共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 8 毫秒
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Jan Dejnozka 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》1989,25(2):65-81
I want to thank Professor José Benardete, Professor Panayot Butchvarov, and Professor David E. Johnson for their very kindly viewing earlier versions of this paper. 相似文献
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Patrick J. Connolly 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2019,27(4):842-859
ABSTRACTDespite its philosophical interest, Susanna Newcome's Enquiry into the Evidence of the Christian Religion (1728, revised 1732) has received little attention from commentators. This paper seeks to redress this oversight by offering a reconstruction of Newcome's innovative argument for God's existence. Newcome employs a cosmological argument that differs from Thomist and kalām version of the argument. Specifically, Newcome challenges the idea that the causal chains observed in nature can exist independently. She does this through an appeal to findings from Newtonian natural philosophy that suggest that the universe has entropic tendencies. This suggests the the continued operations of nature are dependent on a cause external to the universe. Newcome identifies this external cause with God. Various strengths and weaknesses of Newcome's argument are discussed and an attempt is made to situate the argument within her broader epistemic framework and the larger context of Newtonian physico-theology. The paper also explores what is known of Newcome's biography and intellectual milieu. 相似文献
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Prof. Joseph K. Campbell 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》1996,40(3):159-173
Conclusion Let me summarize the results of this paper in a way that seems fitting to Hume's discussion of the cosmological argument. There are some philosophers who adopt the most stringent empiricist principles. Such men and women would reject any notion of necessity that is not analytic, and for this reason they would never admit a proof of the necessary existence of anything. Other philosophers, though empiricists, are not so dogmatic. They question the need for, not the coherence of, necessary existence. They believe that the material universe is nothing over and above the sum of its material parts and, thus, see no reason to conclude that a necessary being exists based on PSR. Still others are driven by a rationalist persuasion. They would gladly recognize the existence of almost anything provided it be proven by reason and argument. When they confront the cosmological argument they do indeed find it compelling but still see no reason to conclude that God, or any transcendent being, necessarily exists. The entity established need be nothing more than the universe itself. Therefore, as Hume has demonstrated, no philosopher need accept the conclusion of the cosmological argument. 相似文献
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Stephen T. Davis 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》1992,31(1):13-27
I would like to thank Linda Zagzebski for her very helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 相似文献
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Gustavo E. Romero Daniela Pérez 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2012,72(2):103-113
We present a formal analysis of the Cosmological Argument in its two main forms: that due to Aquinas, and the revised version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument more recently advocated by William Lane Craig. We formulate these two arguments in such a way that each conclusion follows in first-order logic from the corresponding assumptions. Our analysis shows that the conclusion which follows for Aquinas is considerably weaker than what his aims demand. With formalizations that are logically valid in hand, we reinterpret the natural language versions of the premises and conclusions in terms of concepts of causality consistent with (and used in) recent work in cosmology done by physicists. In brief: the Kalam argument commits the fallacy of equivocation in a way that seems beyond repair; two of the premises adopted by Aquinas seem dubious when the terms ??cause?? and ??causality?? are interpreted in the context of contemporary empirical science. Thus, while there are no problems with whether the conclusions follow logically from their assumptions, the Kalam argument is not viable, and the Aquinas argument does not imply a caused origination of the universe. The assumptions of the latter are at best less than obvious relative to recent work in the sciences. We conclude with mention of a new argument that makes some positive modifications to an alternative variation on Aquinas by Le Poidevin, which nonetheless seems rather weak. 相似文献
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Almeida Michael J. Judisch Neal D. 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2002,51(1):55-64
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - 相似文献
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Dan D. Crawford 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》1980,11(2):111-122
Summary To sum up the main results of this study: I have disentangled two distinct patterns of argument that Taylor runs together in his attempt to show that there is a reason or explanation for the world as a whole. The first is based on the causal dependency of things in the world, the second is based on their logical contingency. It seems to make the most sense of Taylor's discussion if we interpret him not as invoking the principle of sufficient reason at the crucial juncture, but as using these arguments to give backing to that principle by showing that it applies to the world in its totality. However, these arguments do not succeed in doing that. The first fails because it depends on a remote analogy between the world as a whole and the physical objects in the world. Concerning the second, an analysis of the logic of why-questions about the existence of things has revealed that the logical contingency of something is not a ground for thinking it has an explanation. The only promising interpretation of the principle of sufficient reason that we have found is as a causal principle pertaining to things in nature. 相似文献
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Examples involving infinite suspended chains or infinite trains are sometimes used to defend perceived weaknesses in traditional
cosmological arguments. In this article, we distinguish two versions of the cosmological argument, suggest that such examples
can only be relevant if it is one specific type of cosmological argument that is being considered, and then criticize the
use of such examples in this particular type of cosmological argument. Our criticism revolves around a discussion of what
it means to call a system closed, and what it means to call an explanation complete. Our analysis makes no suppositions about
the nature of the infinite, and is therefore independent of many of the issues around which contemporary discussions of the
cosmological argument have tended to revolve. 相似文献
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Bradford Saad 《Philosophical Studies》2018,175(10):2475-2506
Dualism holds (roughly) that some mental events are fundamental and non-physical. I develop a prima facie plausible causal argument for dualism. The argument has several significant implications. First, it constitutes a new way of arguing for dualism. Second, it provides dualists with a parity response to causal arguments for physicalism. Third, it transforms the dialectical role of epiphenomenalism. Fourth, it refutes the view that causal considerations prima facie support physicalism but not dualism. After developing the causal argument for dualism and drawing out these implications, I subject the argument to a battery of objections. Some prompt revisions to the argument. Others reveal limitations in scope. It falls out of the discussion that the causal argument for dualism is best used against physicalism as a keystone in a divide and conquer strategy. 相似文献