A Diagrammatic Reconstruction of Carnap's Quasianalysis

In this paper, I am zeroing in on Carnap's formal method of quasianalysis, arguing against two interpretations of it, offered by Nelson Goodman and Thomas Mormann. In order to overcome their inadequacy, I propose a diagrammatic reconstruction, which takes advantage of the fact that the concept of local sign is no longer ignored. This will give me the opportunity to show that Quine'scriticism of Carnap's constitution of physical space fails, and will allow me to describe QUASIMODOS (QUASIanalytical Machine Oriented Diagrammatic Operation System) – a system designed to construct qualities in continuous domains.     

A Non-Compositional Inferential Role Theory

I propose a version of inferential role theory which says that having a concept is having the disposition to draw most of the inferences based on the stereotypical features associated with this concept. I defend this view against Fodor and Lepore’s objection that it violates compositionality. I show that it is possible to account for productivity and systematicity without assuming compositionality.     

Aristotle's Endoxa and Plausible Argumentation

Aristotle's conception and use of ta endoxa are key points to our understanding of Aristotelian dialectic. But, nowadays, they are not of historical or hermeneutic importance alone, as, in Aristotle's treatment of endoxa, we still see a relevant contribution to the modern study of argumentation. I propose here an interpretation of endoxa to that effect: namely, as plausible propositions. This version is not only defensible in the Aristotelian context, it may also shed new light on some of his assumptions and methodological shortcomings – e.g. concerning the 'plausible/implausible' pair –; finally, it will even enable us to show certain basic hints and guidelines, advanced by Aristotle's study of endoxa, which still serve nowadays to orientate our studies of argumentation from the angle of a theory of plausible argument currently under construction. These hints and guidelines suggest a pragmatic, gradual and comparative discursive concept of plausibility, and point, in particular, towards the reasonable dealing with, and weighing up of, differences of opinion within this frame of reference.     

Rousseau's Insight

My comment makes a point out ofRousseau's original insight: that education forsocial participation ought to start within thestudent's lifeworld, and not, as in our days, with the immediatedemands of modern, time-ridden consumerculture. When time is turned into a commodityand place is turned into a transit point forpeople constantly on the move, presence in acommon lifeworld is lost. I take issue with thedominant thinking of education in terms of timeand efficiency, and suggest that we startthinking of education more in terms of placeand presence. I propose that modern thinkers ofeducation – of which I mention a few here –contributed significantly to the pedagogy ofplace or presence. I don't see time as a stringmade up of past-present-future, but rather asan expanding mental and pragmatic universe ofhere-and-nows. The term kairos catchesthis presence as the capacity for doing theright thing at the right moment, that is, themoment when the past has prepared the ground sothat the future can come as a gift. Thisconception is, I think, an important ground forthe idea of an education for citizenship.     

Moral Explanation and the Special Sciences

Discussion of moral explanation has reached animpasse, with proponents of contemporaryethical naturalism upholding the explanatoryintegrity of moral facts and properties, andopponents – including both anti-realists andnon-naturalistic realists – insisting thatsuch robustly explanatory pretensions as moraltheory has be explained away. I propose thatthe key to solving the problem lies in thequestion whether instances of moral propertiesare causally efficacious. It is argued that,given the truth of contemporary ethicalnaturalism, moral properties are causallyefficacious if the properties of the specialsciences are. Certain objections are rebuttedinvolving the nature of causation, on the onehand, and putative special features of themoral realm, on the other.     

Special Relativity,Coexistence And Temporal Parts: A Reply To Gilmore

In two earlier works (Balashov, 2000a: Philosophical Studies 99, 129–166; 2000b: Philosophy of Science 67 (Suppl), S549–S562), I have argued that considerations based on special relativity and the notion of coexistence favor the perdurance view of persistence over its endurance rival. Cody Gilmore (2002: Philosophical Studies 109, 241–263) has subjected my argument to an insightful three fold critique. In the first part of this paper I respond briefly to Gilmore’s first two objections. I then grant his observation that anyone who can resist the first objection is liable to succumb to the third one. This, however, opens a way to other closely related relativistic arguments against endurantism that are immune to all three objections and, in addition, throw new light on a number of important issues in the ontology of persistence. I develop two such novel arguments in the second half of the paper.     

Inverting Intentional Content

Critics of wide functionalism havetraditionally sought to attack the theory byexposing weaknesses in its account of the qualitative content of experience. Widefunctionalist theories of intentionalcontent, however, were spared philosophicalscrutiny. I propose that wide functionalistaccounts of the intentional content are equallysusceptible to attack. I will attempt todemonstrate this by enlisting thefunctionalist's old foe from the qualia wars –the inverted spectrum hypothesis – in a newway. If the argument is sound, not only will Ihave shown that the inverted spectrumhypothesis may have more use than philosophicalliterature recognizes, I will have also exposeda weakness in a dominant philosophical theory:the wide functionalist theory of intentionalcontent.     

Static And Dynamic Dispositions

When it comes to scientific explanation, our parsimonious tendencies mean that we focus almost exclusively on those dispositions whose manifestations result in some sort of change – changes in properties, locations, velocities and so on. Following this tendency, our notion of causation is one that is inherently dynamic, as if the maintenance of the status quo were merely a given. Contrary to this position, I argue that a complete concept of causation must also account for dispositions whose manifestations involve no changes at all, and that a causal theory that fails to include these ‘static’ dispositions alongside the dynamic ones renders static occurrences miraculous.     

Can We Trust Our Memories? C. I. Lewis's Coherence Argument

In this paper we examine C. I. Lewis's view on the roleof coherence – what he calls 'congruence' – in thejustification of beliefs based on memory ortestimony. Lewis has two main theses on the subject. His negativethesis states that coherence of independent items ofevidence has no impact on the probability of a conclusionunless each item has some credibility of its own. Thepositive thesis says, roughly speaking, that coherenceof independently obtained items of evidence – such asconverging memories or testimonies – raises the probabilityof a conclusion to the extent sufficient for epistemicjustification, or, to use Lewis's expression, 'rationaland practical reliance'.It turns out that, while thenegative thesis is essentially correct (apart from aslight flaw in Lewis's account of independence), astrong positive connection between congruence andprobability – a connection of the kind Lewis ultimatelyneeds in his validation of memory – is contingent on thePrinciple of Indifference. In the final section we assess therepercussions of the latter fact for Lewis's theory in particularand for coherence justification in general.     

In Favor of Being Only Humean

The twin conceptions of (1) natural law as causal structure and (2) explanation as passage from phenomenon to cause, are two sides of a certain philosophical coin, to which I shall offer an alternative – Humean – currency. The Humean alternative yokes together a version of the regularity conception of law and a conception of explanation as passage from one regularity, to another which has it as an instance but of which it is not itself an instance. I will show that the regularity conception of law is the basis of a distinguished branch of physical mechanics; thus the Humean conception of law, like its better-loved rival, enjoys the support of a venerated tradition in mechanical theory – in fact, that strand which culminates in quantum theory. I shall also offer an account of explanatory asymmetry, a natural companion to the Humean conception of explanation as passage from one regularity to another of greater scope, as an alternative to van Fraassen's unsatisfactory account. My account of asymmetry is just as free of reliance on context as it is free of reliance on cause. I shall thus proclaim that explanatory asymmetry is at once a reality deserving of philosophical treatment – one not to be given over to the care of psychology or linguistics – and at the same time susceptible of an account worthy of Hume.     

The Biomedical Paradigm and the Nobel Prize: Is It Time for a Change?

An examination of the early history of Nobel Committee deliberations, coupled with a survey of discoveries for which prizes have been awarded to date – and, equally revealing, discoveries for which prizes have not been awarded – reveals a pattern. This pattern suggests that Committee members may have internalized the received, biomedical model and conferred awards in accord with the physicalistic premises that ground this model. I consider the prospect of a paradigm change in medical science and the possible repercussions of such a change on the distribution of Nobel prizes within the domain of physiology or medicine. For expository purposes, I contrast a model based on a science of pathophysiology with one based on a science of pathopsychophysiology. I propose a means whereby members might minimize the potentially blinding effects of model-dependence and come to evaluate medical discoveries from an inter-model rather than an exclusively intra-model perspective. By bringing to light questions rarely asked and proposing answers, I seek to open a dialogue and furnish a vehicle by which the putative delimiting effects of model-dependence might be overcome.     

Governing drug use through neurobiological subject construction: The sad loss of the sociocultural

Based on their "drugs as instruments" framework, Müller & Schumann (M&S) propose a staged drug policy that matches well the neoliberal governance scheme. To mend the sad loss of the sociocultural dimension in their model, I propose three such considerations: first, sociocultural interactions with the brain; second, sociocultural context and justice of drug use; and third, sociocultural preparedness for implementing their drug policy.     

The Diagonal and the Demon

Reliabilism about epistemic justification – thethesis that what makes a belief epistemicallyjustified is that it was produced by a reliableprocess of belief-formation – must face twoproblems. First, what has been called ``the newevil demon problem', which arises from the ideathat the beliefs of victims of an evil demonare as justified as our own beliefs, althoughthey are not – the objector claims – reliablyproduced. And second, the problem of diagnosingwhy skepticism is so appealing despite beingfalse. I present a special version ofreliabilism, ``indexical reliabilism', based ontwo-dimensional semantics, and show how it cansolve both problems.     

Intertheoretical Identity And Ontological Reductions

I argue that there are good reasons to assume that Quine’s theory of reference and ontology is incompatible with reductive statements – such as ‘Heat is molecular motion’ or ‘Rabbits are conglomerations of cells’. Apparently, reductive statements imply certain intertheoretical identities, yet Quine’s theory of reference and ontology seems incompatible with intertheoretical identities. I argued that treating, for the sake of reconciliation, reductive statements along the lines of Quine’s theory of an ontological reduction (which does not imply intertheoretical identity) fails. Then I discussed two alternative strategies on behalf of Quine to handle reductive statements: the Holistic Strategy (which appeals to Quine’s notion of an all-encompassing background theory) and the Individuative Strategy (which draws on Quine’s notion of an apparatus of individuation). I argue that the Individuative Strategy promises to succeed. However, the Individuative Strategy obliges to revising Quine’s theory of an ontological reduction – a revision that, as I argue, can and should be implemented.     

Western and Russian Traditions of Big History: A Philosophical Insight

Summary  Big History – an integral conception of the past since the Big Bang until today – is a novel subject of cross-disciplinary interest. The concept was construed in the 1980–1990s simultaneously in different countries, after relevant premises had matured in the sciences and humanities.Various versions and traditions of Big History are considered in the article. Particularly, most of the Western authors emphasize the idea of equilibrium, and thus reduce cosmic, biological, and social evolution to the mass-energy processes; the informational parameter involving all mental and spiritual aspects are seen as epiphenomena of material structures” complication that do not play their own role in evolution. In Russian tradition ascending to A. Bogdanov, E. Bauer, I. Prigogine, and E. Jantsch, sustainable non-equilibrium patterns are used. This implies attention to the pan-material sources and evolution of mental capacities and spiritual culture (as basic anti-entropy instruments) and humans” growing intervention in the material processes on Earth and outside it.The non-equilibrium approach in the context of modern control and self-organization theories, alters the portrayal of the past, and still more dramatically, estimation of the civilization’s potential perspectives.     

Exiles of anger: The spatial politics of difficult emotions in contemporary education

Anger is an under-examined yet potent and disruptive emotion with a complex social and spatial history. This paper examines the spatial politics of anger as it emerges in contemporary secondary education, arguing that everyday experience of young people is at odds with tools of emotional governance that are widely practiced across the sector. State education in the UK has increasingly turned to social and emotional forms of learning to both broaden the range of skills taught and to encourage different forms of self-governance. By exploring the operation of this particularly resonant and volatile emotion, the paper attempts to go beyond the intentions of policy to examine the everyday presentation of emotions through the bodies and spaces of governance. Specifically, I draw on young people's experience of anger and examine the individual and institutional responses that position and shape their emotional geographies. I argue that rather than treating emotions in their generality, examining anger specifically reveals a spatiality based on exile and eradication, rather than internal psychological governance.     

The Case of Guest Workers: Exploitation,Citizenship and Economic Rights

Working from a ``capitalist' theory of exploitation, based on a neo-classical account of economic value, I argue that guest workers are exploited. It may be objected, however, that since they are not citizens, any inequality that stems from their status as non-citizens is morally unobjectionable. Although host countries are under no moral obligation to admit guest workers as citizens, thereare independent reasons that call for the extension of economicrights – the freedom of occupation in particular – to guestworkers. Since the cause of unequal exchange rests in the factthat guest workers are deprived of these rights, rather than in their exclusion from citizenship per se, I concludethat they are exploited even if their exclusion from citizenshipmay be justified.     

Getting Beyond Form Filling: The Role of Institutional Governance in Human Research Ethics

It has become almost a truism to describe the interaction between research ethics committees and researchers as being marred by distrust and conflict. The ethical conduct of researchers is increasingly a matter of institutional concern because of the degree to which non-compliance with national standards can expose the entire institution to risk. This has transformed research ethics into what some have described as a research ethics industry. In an operational sense, there is considerable focus on modifying research behaviour through a combination of education and sanctions. The assessment of whether a researcher is ‘ethical’ is too often based on whether they submit their work for review by an ethics committee. However, is such an approach making a useful contribution to the actual ethical conduct of research and the protection of the interests of participants? Does a focus on ethical review minimise institutional risk? Instead it has been suggested that ethics committees may be distorting or frustrating useful research and are promoting a culture of either mindless rule following or frustrated resistance. An alternative governance approach is required. There is a need for a strong institutional focus on promoting and supporting the reflective practice of researchers through every stage of their work. By situating research ethics within the broader framework of institutional governance, this paper suggests it is possible to establish arrangements that actually facilitate excellent and ethical research.     

Mature Ego Development: A Gateway to Ego Transcendence?

This paper explores whether the highest stage in ego development is indicative of ego-transcendence as I initially surmised. Overall, I will explore some of the similarities and differences between rational awareness of the limits of representational thought and genuine postsymbolic knowing. I will present the research territory with a linear and a non-linear model of human development. Both models can accommodate both Eastern and Western self theories including ego development theory and Alexander's levels of mind. Next, I will outline an alternative developmental trajectory based on Alexander's notion of the shifts in the dominant mode of processing from personal–verbal–discursive to transpersonal–postsymbolic. Then, I will present ego development theory as I conceive of it now and outline the important characteristics of the highest stage (Cook-Greuter, 1999). Finally, I will consider the question of whether and in what way the Unitive ego stage is related to higher consciousness and introduce two testable propositions to clarify the issue.