The importance of Hinayāna and Mahāyāna

Volume 1. Hinayāna. Den tidlige indiske buddhisme. Volume 2. Mahāyāna. Den senere indiske buddhisme. Christian Lindtner, 1998, Copenhagen, Spektrum/Forum Publishers, Vol. 1: 228 pp., ISBN 87 7763 170 6; Vol. 2: 256 pp., ISBN 87 7763 174 9     

Dual and non-dual ontology in Satre and Mahāyāna Buddhism

Continental Philosophy Review - This paper examines Sartre's dualistic ontology in the light of the non-duality asserted by Mahāyāna Buddhism. In the first section, I show, against...     

Fārābī and Avicenna on Contraposition

The rule of contraposition has been investigated thoroughly by Arabic logicians. In this paper, we study the work done by Fārābā and Avicenna, the fathers of Arabic logic. Fārābā studied contraposition of universal affirmatives, discussed its four forms, and discovered a relation between one form and the conversion of negative universals. Although Fārābā and logicians before him have used contraposition only for conditionals, as well as for indefinite and universal affirmative categorical propositions, Avicenna generalized the rule to all the four Aristotelian quantified categorical propositions. However, many of his ideas on contraposition were opposed by his 12th and 13th century followers, which are to be investigated later.     

Ghazāli and the Ash'arites

It has been widely accepted that the thought of al‐Ghazāli was broadly in line with the Ash'arite approach to theology, which came to have a dominant role in Islamic thought for the last thousand years. Recently, though, many commentators have argued that this is a misconception, and that there are many instances where Ghazāli produces arguments and opinions which are not compatible with Ash'arism. It is argued here that these examples do not establish that the general line of Ghazāli's thought is not Ash'arite. The fact that on occasion he is prepared to use the language of his opponents does not invalidate the Ash'arite basis of his thought. It is quite possible to adhere to a philosophical view about how reality is and at the same time use the language of those who have a different view without committing oneself to that different form of expression. Although the revisionist approach to the interpretation of Ghazāli is interesting and often perceptive, it does not lead to any necessity to question his adherence to Ash'arite principles in general.     

Mettābhāvanā in Traditional and Popular Buddhist Contexts

Some have referred to relatively recent forms of popular Buddhism as an ‘engaged’ Buddhism that has revived or redirected traditional Buddhist ideas and practices found in meditation texts to reflect a greater social or worldly emphasis than suggested in earlier historical moments. One of these ideas is the quadripartite framework of the ‘immeasurable states’ (aprameya/appameya) or ‘divine abidings’ (brahmavihāra), the most prominent of which in popular Buddhism is mettā (friendliness/loving-kindness). This article traces the philosophy of the ‘immeasurable states’ found in meditation texts from various Indic traditions (Buddhist, Jain, and Hindu) and then presents the ways in which these traditional ideas (especially mettā) have informed popular Buddhist movements in the twentieth century. Points of discussion include: ‘engaged’ Buddhism's relationship with traditional Buddhist ethics; arguments concerning the coalescence of monastic-centred meditation practices with popular Buddhist notions of social service; and the distinct utilization of mettā in contemporary Buddhist societies in contrast to the mobilizing impulses of comparable religious communities (Hindu and Jain) with a similar heritage of mettā discourse in South Asia.     

Prāmāṇyavāda in the Text Tātparyaṭīkā and Pariśuddhi

In the thirteenth century, Gaṅgeśapādhyāya of Mithilā wrote his magnum opus Tattvacintāmaṇi which marked the inception of the Navya- Nyāya School. It was from this time that the works of the Nyāya beginning with the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, and ending with Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamanjarī as well as Udayana’s Nyāya-Vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi came to be designated as Prācīna-nyāya. We have elaborated the arguments of Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana in order to support and prove the extrinsic nature of pramāṇa. In this paper, we have also shown that they have added extra strength to the views of the former Māsters—their predecessors by declaring that the inference (which is advanced by Bhāṣyakāra) is purged of fallacies of all sorts in the field of the validity of pramāṇa.

     

Vijñaptimātratā and the Abhidharma context of rarly Yogācāra

Contemporary accounts of early Mahāyāna Buddhist schools like the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra tend to portray them as generally antithetical to the Abhidharma of non‐Mahāyāna schools such as the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda. This paper attempts to locate early Yogācāra philosophical speculation firmly within the broader context of Abhidharma debates. Certain key Yogācāra concepts such as ālayavijñāna, vijñapti‐mātratā and citta‐mātra are discussed insofar as they relate to pre‐existing concepts and issues found in the Vaibhāsika and Sautrāntika schools, with specific reference to the Abhidharmako?a and the corresponding bhāsya of Vasubandhu. Finally, some remarks are made about the, benefits of approaching the history of religious ideas without the benefits and distortions of hindsight, particularly as this relates to the attribution of an idealistic position to the early Yogācāra literature.     

The development and use of the eight precepts for lay practitioners,Upāsakas and Upāsikās in Theravāda Buddhism in the West

Sometimes translating religious texts brings us up against the problem of scatological language. The author examines this problem in relation to a story of a former life of the Buddha and explores a variety of avenues for guidance on how to render gūtha ‘shit’ into English. This includes looking at Buddhist monastic law, which does not necessarily give us the guidance we might expect, and how the existing translation of this source of guidance illustrates the very problem in hand. The textual history and context of the story precludes some otherwise useful strategies for determining our translation and the best guide to the translator's hand in this instance turns out to be humour. The author makes a case that, employed judiciously, humour could become a useful hermeneutic tool for drawing meaning from religious literature. Along the way the author also reflects on the influence of the social context of the translator, including changes in British obscenity law, and on the possibility that academia is unconsciously constrained by unexamined assumptions of ‘decency’. Buddhist attitudes to language are also touched upon.     

Syncategoremata in Arabic Logic,al-Fārābī and Avicenna

Presented here are translations of two essays of the Austrian logician, philosopher and experimental psychologist Ernst Mally, originally delivered at the Third International Congress of Philosophy in Heidelberg, Germany. Both essays conclude with discussion between Mally and Kurt Grelling. Mally was a student of Alexius Meinong and a contributor to logical investigations in the field of object theory (Gegenstandstheorie). In these essays, Mally introduces a vital distinction between formal and extra-formal ‘determinations’ (Bestimmungen), and he argues that formal determinations are not part of the identity conditions for intended objects, but provide the basis for a theory of pure logical and mathematical relations. Mally then proceeds to develop a formal logic of formal and extra-formal determinations, whose interrelations of ontic and modal predications provide an analysis of fundamental object theory concepts.     

From Yogācāra to Philosophical Tantra in Kashmir and Tibet

This paper outlines a shift in the role of self-awareness from Yogācāra to tantra and connects some of the dots between Yogācāra, Pratyabhijñā, and Buddhist tantric traditions in Tibet. As is the case with Yogācāra, the Pratyabhijñā tradition of Utpaladeva (10th c.) maintains that awareness is self-illuminating and constitutive of objects. Utpaladeva’s commentator and influential successor, Abhinavagupta (10th–11th c.), in fact quotes Dharmakīrti’s (7th c.) argument from the Pramā?avini?caya that objects are necessarily perceived objects (sahopalambhaniyama). That is, everything known is known in consciousness; there is nothing that can be known outside or separate from consciousness. This aspect of Pratyabhijñā thought is shared with Yogācāra. While Utpaladeva drew upon Yogācāra epistemology to formulate a differential construction of objects (via apoha), he departed from this theory to develop a distinctive monistic framework for the interpretation of subjectivity. By appealing to the ultimate reality of a singularly nonconceptual, transcendental subject rather than a plurality of (non)conceptual particulars, Utpaladeva appropriated Dharmakīrti’s epistemological model while turning it on its head. That is, Utpaladeva critiqued Dharmakīrti in one context (his external realism) while he is indebted to him in another (his epistemic idealism) to establish the framework for his own absolute idealism, where everything happens in and through the absolute self that is ?iva. Utpaladeva extended (or made explicit) the place of self-awareness in Yogācāra to formulate an absolute idealism that is the theoretic foundation for philosophical tantra. In this paper, I will chart a trajectory of this development, from Yogācāra to Pratyabhijñā, and show how a parallel development took place in tantric assimilations of Yogācāra in Tibet.     

Vedic and devotional waters: The Jalabheda of vallabhācārya

Summary Bhāvas, or comprehensive states of mental and emotional awareness, manifest different guṇas, or attributes, of the Lord. These attributes are wholly composed of saccidānanda, but due to variations in their bearers (ādhāra), which is to say in the antaḥkaraṇa of different speakers and listeners, they are affected, expressed, and experienced differently. In this way, bhāvas cannot exist without the Lord’s divine attributes, nor can they exist in the absence of the individual jīva. They are eternal because they belong to the Lord but become meaningful only because the individual through the senses can realize them. They thus serve as a fulcrum between the human and divine, and it is at this delicate point of balance that līlā is played out.     

The incarnated icon of Ṣaydnāyā: light and shade

The shrine of the Virgin Mary in the Syrian town of ?aydnāyā is an important Levantine Christian centre and one of the principal Christian pilgrimage sites in the Middle East, second only to the holy city of Jerusalem during the Middle Ages. This study's intent is to examine in detail, and to provide a key for interpreting, the major incongruity emerging through a comparison of the two main textual traditions regarding the shrine: the Christian-Arabic and the Latin-Western. The dissimilarity is constituted by the significant divergences concerning the representation of the miracle of the incarnation traditionally ascribed to the icon of the Virgin venerated in ?aydnāyā, which is essentially omitted in the Christian-Arabic sources. I argue that a key to the understanding of this reticence can be provided by an analysis of the heretical character ascribed to this particular miracle in Islamic theological thought and of the consequent threat it posed to the survival of the shrine itself. That being the primary focus of the investigation, the article also explores some aspects of the cultural and historical vicissitudes and crises of the cult of the shrine in the West from the fourteenth century onwards which, despite the great number of academic works dedicated to this subject, have remained unclear to this day. More specifically, I argue that apparently aporematic elements on the textual level can be interpreted logically by examining the central role played by the Knights Templar in the cult's material and cultural diffusion and by taking into account the connection of the shrine's decay with the order's downfall. The present analysis focuses almost exclusively on the medieval period as being the most significant for the formation and development of the cult of the shrine.     

Kālīghāṭ and the Fashioning of Middle-Class Modernities

International Journal of Hindu Studies - The upper middle classes have worked over the past century to transform the Hindu temple from a symbol of “backwardness” to a symbol of the...     

The Problem of Foundation in Early Nyāya and in Navya-Nyāya

The evaluation of arguments was not the sole concern of logicians in ancient India. Early Nyāya and the later Navya-Nyāya provide an interesting example of the interaction between logic and ontology. In their attempt to develop a kind of property-location logic (Navya-)Naiyāyikas had to consider what kind of restrictions they should impose on the residence relation between a property and its locus (which might again be a property). Can we admit circular residence relations or infinitely descending chains of properties, each depending on its successor as its locus? Early Naiyāyikas and to some extent also Navya-Naiyāyikas regard these phenomena as a kind of absurdity and they want to rule them out. Their intuitions about properties are close to well-founded systems of set theory, whereas the author of the Navya-Nyāya work Upādhidarpa?a is a proponent of a non-well-founded property concept. Despite certain similarities with sets properties are still regarded as intensional objects in Navya-Nyāya. In the present article I demonstrate that a Quine/Morse-style extension of George Bealer's property calculus T1 (with or without a property adaptation of the axiom of regularity) may serve as a formal system which adequately mirrors the Navya-Nyāya property-location logic.     

Self-Awareness and the Integration of Pramāṇa and Madhyamaka

Buddhist theories of mind pivot between two distinct interpretative strands: (1) an epistemological tradition in which the mind, or the mental, is the foundation for valid knowledge and (2) a tradition of deconstruction, in which there is no privileged vantage point for truth claims. The contested status of these two strands is evident in the debates surrounding the relationship between epistemology (pramāna) and Madhyamaka that extend from India to Tibet. The paper will focus on two exemplars of these approaches in Tibet, those of ?ākya Chokden (shākya mchog ldan, 1428–1507) and Tsongkhapa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357–1419).