Facial Reactions to Emotional Facial Expressions: Affect or Cognition?

This study investigated whether observers' facial reactions to the emotional facial expressions of others represent an affective or a cognitive response to these emotional expressions. Three hypotheses were contrasted: (1) facial reactions to emotional facial expressions are due to mimicry as part of an affective empathic reaction; (2) facial reactions to emotional facial expressions are a reflection of shared affect due to emotion induction; and (3) facial reactions to emotional facial expressions are determined by cognitive load depending on task difficulty. Two experiments were conducted varying type of task, presentation of stimuli, and task difficulty. The results show that depending on the nature of the rating task, facial reactions to facial expressions may be either affective or cognitive. Specifically, evidence for facial mimicry was only found when individuals made judgements regarding the valence of an emotional facial expression. Other types of judgements regarding facial expressions did not seem to elicit mimicry but may lead to facial responses related to cognitive load.     

D. photographs of facial displays provide a sound basis for classifying the primary emotions?

Izard (1971) and Tomkins (1963) argue that facial displays can be used to classify the primary emotions, and they include shame as such an emotion. An investigation of responses to photographs of facial expressions showed that shame had low identification rates and that subjects had little confidence in their judgements about photographs intended to express shame. The implications of these findings for such classification schemes are discussed.     

Here is looking at you: emotional faces predominate in binocular rivalry

Two incompatible pictures compete for perceptual dominance when they are presented to one eye each. This so-called binocular rivalry results in an alternation of dominant and suppressed percepts. In accordance with current theories of emotion processing, the authors' previous research has suggested that emotionally arousing pictures predominate in this perceptual process. Three experiments were run with pictures of emotional facial expressions that are known to induce emotions while being well controlled in terms of physical characteristics. In Experiment 1, photographs of emotional and neutral facial expressions were presented of the same actor to minimize physical differences. In Experiment 2, schematic emotional expressions were presented to further eliminate low-level differences. In Experiment 3, a probe-detection task was conducted to control for possible response-biases. Together, these data clearly demonstrate that emotional facial expressions predominate over neutral expressions; they are more often the first percept and they are perceived for longer durations. This is not caused by physical stimulus properties or by response-biases. This novel approach supports that emotionally significant visual stimuli are preferentially perceived.     

When representations conflict with reality: the preschooler's problem with false beliefs and "false" photographs

It has been argued that young preschoolers cannot correctly attribute a false belief to a deceived actor (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Some researchers claim that the problem lies in the child's inadequate epistemology (Chandler & Boyes, 1982; Wellman, 1988); as such, it is specific to the child's theory of mind and no such problem should appear in reasoning about nonmental representations. This prediction is tested below in the "false photograph" task: here an actor takes a photograph of an object in location X; the object is then moved to location Y. Preschool subjects are asked: "In the picture, where is the object?" Results indicate that photographs are no easier to reason about than are beliefs. Manipulations to boost performance on the photograph task proved ineffective. Further, an explanation of the failure as a processing limitation having nothing to do with the representational nature of beliefs or photographs was ruled out. It is argued that young children's failure on the false belief task is not due to an inadequate epistemology (though they may have one) and is symptomatic of a larger problem with representations.     

Effect of counterfactual and factual thinking on causal judgements

The significance of counterfactual thinking in the causal judgement process has been emphasized for nearly two decades, yet no previous research has directly compared the relative effect of thinking counterfactually versus factually on causal judgement. Three experiments examined this comparison by manipulating the task frame used to focus participants' thinking about a target event. Prior to making judgements about causality, preventability, blame, and control, participants were directed to think about a target actor either in counterfactual terms (what the actor could have done to change the outcome) or in factual terms (what the actor had done that led to the outcome). In each experiment, the effect of counterfactual thinking did not differ reliably from the effect of factual thinking on causal judgement. Implications for research on causal judgement and mental representation are discussed.     

Children's Recognition of Emotional Facial Expressions Through Photographs and Drawings

The author's purpose was to examine children's recognition of emotional facial expressions, by comparing two types of stimulus: photographs and drawings. The author aimed to investigate whether drawings could be considered as a more evocative material than photographs, as a function of age and emotion. Five- and 7-year-old children were presented with photographs and drawings displaying facial expressions of 4 basic emotions (i.e., happiness, sadness, anger, and fear) and were asked to perform a matching task by pointing to the face corresponding to the target emotion labeled by the experimenter. The photographs we used were selected from the Radboud Faces Database and the drawings were designed on the basis of both the facial components involved in the expression of these emotions and the graphic cues children tend to use when asked to depict these emotions in their own drawings. Our results show that drawings are better recognized than photographs, for sadness, anger, and fear (with no difference for happiness, due to a ceiling effect). And that the difference between the 2 types of stimuli tends to be more important for 5-year-olds compared to 7-year-olds. These results are discussed in view of their implications, both for future research and for practical application.     

Responsibility attribution by groups and individuals: The effects of the interaction episode

Studied the effects of formal and informal interaction styles on the extremity of responsibility attribution judgements by groups. The stimuli were eight scenarios describing typical ‘life dilemmas’, incorporating the manipulation of the following two variables in a 2 × 2 design: (a) the risky-cautious decision taken by the actor in response to the dilemma, and (b) the outcome of the decision (success-failure). Subjects (N = 130) provided judgements about the attributed responsibility of the actor, and their perception of the actor and the situation first as individuals, followed by (a) formal or (b) informal group discussion, leading to consensus judgements. Results showed that group attributions were significantly more extreme than individual attributions, but only following the informal group interaction. The actors' riskiness and success were also significantly related to the size of the extremity shift. The findings are discussed in terms of the importance of the social context and the specific interaction episode in attribution judgements, and the possible implications of the results for such real life decision-making groups as committees and interviewing panels are considered.     

Audio-visual integration of emotional cues in song

We examined whether facial expressions of performers influence the emotional connotations of sung materials, and whether attention is implicated in audio-visual integration of affective cues. In Experiment 1, participants judged the emotional valence of audio-visual presentations of sung intervals. Performances were edited such that auditory and visual information conveyed congruent or incongruent affective connotations. In the single-task condition, participants judged the emotional connotation of sung intervals. In the dual-task condition, participants judged the emotional connotation of intervals while performing a secondary task. Judgements were influenced by melodic cues and facial expressions and the effects were undiminished by the secondary task. Experiment 2 involved identical conditions but participants were instructed to base judgements on auditory information alone. Again, facial expressions influenced judgements and the effect was undiminished by the secondary task. The results suggest that visual aspects of music performance are automatically and preattentively registered and integrated with auditory cues.     

Dressing up posture: The interactive effects of posture and clothing on competency judgements

Individuals often receive judgements from others based on their clothing and their posture. While both of these factors have been found to influence judgements of competency independently, their relative importance in impression formation is yet to be investigated. We address this by examining interactive effects of posture and clothing on four competency measures: confidence, professionalism, approachability, and likeliness of a high salary. Participants rated photographs of both male and female models pictured in different postures (strong, neutral, weak) in smart clothing (a suit for males; both a trouser suit and skirt suit for females) and casual clothing. We confirm that posture manipulations affected judgements of individuals differently according to the clothing they were pictured in. The nature of these interactions varied by gender and, for women, competency judgements differed according to attire type (trouser or skirt suit). The implications of these findings in relation to impression formation are discussed.     

Effects of stimulus order on discrimination processes in comparative and equality judgements: Data and models

In typical discrimination experiments, participants are presented with a constant standard and a variable comparison stimulus and their task is to judge which of these two stimuli is larger (comparative judgement). In these experiments, discrimination sensitivity depends on the temporal order of these stimuli (Type B effect) and is usually higher when the standard precedes rather than follows the comparison. Here, we outline how two models of stimulus discrimination can account for the Type B effect, namely the weighted difference model (or basic Sensation Weighting model) and the Internal Reference Model. For both models, the predicted psychometric functions for comparative judgements as well as for equality judgements, in which participants indicate whether they perceived the two stimuli to be equal or not equal, are derived and it is shown that the models also predict a Type B effect for equality judgements. In the empirical part, the models' predictions are evaluated. To this end, participants performed a duration discrimination task with comparative judgements and with equality judgements. In line with the models' predictions, a Type B effect was observed for both judgement types. In addition, a time-order error, as indicated by shifts of the psychometric functions, and differences in response times were observed only for the equality judgement. Since both models entail distinct additional predictions, it seems worthwhile for future research to unite the two models into one conceptual framework.     

Smiling of preschool children in performance-oriented situations: assessment of the emotional significance in relation to other facial expressions

The goal of the reported experiment was to study how adults judge the meaning of different kinds of smiling and laughing by preschool children, and the role played by other facial movements in determining this meaning. Videotapes and photographs of spontaneous facial expressions of children in a play situation served as stimuli. The results show that different kinds of smiling were judged by the adult subjects as being significantly different from each other. In order to find subgroups within the stimuli, cluster analyses were performed, and the resulting clusters indicated different mixtures of positive and negative emotions contained within the pictures. Regression analyses showed that the adults' judgements were dependent on the number of indicators for positive and negative emotions which could be seen in the pictures. The most important indicator movement for the judged strength of the positive emotion expressed in the smile was the raising of the cheeks and, for negative emotions, the lowering of the lip corners. The significance of the components of the expressions as well as the strength of the expressed emotion were, however, dependent on the mode of presentation (video/photo).     

Reasons for the attribution of intent in 7- and 9-year-old children

Seven- and 9-year-old children were presented with drawings which depicted two ambiguous action-outcome sequences and asked to make judgements about the intention of an actor towards another, and then to provide an explanation for the judgement. The design incorporated two levels of actor valence (nice, bad) with two types of outcome quality (good, bad). Judgements were influenced by both valence and outcome factors, but no age effect emerged. Content analysis of the explanations did reveal an age difference in reasoning about social judgements which was associated with the bad outcome. Nine-year-olds used more inference-based explanations which reflected a more objective appraisal of the incident. The explanations of the younger children tended to be dominated by the immediacy of the situation. The findings further highlighted the importance of consistency between actor valence and outcome information relative to the direction of the child's judgement. Inconsistency arising in the context of a bad outcome situation elicited more rigorous explanations from the 9-year-olds.     

Conscious and unconscious processing of facial expressions: Evidence from two split‐brain patients

We investigated how the brain's hemispheres process explicit and implicit facial expressions in two ‘split‐brain’ patients (one with a complete and one with a partial anterior resection). Photographs of faces expressing positive, negative or neutral emotions were shown either centrally or bilaterally. The task consisted in judging the friendliness of each person in the photographs. Half of the photograph stimuli were ‘hybrid faces’, that is an amalgamation of filtered images which contained emotional information only in the low range of spatial frequency, blended to a neutral expression of the same individual in the rest of the spatial frequencies. The other half of the images contained unfiltered faces. With the hybrid faces the patients and a matched control group were more influenced in their social judgements by the emotional expression of the face shown in the left visual field (LVF). When the expressions were shown explicitly, that is without filtering, the control group and the partially callosotomized patient based their judgement on the face shown in the LVF, whereas the complete split‐brain patient based his ratings mainly on the face presented in the right visual field. We conclude that the processing of implicit emotions does not require the integrity of callosal fibres and can take place within subcortical routes lateralized in the right hemisphere.     

Impaired categorical perception of facial expressions in high-functioning adolescents with autism.

Categorical perception of facial expressions is studied in high-functioning adolescents with autism, using three continua of facial expressions obtained by morphing. In contrast to the results of normal adults, the performance on the identification task in autistic subjects did not predict performance on the discrimination task, an indication that autistic individuals do not perceive facial expressions categorically. Performance of autistic subjects with low social intelligence was more impaired than that of subjects with higher social IQ scores on the expression recognition of unmanipulated photographs. It is suggested that autistic subjects with higher social intelligence may use compensatory strategies that they have acquired in social training programs This may camouflage the deficits of this subgroup in the perception of facial expressions.     

Effects of Mood on Evaluative Judgements: Influence of Reduced Processing Capacity and Mood Salience

Schwarz and Clore (1983) proposed that the effects of mood on evaluative judgements are due to people's use of a “feeling heuristic”. Results of the present study suggest that this heuristic is particularly likely to be used under conditions of reduced processing capacity, induced by time pressure and competing task demands, as both factors intensified the effects of mood on evaluative judgements. In addition, previous findings that increasing the salience of a judgement-irrelevant cause disrupts the effects of mood on evaluative judgements were replicated. All of these effects were, however, obtained only when mood was salient to the participants, suggesting that to be effective, mood must exceed a threshold of salience. Taken together, the findings further support the hypothesis that at least in some situations, the effects of moods on evaluative judgements are based on a controlled inference strategy, rather than on automatic priming effects.     

Kant on Truth-Aptness

Many scholars claimed that, according to Immanuel Kant, some judgements lack a truth-value: analytic judgements, judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience, judgements of perception, and non-assertoric judgements. However, no one has undertaken an extensive examination of the textual evidence for those claims.

Based on an analysis of Kant's texts, I argue that: ? according to Kant, only judgements of perception are not truth-apt. All other judgements are truth-apt, including analytic judgements and judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience.

? Kant sometimes states that truth-apt judgements are actual bearers of truth or falsity only when they are taken to state what is actually the case. Kant calls these judgements assertoric. Other texts ascribe truth and falsity to judgements, regardless of whether they are assertoric.

Kant's views on truth-aptness raise challenges for correspondentist and coherentist interpretations of Kant's theory of truth; they rule out the identification of Kant's crucial notion of objective validity with truth-aptness; and they imply that Kant was not a verificationist about truth or meaning.     

Articulatory coding and phonological judgements on written words and pictures: The role of the phonological output buffer

Abstract

The ability of Italian subjects to make phonological judgements was investigated in three experiments. The judgements comprised initial sound similarity and stress assignment on pain of both written words and pictures. Stress assignment on both words and pictures as well as initial sound similarity on pictures required the activation of phonological lexical representations, but this was not necessarily the case for initial sound similarity judgements on word pairs. The first study assessed the effects of concurrent articulatory suppression on the judgements. Experiment 2 used a concomitant task (chewing), which shares with suppression the use of articulatory components but does not involve speech programming and production. The third experiment investigated the effects of unattended speech on the phonological judgements. The results of these three experiments showed that articulatory suppression had a significant disrupting effect on accuracy in all four conditions, while neither articulatory non-speech (chewing) or unattended auditory speech had any effect on the subjects' performance. The results suggest that these phonological judgements involve the operation of an articulatory speech output component, which is not implemented peripherally and does not require the involvement of a non-articulatory input system.     

The face wins: Stronger automatic processing of affect in facial expressions than words in a modified Stroop task

Affective words and faces each seem to be evaluated automatically, but it is unclear if they differ from one another in perceptual salience as measured by automaticity. The current study examined a possible hierarchy among affective stimuli using a modified photo–word Stroop task. Positive and negative words were superimposed across faces expressing positive (happy) and negative (angry, sad) emotions. Participants categorised the valence of faces and words. Across two experiments, interference effects were seen for both stimulus types. However, larger interference effects occurred during judgements of words than expressions, suggesting affective faces are processed more automatically than affective words. When the strength of positive and negative expressions is compared, angry expressions resulted in a larger interference effect than sad, and happy expressions produce interference similar to that of angry faces. The latter result contrasts with research suggesting potential threat stimuli are processed more automatically than positive stimuli. Implications are discussed.