Argumentation and Explanation in Conceptual Change: Indications From Protocol Analyses of Peer-to-Peer Dialog

In this paper we attempt to identify which peer collaboration characteristics may be accountable for conceptual change through interaction. We focus on different socio-cognitive aspects of the peer dialog and relate these with learning gains on the dyadic as well as the individual level. The scientific topic that was used for this study concerns natural selection, a topic for which students' intuitive conceptions have been shown to be particularly robust. Learning tasks were designed according to the socio-cognitive conflict instructional paradigm. After receiving a short instructional intervention on natural selection, paired students were asked to collaboratively construct explanations for certain evolutionary phenomena while engaging in dialectical argumentation. Two quantitative coding schemes were developed, each with a different granularity. The first assessed discrete dialog moves that pertained to dialectical argumentation and to consensual explanation development. The second scheme characterized the dialog as a whole on a number of socio-cognitive dimensions. Results from analyses on the dyadic as well as the individual level revealed that the engagement in dialectical argumentation predicted conceptual learning gains, whereas consensual explanation development did not. These findings open up new venues for research on the mechanisms of learning in and from peer collaboration.     

Modern Molar Behaviorism And Theoretical Behaviorism: Religion And Science.

Baum and staddon disagree on the status of internal states in behavior analysis. Baum advocates molar behaviorism, treating behavior in temporally extended segments and so avoiding the need for internal states. Staddon argues that internal states merely represent the effects of different histories and that their use brings behavior analysis in line with the established sciences. The dispute is one form of the age‐old molar—molecular controversy that characterized Aristotle's disagreement with Plato. Both molar and molecular analyses have their place, but molar behaviorism may apply more naturally to a variety of phenomena, ranging from the matching law and avoidance learning to socalled “higher mental processes.” When molecular analysis involves internal states, as in Staddon's Theoretical Behaviorism (or New Behaviorism), misunderstanding will be inevitable and behaviorism will be seen as one more instance of the mediational theories in which psychology has long been mired. Such theories have long dominated the physical sciences, where their usefulness is indisputable, but psychology is far behind the physical sciences and nonmediational molar behaviorism better suits a discipline that lacks the methods and the data of the established sciences.     

A puzzle about voluntarism about rational epistemic stances

The philosophy of science has produced numerous accounts of how scientific facts are generated, from very specific facilitators of belief, such as neo-Kantian constitutive principles, to global frameworks, such as Kuhnian paradigms. I consider a recent addition to this canon: van Fraassen’s notion of an epistemic stance—a collection of attitudes and policies governing the generation of factual beliefs—and his commitment to voluntarism in this context: the idea that contrary stances and sets of beliefs are rationally permissible. I argue that while scientific inquiry inevitably favours a high degree of consensus in our choices of stance, there is no parallel constraint in the case of philosophical inquiry, such as that concerned with how scientific knowledge should be interpreted. This leads, in the latter case, to a fundamental and apparently irresolvable mystery at the heart of stance voluntarism, regarding the grounds for choosing basic epistemic stances.     

Scientific Revolutions without Paradigm-Replacement and the Coexistence of Competing Paradigms: The Case of Generative Grammar and Construction Grammar

In the Kuhnian and Post-Kuhnian Philosophy of Science, it is widely accepted that scientific revolutions always involve the replacement of an old paradigm by a new paradigm. This article attempts to refute this assumption by showing that there are paradigm-constellations that conform to the relation of a scientific revolution in a Kuhnian sense without a paradigm-replacement occurring. The paradigms investigated here are the linguistic paradigms of Generative Grammar and Construction Grammar that, contrary to Kuhn’s conception of a sequence of paradigm-replacements, are reconstructed as coexisting competing paradigms. By choosing linguistic paradigms, Kuhn’s assumption that paradigm-led research takes place only in the natural sciences is implicitly challenged, and an insight into linguistic theory-construction largely underrepresented in the philosophy of science is given.     

Transitions Versus Dissociations: A Paradigm Shift in Unconscious Cognition

Since Freud and his co-author Breuer spoke of dissociation in 1895, a scientific paradigm was painstakingly established in the field of unconscious cognition. This is the dissociation paradigm. However, recent critical analysis of the many and various reported dissociations reveals their blurred, or unveridical, character. Moreover, we remain ignorant with respect to the ways cognitive phenomena transition from consciousness to an unconscious mode (or the reverse). This hinders us from filling in the puzzle of the unified mind. We conclude that we have reached a Kuhnian crisis in the field of unconscious cognition, and we predict that new models, incorporating partly the relevant findings of the dissociation paradigm—but also of dynamic psychology—, will soon be established. We further predict that some of these models will be largely based on the pairs representation–process and analog–digital.     

Unification and Revolution: A Paradigm for Paradigms

Incommensurability was Kuhn’s worst mistake. If it is to be found anywhere in science, it would be in physics. But revolutions in theoretical physics all embody theoretical unification. Far from obliterating the idea that there is a persisting theoretical idea in physics, revolutions do just the opposite: they all actually exemplify the persisting idea of underlying unity. Furthermore, persistent acceptance of unifying theories in physics when empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted means that physics makes a persistent implicit assumption concerning unity. To put it in Kuhnian terms, underlying unity is a paradigm for paradigms. We need a conception of science which represents problematic assumptions concerning the physical comprehensibility and knowability of the universe in the form of a hierarchy, these assumptions becoming less and less substantial and more and more such that their truth is required for science, or the pursuit of knowledge, to be possible at all, as one goes up the hierarchy. This hierarchical conception of science has important Kuhnian features, but also differs dramatically from the view Kuhn expounds in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In this paper, I compare and contrast these two views in a much more detailed way than has been done hitherto. I show how the hierarchical view can be construed to emerge from Kuhn’s view as it is modified to overcome objections. I argue that the hierarchical conception of science is to be preferred to Kuhn’s view.     

Charles Darwin: Continuity,Teleology and Ideology

Climate change has mutated from being a physical phenomenon to be studied to an idea to be contested. The sites of adjudication between competing truth claims have therefore moved from the secluded academy and scientific peer review to the vociferous agora and the extended peer community. This move is illustrated here using the case of the shrinking glaciers of Mt Kilimanjaro. Both the British engineer Guy Callendar, in 1944, and the American campaigner Al Gore, in 2006, claimed that the primary cause of this glacial recession was rising world temperature. Both were passionate believers in the reality of human-induced global warming, but they had very different resources at their disposal to advance these beliefs. While Callendar's claim was revealed only to the editor of the science journal Nature, Gore's claims were visible to millions through his film An Inconvenient Truth. While the force of Callendar's claim was weighed and adjudicated by one peer reviewer, the validity of Gore's claim was tested very publicly in the British courts. Both claims about the cause of Kilimanjaro's retreating glaciers were found wanting. The paper argues that this simple, but powerful, comparison between identical claims-making drawn from two different eras of science, yet with contrasting processes of truth-adjudication, illuminates the different ‘post-normal’ world of science climate change now inhabits. The case study is used to reflect on the role of the extended peer community in establishing and validating scientific knowledge about climate change: who participates, how trust is stabilised and whether science is thereby democratised.     

Kuhnianism and Neo-Kantianism: On Friedman’s Account of Scientific Change

Friedman’s perspective on scientific change is a sophisticated attempt to combine Kantian transcendental philosophy and the Kuhnian historiographical model. In this article, I will argue that Friedman’s account, despite its virtues, fails to achieve the philosophical goals that it self-consciously sets, namely to unproblematically combine the revolutionary perspective of scientific development and the neo-Kantian philosophical framework. As I attempt to show, the impossibility of putting together these two aspects stems from the incompatibility between (a) Friedman’s neo-Kantian conception of the role of philosophy and the role of the notion of incommensurability, and (b) the framework of transcendental idealism and the radical character of scientific revolutions. Hence, I suggest that pace Friedman and pace Kuhn’s own self-understanding, the Kuhnian theory of scientific revolutions cannot be seen as ‘Kantianism with moveable categories’ and consequently we should either abandon the notion of radical scientific revolution or place the Kuhnian account into another, non-Kantian philosophical framework.     

II. A reply to Siegel on Kuhnian relativism

Siegel argues that the Kuhnian relativism presented in ‘Kuhn's Epistemological Relativism’ fails because it neglects the possibility of rational choice in science between rival paradigms’ own incommensurable standards on the basis of ‘paradigm‐neutral external standards’. In reply, it is argued (1) that Siegel has given no reason to believe that there are such external standards in science, (2) that the mere ‘possibility’ of such standards in scientific debate is not sufficient to vitiate Kuhn's relativism, (3) that the actual existence of rational debate concerning the internal standards of rival paradigms does not entail (as Siegel claims) the existence of ‘paradigm‐neutral external standards’, and finally (4) that Kuhn's relativism concerning standards in science does not lead (as Siegel claims) to a ‘reductio’ which undermines the philosophical standards implicit in Kuhn's argument.     

A Review of Baum's Review of Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism

Baum expressed numerous concerns about my Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism in his review. If his review were an independent submission and I were an independent referee, I would recommend that his review be rejected and that he be encouraged to revise and resubmit, once he has studied the field a bit more and clarified for himself and journal readers several important matters. I outline two sets of concerns that he might usefully clarify in his revision: (a) the important contributions of B. F. Skinner to a book about radical behaviorism, and (b) the nature of private behavioral events. In particular, the methodological behaviorism inherent in Baum's position needs to be resolved.     

Advancing scientific discourse in the controversy surrounding the Comprehensive System for the Rorschach: a rejoinder to Meyer (2000)

A recent commentary by Meyer (2000) in the Journal of Personality Assessment alleged that Rorschach critic Wood and his colleagues had intentionally published information that they knew to be in error. To substantiate this contention, Meyer's commentary published information that was part of the peer review process at another journal. In this rejoinder, we present factual information that shows we have consistently acted in good faith. This rejoinder suggests that the scientific debate regarding the Comprehensive System for the Rorschach is unlikely to be advanced by speculating about the intentions of Rorschach critics, or by publishing information from the peer review process that is usually kept confidential.     

Global precedence effect in audition and vision: evidence for similar cognitive styles across modalities

This study aimed to provide evidence for a Global Precedence Effect (GPE) in both vision and audition modalities. In order to parallel Navon's paradigm, a novel auditory task was designed in which hierarchical auditory stimuli were used to involve local and global processing. Participants were asked to process auditory and visual hierarchical patterns at the local or global level. In both modalities, a global-over-local advantage and a global interference on local processing were found. The other compelling result is a significant correlation between these effects across modalities. Evidence that the same participants exhibit similar processing style across modalities strongly supports the idea of a cognitive style to process information and common processing principle in perception.     

Fear information and social phobic beliefs in children: a prospective paradigm and preliminary results

This paper presents a first attempt to develop a prospective paradigm to test Rachman's (Behav. Res. Ther. 15 (1977) 375) theory of fear acquisition for social fears. Following the prospective paradigm for animal fears developed by Field et al. (Behav. Res. Ther. 39 (2001) 1259) an attempt is made to adapt this paradigm to look at the effect of fear information in the development of social fears. A large group of normal children (N=135) who were at an age (10-13 years) at which social concerns are most pertinent were tested using this paradigm. They were given positive, negative or neutral information about three social situations: public speaking, eating in public, and meeting a new group of children. Children's fear beliefs were measured before and after the information was given and the information was given by a teacher, a same age peer or no information was given (a control). The results indicate that although information can change social fear beliefs it is dependent upon the type of social activity and who provides the information. The implications of these initial results for our understanding of both the role of fear information in the development of social fear beliefs, and the limitations of this current paradigm are discussed.     

The Kuhnian mode of HPS

In this article I argue that a methodological challenge to an integrated history and philosophy of science approach put forth by Ronald Giere almost forty years ago can be met by what I call the Kuhnian mode of History and Philosophy of Science (HPS). Although in the Kuhnian mode of HPS norms about science are motivated by historical facts about scientific practice, the justifiers of the constructed norms are not historical facts. The Kuhnian mode of HPS therefore evades the naturalistic fallacy which Giere’s challenge is a version of. Against the backdrop of a discussion of Laudan’s normative naturalism I argue that the Kuhnian mode of HPS is a superior form of naturalism: it establishes contact to the practice of science without making itself dependent on its contingencies.     

Five commandments for APA

The author delineates 5 rules of scientific review and publishing and argues that these norms need to be upheld even when to do so proves politically difficult. The 5 rules are: (a) Scientific articles should be judged only by their logic and the strength of their evidence; (b) the results of a competent peer review should be accepted; (c) disagreements with scientific articles should be aired in peer reviewed commentaries; (d) efforts to judge scientific articles on the basis of political concerns should be resisted; and (e) the explicit rules and normative expectations of peer review should not be arbitrarily altered.     

Kuhnian Revolutions Revisited

I re-examine Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions. I argue that the sorts of events Kuhn regards as scientific revolutions are a diverse lot, differing in significant ways. But, I also argue that Kuhn does provide us with a principled way to distinguish revolutionary changes from non-revolutionary changes in science. Scientific revolutions are those changes in science that (1) involve taxonomic changes, (2) are precipitated by disappointment with existing practices, and (3) cannot be resolved by appealing to shared standards. I argue that an important and often overlooked dimension of the Kuhnian account of scientific change is the shift in focus from theories to research communities. Failing to make this shift in perspective might lead one to think that when individual scientists change theories a scientific revolution has occurred. But, according to Kuhn, it is research communities that undergo revolutionary changes, not individual scientists. I show that the change in early modern astronomy is aptly characterized as a Kuhnian revolution.     

Ghost and self: Jung's paradigm shift and a response to Zinkin

Abstract :  Zinkin's lucid challenge to Jung makes perfect sense. Indeed, it is the implications of this 'making sense' that this paper addresses. For Zinkin's characterization of the 'self' takes it as a 'concept' requiring coherence; a variety of abstract non-contextual knowledge that itself has a mythical heritage. Moreover, Zinkin's refinement of Jung seeks to make his work fit for the scientific paradigm of modernity. In turn, modernity's paradigm owes much to Newton's notion of knowledge via reductionism. Here knowledge or investigation is divided up into the smallest possible units with the aim of eventually putting it all together into 'one' picture of scientific truth. Unfortunately, 'reductionism' does not do justice to the resonant possibilities of Jung's writing. These look forward to a new scientific paradigm of the twenty-first century, of the interactive 'field', emergence and complexity theory. The paper works paradoxically by discovering Zinkin's 'intersubjective self' after all, in two undervalued narratives by Jung, his doctoral thesis and a short late ghost story. However, in the ambivalences and radical fictional experimentation of these fascinating texts can be discerned an-Other self, one both  created and found .     

Structure and Scientific Controversies

In this paper, I highlight the importance of models and social structure to Kuhn’s conception of science, and then use these elements to sketch a Kuhnian classification of scientific controversies. I show that several important sorts of non-revolutionary scientific disagreements were both identified and analyzed in Structure. Ultimately, I contend that Kuhn’s conception of science supports an approach to scientific controversies that has the potential to both reveal the importantly different sources of scientific disagreements and to provide useful resources for understanding their endurance and eventual termination. Several brief examples are used to suggest the power of a Kuhnian analysis and this analysis is contrasted with several more contemporary alternatives.     

The Influence of Peer Interactions on Sexually Oriented Joke Telling

Although the negative consequences and prevalence rates of sexual imposition are widely known through self-report surveys, currently there are few laboratory paradigms to examine the determinants of this type of behavior, especially peer sexual harassment. The purpose of the present study was to examine the effects of two types of peer interactions on peer sexual harassment among college students using a laboratory paradigm of sexually oriented joke telling as an analogue of sexual harassment. Results from two different experiments revealed an effect of type of peer interaction on sexually oriented joke telling. In Experiment 1, male college students, who were exposed to a male peer who modeled sexually harassing behavior, subsequently told significantly more sexually oriented jokes to an unknown female peer than did male students exposed to a male peer who modeled nonsexually harassing behavior. In Experiment 2, male college students, who were exposed to a male peer who was seemingly sexist in his interaction with them, subsequently told significantly more sexually oriented jokes to an unknown female peer than did male students exposed to a male peer who was seemingly nonsexist in his interactions with them. These results suggest that peer interactions may serve as a disinhibiting situational factor of sexually harassing behaviors perpetrated by male college students on female peers. The results also provide further validity for the use of a laboratory paradigm for the study of peer sexual harassment.     

Intelligence and race: further comments on J. P. Rushton's work.

A review of some implications of J.P. Rushton's 1988 and 1990 work on racial differences in brain mass (size or weight) suggests that his comments do not constitute a viable scientific theory.