An analysis of ideomotor action.

This article presents a framework based on the work of R. H. Lotze (1852), W. James (1890), and A. G. Greenwald (1970) for understanding ideomotor actions that tend to arise when individuals watch others perform certain actions. Two principles of ideomotor action induction are distinguished: perceptual induction, in which people tend to perform the movements they see, and intentional induction, in which people tend to perform movements suited to achieve what they would like to see. In 3 experiments, ideomotor hand, head, and foot movements were studied while participants watched a ball traveling toward a target. Results showed strong support for intentional induction, weaker support for perceptual induction, and a strong impact of the effector studied. The representational basis of action induction (stimulus vs. goal representations) and the automaticity of the underlying processing (task-dependent vs. task-independent induction) were considered.     

The Experience of Agency: Feelings, Judgments, and Responsibility

ABSTRACT— The experience of agency refers to the experience of being in control both of one's own actions and, through them, of events in the external world. Recent experimental studies have investigated how people recognise a particular event as being caused by their own action or by that of another person. These studies suggest that people match sensory inputs to a prediction based on the action they are performing. Other studies have contrasted voluntary actions to physically similar but passive body movements. These studies suggest that voluntary action triggers wide-ranging changes in the spatial and temporal experience not only of one's own body but also of external events. Prediction and monitoring of the consequences of one's own motor commands produces characteristic experiences that form our normal, everyday feeling of being in control of our life. We conclude by discussing the implications of recent psychological work for our notions of responsibility for action.     

The action congruency effect on the feelings of agency

Previous studies suggest that the sense of agency (SoA), the feeling of control about one’s own actions and ensuing effects is also generated during action selection processes. We investigate whether the conflict at the action selection stage induced by a supraliminal stimulus, modulates an implicit measure of SoA, namely intentional binding. Furthermore, we were interested to investigate the influence of different types of stimulus-response compatibility on SoA. To this aim we compared the influence of an automatic imitation task and a stroop-like task on intentional binding. In both tasks participants performed congruent and incongruent fingers movements (key release) in response to an external stimulus. Their movements caused an effect and participants estimated the time between their action and the ensuing effect. We found a reduced intentional binding effect in incongruent compared to congruent conditions in both tasks. The results are discussed within the theoretical framework of the fluency of action.     

Action identity: evidence from self-recognition, prediction, and coordination

Prior research suggests that the action system is responsible for creating an immediate sense of self by determining whether certain sensations and perceptions are the result of one's own actions. In addition, it is assumed that declarative, episodic, or autobiographical memories create a temporally extended sense of self or some form of identity. In the present article, we review recent evidence suggesting that action (procedural) knowledge also forms part of a person's identity, an action identity, so to speak. Experiments that addressed self-recognition of past actions, prediction, and coordination provide ample evidence for this assumption. The phenomena observed in these experiments can be explained by the assumption that observing an action results in the activation of action representations, the more so, when the action observed corresponds to the way in which the observer would produce it.     

The valence of action outcomes modulates the perception of one's actions

When interacting with the world, we need to distinguish whether sensory information results from external events or from our own actions. The nervous system most likely draws this distinction by comparing the actual sensory input with an internal prediction about the sensory consequences of one's actions. However, interacting with the world also requires an evaluation of the outcomes of self-action, e.g. in terms of their affective valence. Here we show that subjects' perceived pointing direction does not only depend on predictive and sensory signals related to the performed action itself, but also on the affective valence of the action outcome: subjects perceived their movements as directed towards positive and away from negative outcomes. Our findings suggest that the non-conceptual perception of the sensory consequences of self-action builds on both sensorimotor information related directly to self-action and a post hoc evaluation of the affective action outcome.     

动作自主性与结果性质对不同预测性条件下施动感的影响

采用时间估计法考察动作自主性水平、动作结果性质(利己、利他、中性)以及结果是否可预测对施动感的影响。结果发现, 高自主性的自由选择条件比低自主性的服从条件增强了个体的施动感, 且不受动作结果性质与结果是否可预测的影响; 在低自主性的服从条件下, 当结果可预测时利己结果比利他结果的施动感更强, 而在结果不可预测时利己和利他结果的施动感没有区别, 但均弱于中性结果。这揭示出动作的主观意愿在施动感产生过程中的重要作用, 同时在自主性较低的服从条件下, 对利己或利他道德属性的动作结果能否被预测, 对个体的施动感产生了不同的影响。研究结果说明具有利己或利他道德属性的动作对施动感会产生自上而下的调节作用, 且这种调节作用在低自主条件下较为突显。     

From outcome prediction to action selection: developmental change in the role of action–effect bindings

Ideomotor theory considers bidirectional action–effect associations to be the fundamental building blocks for intentional action. The present study employed a novel pupillometric and oculomotor paradigm to study developmental changes in the role of action‐effects in the acquisition of voluntary action. Our findings suggest that both 7‐ and 12‐month‐olds (and adults) can use acquired action–effect bindings to predict action outcomes but only 12‐month‐olds (and adults) showed evidence for employing action‐effects to select actions. This dissociation supports the idea that infants acquire action–effect knowledge before they have developed the cognitive machinery necessary to make use of that knowledge to perform intentional actions.     

Adaptive control of ideomotor effect anticipations

According to ideomotor theory, voluntary actions are selected and initiated by means of anticipated action effects. Prior experiments yielded evidence for these effect anticipations with response-effect (R-E) compatibility phenomena using blocked R-E relations. Daily actions, however, typically evoke different effects depending on the situational context. In the present study, we accounted for this natural variability and investigated R-E compatibility effects by a trial-by-trial variation of R-E compatibility relations. In line with recent observations regarding ideomotor learning, R-E compatibility influenced responding only when participants responded in free choice trials assuming that participants then adopted an intention-based action control mode. In contrast, R-E compatibility had no impact when participants responded according to imperative stimuli throughout the experiment, thus when participants adopted a stimulus-based action control mode. Interestingly, once an intention-based mode was established because of free choice trials within an experimental block, we observed response compatibility effects in free as well as forced choice trials. These findings extend and refine theoretical assumptions on different action control modes in goal-directed behavior and the specific contribution of ideomotor processes to intention-based action control.     

Intention and attention in ideomotor learning

Human actions may be carried out in response to exogenous stimuli (stimulus based) or they may be selected endogenously on the basis of the agent's intentions (intention based). We studied the functional differences between these two types of action during action-effect (ideomotor) learning. Participants underwent an acquisition phase, in which each key-press (left/right) triggered a specific tone (low pitch/high pitch) either in a stimulus-based or in an intention-based action mode. Consistent with previous findings, we demonstrate that auditory action effects gain the ability to prime their associated responses in a later test phase only if the actions were selected endogenously during acquisition phase. Furthermore, we show that this difference in ideomotor learning is not due to different attentional demands for stimulus-based and intention-based actions. Our results suggest that ideomotor learning depends on whether or not the action is selected in the intention-based action mode, whereas the amount of attention devoted to the action-effect is less important.     

The handedness of imagined bodies in action and the role of perspective taking

Past research at the nexus of motor control and perception investigated the role of perspective taking in many behavioral and neuroimaging studies. Some investigators addressed the issue of one's own vs. others' action imagination, but the possible effects of a front or a back view in imagining others' actions have so far been neglected. We report two 'single trial' experiments in which a total of 640 participants were asked to imagine a person performing a manual action - either in a front or in a back view - and then to indicate the hand used by the imagined person during movement execution. In such a task, we assume the existence of two distinct biases: a perceptual-mnemonic bias due to subjects' visual experience of others' actions, encouraging them to imagine right-handed movements, and a motor bias due to subjects' experience of self-made actions, encouraging them to imagine movements performed with the same hand as their dominant hand. We hypothesized that a greater involvement of motor representations in the back view compared to the front view could result in an increased correspondence between one's own manual preference and the hand used by the imagined agent in the former condition. The results of both experiments were consistent with this hypothesis, suggesting that while imagining others' actions we employ motor simulations in different degrees according to the perspective adopted.     

Who is causing what? The sense of agency is relational and efferent-triggered

The sense of agency ("I did that") is a basic feature of our subjective experience. Experimental studies usually focus on either its attributional aspects (the "I" of "I did that") or on its motoric aspects (the "did" aspect of "I did that"). Here, we combine both aspects and focus on the subjective experience of the time between action and effect. Previous studies [Haggard, P., Aschersleben, G., Gehrke, J., & Prinz, W. (2002a). Action, binding and awareness. In W. Prinz, & B. Hommel (Eds.), Common mechanisms in perception and action: Attention and performance (Vol. XIX, pp. 266-285). Oxford: Oxford University Press] have shown a temporal attraction in the perceived times of actions and effects, but did directly not study the relation between them. In three experiments, time estimates of an interval between an action and its subsequent sensory effect were obtained. The actions were either voluntary key press actions performed by the participant or kinematically identical movements applied passively to the finger. The effects were either auditory or visual events or a passive movement induced to another finger. The results first indicated a shortening of the interval between one's own voluntary action and a subsequent effect, relative to passive movement conditions. Second, intervals initiated by observed movements, either of another person or of an inanimate object, were always perceived like those involving passive movements of one's own body, and never like those involving active movements. Third, this binding effect was comparable for auditory, somatic and visual effects of action. Our results provide the first direct evidence that agency involves a generalisable relation between actions and their consequences, and is triggered by efferent motor commands.     

The role of proprioception in action recognition

This study aimed at evaluating the role of proprioception in the process of matching the final position of one's limbs with an intentional movement. Two experiments were realised with the same paradigm of conscious recognition of one's own limb position from a distorted position. In the first experiment, 22 healthy subjects performed the task in an active and in a passive condition. In the latter condition, proprioception was the only available information since the central signals related to the motor command were likely to be absent. The second experiment was realised with a deafferented patient who suffers from a complete haptic deafferentation, including loss of proprioception. The results first argue in favour of a dominant role of proprioception in action recognition, but they also stress the possible role of central signals. The process of matching the final position of one's limbs with an intended movement and thus of action recognition would be achieved through a comparison process between the predicted sensory consequences of the action, which are stored in its internal model, and the actual sensory consequences of that action.     

Representing others' actions: just like one's own?

Previous research has shown that observing others' actions can affect individual performance of the same actions. In the present study, we developed a new paradigm to investigate whether and how complementary actions at the disposal of another agent are represented and influence one's own actions. A spatial compatibility task was distributed among two people so that each participant took care of one of two responses. The identical task was performed alone and alongside another participant. There was a spatial compatibility effect in the group setting only. It was similar to the effect obtained when one person took care of both responses. This result suggests that one's own actions and others' actions are represented in a functionally equivalent way.     

Intention and attention in ideomotor learning

Human actions may be carried out in response to exogenous stimuli (stimulus based) or they may be selected endogenously on the basis of the agent's intentions (intention based). We studied the functional differences between these two types of action during action–effect (ideomotor) learning. Participants underwent an acquisition phase, in which each key-press (left/right) triggered a specific tone (low pitch/high pitch) either in a stimulus-based or in an intention-based action mode. Consistent with previous findings, we demonstrate that auditory action effects gain the ability to prime their associated responses in a later test phase only if the actions were selected endogenously during acquisition phase. Furthermore, we show that this difference in ideomotor learning is not due to different attentional demands for stimulus-based and intention-based actions. Our results suggest that ideomotor learning depends on whether or not the action is selected in the intention-based action mode, whereas the amount of attention devoted to the action–effect is less important.     

You Can't Always Get What You Want: Infants Understand Failed Goal-Directed Actions

ABSTRACT— At what age do infants understand that goals exist independently of the actions that result from them? Exploring infants' understanding of failed intentional actions—when the goal of the action is unfulfilled and thus not apparent in the actor's movements—is a critical step in answering this question. Using a visual habituation paradigm, we assessed when infants understand that a failed intentional action is goal directed and whether an understanding of successful intentional actions (actions that do overtly attain their goals) precedes an understanding of failed intentional actions. Results demonstrated that 10- and 12-month-olds recognized the goal directedness of both successful and failed reaching actions. Eight-month-olds also recognized the goal directedness of successful actions, but not of unsuccessful attempts. Thus, by the end of the 1st year of life, infants possess an impressive understanding of intentional action, and an understanding of failed intentional actions follows an earlier understanding of successful ones.     

Recognizing people from their movement

Human observers demonstrate impressive visual sensitivity to human movement. What defines this sensitivity? If motor experience influences the visual analysis of action, then observers should be most sensitive to their own movements. If view-dependent visual experience determines visual sensitivity to human movement, then observers should be most sensitive to the movements of their friends. To test these predictions, participants viewed sagittal displays of point-light depictions of themselves, their friends, and strangers performing various actions. In actor identification and discrimination tasks, sensitivity to one's own motion was highest. Visual sensitivity to friends', but not strangers', actions was above chance. Performance was action dependent. Control studies yielded chance performance with inverted and static displays, suggesting that form and low-motion cues did not define performance. These results suggest that both motor and visual experience define visual sensitivity to human action.     

Sense of body and sense of action both contribute to self-recognition

Recognizing oneself, easy as it appears to be, seems at least to require awareness of one's body and one's actions. To investigate the contribution of these factors to self-recognition, we presented normal subjects with an image of both their own and the experimenter's hand. The hands could make the same, a different or no movement and could be displayed in various orientations. Subjects had to tell whether the indicated hand was theirs or not. The results showed that a congruence between visual signals and signals indicating the position of the body is one component on which self-recognition is based. Recognition of one's actions is another component. Subjects had most difficulty in recognizing their hand when movements were absent. When the two hands made different movements, subjects relied exclusively on the movement cue and recognition was almost perfect. Our findings are in line with pathological alterations in the sense of body and the sense of action.     

观念运动理论：内涵与证据

人类日常动作有两种类型, 一是是对外界刺激的反应, 是一种自下而上的动作模式, 即感觉运动(sensorimotor)模式; 二是以人们头脑中的观念意图为基础, 由观念引导, 为了实现一个特定的目标而执行特定的动作, 是一种自上而下的动作模式, 即观念运动(ideomotor)模式。观念运动理论(ideomotor theory)所解释的就是以基于意图的动作。该理论经历了长期的演变, 一般动作执行与动作模仿领域内的行为与神经科学研究的证据初步证实了观念运动的理论构想与主要机制：共同编码机制与镜像神经机制。观念运动理论在贯通感知觉与动作方面具有重大意义, 由此还产生了共享环路模型(shared circuits model, SCM)等新近观点。此外, 观念运动理论还强调了目标和预期的重要地位。未来还需加强对动作与意图之间的通路, 以及动作的本体性效果等方面的研究。     

Sense of agency for mental actions: Insights from a belief-based action-effect paradigm

A substantial body of research has converged on the idea that the sense of agency arises from the integration of multiple sources of information. In this study, we investigated whether a measurable sense of agency can be detected for mental actions, without the contribution of motor components. We used a fake action-effect paradigm, where participants were led to think that a motor action or a particular thought could trigger a sound. Results showed that the sense of agency, when measured through explicit reports, was of comparable strength for motor and mental actions. The intentional binding effect, a phenomenon typically associated with the experience of agency, was also observed for both motor and mental actions. Taken together, our results provide novel insights into the specific role of intentional cues in instantiating a sense of agency, even in the absence of motor signals.     

Finger-number interaction: an ideomotor account

Recent findings have shown that processing numerical magnitude may interact with finger movements through goal-directed movements. Here we tested these number-finger interactions in a response-effect (R-E) paradigm. During a learning phase, participants read meaningless consonant-vowel (CV) syllables immediately followed by unrelated opening or closing finger movements; during a transfer test, they again named these CV syllables in response to processing a small or a large number. The results showed that responding to a large magnitude number during the transfer phase was slower in an incompatible situation, that is, when the answer was the CV syllable that had been associated to a grip closure during the learning phase. This interference effect demonstrates that ideomotor principles can account for the link between the meaning of numbers and the perception of actions through an anticipated-magnitude code.