‘Freud's speculations in ethnology’: A reflection on anthropology's encounter with psychoanalysis

In the early 20th century, many analysts – Freud and Ernest Jones in particular – were confident that cultural anthropologists would demonstrate the universal nature of the Oedipus complex and other unconscious phenomena. Collaboration between the two disciplines, however, was undermined by a series of controversies surrounding the relationship between psychology and culture. This paper re‐examines the three episodes that framed anthropology's early encounter with psychoanalysis, emphasizing the important works and their critical reception. Freud's Totem and Taboo began the interdisciplinary dialogue, but it was Bronislaw Malinowski's embrace of psychoanalysis – a development anticipated through a close reading of his personal diaries – that marked a turning point in relations between the two disciplines. Malinowski argued that an avuncular (rather than an Oedipal) complex existed in the Trobriand Islands. Ernest Jones’ critical dismissal of this theory alienated Malinowski from psychoanalysis and ended ethnographers’ serious exploration of Freudian thought. A subsequent ethnographic movement, ‘culture and personality,’ was erroneously seen by many anthropologists as a product of Freudian theory. When ‘culture and personality’ was abandoned, anthropologists believed that psychoanalysis had been discredited as well – a narrative that still informs the historiography of the discipline and its rejection of psychoanalytical theory.     

Freedom – the abyssal ground of Freudian psychoanalysis

Freedom is an a priori condition for the way in which Freudian psychoanalysis thematizes the development, the structure and the dynamics of our psychic life; the human psyche is essentially constituted by freedom. What this really means is that psychoanalysis lacks a foundation or ground – both as a psychological science and as a kind of clinical treatment. Freedom is the abyssal ground of psychoanalysis.     

SOME THOUGHTS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS AND ETHICS

The author attempts to establish a framework for understanding the contribution of psychoanalysis to ethics through examining the work of certain philosophers, especially Kant. After reviewing the development of Freudian thought and going beyond the ‘psychoanalysis and/or psychiatry?’ question, he asserts that the space of the psychoanalytical cure revolves around an ethical problem. Thus, the limits of analysis should be determined by the subject's capacity for developing a structure of belief in the unconscious, with the concomitant capacity to go beyond equivocation in respect of an ethical conflict that underlies all cases where psychical suffering is manifested. Indeed, only human beings are called upon to deal with an ethical paradox “equally a logical one”which could be stated thus: there is Good in Evil and Evil in Good. This ethical paradox is the consequence of human subjection to the constituent laws of the Oedipus complex, which distances the human being, in his/her dealings with Evil and with Good, from any naturalist stance. In respect of the cure, then, we must take into account that Evil does not proceed from any particular drive‐based characteristic, but is rather the expression of specific subjection to an unconscious Other, towards which it directs its affects. Finally, the author proposes a principle that emerges from the preceding discussion: let us not impute to or place in the Other our own subjective splitting or pain at existing.     

Vicissitudes of ideas of cure in analysands and their analysts: a longitudinal interview study

This longitudinal prospective study focuses on analysands' and analysts' implicit ideas of how psychoanalysis might help analysands' psychological problems. Seven analysands and their analysts were periodically interviewed. Single ideas of cure from 75 interviews were inductively categorized. Nine distinct types of cures emerged, representing the wished-for goals of psychoanalysis, as well as the actions to achieve the wished-for changes. Each category might comprise more or less utopian ideas of wished-for cure as well as ideas of an attainable, more limited cure, or combinations of these. The utopian ideas of wished-for cures persisted throughout the psychoanalytic process for more than half the analysands and analysts. The abandonment of these ideas was related to the experienced outcome of psychoanalysis. The relation between the theories of one analysand and her analyst is explored in depth in a case study with special emphasis on the analytic process. The study suggests that the psychoanalytic process might profit from the analyst's observance of such incongruities and an openness to work through them.     

The working alliance is St. Stephan's cathedral. Epistemological considerations of the Heinrich Deserno lecture, "Analysis and the working alliance" (1990)]

With the term "working alliance", as it was discussed by R.R. Greenson in noted publications, an understanding of work was introduced that corresponds with the dominant contemporary idea of work as a purely instrumental and technical process which is alien to the original "spirit" of Freudian Analysis. The author shows that psychological work, which in analysis is carried out cooperatively by analyst and analysand, needs transference to be successful, a transference with the help of which the analysand is able to discuss and specify his unconscious psychological conflicts. In Greenson's understanding the working alliance--supposedly neurosis-free--appeals to the rational part of the ego and introduces a normative understanding of reality. The transference relationship, by contrast, gives room to those psychic forces which refuse to obey the authority of the ego and its tendencies to conventionalize and suppress unconscious material.     

Transference Interpretations as Relationship Work

Abstract

In the development of the psychoanalytical treatment technique, a polarity has formed between interpretation and relationship. In contrast to this, the view is elaborated in this paper that interpretation is the specific relationship mode of psychoanalysis. Against the background of the object relationship theory, interpretation work provides an alternative to internalised experiences. A prerequisite is the concept, that transference is a circular process, in which the analyst and analysand both participate.     

This art of psychoanalysis

It is the art of psychoanalysis in the making, a process inventing itself as it goes, that is the subject of this paper. The author articulates succinctly how he conceives of psychoanalysis, and offers a detailed clinical illustration. He suggests that each analysand unconsciously (and ambivalently) is seeking help in dreaming his 'night terrors' (his undreamt and undreamable dreams) and his 'nightmares' (his dreams that are interrupted when the pain of the emotional experience being dreamt exceeds his capacity for dreaming). Undreamable dreams are understood as manifestations of psychotic and psychically foreclosed aspects of the personality; interrupted dreams are viewed as reflections of neurotic and other non-psychotic parts of the personality. The analyst's task is to generate conditions that may allow the analysand-with the analyst's participation-to dream the patient's previously undreamable and interrupted dreams. A significant part of the analyst's participation in the patient's dreaming takes the form of the analyst's reverie experience. In the course of this conjoint work of dreaming in the analytic setting, the analyst may get to know the analysand sufficiently well for the analyst to be able to say something that is true to what is occurring at an unconscious level in the analytic relationship. The analyst's use of language contributes significantly to the possibility that the patient will be able to make use of what the analyst has said for purposes of dreaming his own experience, thereby dreaming himself more fully into existence.     

“Coming from Afar” and “Temporarily Becoming the Patient Without Knowing it”: Two Necessary Analytic Conditions According to Ferenczi’s Later Thought

In this paper the author discusses two points regarding Ferenczi’s views of psychoanalysis. The first concerns the fact that analysts, like their patients, “come from afar” (a concept of Borgogno, 2011). The second, closely linked to the first, has to do with Ferenczi’s belief that psychoanalytical knowledge is not intellectual but visceral, seeing that if analysts are to truly understand their patients they must first “take on” their suffering in such a way as to “become the patient.” The author follows Ferenczi’s progression along these two points through his whole oeuvre, from his first psychoanalytical writings to the Clinical Diary (1932a) of the last year of his life.     

The Alchemical Oedipus: Re-Visioning the Myth

The Oedipus myth is foundational to depth psychology due to Freud’s use of Sophocles’ play Oedipus Rex in the creation of psychoanalysis. But analytical psychology’s engagement with the myth has been limited despite the importance Jung also places upon it. The absence of a developed Jungian response to Oedipus means the myth’s psychologically constructive elements have been overlooked in favour of reductive Freudian interpretations. I examine whether analytical psychology can fruitfully re-engage with Oedipus by reinterpreting his story as a paternal rebirth. This is achieved by reincorporating those parts of the myth that occur before and after the period portrayed in Oedipus Rex. Such a move reintegrates Oedipus’ father, King Laius, into the story and unveils important parallels with the alchemical trope of the king’s renewal by his son. Using Jung’s method of amplification, Oedipus is recast as Laius’ redeemer and identified with the archetype of psychological wholeness, the Self. The contention is that such an understanding of Oedipus supports a clearer recognition of the potentially generative quality of human suffering, restoring to the myth the quality of moral instruction it possessed in antiquity.     

Psychoanalytic process and thought: Convergence of Bion and Matte‐Blanco1

Using the convergence between Bion and Matte‐Blanco, in this article the author attempts to stress the view of the psychoanalytical method as promoter of expansion of the ability of the patient to think his emotional experiences. After a brief résumé of the ideas of both Bion and Matte‐Blanco, certain points of congruence between the two are emphasised: the way of perceiving the range of phenomena observed by psychoanalysis, intuition as a method for observing this field, the feelings as the raw material for thinking, and the importance of the concept of infinity in psychoanalysis. The way in which the ideas of Matte‐Blanco assist in the understanding of Bion's propositions is highlighted. Following these correlations, the author discusses certain questions pertinent to the psychoanalytical method and proposes a model in which the analyst acts as a mediator/catalyst in the process of revision of the ways in which the patient has organised his emotional experiences and the theories constructed to support these hypotheses. Samples of clinical material are presented.     

Symbols and symbolization in clinical practice and in Elisabeth Marton's film My Name was Sabina Spielrein

If symbolization can be defined, in a general way, as the operation of substitution by which something can represent something else for someone, the Freudian discovery of the unconscious introduced the idea of a process of work whereby the subject is differentiated from the object. As a consequence, the vicissitudes of symbolization are related to the vicissitudes of the drive. The clinical case of a psychotic patient treated in individual psychoanalytic psychodrama shows the possibility of overcoming violence and destructivity thanks to the work of representation and symbolization of the denied and split psychic movements. Thanks to the third party function of the leader and of the analytic setting, the individual psychoanalytical psychodrama favours psychic change. Elisabeth Marton's film illustrates this issue in so far as the destructive passion between Sabina Spielrein and Jung was partly transformed into a creative work with Freud's role as a third party.     

Careful Engagement: Can the work of Ettinger,Klein and Bion help us to understand the relational field in dementia care?

Despite a widespread focus on dementia – a focus on cause, care and cure – in both the media and on the agenda of policy makers, it is not always clear what is understood about the relational field in professional dementia care. This article draws on ideas that have their origins in psychoanalysis as a way in to exploring the affective and bodily encounters that can take place in a residential care setting. Informed by the work of Klein, Bion and Ettinger, the article sets out to demonstrate how connections between the professional carer and the cared-for are sometimes made, unmade and remade, and where at times the figure of the maternal might emerge in relationship to the other or to the wider organisation. Combining theory with observational vignettes, taken from an ongoing organisational study, the article suggests that to approach the work of relating from a psychoanalytical perspective can both enliven care practice and generate curiosity towards the other, both at an organisational and individual level.     

Facing the absurd: On Lev Shestov’s angel of death

2018 marks one hundred and fifty two years since the birth of the Russian religious existential thinker Lev Shestov (1866–1938), whose name is counted amongst the most influential European philosophers of the 20^th century. A paradoxical and provocative writer, Lev Shestov searched for ways to diminish the burden of psychological and existential suffering in the life of the individual. His parable about receiving ‘the mysterious gift’ of ‘a new pair of eyes’ from the Angel of Death engaged the existential problems of facing uncertainty, the unknown and death with the possibility of a creative transformation, which could allow an individual to see things outside the law of reason and ‘preconceived self-evident truths.’ Drawing on Shestov’s analysis of Dostoevsky, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, as well as Camus and Lovtsky’s observations, I argue that Shestov’s interest in the human psyche manifested in his writing, in which he often strove to ‘psychoanalyse’ his characters, found common ground with the psychoanalytical approach. However, unlike Freud’s psychoanalysis, which was grounded in reason and analytical systematisation, Shestov’s philosophy aspired to find a cure to enable an individual to withstand the pressure of the absurd reality of human existence by breaking free from the constraints of rational thought.     

Jung's analysis of Sabina Spielrein and his use of Freud's free association method

This paper examines Jung's use of Freud's free association method and his own association experiments in his analysis of Sabina Spielrein in 1904-1905. Jung's gradual rejection of the Freudian free association method is noted. By the time of their split in 1913, Jung came to view Freud's method of using associations to analyse personal complexes as reductive, limiting and backward-looking. He also felt that the Freudian method threatened the analysand by creating confusion and a regressive dependency on the analyst. Jung's early approach inclined away from personal pain in favour of analysing autonomous, impersonal and collective phenomena. The historical question is raised whether Jung's rejection of the use of the free associations of the individual analysand might be as fundamental as their well-known disagreement about Freud's belief in the central role of sexuality in neurosis.     

A development of Freudian metapsychology for schizophrenia

The author states that psychoanalysis has much to contribute to schizophrenia. Beginning with a development of Freudian metapsychology, he addresses the in‐depth psychopathological study of a session (the first on the couch) with a schizophrenic patient who hears voices and feels that he is being watched. Since the symptoms appear at the level of the heard word and the visual image – key to Freudian metapsychology – he delineates a circuit for the word and one for the image, describing a blockage in both and the consequences of these. Furthermore, with regard to the patient's progress, he demonstrates first a quantitative improvement in symptoms, and later qualitative changes in his functioning. He shows how, over a time, functioning is improved in a once‐a‐week on‐the‐couch setting after two years of face‐to‐face treatment.     

“Why do (don't) you ask?” transference and the desire (not) to know

One of the criterial distinctions of psychoanalysis is its renunciation of indoctrination through suggestion. In spite of the fact that psychoanalysis is both an organized body of knowledge and a disciplined form of interpersonal influence, it regards an analyst who tells the analysand what to think or do as essentially doing harm by substituting a new form of prejudice and alienation for the preexisting form he is attacking. Even though an analyst regards his knowledge of psychoanalytic theory as adequate at a general level, this "truth" is not an adequate mode of discourse with an individual. Why not? It is a fact that analysands often do not accept an analyst's idea. However, the fundamental problematic of clinical psychoanalysis comes precisely at the point that the analysand would accept the analyst's idea, involving the distinction between a properly psychoanalytic cure and a transference cure. Psychoanalytic theory itself holds that unreflective incorporation of another's idea about oneself comes at the expense of autonomous and spontaneous self-revelation. Despite its resolute pursuit of new truths, the aim of psychoanalysis is less concerned with attaining specific ideas about unrecognized conflicts than it is with achieving a general attitude--that self-understanding requires a capacity to admit dubious and unwanted ideas and feelings that symptoms, dreams, and free associations bring to light. This "psychoanalytic" attitude permits a new type of discourse in which the person recognizes himself or herself through expression, rather than parrotting the analyst's (or others') words, or continuing rigidly to hide the truth of desire for oneself. In the long run, psychoanalysis offers to correct a primary misunderstanding: that one can acquire a comprehensively true image of oneself. As Barratt (1988) emphasizes, this transformation is tantamount to a change in personal epistemology for the analysand and a change in epistemological theory for the culture as a whole. In our culture, most analysts and lay people alike take for granted that the ego is an agent that is to be integrated and strengthened in order to direct one's life. Likewise, the unconscious is commonly regarded as a type of savage alter ego that must be mastered by the ego. According to Lacan's critique, the ego is a snare and a delusion for the patient, however highly commended by society it may be, because its very essence is to furnish the illusion of enduring self-knowledge.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Ambivalenz und gleichschwebende Aufmerksamkeit

Starting from some aspects of a case study the clinical significance of the concept of ambivalence will be exposed. It will be shown that beyond all the different symptoms ambivalence plays an important role in evenly-suspended attention, a concept which was developed by Freud at nearly the same time as ambivalence itself. As far as this attention is not freely suspended, ambivalence means that the suspension is always threatened by the danger of a crash. When it is right, that from a psychoanalytical viewpoint the achievement of the subject lies particularly in a misachievement, in the Freudian slip, the promise of efficiency and cure in an analysis will prove itself in its failure. The young man in the case study tells the psychoanalysis about the ambivalences it is involved in and in this he is very efficient. Ambivalence as an essential part of the evenly-suspended attention will reveal itself as a strong means of deconstructing efficiency.     

Psychoanalyse und Psychotherapie, Bildung und Erziehung

Psychotherapy and psychoanalysis form a contrast – in particular in German-speaking countries – comparable to that between education and “Bildung”: psychotherapy and education intentionally and purposefully influence the patient or pupil whereas psychoanalysis and “Bildung” pursue the ideal of a development process which is to a great extent free from outside influences. The present paper aims to show that these seemingly contrasting pairs have been artificially differentiated into extremes. Both are supposed to solve the following paradoxes: the educational paradox “How is freedom possible under constraint?” and the psychoanalytical paradox “How is independence possible under dependency?” It might, however, be possible to overcome the unfruitful contrast in both cases and to keep the feared paradox in abeyance.     

On the need of fundaments in psychoanalytic thinking

The questions concerning the foundations of psychoanalytic knowledge have been pressing from the beginning. Beside as a therapeutic practice, Freud conceived psychoanalysis as a science, maintaining that like other sciences psychoanalysis should have sound empirical and conceptual fundaments. Freud claimed that there is an inseparable bond (ein Junktim) between cure and acquiring knowledge in psychoanalysis. One of his aims in developing a metapsychology (analogously to metaphysics) was to explicate the conceptual structure of psychoanalytic knowledge. After Freud psychoanalysts have not reached a consensus in the questions concerning the foundations. What kind of foundations does psychoanalytic knowledge need? Are they to be found from the psychoanalytic practice and research on the couch, or rather from metapsychological constructions? In what way should psychoanalysis rely on external scientific research? The article addresses these questions, arguing that even though psychoanalytic work and knowledge do gain justification from various external sources, in the end psychoanalysis stands on its own foundations. It is further argued that especially under the prevailing plurality of theoretical and clinical approaches, psychoanalysis does not have – and does not need – a foundation that could not be further questioned. Thus a coherentist picture of psychoanalysis is defended.