The representation of abstract words: why emotion matters

Although much is known about the representation and processing of concrete concepts, knowledge of what abstract semantics might be is severely limited. In this article we first address the adequacy of the 2 dominant accounts (dual coding theory and the context availability model) put forward in order to explain representation and processing differences between concrete and abstract words. We find that neither proposal can account for experimental findings and that this is, at least partly, because abstract words are considered to be unrelated to experiential information in both of these accounts. We then address a particular type of experiential information, emotional content, and demonstrate that it plays a crucial role in the processing and representation of abstract concepts: Statistically, abstract words are more emotionally valenced than are concrete words, and this accounts for a residual latency advantage for abstract words, when variables such as imageability (a construct derived from dual coding theory) and rated context availability are held constant. We conclude with a discussion of our novel hypothesis for embodied abstract semantics.     

Second-personal reasons: why we need something like them,but why there are actually no such things

Abstract

Stephen Darwall, in his book The Second-Person Standpoint (2006), has argued for an account of morality grounded in what he calls second-personal reasons. My first aim in this paper is to demonstrate the value of an account like Darwall’s; as I read it, it responds to the need for an account of morality as ‘intrinsic’ to the person. However, I go on to argue, as my second aim in this paper, that Darwall’s account is ultimately unsuccessful. I hope to achieve these aims by contrasting Darwall’s second-personal account with two other accounts, Hobbes’ and the neo-Kantians’. In the first case, I aim to show that Darwall’s account meets a need that the other accounts don’t in virtue of its differences from the other accounts; and in the second case, I aim to show that Darwall’s account ultimately fails in virtue of its residual similarities to at least one of them.     

Seven sins in the study of emotion: correctives from affective neuroscience

This brief commentary highlights seven sins in the study of emotion that are explicitly treated in contemporary affective neuroscience. These sins are (1) Affect and cognition are subserved by separate and independent neural circuits; (2) Affect is subcortical; (3) Emotions are in the head; (4) Emotions can be studied from a purely psychological perspective; (5) Emotions are similar in structure across age and species; (6) Specific emotions are instantiated in discrete locations in the brain; and (7) Emotions are conscious feeling states. Each of these is briefly discussed and evidence from affective neuroscience that bears on these sins is noted. The articles in this Special Issue underscore the vitality of research in affective neuroscience and illustrate how some of these sins can be addressed and rectified using concepts and methods from affective neuroscience.     

Nonverbal channel use in communication of emotion: how may depend on why

This study investigated the hypothesis that different emotions are most effectively conveyed through specific, nonverbal channels of communication: body, face, and touch. Experiment 1 assessed the production of emotion displays. Participants generated nonverbal displays of 11 emotions, with and without channel restrictions. For both actual production and stated preferences, participants favored the body for embarrassment, guilt, pride, and shame; the face for anger, disgust, fear, happiness, and sadness; and touch for love and sympathy. When restricted to a single channel, participants were most confident about their communication when production was limited to the emotion's preferred channel. Experiment 2 examined the reception or identification of emotion displays. Participants viewed videos of emotions communicated in unrestricted and restricted conditions and identified the communicated emotions. Emotion identification in restricted conditions was most accurate when participants viewed emotions displayed via the emotion's preferred channel. This study provides converging evidence that some emotions are communicated predominantly through different nonverbal channels. Further analysis of these channel-emotion correspondences suggests that the social function of an emotion predicts its primary channel: The body channel promotes social-status emotions, the face channel supports survival emotions, and touch supports intimate emotions.     

Why emotion recognition is not simulational

According to a dominant interpretation of the simulation hypothesis, in recognizing an emotion we use the same neural processes used in experiencing that emotion. This paper argues that the view is fundamentally misguided. I will examine the simulational arguments for the three basic emotions of fear, disgust, and anger and argue that the simulational account relies strongly on a narrow sense of emotion processing which hardly squares with evidence on how, in fact, emotion recognition is processed. I contend that the current body of empirical evidence suggests that emotion recognition is processed in an integrative system involving multiple cross-regional interactions in the brain, a view which squares with understanding emotion recognition as an information-rich, rather than simulational, process. In the final section, I discuss possible objections.     

明清闽台地区雷海青信仰兴盛探微

雷海青,俗称田都元帅、田公元帅、相公爷等,天宝年间,唐明皇“命天下梨园祀之”①,其信仰现象出现较早。但是从目前调查情况看,明清时期雷海青成为闽台等地信仰广泛的特殊神灵,其信仰状况相当兴盛:一方面被闽台戏业艺人奉为祖师爷和保护神;另一方面随着闽戏的传播和闽人的外移,     

Visual search is not blind to emotion

A series of three visual search tasks revealed more efficient search for hostile than for peaceful faces among neutral face distractors. Given that this effect has been observed inconsistently in prior literature, meta-analytic methods were employed for evaluating data across three experiments in order to develop a more valid estimate of the potentially small effect size. Furthermore, in the present experiments, different emotional meanings were conditioned to identical faces across observers, thus eliminating confounds between the physical characteristics and the emotional valences of the face stimuli. On the basis of the present findings, we argue that the visual system is capable of determining a face's emotional valence before the face becomes the focus of attention, and that emotional valence can be used by the visual system to determine subsequent attention allocation. However, meta-analytic results indicate that emotional valence makes a relatively small contribution to search efficiency in the present search context.     

What time reversal invariance is and why it matters

David Albert's Time and Chance (2000) provides a fresh and interesting perspective on the problem of the direction of time. Unfortunately, the book opens with a highly non-standard exposition of time reversal invariance that distorts the subsequent discussion. The present article not only has the remedial goal of setting the record straight about the meaning of time reversal invariance, but it also aims to show how the niceties of this symmetry concept matter to the problem of the direction of time and to related foundation issues in physics.     

Ten reasons why ANOVA theory and research fail to explain attribution processes: 2. Methodological problems

In this, the second of two companion papers, five major methodological problems of questionnaire research into Kelley’s ANOVA model are identified: the formulation of instructions; the choice of stimulus events; the manipulation of information variables; the choice of attribution measures; and the application of process-probing methods. It is argued that the absence of any sophisticated process propositions in Kelley’s theory, in conjunction with the five methodological problems, has led to a poverty of acceptable evidence about how people process unfolding sequences of behaviour (episodes). In conclusion, some of the process-probing methodologies of cognitive science are considered as a remedy to the naive models and methods of attribution researchers.     

The semantic structure of emotion words across languages is consistent with componential appraisal models of emotion

Appraisal theories of emotion, and particularly the Component Process Model, claim that the different components of the emotion process (action tendencies, physiological reactions, expressions, and feeling experiences) are essentially driven by the results of cognitive appraisals and that the feeling component constitutes a central integration and representation of these processes. Given the complexity of the proposed architecture, comprehensive experimental tests of these predictions are difficult to perform and to date are lacking. Encouraged by the “lexical sedimentation” hypothesis, here we propose an indirect examination of the compatibility of the theoretical assumptions with the semantic structure of a set of major emotion words as measured in a cross-language and cross-cultural study. Specifically, we performed a secondary analysis of the large-scale data set with ratings of affective features covering all components of the emotion process for 24 emotion words in 27 countries, constituting profiles of emotion-specific appraisals, action tendencies, physiological reactions, expressions, and feeling experiences. The results of a series of hierarchical regression analyses to examine the prediction of the theoretical model are highly consistent with the claim that appraisal patterns determine the structure of the response components, which in turn predict central dimensions of the feeling component.     

Test-retest reliability of an emotion maintenance task

Research on working memory has suggested domain-specific components for visual, verbal, and spatial information, and more recently for emotion. Affective working memory has been proposed as the set of processes involved in the maintenance of emotions to guide behaviour. The current study examined the reliability of an emotion maintenance/affective working memory task over two experimental sessions separated by one week. Subjective accuracy based on individual ratings was found to correlate over time and was highest for negatively valenced pictures. Results suggest that this paradigm is a reliable measure of emotion maintenance, underscoring the utility of this measure as an assessment tool for normative and clinical populations.     

A cognitive-emotional model of NSSI: using emotion regulation and cognitive processes to explain why people self-injure

Non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) is a complex behaviour, routinely engaged for emotion regulatory purposes. As such, a number of theoretical accounts regarding the aetiology and maintenance of NSSI are grounded in models of emotion regulation; the role that cognition plays in the behaviour is less well known. In this paper, we summarise four models of emotion regulation that have repeatedly been related to NSSI and identify the core components across them. We then draw on social cognitive theory to unite models of cognition and models of emotion in developing a new cognitive-emotional model of NSSI. Our model articulates how emotion regulation and cognition can work in concert to govern NSSI, and offers several new research questions that can be addressed within this framework.     

"I feel better but I don't know why": the psychology of implicit emotion regulation

Although emotion regulation has traditionally been conceived as a deliberative process, there is growing evidence that many emotion-regulation processes operate at implicit levels. This special issue of Cognition and Emotion showcases recent advances in theorising and empirical research on implicit emotion regulation. Implicit emotion regulation can be broadly defined as any process that operates without the need for conscious supervision or explicit intentions, and aims at modifying the quality, intensity, or duration of an emotional response. Implicit emotion regulation is likely to be pervasive in everyday life and may contribute considerably to the effectiveness of emotion regulation. Research in this area has developed several valid methods for measuring and manipulating implicit emotion. The contributions to this special issue highlight the significance of implicit emotion regulation in psychological adaptation, goal-directed behaviour, interpersonal behaviour, personality functioning, and mental health.     

Ten reasons why ANOVA theory and research fail to explain attribution processes: 1. Conceptual problems

Ten reasons are proposed to explain why Kelley’s attribution theory and related questionnaire research fail to account for the cognitive processes underlying ordinary explanations of behaviour. In this first paper, five salient conceptual problems of the ANOVA model are reviewed: the inadequate analysis of behaviours and their contexts, and the inferences to which they give rise; deployment of the vague and ambiguous internal-external distinction; the normative view of people as poor social scientists; the crude analogy between ordinary reasoning and statistical procedures; and, fundamentally, the naive conceptualization of cognitive processes. Schank’s computational theory of social inference is identified as a sophisticated process model which avoids the conceptual problems inherent in the ANOVA model.     

Religion is natural, atheism is not: On why everybody is both right and wrong

After discussing evidence of irreligion and the rise of the so called “New Atheism”, the authors refute the claim that this poses a problem for the cognitive science of religion and its hypothesis that religion is natural. The “naturalness hypothesis” is not deterministic but probabilistic and thus leaves room for atheism. This, the authors maintain, is true of both the by-product and adaptationist stances within the cognitive science of religion. In this context the authors also discuss the memetic or “unnaturalness” hypothesis, i.e. that religion is a “virus of the mind”. The authors criticize accounts of atheism offered by cognitive scientists of religion as being based on unfounded assumptions about the psychology of atheists, and object to the notion that the natural aspects of religion by corollary make atheism unnatural. By considering human cognition in a semiotic framework and emphasizing its natural ability to take part in semiotic systems of signs, atheism emerges as a natural, cognitive strategy. The authors argue that to reach a fuller account of religion, the cognitive (naturalness) and memetic (unnaturalness) hypotheses of religion must be merged. Finally, a preliminary analysis of the “New Atheism” is offered in terms of semiotic and cognitive dynamics.     

Religion is natural,atheism is not: On why everybody is both right and wrong

After discussing evidence of irreligion and the rise of the so called “New Atheism”, the authors refute the claim that this poses a problem for the cognitive science of religion and its hypothesis that religion is natural. The “naturalness hypothesis” is not deterministic but probabilistic and thus leaves room for atheism. This, the authors maintain, is true of both the by‐product and adaptationist stances within the cognitive science of religion. In this context the authors also discuss the memetic or “unnaturalness” hypothesis, i.e. that religion is a “virus of the mind”. The authors criticize accounts of atheism offered by cognitive scientists of religion as being based on unfounded assumptions about the psychology of atheists, and object to the notion that the natural aspects of religion by corollary make atheism unnatural. By considering human cognition in a semiotic framework and emphasizing its natural ability to take part in semiotic systems of signs, atheism emerges as a natural, cognitive strategy. The authors argue that to reach a fuller account of religion, the cognitive (naturalness) and memetic (unnaturalness) hypotheses of religion must be merged. Finally, a preliminary analysis of the “New Atheism” is offered in terms of semiotic and cognitive dynamics