Mizpah of Benjamin

In this article I discuss the question of how to speak of the body in theology after Friedrich Nietzsche's critique of Christianity as nihilistic. A purely theoretical and a-historic approach, such as could be found in much doctrinal theology as well as philosophy after Descartes, runs the risk of objectifying the body through its representations of it. The phenomenological approach to embodiment would instead help theology to avoid treating the body as a thing and instead as a communicative and expressive medium for relationships with divinity as well as other human beings. A critical theological somatology after Nietzsche would have to speak of the body through genealogical accounts of the traces of the body in biblical and theological texts as well as in religious practices such as prayer, liturgy and hymns with the aim of correlating this theological tradition with the articulations and configurations of embodiment today.     

Organisms and the form of freedom in Kant's third Critique

In the second half of the third Critique, Kant develops a new form of judgment peculiar to organisms: teleological judgment. In the Appendix to this text, Kant argues that we must regard the final, unconditioned end of creation as human freedom, due to reason's demand that we regard nature as a system of ends. In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of this argument, according to which judgments of freedom within nature are possible as instances of teleological judgment. Just as individual organisms are to be regarded as governed by supersensible teleological laws, so too is nature as a whole to be regarded as given laws from a supersensible ground. This supersensible ground in the case of nature as a whole is freedom. Freedom and teleological judgments are to be regarded as unifiable with mechanism in the supersensible, and we are to subordinate mechanical explanations to teleological judgments as well as to freedom. This interpretation makes sense both of Kant's claim that he overcomes the “incalculable gulf” between nature and freedom in the third Critique, and also of the location of this argument, as following after and relying on the results of the Dialectic of Teleological Judgment.     

Self as verb and the metaphor of dance: An explanation of the self discovery experience within a constructivist framework

The concept of self discovery within a constructivist framework is difficult to explain given the central assumption of constructivism that self is a created construct rather than an entity to be discovered. Two problems are identified as impediments to constructivist accounts of the self discovery experience: first, their failure to adequately account for the embodied experience of self, and second, the difficulties inherent in using self as a noun to express a process.
It is proposed that if self is considered as a verb, as the action of a body-subject, the verbal contortionism of referring to self as a process in a language that places self as an entity may be overcome. The notion of self as verb places the individual firmly in the role of active embodied participant in the experience of self. The metaphor of "self'" as "dance" is explored to emphasize the materiality of the human animal that is argued to be central to the experience of self discovery.     

Different responses in word association tests in normotensive and hypertensive subjects]

Activation of latent associations by word stimuli of different emotional relevance as well as the accompanying electrophysiological tracings reveal statistically significantly characteristics in juvenile essential (arterial) hypertensives as compared to normotensives. This applies to the verbal reactions as well as to the electrophysical concomitants. Under additional cognitive demands both groups achieve better performance. This rise is significantly greater, however for hypertensives than for normotensives. Our special recording system permitted exact phonographic registration of the verbal stimulus and reaction as well as of the PGR.     

Avoiding Colonizer Positions in the Therapy Room: Some Ideas About the Challenges of Dealing with the Dialectic of Misery and Resources in Families

Some authors have argued that certain acts of family therapists—despite their best intentions—may represent a form of colonizing the family. When acting as a colonizer, a therapist is understood as becoming overly responsible for the family and focusing too strongly on change. In so doing, the therapist disrespects the family's pace, and neglects their own resources for change. This paper aims to highlight the need for therapists to be hypersensitive both to the resources of families entering therapy as well as to the impact of prevailing ideologies on their own positioning in the session. The kind of sensitivity advocated here is dialectical in the sense that every family is understood as having potentials promoting dynamism, happiness, and well-being as well as potentials contributing to stagnation, unhappiness, and misery. In this article, using illustrations from clinical practice, we present some ideas for resisting the tendency by the therapist to assume a colonizing position as a professional solver of problems for families. Our main aim here is to redirect the therapist toward connecting with the family's suffering, as well as with the resource repertoire it has developed for navigating and negotiating its way through life.     

Gesundheitssystem und psychotherapeutisches Selbst

Psychotherapy as a profession can be analysed from two different theoretical points of view: as far as social conditions are concerned the author profits on the one hand from a system-theoretical approach in treating the health-system as a social system; on the other hand and as far as the inner conditions of psychotherapeutic work are concerned, basic assumptions of psychoanalytic self-psychology may be helpful to demonstrate and understand the special character of psychotherapy as a “people-changing-profession”. This special status historically refers to medical treatment as a communicative practice. Actually the psychotherapeutic self seems to split itself up into many competing directions and thereby weakens its possible impact on the health-system.     

日常经验研究：一种独具特色的研究方法

日常经验研究是一种通过研究日常生活中各种事件发生时人们的瞬时感受而在自发、自然的情景中对人的心理现象、过程进行探索的方法。其目的是通过获得关于个人日常生活中某些特定事件或特定时刻的详细描述,来提取有关思维、情绪、行为的持久性、周期性、变化以及时间结构等方面的信息,并确定上述因素之间的情境性以及倾向性相关。日常经验研究的价值和意义在于在方法论三角互证原则的指导下,与其他各种方法结合起来,帮助研究者从不同角度理解心理现象及其过程,从而达到最大限度地探索、了解人类心理世界的目的     

Compulsive "helpfulness": or, how I learned to stop working so hard and love the group

Compulsive helpfulness, an anxiety-laden need by the therapist to feel helpful, akin to the notion of rescuing others, is a potential pitfall in developing an effective psychotherapy group. It can be regarded variously: (1) as a reaction formation against feelings of boredom and frustration stimulated by such phenomena as group resistance or the enactment of inauthentic relationships in the group; (2) as a therapist style driven by a transferential reaction to be regarded as competent and worthy; (3) as an induced countertransference enactment tied to group members' frustration and passivity about their own interpersonal inadequacies; (4) and as a manic defense against despair over the feeling that one's loving has not done any good. In this essay, the author explores his struggle to identify and come to terms with compulsive helpfulness as a dominant theme in the early stages of his tenure as leader of a psychotherapy group.     

The psychology of anxiety: A phenomenological description

Abstract

The psychology of anxiety continues to be debated by researchers, as well as therapists. By investigating it with phenomenological methods, I have been able to determine its three existential preconditions; the way in which an anxious situation announces a crisis of one's efforts to surpass one's unacceptable incompleteness; being anxious as being impeded, if not fundamentally blocked, and moving beyond being anxious as either ambivalently reaffirming the viability of the projects and relations in which one was already invested, or as transformatively accepting those projects and relations as fundamentally uncertain and hence, as open to future determination.     

Abwehr, Verdrängung und Ersatzbildung

The author investigates the relationship of defence, repression and substitutive formation as it presents itself in Freud’s writings. He shows that Freud gives at least four different meanings to the term “repression”: Freud uses it interchangeably with defence, as a consciously intended forgetting, as a specific unconscious mechanism of defence and to describe the consequence of defence mechanisms leading to substitutive formations. The inconsistencies in this relationship are discussed and clarified and Freud’s economic and linguistic attempts to justify repression are subjected to critique as well as the need of a primal repression as a necessary condition for repression proper. In developing Freud’s linguistic justification of repression further, the author presents defence as a semantic displacement. Ideas are excluded from the realm of the concepts which belong to them historically. These presentations become unconscious, i.e. repressed, in that they can no longer be identified as “cases” of these conceptual internal contents. At the same time they are displaced into the extensions of concepts whose internal contents do not belong to them originally. It is by virtue of the internal contents of these concepts that the displaced elements as substitutive formations once again attain consciousness, albeit a false one. It is suggested that repression as a specific defence mechanism of its own should be dismissed, to reverse Freud’s thesis that repression as a rule creates a substitutive formation into its opposite and to understand that the mechanisms used to build substitutes as a rule create repression.     

Against Substitutive Harm

Frances Kamm's Principle of Secondary Permissibility (PSP) specifies a class of exceptions to the general rule not to kill as a means. The principle allows us to harm as a means some of those who would have been otherwise harmed as side effects. ‘For example, suppose it is impermissible to paralyze A's legs as a means to a greater good. It would still be permissible to do this as the alternative to permissibly killing A as a mere indirect side effect.’ I argue that, despite of its great appeal, PSP is incorrect; it is simply not true that the victims of substitutive harm are not worse off than they would otherwise permissibly have been. In fact, there is no moral difference between the purportedly substitutive harm licensed by PSP (and its extension) and the standard sort of harming as means repudiated by nonconsequentialists.     

Some thoughts between body and mind in the light of Wilma Bucci's multiple code theory

The author proposes the usefulness of Wilma Bucci's Multiple Code Theory in clarifying some controversial issues in psychoanalytically inspired psychosomatics. Definition of a dialectic among different entities may appear difficult in an unitarian view of the organism, where body and mind are seen as having no kind of intrinsic existence, which may be differentiated from the organism as a whole, but as two categories having to do with the perspective of the observer. This aporia may find a solution in a redefinition of the body-mind relationship as that between symbolic systems and the subsymbolic system, both of which may be viewed as mind or as body depending on the point of observation. Similarly, somatic pathology, if we accept an unitary paradigm, need no longer be viewed as due to an influence of 'mind' on 'body': a definition of pathology as linked to a disconnection between different systems, as found in Bucci's theory, is proposed as a possible solution. Emergence of somatic symptoms, however, besides being witness to disconnection, may be seen as the subsymbolic first expression of an item of content, an attempt at reconnection, as already proposed, in a way, by Winnicott in 1949. This attempt has much better opportunities to succeed when it finds an adequate container, as in analysis. A clinical situation of this kind is presented.     

Testimonies in the Treatment of Genocidal Trauma

This article describes an approach to the treatment of genocide survivors that addresses both the personal and communal/historical dimensions of their experiences. I begin by outlining the characteristics of massive psychic trauma as background for using video testimonies in the treatment of Holocaust survivors. I then discuss videotaped interviews with perpetrators as an illustrative contrast to survivors' testimonies. The third section explains my position as a psychoanalyst encountering historical trauma and its relationship to my own experiences as a survivor. Following a brief history of videotaping as a medium for recording testimonies, I conclude by demonstrating the ways in which active listening can lead to the revelation of new dimensions of historical as well as personal truth.     

Outside Color from Just Outside

Chirimuuta's view and my own are as close as they are because we both take two quite controversial stances: pragmatism as against a correspondence‐based view of perceptual success, and adverbialism as against a representational view of color experience. Unsurprisingly, of course, we do not understand these positions in precisely the same ways. In these comments I would like to see if I can persuade Chirimuuta to take two steps in my direction. The first step is to broaden her pragmatism so that it treats truth and accuracy in similar ways, for belief as well as perception, and for all sorts of properties. The second is to narrow her adverbialism so that it applies only to the fine‐grained appearances of the colors, and leaves aside the coarse‐grained colors themselves, which seem to remain as constant properties of objects, even as their appearances change.     

Ordinary Sadism in the Consulting Room

The analyst’s retaliatory sadism can be construed as a perversion of the wish to penetrate, just as masochism can be viewed as a degradation of the desire to surrender. When a patient refuses to speak any other language but that of domination and submission, ordinary attempts for communication and recognition fail. In her attempt to reach the patient, to reinstate herself as an active agent and subject, and also to dislodge the patient from a rut of despair, passivity, or malignity, the analyst may escalate to a sadistic response, even if she suspects that this might cause the patient pain. This type of sadomasochistic enactment can gather strength when disowned self-states of analyst and analysand are activated. In this process, an analytic interpretation, seemingly legitimate, can be used as a knife, a weapon, an instrument of retaliation and sadistic control. The disastrous potential of the analyst’s sadism is easy to imagine. Through a couple of clinical vignettes I will demonstrate that even something as lamentable as the analyst’s sadistic retaliation can lead to growth as long as such sadism can enter the analytic dialogue and the patient is allowed to perceive and reflect upon the analytic misbehavior, and the analyst is willing to join the patient in the quest to understand their co-created predicament.     

Leading with ethics,aiming for policy: new opportunities for philosophy of science

The goal of this paper is to articulate and advocate for an enhanced role for philosophers of science in the domain of science policy as well as within the science curriculum. I argue that philosophy of science as a field can learn from the successes as well as the mistakes of bioethics and begin to develop a new model that includes robust contributions to the science classroom, research collaborations with scientists, and a role for public philosophy through involvement in science policy development. Through an analysis of two case studies, I illustrate how philosophers of science can make effective and productive contributions to science education as well as to interdisciplinary scientific research, and argue for the essential role of philosophers of science in the realm of science policy.     

Some determinants of looking time under different instructional sets

Four groups of Ss were asked to look at sets of figures whose members differed in degree of complexity and asymmetry. Ss instructed to look as long as the figures were pleasing did so for a significantly shorter time than did Ss who were instructed to look as long as they cared to, as long as the figures were interesting, or until they could recognize the figures in a large group of similar figures. Results indicated that looking time was affected by both the complexity and the asymmetry/symmetry dimensions and led to the conclusion that looking time is primarily a measure of exploratory behavior.     

Inferred characteristics of successful suicides as function of gender and context.

This paper examines college students' attributions about suicide as a function of gender and context (athletic vs. relationship failure). Results indicated that male athletes who suicided were considered more emotionally well-adjusted compared to males who suicided because of a relationship failure and all females. Male and female athletes who suicided were seen as more competent and less distressed compared to those who suffered a failed relationship. Females were also seen as more distressed compared to males. These results are discussed in terms of a positive bias toward athletes in our society as well as gender stereotypes. Implications of these findings as well as methodological limitations are discussed.     

Pacifism: Equipment or Accessory of War?

It is my intention to attempt to define pacifism, in its engagement and concept, as a necessary requisite of war and military action, following a phrase used over a hundred years ago by Franz Rosenzweig when speaking of pacifism as “necessary equipment of war.” I will try to defend the importance of pacifism as an integral part of war (as such, pacifism as a requisite of war ought to shorten the period of war and mitigate destruction) and oppose this concept of pacifism to Jan Narveson’s old attempt at constructing pacifism as a position and then designating it as “untenable and unreasonable,” and then further oppose this to his later attempt to find in pacifism the cause of further (and more) violence for ever more vicious wars.