Willusionism,epiphenomenalism, and the feeling of conscious will

While epiphenomenalism—i.e., the claim that the mental is a causally otiose byproduct of physical processes that does not itself cause anything—is hardly ever mentioned in philosophical discussions of free will, it has recently come to play a crucial role in the scientific attack on free will led by neuroscientists and psychologists. This paper is concerned with the connection between epiphenomenalism and the claim that free will is an illusion, in particular with the connection between epiphenomenalism and willusionism, i.e., with the thesis that there is empirical evidence for a thoroughgoing skepticism with regard to free will that is based on the claim that mental states are epiphenomena. The paper discusses four arguments for willusionism that in some form or other appeal to epiphenomenalism and argues that three of them can be discarded relatively easily. The fourth one, based on Daniel Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation and his claim that free will is an illusion because the feeling of conscious will is epiphenomenal with regard to the corresponding voluntary actions, is dealt with in more detail. The overall verdict is negative: there is no empirical evidence for any kind of epiphenomenalism that would warrant the claim that free will is an illusion. Whatever it is that makes free will the object of contention between neuroscience and philosophy, epiphenomenalism provides no reason to think that free will is an illusion.     

Slope of regard as a distance cue

It is proposed that some distance cues are learned when a perceptual parameter that varies with observation distance is regularly associated with objects whose distances are perceived because another distance cue operates. If that is the way distance cues can come into existence, it may be possible to identify a parameter that varies with distance but is not a known distance cue and to show that it functions as one. The slope of regard with which an object on the ground is viewed is such a potential distance cue. Its angle varies approximately with the reciprocal of distance. An experiment was done that showed that this slope angle functions as a distance cue. Subjects who looked through a device that altered slope angles gave estimates of the dimensions of an object on the ground. Perceived sizes, which vary inversely with distance, were found to be altered in accordance with the altered slope angle.     

On the origins of dynamical awareness

An inquiry into the origins of dynamical awareness is conducted. Particular attention is given to a theory that postulates that impressions of dynamical quantities are derived from and structured by lawful physical relations. It is shown that impressions of dynamical quantities are not generally correlated with the values that these quantities take in the equations of motion but rather are highly correlated with simple ratios of kinematic quantities or with specific kinematic features that do not specify the underlying dynamics. It is argued that kinematic information, to the extent that it is used, is used heuristically, and its availability for dynamical analysis is constrained by general principles of organization. A formal analysis of the physical organization implicit in the specification of dynamical invariants is given and compared with types of perceptual organization that are observed.     

青少年学生体像烦恼现状研究

采用自编的《青少年学生体像烦恼现状调查表》,对3121名大、中学生的形体烦恼、性别烦恼、性器官烦恼和容貌烦恼等进行抽样调查.研究表明:(1)22.3%青少年存在体像烦恼,且女性高于男性;(2)44.0%青少年肥胖指数异常,其中偏瘦的为33.7%,偏胖的为10.3%,前者男性高于女性,后者女性高于男性;(3)7.6%的学生存在形体烦恼,且女性多于男性;(4)8.9%的学生存在性别烦恼,且女性多于男性;(5)5.2%学生存在性器官烦恼,且男性多于女性;(6)5.1%学生存在容貌烦恼,男女之间没有差异.     

Is Knowledge of God a Cognitive Achievement?

This essay considers whether reformed epistemology is compatible with the claim that knowledge is a cognitive achievement. It is argued that knowledge of God is not only compatible with a more general achievement claim, but is also compatible with a much stronger achievement claim – namely, the strong achievement thesis where achievements are characterized by the overcoming of some obstacle. With respect to reformed epistemology, then, it is argued that the obstacle that is overcome is an environment that is not conducive to belief in God given the cognitive consequence of sin. This essay suggests two ways in which the agent is involved in the process of overcoming this obstacle.     

Religions and Conflicts

Many believe that a peaceful, tolerant and respectful coexistence among religions is not compatible with the conviction that only one of them is true. I argue that this ‘incompatibility problem’ (IP) is grounded in a ‘naturalistic assumption’ (NA), that is, the assumption that every subject, including religion, should be treated without taking into account that a super-natural being may exist and reveal to us an unexpected way to deal with our experience. I then argue that in matters of religion, NA is untenable and that its very opposite, which I call ‘super-naturalistic assumption’ (SA), should be adopted. My thesis is that, once SA is adopted, IP can be dismissed and that it is plausible to maintain that a peaceful, tolerant and respectful coexistence among religions is compatible with the conviction that only one of them is true.     

Human Rights and Human Dignity: A Reply to Doris Schroeder

According to Doris Schroeder, the view that human rights derive from human dignity should be rejected. She thinks that this is the case for three different reasons: the first has to do with the fact that the dominant concept of dignity is based on religious beliefs which will do no justificatory work in a secular society; the second is that the dominant secular view of dignity, which is the Kantian view, does not provide us with a justification of human rights, i.e. rights all humans have; and the third reason has to do with the fact that dignity is understood in too many different ways to provide us with a justification of human rights. It is argued in this paper that none of these reasons for separating human rights from human dignity is convincing. It is true, it will be argued, that some accounts of dignity will not be successful in justifying human rights. But there is no reason to assume that no account of human dignity is capable of doing this. In the final part of the paper a concept of human dignity is presented that could indeed provide us with a justificatory basis for human rights.     

Visual perspective influences the use of metacognitive information in temporal comparisons

Four studies test the proposition that when people look back to past selves as a means of gauging current status, the visual perspective they assume determines the kind of information that they consider in making their judgments of change. In this way, visual perspective, coupled with the kind of change for which people are looking, determines how much change is perceived. The studies demonstrate that in the first-person perspective, experiential information is weighted more heavily than content information, whereas in the third-person perspective, the converse is true. In addition, the effects of perceived change on behavior are revealed, such that greater perceived positive change is associated with behaviors that are congruent with that change, whereas greater perceived negative change is associated with behaviors that are incongruent with that change. Theoretical implications, as well as implications for behavioral interventions, are discussed.     

Dispositionality: Beyond The Biconditionals

I defend pretence hermeneutic fictionalism against the Autism Objection. The objection is this: since people with autism have no difficulty in engaging with mathematics even if they cannot pretend, it is not the case that engagement with mathematics involves pretence. I show that a previous response to the objection is inadequate as a defence of the kind of pretence hermeneutic fictionalism put forward as a semantic thesis about the discourse in question. I claim that a more general response to the Autism Objection is to deny the premise that people with autism cannot pretend. To motivate this response, I appeal to psychological studies suggesting that people with autism can understand pretence and they can pretend under certain conditions. Finally, I provide explanations for why it is the case that people with autism do not have a problem with engaging in mathematics whereas they have so much difficulty with other kinds of figurative language and pretence.     

Distinct conflict resolution deficits related to different facets of Schizophrenia

An important issue in understanding the nature of conflict processing is whether it is a unitary or multidimensional construct. One way to examine this is to study whether people with impaired conflict processing exhibit a general pattern of deficits or whether they exhibit impairments in distinct aspects of conflict processing. One group who might exhibit conflict deficits are people with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia is a heterogeneous disorder, with one way to break down the heterogeneity of schizophrenia is to examine specific symptoms. Previous research has found that specific symptoms of schizophrenia are associated with specific deficits in conflict processing. In particular, disorganization is associated with increased response conflict, alogia is associated with increased retrieval conflict, and anhedonia is associated with increased emotional conflict. Moreover, there is evidence that different types of conflict processing are unassociated with each other. This evidence suggests that conflict processing is a multidimensional construct and that different aspects of schizophrenia are associated with impairments in processing different types of conflict.     

Visual impressions of active and inanimate resistance to impact from a moving object

ABSTRACT

Images of moving objects presented on computer screens may be perceived as animate or inanimate. A simple hypothesis, consistent with much research evidence, is that objects are perceived as inanimate if there is a visible external contact from another object immediately prior to the onset of motion, and as animate if that is not the case. Evidence is reported that is not consistent with that hypothesis. Objects (targets) moving on contact from another object (launcher) were perceived as actively resisting the impact of the launcher on them if the targets slowed rapidly. Rapid slowing is consistent with the laws of mechanics for objects moving in an environment that offers friction and air resistance. Despite that, ratings of inanimate motion were lower than ratings of active resistance for objects that slowed rapidly. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that there is a perceptual impression of active (animate) resistance that is evoked by the kinematic pattern of rapid slowing from an initial speed after contact from another object.     

Indispensability and Holism

It is claimed that the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical entities (IA) works in a way that allows a proponent of mathematical realism to remain agnostic with regard to how we establish that mathematical entities exist. This is supposed to be possible by virtue of the appeal to confirmational holism that enters into the formulation of IA. Holism about confirmation is supposed to be motivated in analogy with holism about falsification. I present an account of how holism about falsification is supposed to be motivated. I argue that the argument for holism about falsification is in tension with how we think about confirmation and with two principles suggested by Quine for construing a plausible variety of holism. Finally, I show that one of Quine’s principles does not allow a proponent of mathematical realism to remain agnostic with regard to how we establish that mathematical entities exist.     

Psychoanalytic action explanation

Psychoanalysis is concerned with neurotic behaviour that counts as an action if one takes into account “repressed” mental states. Freud's paradigmatic examples are a challenge for philosophical theories of action explanation. The main problem is that such symptomatic behaviour is, in a characteristic way, irrational. In line with standard interpretations, I will recap that psychoanalytic action explanation is not in accordance with Davidson's classical reason-explanation model, and I will recall that Freud's unconsciousness is not a second mind with its own rationality but that it is non-propositional in character. However, I then will argue that this characterization is not discriminating enough to explain the dynamical unconscious and overlooks the crucial role of “counter-cathexis”. With counter-cathexis the relevant desire turns out to be a complex with two inseparable aspects (“double-aspect view”), so that the causing belief–desire pair is still part of the space of reasons, although it cannot rationalize the behaviour. Psychoanalytic action explanation is hence still Davidsonian, albeit in a modified way.     

Strong Global Supervenience is Valuable

It is generally assumed that everything that can be said about dependence with the notion of strong global supervenience can also be said with the notion of strong supervenience. It is argued here, however, that strong global supervenience has a metaphysically distinctive role to play. It is shown that when the relevant sets include relations, strong global supervenience and strong supervenience are distinct. It is then concluded that there are claims about dependence of relations that can be made with the global notion of strong supervenience but not with the “local” (individual) one.     

The Problem of Historical Rectification for Rawlsian Theory

In this paper we claim that Rawls’s theory is compatible with the absence of rectification of extremely important historical injustices within a given society. We hold that adding a new principle to justice-as-fairness may amend this problem. There are four possible objections to our claim: First, that historical rectification is not required by justice. Second, that, even when historical rectification is a matter of justice, it is not a matter of distributive justice, so that Rawls’s theory is justified in leaving it unaddressed. Third, that dealing with historical injustice is outside of the scope of ideal theory, so that even when historical rectification is required by justice, Rawls’s theory starts with the assumption that no such historical injustice has occurred. Fourth, that while historical injustice is within the scope of Rawls’s theory, there is no need for further principles of justice to deal with it, so that the correct regulation of the principles of justice-as-fairness would ensure the rectification of all relevant historical injustices of a particular society. While we offer several arguments against the first and second objections, we address the last two at length and show that both fail.     

Homelessness and the problem of containment

Homelessness is a problem that is hardly spared to any society in our modern world. Usually discussed by people concerned with social policy, sociology, public health and politics, homelessness has only quite recently begun to command the attention of professionals concerned with psychological and psychotherapeutic processes. Following from the author's experience of working therapeutically with homeless people, as well as in discussions with homeless services, the paper follows a line of thinking around homelessness that is explicitly psychodynamic in orientation. The central argument here is that homelessness is an experience that is, so to speak, waiting to happen. Homelessness is portrayed as a natural extension of an underlying experience of the sister states of uncontainment and alienation. I argue that the homeless person not only experienced a lack of containment in his earliest interactions, but has grown through life with significant difficulties in this area. Homelessness then is an extreme response to a deeper psychological reality that projects into a part of the person's life the agonies associated with uncontainment. Homelessness is the realization of an internal situation –a shifting of a personal struggle into a new and more visible stage. This view of homelessness is designed to provide an amendment to current views that privilege the roles of poverty and social exclusion in the origins of homelessness rather than as an alternative account of the origins of homelessness.     

Coherence and the Truth Connection

There is an objection to coherence theories of knowledge to the effect that coherence is not connected with truth, so that when coherence leads to truth this is just a matter of luck. Coherence theories embrace falliblism, to be sure, but that does not sustain the objection. Coherence is connected with truth by principles of justified acceptance that explain the connection between coherence and truth. Coherence is connected with truth by explanatory principle, not just luck.     

LIVING WITH THE WICKED PROBLEM OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Outlining the characteristics of “wicked” and “super‐wicked” problems, climate change is considered as a global super‐wicked problem that is primarily about the future. Being global‐ and future‐oriented makes climate change something we have to learn to live with but cannot expect to solve. Because the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science (IRAS) is a multidisciplinary society that yokes the natural and social sciences with values, it is in a position to explore strategies for living with climate change—exemplified by the articles in this section. Finally, asking “who/what is in charge,” it is suggested that in a dynamically interrelated and evolving world no one is. It is important to distinguish between good that is already created and the creative interactions that give rise to new good. In order to live with climate change, our primary orientation should be to live with the creativity that has created and continues to create our life on Planet Earth—since we are not able to know what the future holds.