Blaming leaders for organizational accidents: Proxy logic in collective- versus individual-agency cultures

The current research investigates whether observers blame leaders for organizational accidents even when these managers are known to be causally uninvolved. Past research finds that the public blames managers for organizational harm if the managers are perceived to have personally played a causal role. The present research argues that East Asian perceivers, who are culturally oriented to focus on the causal influence of groups [Menon, T., Morris, M. W., Chiu, C., & Hong, Y. (1999). Culture and the construal of agency: Attribution to individual versus group dispositions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 701–717.], blame managers based on the behavior of the group, not only based on the behavior of the individual managers. We argue that perceivers first assign responsibility to the collectivity, the organizational unit or some group within it, and then extend responsibility to the manager representing it. We tested this proposal in a series of studies with a community sample in Japan and matched student samples of Japanese and Americans. Results show that perceivers who are culturally oriented to focus on collective-level causality (Japanese, more so than Americans; Asian Americans, more so than European Americans) blame leaders through proxy logic. Implications of this intuitive logic and of the cultural difference are discussed.     

Culture and systems of thought: holistic versus analytic cognition

The authors find East Asians to be holistic, attending to the entire field and assigning causality to it, making relatively little use of categories and formal logic, and relying on "dialectical" reasoning, whereas Westerners are more analytic, paying attention primarily to the object and the categories to which it belongs and using rules, including formal logic, to understand its behavior. The 2 types of cognitive processes are embedded in different naive metaphysical systems and tacit epistemologies. The authors speculate that the origin of these differences is traceable to markedly different social systems. The theory and the evidence presented call into question long-held assumptions about basic cognitive processes and even about the appropriateness of the process-content distinction.     

跨文化的实证法学研究：文化心理学的挑战与贡献

跨文化的实证法学研究把文化心理学的理论突破和心理学的实证方法引入到对法学基本原理的研究之中。文化心理学研究中发现的东西方文化在价值定向、道德判断和思维方式等方面的差异能够给跨文化实证法学研究带来重要的启示。在对一些重要法律问题的认识上, 例如法律中的因果关系和责任的判定、合同形成以及纠纷调解等方面, 跨文化心理学研究已经发现了显著的跨文化差异, 这些差异可能会影响到不同文化背景的人对法的认识、法的建设以及法律的应用。我们认为跨文化的实证法学研究不仅可以为法学研究提供一条新的研究路径, 更主要的是还可以为中国法学研究的国际化和国际法律纠纷提供理论指导。     

Culture and context: East Asian American and European American differences in P3 event-related potentials and self-construal

Research has demonstrated differences in social and cognitive processes between East Asians and European Americans. Whereas East Asians have been characterized as being more sensitive to situational context and attending more to the perceptual field, European Americans have been characterized as being more focused on the object and being more field independent. The goal of the present experiment was to investigate differences in neural responses to target objects and stimulus context between East Asian Americans and European Americans using a three-stimulus novelty P3 event-related potential design. As hypothesized, European Americans displayed relatively greater target P3 amplitudes, indexing attention to target events, whereas East Asian Americans displayed relatively greater novelty P3 amplitudes, indexing attention to contextually deviant events. Furthermore, the authors found that interdependent self-construal mediated the relationship between culture and the novelty P3. These findings identify a specific pattern of neural activity associated with established cultural differences in contextual sensitivity.     

Human sensitivity to the magnitude and probability of a continuous causal relation in a video game

Continuous causation, in which incremental changes in one variable cause incremental changes in another, has received little attention in the causal judgment literature. A video game was adapted for the study of continuous causality in order to examine the novel cues to causality that are present in these paradigms. The spatial proximity of an object to an "enemy detector" produced auditory responses as a function of the object's proximity. Participants' behavior was a function of the range of the effect's auditory sensitivity and the moment-to-moment likelihood of detection. This new paradigm provides a rich platform for examining the cues to causation encountered in the learning of continuous causal relations.     

Perceived causality and perceived force: Same or different?

Visually perceived interactions between objects, such as animated versions of billiard ball collisions, give rise to causal impressions, impressions that one object produces some effect in another, and force impressions, impressions that one object exerts a certain amount of force on another. In four experiments, evidence for strong divergence between these two impressions is reported. Manipulations of relative direction of motion and point of contact between the objects had different effects on the causal and force impressions (Experiment 1); delay between one object contacting another and the latter starting to move had a stronger effect on the causal impression than on the force impression (Experiment 2); a context of other moving objects significantly weakened the causal impression but not the force impression (Experiment 3); and there was an inverse relation between an impression of one object penetrating another and the amount of force the former was perceived as exerting on the latter (Experiment 4). These findings are explained in terms of differential effects of instructions on attention, and also in terms of differences in meaning between force and causality.     

Effects of grouping and attention on the perception of causality

Beyond perceiving patterns of motion in simple dynamic displays, we can also perceive higher level properties, such as causality, as when we see one object collide with another object. Although causality is a seemingly high-level property, its perception--like the perception of faces or speech--often appears to be automatic, irresistible, and driven by highly constrained and stimulus-driven rules. Here, in an exploration of such rules, we demonstrate that perceptual grouping and attention can influence the both perception of causality in ambiguous displays. We first report several types of grouping effects, based on connectedness, proximity, and common motion. We further suggest that such grouping effects are mediated by the allocation of attention, and we directly demonstrate that causal perception can be strengthened or attenuated on the basis of where observers are attending, independent of fixation. Like Michotte, we find that the perception of causality is mediated by strict visual rules. Beyond Michotte, we find that these rules operate not only over discrete objects, but also over perceptual groups, constrained by the allocation of attention.     

Culture, control, and perception of relationships in the environment

East Asian cognition has been held to be relatively holistic; that is, attention is paid to the field as a whole. Western cognition, in contrast, has been held to be object focused and control oriented. In this study East Asians (mostly Chinese) and Americans were compared on detection of covariation and field dependence. The results showed the following: (a) Chinese participants reported stronger association between events, were more responsive to differences in covariation, and were more confident about their covariation judgments; (b) these cultural differences disappeared when participants believed they had some control over the covariation judgment task; (c) American participants made fewer mistakes on the Rod-and-Frame Test, indicating that they were less field dependent; (d) American performance and confidence, but not that of Asians, increased when participants were given manual control of the test. Possible origins of the perceptual differences are discussed.     

Visual impressions of force exerted by one object on another when the objects do not come into contact

Simple animations in which one object contacts another give rise to visual impressions that the former object causes the outcome for the latter, and that the former object is exerting force on the latter. How does the impression of force relate to the impression of causality? The main aim of this research was to investigate this issue using stimuli in which there is a gap between the objects at closest approach. Delay between the first object stopping and the second object starting to move had a strong effect on reported force impressions, which is consistent with findings of research on the causal impression. However, the reported force impression was little affected by either the size of the gap or the presence and features of an object in the gap, whereas the causal impression was strongly affected by both. The findings support the conclusion that the force impression and the causal impression are distinct components of the visual interpretation of the stimulus.     

Finkish Dispositions

Many years ago, C.B. Martin drew our attention to the possibility of 'finkish' dispositions: dispositions which, if put to the test would not be manifested, but rather would disappear. Thus if x if finkishly disposed to give response r to stimulus s , it is not so that if x were subjected to stimulus r , x would give response z ; so finkish dispositions afford a counter-example to the simplest conditional analysis of dispositions. Martin went on to suggest that finkish dispositions required a theory of primitive causal powers; there, I think, he was mistaken. All that they require is an improved conditional analysis, and this improved analysis can be built upon whatever treatments of properties and of laws we may favour on other grounds.     

Activating Culture Through Persuasion Appeals: An Examination of the Bicultural Consumer

In this research, I examined how biculturals, or individuals who have been equally influenced by an East Asian and Western cultural orientation, respond to various types of persuasion appeals that promote values unique to a particular culture. In the first experiment, I found that biculturals, relative to monoculturals, tend to react favorably toward both individually and interpersonally focused appeals due to their having 2 equally developed and accessible cultural dispositions. In the second experiment, I identified boundary conditions under which having relatively equal access to both cultural dispositions leads to favorable responses. Results indicate that biculturals who tend to compartmentalize each culture react less favorably toward appeals that are both individually and interpersonally focused than biculturals who tend to integrate the 2 cultures. In other words, the former type of bicultural prefers appeals that activate one cultural disposition, whereas the latter type of bicultural favors appeals that activate both cultural dispositions. These findings are discussed in light of the growing trend toward multiculturalism and the increasing need for researchers to understand the impact of this trend on various consumer behavior issues.     

Amodal causal capture in the tunnel effect

In addition to identifying individual objects in the world, the visual system must also characterize the relationships between objects, for instance when objects occlude one another or cause one another to move. Here we explored the relationship between perceived causality and occlusion. Can one perceive causality in an occluded location? In several experiments, observers judged whether a centrally presented event involved a single object passing behind an occluder, or one object causally launching another (out of view and behind the occluder). With no additional context, the centrally presented event was typically judged as a non-causal pass, even when the occluding and disoccluding objects were different colors--an illusion known as the 'tunnel effect' that results from spatiotemporal continuity. However, when a synchronized context event involved an unambiguous causal launch, participants perceived a causal launch behind the occluder. This percept of an occluded causal interaction could also be driven by grouping and synchrony cues in the absence of any explicitly causal interaction. These results reinforce the hypothesis that causality is an aspect of perception. It is among the interpretations of the world that are independently available to vision when resolving ambiguity, and that the visual system can 'fill in' amodally.     

Measuring causal perception: connections to representational momentum?

In a collision between two objects, we can perceive not only low-level properties, such as color and motion, but also the seemingly high-level property of causality. It has proven difficult, however, to measure causal perception in a quantitatively rigorous way which goes beyond perceptual reports. Here we focus on the possibility of measuring perceived causality using the phenomenon of representational momentum (RM). Recent studies suggest a relationship between causal perception and RM, based on the fact that RM appears to be attenuated for causally 'launched' objects. This is explained by appeal to the visual expectation that a 'launched' object is inert and thus should eventually cease its movement after a collision, without a source of self-propulsion. We first replicated these demonstrations, and then evaluated this alleged connection by exploring RM for different types of displays, including the contrast between causal launching and non-causal 'passing'. These experiments suggest that the RM-attenuation effect is not a pure measure of causal perception, but rather may reflect lower-level spatiotemporal correlates of only some causal displays. We conclude by discussing the strengths and pitfalls of various methods of measuring causal perception.     

Supervenience and causal necessity

Causal necessity typically receives only oblique attention. Causal relations, laws of nature, counterfactual conditionals, or dispositions are usually the immediate subject(s) of interest. All of these, however, have a common feature. In some way, they involve the causal modality, some form of natural or physical necessity. In this paper, causal necessity is discussed with the purpose of determining whether a completely general empiricist theory can account for the causal in terms of the noncausal. Based on an examination of causal relations, laws of nature, counterfactual conditionals, and dispositions, it is argued that no reductive program devoid of essentialist commitments can account for all the phenomena that involve causal necessity. Hence, neo-Humean empiricism fails to provide a framework adequate for understanding causal necessity.I am grateful to D. M. Armstrong, Ellery Eels, Kit Fine, Philip Quinn, Elliot Sober, Chris Swoyer, Bas van Fraassen, and an anonymous Synthese referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Infant perception of causal motion produced by humans and inanimate objects

Both the movements of people and inanimate objects are intimately bound up with physical causality. Furthermore, in contrast to object movements, causal relationships between limb movements controlled by humans and their body displacements uniquely reflect agency and goal-directed actions in support of social causality. To investigate the development of sensitivity to causal movements, we examined the looking behavior of infants between 9 and 18 months of age when viewing movements of humans and objects. We also investigated whether individual differences in gender and gross motor functions may impact the development of the visual preferences for causal movements. In Experiment 1, infants were presented with walking stimuli showing either normal body translation or a “moonwalk” that reversed the horizontal motion of body translations. In Experiment 2, infants were presented with unperformable actions beyond infants’ gross motor functions (i.e., long jump) either with or without ecologically valid body displacement. In Experiment 3, infants were presented with rolling movements of inanimate objects that either complied with or violated physical causality. We found that female infants showed longer looking times to normal walking stimuli than to moonwalk stimuli, but did not differ in their looking time to movements of inanimate objects and unperformable actions. In contrast, male infants did not show sensitivity to causal movement for either category. Additionally, female infants looked longer at social stimuli of human actions than male infants. Under the tested circumstances, our findings indicate that female infants have developed a sensitivity to causal consistency between limb movements and body translations of biological motion, only for actions with previous visual and motor exposures, and demonstrate a preference toward social information.     

Cultural differences in visual attention: Implications for distraction processing

We investigated differences between participants of East Asian and Western descent in attention to and implicit memory for irrelevant words which participants were instructed to ignore while completing a target task (a Stroop Task in Experiment 1 and a 1‐back task on pictures in Experiment 2 ). Implicit memory was measured using two conceptual priming tasks (category generation in Experiment 1 and general knowledge in Experiment 2 ). Participants of East Asian descent showed reliable implicit memory for previous distractors relative to those of Western descent with no evidence of differences on target task performance. We also found differences in a Corsi Block spatial memory task in both studies, with superior performance by the East Asian group. Our findings suggest that cultural differences in attention extend to task‐irrelevant background information, and demonstrate for the first time that such information can boost performance when it becomes relevant on a subsequent task.     

How long does it take to find a cause? An online investigation of implicit causality in sentence production

Some interpersonal verbs show an implicit causality bias in favour of their subject or their object. Such a bias is generally seen in offline continuation tasks where participants are required to finish a fragment containing the verb (e.g., Peter annoyed Jane because ...). The implicit causality bias has been ascribed to the subject's focusing on the initiator of the event denoted by the verb. According to this "focusing theory" the implicit cause has a higher level of activation, at least after the connective "because" has been read. Recently, the focusing theory has been criticized by researchers who used a probe recognition or reading-time methodology. However no clear alternative has been proposed to explain the offline continuation data. In this paper, we report three experiments using an online continuation task, which showed that subjects took more time to imagine an ending when the fragment to be completed contained an anaphor that was incongruent with the verbal bias (e.g., Peter annoyed Jane because she ...). This result suggests that the offline continuation data could reflect the cognitive effort associated with finding a predicate with an agent incongruent with the implicit causality bias of a verb. In the discussion, we suggest that this effort could be related to the number of constraints that an incongruent clause must satisfy to be consistent with the causal structure of the discourse.     

Launching at a distance: The effect of spatial markers

It has been widely reported that spatial contiguity is important to judgements of causality involving one object launching another [Michotte's “launching effect” (1963, 1991)]. The present study examined the impact of different types of spatial markers on causal judgements of a distal launch (one object approaching other, stopping short of it, and the second object subsequently moving along the same trajectory). The spatial markers were objects that either partially or completely bridged the spatial gap between two objects (Experiment 1), or they were dashed lines that marked the stopping location of the first object or the starting location of the second object (Experiment 2). The presence of either objects or dashed lines could produce higher causal ratings, but the location of the marker mattered. The results suggest that altering a cause's ability to predict when the effect would occur (via a spatial marker) and the presence of a conduit for energy transmission have independent effects on causal judgements of object interaction.