aged 4-12 years. In line with our previous study, results indicate that a sizable proportion of children (i.e. 17.6%) met the full criteria for specific phobia.     

How serious are expressions of protected values?

People think that some things that they value should be protected from trade-offs with other things. For example, people think that no economic gain is great enough to justify clear-cutting old-growth forest. The authors probed the stability of these protected values (PVs) in several ways. Subjects were asked to think of counterexamples, and this had some effect on PVs. Subjects were then asked how they would resolve conflicts between 2 PVs. Resolutions did not differ from those between other values, but subjects tended to feel that conflicts between PVs did not occur in reality. Despite people's claims that PVs are unchanged by variation in quantity, expression of PVs was reduced when the magnitude or probability of the violation of a PV was smaller. In summary, PVs appear to be labile and amenable to challenge. Despite earlier concerns, apparent PVs may not always preclude the use of valuation measures in cost-effectiveness analysis or negotiated agreement on controversial issues.     

How serious a fallacy is inconsistency?

Consistency is often pictured as an indispensable requisite for rationality. The paper argues that this is overly rigoristic. Inconsistency can be treated as a matter of isolable singularities rather than an all-destructive disaster. The paper, supports and illustrates a perspective on which consistency can be seen as a desideratum rather than a totaly non-negotiable demand. The argumentation of the paper casts consistency in the role of a cognitive ideal rather than a sine qua non condition of rational process.     

How stable are borderline diagnoses?

Borderline diagnostic terms are still being routinely and rather unreliably made in many centers. In the present sample of probands with various borderline states other diagnoses from the entire spectrum of psychiatric disorders, especially schizophrenia, were also found. Thus, in those cases with multiple admissions, a borderline diagnosis demonstrated only little stability over time. There was a strong tendency for borderline cases towards a diagnosis of schizophrenia and vice versa. Indeed, probands, with both borderline and schizophrenic diagnoses had no clear-cut course characteristics. It is suggested that the criteria of DSM-III for borderline personality disturbance be provisionally used for research purposes.     

How automatic are crossmodal correspondences?

The last couple of years have seen a rapid growth of interest (especially amongst cognitive psychologists, cognitive neuroscientists, and developmental researchers) in the study of crossmodal correspondences – the tendency for our brains (not to mention the brains of other species) to preferentially associate certain features or dimensions of stimuli across the senses. By now, robust empirical evidence supports the existence of numerous crossmodal correspondences, affecting people’s performance across a wide range of psychological tasks – in everything from the redundant target effect paradigm through to studies of the Implicit Association Test, and from speeded discrimination/classification tasks through to unspeeded spatial localisation and temporal order judgment tasks. However, one question that has yet to receive a satisfactory answer is whether crossmodal correspondences automatically affect people’s performance (in all, or at least in a subset of tasks), as opposed to reflecting more of a strategic, or top-down, phenomenon. Here, we review the latest research on the topic of crossmodal correspondences to have addressed this issue. We argue that answering the question will require researchers to be more precise in terms of defining what exactly automaticity entails. Furthermore, one’s answer to the automaticity question may also hinge on the answer to a second question: Namely, whether crossmodal correspondences are all ‘of a kind’, or whether instead there may be several different kinds of crossmodal mapping (e.g., statistical, structural, and semantic). Different answers to the automaticity question may then be revealed depending on the type of correspondence under consideration. We make a number of suggestions for future research that might help to determine just how automatic crossmodal correspondences really are.     

How automatic are social judgments?

Do people infer personality dispositions automatically when they encode behavior? Tulving's encoding-specificity paradigm was adapted to test three operational indicants of automatism: absence of intention, of interference from other mental activity, and of awareness. Recruited for a digit-recall study, subjects read sentences describing actions during the retention interval of either an easy or a difficult digit recall task. Later, sentence recall was cued by (a) disposition cues, (b) strong semantic associates to the sentence actor, or (c) words representing the gist of the sentence, or (d) sentence recall was not cued. Awareness was measured immediately after the last sentence was read. Disposition-cued recall was higher than (b) or (d) and was unaffected by digit recall difficulty. Awareness of making dispositional inferences was only weakly correlated with disposition-cued recall. Results suggest that disposition inferences occurred at encoding, without intention, without interference by differential drain on processing capacity, and with little awareness. Thus, making dispositional inferences seems to be largely, but not entirely, automatic.     

How are scientific corrections made?

This paper provides examples drawn from the author’s experience that support the conclusion that errors and deceptions in archival science are often not easily or quickly corrected. The difficulty in correcting errors and deceptions needs wider recognition if it is to be overcome. In addition, the paper discusses how subtle abuses introduce errors into the archival literature.     

How are qualia coupled to functions?

WHAT DETERMINES THE NATURE OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE: associated behavioural functions or mediating neural activity? A recent analysis by Hurley and No? of a variety of cases of behavioural and neural plasticity shows that, under different conditions, either can predominate. This adds to other efforts to transfer the doctrine of functionalism from philosophical debate to empirical scrutiny, where it is hoped that it may eventually be resolved.     

How many hindsight biases are there?

The answer is three: questioning a conceptual default assumption in hindsight bias research, we argue that the hindsight bias is not a unitary phenomenon but consists of three separable and partially independent subphenomena or components, namely, memory distortions, impressions of foreseeability and impressions of necessity. Following a detailed conceptual analysis including a systematic survey of hindsight characterizations in the published literature, we investigated these hindsight components in the context of political elections. We present evidence from three empirical studies that impressions of foreseeability and memory distortions (1) show hindsight effects that typically differ in magnitude and sometimes even in direction, (2) are essentially uncorrelated, and (3) are differentially influenced by extraneous variables. A fourth study found similar dissociations between memory distortions and impressions of necessity. All four studies thus provide support for a separate components view of the hindsight bias. An important consequence of such a view is that apparent contradictions in research findings as well as in theoretical explanations (e.g., cognitive vs. social-motivational) might be alleviated by taking differences between components into account. We also suggest conditions under which the components diverge or converge.     

How are pictures registered in memory?

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that pictorial memory is much less dependent on rehearsal than is verbal memory. Experiment I examined incidental learning since this is assumed to reflect learning with little or no rehearsal. Following a classification task, intentional and incidental learning for pictures and for words was compared. The superiority of pictorial memory was especially marked in incidental learning. Experiment II showed that this result was not due to differences in the amount of processing required to classify pictures and words. RTs to classify words and pictures did not differ, and incidental learning was again superior for pictures. In Experiment III rehearsal opportunity was restricted by a concurrent task during presentation of word and picture lists, and the decrement was very much greater for word learning than for picture learning. It was concluded that manipulation of rehearsal opportunity has relatively little effect on pictorial memory.     

How are cognitive and physical difficulty compared?

Tasks that require less physical effort are generally preferred over more physically demanding alternatives. Similarly, tasks that require less mental effort are generally preferred over more mentally demanding alternatives. But what happens when one must choose between tasks that entail different kinds of effort, one mainly physical (e.g., carrying buckets) and the other mainly mental (e.g., counting)? We asked participants to choose between a bucket-carrying task and a counting task. Our participants were less likely to choose the bucket task when it required a long reach rather than a short reach, and our participants were also less likely to choose the bucket task the smaller the final count value. We tested the hypothesis that subjective task durations provided a common currency for comparing the difficulties of the two kinds of tasks. We found that this hypothesis provided a better account of the task choice data than did an account that relied on objective task durations. Our study opens the door to a new problem in the study of attention, perception, and psychophysics—judging the difficulty of different kinds of tasks. The approach we took to this problem, which relies on two-alternative forced choice along with modeling the basis for the choice, may prove useful in future investigations.     

How lonely are gay and lesbian youth?

UCLA Loneliness Scale (8-item version) scores in a sample of 384 gay and lesbian adolescents support the hypothesis that such youths are especially vulnerable to loneliness.     

How central are judgment and agency to epistemology?

Ernest Sosa’s Judgment and Agency marks an important change from his earlier work in epistemology. While belief was at the center of his earlier approach to epistemological issues, a far more sophisticated mental state, judgment, plays the central role here. This paper examines the significance of this change in focus, and argues that there is reason to favor the earlier belief-centered approach over this new judgment-centered account.