Let the Vat-Brains Speak for Themselves

It's pretty standard to find pretty compelling the claim that for all one can tell one may be a vat-brain: not least, to say the least, because it's a version of Descartes' demon thought-experiment in the First Meditation. Here I refute that claim. Like Descartes I start with the idea that one has an undeniable grip on most of what one is thinking. To this I add the idea that knowing thinking as thinking is being able to engage in it. Then I argue that one can't engage in the (purported) thinking of a vat-brain (there are various specimens of vat-brain to be considered). The essential point is that one cannot make anything of what a vat-brain's intended ontology would be, and how the brain might conceive of it. So one cannot engage with any vat-brain's (purported) thinking. Yet one engages with one's own. So one isn't any of them. I'm not, anyway: you can speak for yourself.     

Know yourself and you shall know the other... to a certain extent: multiple paths of influence of self-reflection on mindreading

Social and neurocognitive research suggests that thinking about one's own thinking and thinking about the thinking of others-termed 'mindreading', 'metacognition', 'social cognition' or 'mentalizing' are not identical activities. The ability though to think about thinking in the first person is nevertheless related to the ability to think about other's thoughts in the third person. Unclear is how these phenomena influence one another. In this review, we explore how self-reflection and autobiographical memory influence the capacity to think about the thoughts and emotions of others. We review studies suggesting that the more individuals are able to reflect on and retrieve episodes from their life narratives, the more they are likely to grasp others' thoughts and emotions. We discuss evidence supporting this possibility including studies of the neurocognitive bases of empathy and self-awareness and how different aspects of self-reflection may impact on mindreading. We also draw from clinical reports how improved self-reflection may result in a more nuanced mindreading, namely persons suffering from schizophrenia and narcissistic personality disorder. We finally discuss the implications for research and practice and consider whether there are conditions in which the reverse is true, where self-reflection might impair mindreading or in which mindreading may facilitate self-reflection.     

A Poetic Path from Melancholy to Mourning: Robert Lowell's Elegies as Case Study

This essay builds on a previous one in this journal (Cole, 2005) that details how reading elegiac poetry, the poetry of mourning, may be a pastoral resource for complicated grief or what is classically termed melancholia. A study of elegies by poet Robert Lowell (1917–1977), which depict a progression from melancholia to more “typical” mourning, demonstrates how thinking and writing in elegiac terms may offer a similar resource, whether for one's own melancholia or that of persons in one's care. Allan Hugh Cole, Jr. is Assistant Professor of Pastoral Care at Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary.     

Children and adults as intuitive scientists

The metaphor of children and lay adults as intuitive scientists has gained wide acceptance. Although useful in one sense, pertaining to scientific understanding, in another, pertaining to the process of scientific thinking, the metaphor may be fundamentally misleading. Research is reviewed indicating that processes of scientific thinking differ significantly in children, lay adults, and scientists. Hence, it is the instruments of scientific thinking, not just the products, that undergo "strong restructuring" (Carey, 1986). A framework for conceptualizing development of scientific thinking processes is proposed, centering on progressive differentiation and coordination of theory and evidence. This development is metacognitive, as well as strategic. It requires thinking about theories, rather than merely with them, and thinking about evidence, rather than merely being influenced by it, and, hence, reflects the attainment of control over the interaction of theories and evidence in one's own thinking.     

If You Want to Do Something About Your Own Craziness, Have Your Own Experiential Sessions

If a person is troubled by worries or fears about being crazy, out of one's mind, psychotic, the person can learn to have one's own experiential sessions aimed at two goals. One is to undergo a deep-seated, qualitative change toward becoming the person one is capable of becoming. The related other goal is to be free of the worrisome, fearful scenes or situations of being crazy, out of one's mind, psychotic. An illustration is given of how to achieve these goals by having one's own experiential session.     

Brain potentials related to seeing one''s own name

Subjects were assigned an assumed name and then shown a series of statements of the form, "My name / is / X", where X was the assumed name, their own first name, or one of a set of other false names. Their task was to respond positively to the "assumed" name and reject as false all other names, including their own. An N380 feature of the averaged task-related brain potentials, considered to be inversely related to the degree of contextual priming, was greatly enhanced for the false names compared to the assumed name. The N380 to one's own name was more similar to that of the false than the assumed name, indicating that the sentence context's priming of various names was under the subjects' attentional control, and that the late negativity could be modulated by this attention. In contrast, a large P510 feature distinguished one's own name from the false name, and this difference was unaffected by practice. Even in cases, then, where the context allows anticipation of one verbal event (here, the assumed name), a highly overlearned and salient stimulus such as one's own name continues to produce a distinctive neural response.     

The soft embodiment of culture: camera angles and motion through time and space

Cultural assumptions about one's relation to others and one's place in the world can be literally embodied in the way one cognitively maps out one's position and motion in time and space. In three experiments, we examined the psychological perspective that Asian American and Euro-American participants embodied as they both comprehended and produced narratives and mapped out metaphors of time and space. In social situations, Euro-American participants were more likely to embody their own perspective and a sense of their own motion (rather than those of a friend), whereas Asian American participants were more likely to embody a friend's perspective and sense of motion (rather than their own). We discuss how these psychological perspectives represent the soft embodiment of culture by implicitly instantiating cultural injunctions (a) to think about how you look to others and to harmonize with them or (b) to know yourself, trust yourself, and act with confidence.     

Electrophysiological responses in mothers to their own and unfamiliar child's gaze information

An attachment bond between a mother and her child is one of the most intimate human relationships. It is important for a mother to be sensitive to her child's gaze direction because exchanging gaze information plays a vital role in their relationship. Furthermore, recent studies have revealed differential neural activation patterns in mothers when presented the faces of their own children or the unfamiliar child of other people. Based on these findings, in the present study, we investigated whether mothers show differential neural responses to gaze information of their own child compared to that of an unfamiliar child. To this end, event-related-potentials elicited by the faces of one's own or an unfamiliar child with straight or averted gaze directions were measured using an oddball-paradigm. The results showed that peak amplitudes of the N170 component were enlarged by viewing the straight gazes compared to the averted gazes of one's own child, but not of an unfamiliar child. When the gaze was directed straight, the P3 amplitude elicited by one's own child's face is smaller than that elicited by an unfamiliar child's face. P3s elicited in viewing one's own child's face with averted gaze and in viewing an unfamiliar child's face with straight gaze were positively correlated with state-anxiety. These results bolster the hypothesis that processing the gaze information of one's own child elicits differential neural activation compared to the gaze information of an other person's unfamiliar child at both perceptual and evaluative stages of face processing.     

Subtle priming of shared human experiences eliminates threat-induced negativity toward Arabs, immigrants, and peace-making

Many studies demonstrate that mortality salience can increase negativity toward outgroups but few have examined variables that mitigate this effect. The present research examined whether subtly priming people to think of human experiences shared by people from diverse cultures increases perceived similarity of members of different groups, which then reduces MS-induced negativity toward outgroups. In Study 1, exposure to pictures of people from diverse cultures engaged in common human activities non-significantly reversed the effect of MS on implicit anti-Arab prejudice. In Study 2, thinking about similarities between one's own favorite childhood memories and those of people from other countries eliminated MS-induced explicit negative attitudes toward immigrants. In Study 3, thinking about similarities between one's own painful childhood memories and those of people from other countries eliminated the MS-induced reduction in support for peace-making. Mediation analyses suggest the effects were driven by perceived similarity of people across cultures. These findings suggest that priming widely shared human experiences can attenuate MS-induced intergroup conflict.     

Through with the looking glass: escape responses to implicit mirror exposure

Based on the assumption that confrontation with one's physical reflection can be aversive, we explored the appeal of possible "escape routes" when incidentally exposed to one's mirror image. Compared to their no-exposure peers, individuals who felt less chronically "trapped" in their bodies showed increased interest in flow experiences and decreased interest in experiences involving low-level thinking or a subjective sense of meaning when exposed to their reflection. Mirror exposure also increased overall interest in "pure consciousness events," wherein the transcendence of space and time figures centrally. The aversive effects of even implicit confrontation with one's reflection therefore seem more diverse than anticipated based on existing frameworks such as Objective Self-Awareness theory, so additional theoretical development seems warranted.     

How sex puts you in gendered shoes: sexuality-priming leads to gender-based self-perception and behavior

Scripts for sexual behavior dictate that women be submissive and tender and that men be assertive and dominant, reflecting the stereotypical view of women as communal and of men as agentic. Six experiments tested the hypothesis that exposure to sexuality cues causes men's and women's momentary self-perceptions and concomitant behavior to become more gender-typical. Using both pictorial and verbal prime materials that were presented both supraliminally and subliminally, we found that sex-priming strengthened gender-based self-perceptions (i.e., faster self-categorization as a woman or man; Study 1), heightened identification with one's own gender (Study 2), increased gender self-stereotyping (Study 3), and elicited greater submissiveness in women's behavior and greater assertiveness in men's behavior (Studies 4 and 5). These findings indicate that sex-priming causes self-perception and social behavior to become "attuned" to gender stereotypes. Study 6 demonstrated that these sex-priming effects can be eliminated by modern gender role primes. The potentially detrimental effects of sex-priming and possible countermeasures are discussed.     

Saint Paul's approach to grief: Clarifying the ambiguity

There is a certain ambiguity in the Christian approach to grief that dates back to St. Paul. Paul stood at the crossroads of two traditional approaches to grief: the lamentation stradition, encouraging the full, free expression of grief emotions, and the consolation tradition, which encouraged restraint, moderation, and patience. Paul's pastoral approach to grief reflects elements of both traditions, synthesized to fit his own unique theological context. The modern pastor, informed by current thinking in psychology, faces a similar challenge. To facilitate one's own synthesis, the pastor must begin by clarifying his/her psychological assumptions about the nature of health and his/her theological assumptions about the nature of loss.     

Thinking outside the box: a metacognitive / theory of mind perspective on concrete thinking

Concrete thinking, an extraordinarily difficult condition to treat, has been psychoanalytically theorized to result from failures of symbolization-problems forming, linking, or fathoming the meaning of symbols-and/or failures of differentiation, resulting in difficulties distinguishing symbols from the thing being symbolized, fantasy from reality, self from other. Though difficulties symbolizing and differentiating are clearly evident in patients whose thinking is concrete, these may be a manifestation of concrete thinking rather than a root cause. Childhood thinking is characteristically concrete, and a persistence of such thinking into adulthood can be adequately explained as a failure to develop a more sophisticated theory of mind. Given that patients who exhibit such thinking tend to respond poorly to classic psychoanalytic interpretations, alternative technical approaches have been proposed. One such approach, "metacognitive" in nature, draws on a mode of thought used by gifted individuals that helps them "think outside the box" by dispensing with a typical pattern-recognition search so that novel meanings might be discovered. Metacognition, thoughts about one's thoughts and thought processes, facilitates symbolic thinking by creating sufficient distance from one's thoughts to allow the consideration of alternative meanings.     

The Murderer at the Door: What Kant Should Have Said

Embarrassed by the apparent rigorism Kant expresses so bluntly in 'On a Supposed Right to Lie,' numerous contemporary Kantians have attempted to show that Kant's ethics can justify lying in specific circumstances, in particular, when lying to a murderer is necessary in order to prevent her from killing another innocent person. My aim is to improve upon these efforts and show that lying to prevent the death of another innocent person could be required in Kantian terms. I argue (1) that our perfect Kantian duty of self-preservation can require our lying to save our own lives when threatened with unjust aggression, and (2) that Kant's understanding of moral duty was that duties are symmetrical , such that if one has a duty to perform a given action on one's own behalf or to protect one's own rational nature, then one also has a duty to perform similar acts on other's behalf or to protect their rational nature. Thus, that the individual protected against aggression by means of deception is not oneself should be of no consequence from a Kantian perspective. Lying to the murderer is thus an extension of the Kantian requirement of self-defense.     

Feeling like you know who you are: perceived true self-knowledge and meaning in life

The essence of who a person really is has been labeled the "true self," and an emerging area of research suggests that this self-concept plays an important role in the creation of a fulfilling existence. Three studies investigate the role of the subjective feeling that one possesses knowledge of one's true self in meaning in life judgments. Consistently, the perception of availability of true self-knowledge (operationalized as the metacognitive experience of ease in describing one's true self) predicted meaning in life judgments over and above other potentially related constructs such as mood and self-esteem. Conversely, the subjective availability of knowledge of how one actually behaves (i.e., one's actual self) was unrelated to meaning in life judgments. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.     

Short article one's own face is hard to ignore

One's own face possesses two properties that make it prone to grab attention: It is a face, and, in addition, it is a self-referential stimulus. The question of whether the self-face is actually an especially attention-grabbing stimulus was addressed by using a face-name interference paradigm. We investigated whether interference from a flanking self-face on the processing of a target classmate's name was stronger than interference from a classmate's flanking face on the processing of one's own name as the target. In a control condition a third familiar face served as the flanker for both decisions from the participant's own name and from the classmate's name. The presentation of the self-face as a flanker produced significantly more interference on the identification of a classmate's name than the presentation of that classmate's face did on the identification of one's own name. This result was due to the interfering power of the self-face and not to a particular resistance of one's name to interfering facial stimuli. We argue that the emotional value or the high familiarity of one's own face may explain its attention-grabbing property.     

Why read Fairbairn?

The author offers a close reading of portions of Fairbairn's work in which he not only explicates and clarifies Fairbairn's thinking, but generates ideas of his own by developing concepts that he believes to be implicit in, or logical extensions of, Fairbairn's work. Among the unstated or underdeveloped aspects of Fairbairn's contribution that the author discusses are (1) the idea that the formation of the internal object world is always, in part, a response to trauma (actual failure on the part of the mother to convey to her infant a sense that she loves him and accepts his love); (2) the notion that the infant's unceasing efforts to transform the internalized relationship with the unloving mother into a loving relationship – thus reversing the effect on his mother of his (imagined) 'toxic love'– is the single most important motivation sustaining the structure of the internal object world; and (3) the idea that attacks on oneself for the way one loves, while self-destructive, contain a glimmer of insight into one's own self-hatred and shame regarding one's endless, futile attempts to change oneself (or the rejecting object) into a different person. The author, using his own clinical work, illustrates the way he makes use of his understanding of the 'emotional life' of internal objects to facilitate the patient's emotional growth.     

On refusal

Traditionally, all efforts to counter psychotherapeutic work have been captured under the umbrella term, "resistance." However, it is useful to distinguish a concept of refusal. Resistance entails therapeutically a gradual elaboration of unconscious, preconscious, and partially conscious experience. Refusal manifests as a willful nonparticipation in offering or responding to material that can be symbolized. All communication has an element of refusal, which occurs at various levels of persistence, intensity, and legitimacy. Clinical examples are provided to discriminate refusal from resistance proper, and to describe three categories of mental and group experience, (a) refusal to perceive external experience; (b) refusal to think about what one knows, and (c) refusal to think about what one does not know. Therapeutic impasses may relate to limitations of the therapist's creativity and flexibility in thinking about and dealing with refusals, including one's own.     

Cognitive sophistication does not attenuate the bias blind spot

The so-called bias blind spot arises when people report that thinking biases are more prevalent in others than in themselves. Bias turns out to be relatively easy to recognize in the behaviors of others, but often difficult to detect in one's own judgments. Most previous research on the bias blind spot has focused on bias in the social domain. In 2 studies, we found replicable bias blind spots with respect to many of the classic cognitive biases studied in the heuristics and biases literature (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Further, we found that none of these bias blind spots were attenuated by measures of cognitive sophistication such as cognitive ability or thinking dispositions related to bias. If anything, a larger bias blind spot was associated with higher cognitive ability. Additional analyses indicated that being free of the bias blind spot does not help a person avoid the actual classic cognitive biases. We discuss these findings in terms of a generic dual-process theory of cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

X—Knowledge of Action Without Observation

This paper argues that perception of one's body 'from the inside' provides one with an awareness of acting, and that this awareness explains a previously overlooked feature of one's knowledge of one's own actions. Actions are events: they occur during periods of time. Knowledge of such events must be sensitive to their course through time. Perception of one's body 'from the inside' allows one to monitor one's actions as they unfold, thereby sustaining one's knowledge of what one is doing over the period of time in which one is doing it.