Ethics education or moral persuasion?

The question, "What is virtue and how can it be taught?" has been with us for quite a while. H. Steven Moffic, John Coverdale, and Timothy Bayer address it in a particular setting -- psychiatric practice -- with a particular group of students -- GY-III residents -- and employ a particular strategy -- a seminar... The course sounds like a good one -- wide ranging, open minded, and relevant to students' interests and experiences. I am less convinced than they are that education in ethics leads to moral behavior, but nonetheless I share their belief that it belongs in the curriculum... The authors are right to emphasize that ethical issues go beyond the doctor-patient relationship and include the profession-society interface as well.     

早期儒家与德性伦理学:儒学研究中的相对主义话题——兼与安乐哲、罗思文商榷

20世纪中叶以来,西方伦理学研究的一个重要特征是德性伦理学的复兴.万白安、艾文贺、余纪元等西方汉学学者参照德性伦理学视角来重新诠释中国早期儒家伦理学,借以彰显儒家伦理与西方伦理对话的新路径.安乐哲和罗思文《早期儒家是德性论的吗?》一文则持一种与德性伦理学完全相异的视角:他们认为早期儒家伦理是一种角色伦理(role ethics),“儒家不寻求普遍,而是集中关注特殊性”.本文尝试对此问题展开讨论.意在阐明三个论点:其一,德性伦理学是儒家伦理的题中应有之义;在这一点上,早期儒家伦理虽不及宋明新儒家突出,但实备此一面向.故此,以德性伦理为视角来考究早期儒家伦理,不仅并非绝然扦格,而且可以开启理解儒家伦理的新视域.其二,安乐哲、罗思文的观点固然能够启人心智,但其论说与其说阐明了早期儒家伦理的根本特征,莫若说自我指涉性地流露了其自身的理论限域:去本质化的过程哲学、以实践为先的新实用主义.将这一理论限阈视为“奥卡姆剃刀”,只会使早期儒家伦理成为一种过度后现代化和单面化的狭隘存在.其三,与角色伦理相关联的文化相对主义极度排斥普遍主义的价值诉求,对相对主义和普遍主义之间应有的张力视若不见.以儒家伦理为价值取向的理论和行为主体若将这种绝对了的相对主义内在化为主体自身的信念内容,则无异于自我设限,从而在根本上使得跨文化交流和融合成为一纸空文,在最低限度上也不能避免或消弭不同伦理体系之间的道德冲突.     

Virtue theory and abortion

The sort of ethical theory derived from Aristotle, variously described as virtue ethics, virtue-based ethics, or neo-Aristotelianism, is becoming better known, and is now quite widely recognized as at least a possible rival to deontological and utilitarian theories. With recognition has come criticism, of varying quality. In this article I shall discuss nine separate criticisms that I have frequently encountered, most of which seem to me to betray an inadequate grasp either of the structure of virtue theory or of what would be involved in thinking about a real moral issue in its terms. In the first half I aim particularly to secure an understanding that will reveal that many of these criticisms are simply misplaced, and to articulate what I take to be the major criticism of virtue theory. I reject this criticism, but do not claim that it is necessarily misplaced. In the second half I aim to deepen that understanding and highlight the issues raised by the criticisms by illustrating what the theory looks like when it is applied to a particular issue, in this case, abortion.     

Determinism, possibility, and ethics

This essay reexamines the age-old "determinism-free will" problem from a psychoanalytic perspective. The first section recapitulates the author's (1985) earlier argument on the nature of causation in psychoanalysis; the second part examines the compatibility of determinism and freedom; and the final section looks at the ethical ramifications of the issues at hand. The author exposits his adherence to universal determinism and attempts to answer the question, "What sort of possibility and ethics are permitted in a deterministic universe?"     

Indiscriminable shades and demonstrative concepts

Virtue ethicists argue that modern ethical theories aim to give direct guidance about particular situations at the cost of offering artificial or narrow accounts of ethics. In contrast, virtue ethical theories guide action indirectly by helping one understand the virtues—but the theory will not provide answers as to what to do in particular instances. Recently, this had led many to think that virtue ethical theories are self-effacing the way some claim consequentialist and deontological theories are. In this paper I defend virtue ethics against the charge of self-effacement. I distinguish between modestly self-effacing theories, immodestly self-effacing theories and theories that recommend indirect guidance. Though all self-effacing theories are indirect, not all indirect theories are self-effacing. I argue that virtue ethics is not self-effacing, but rather indirectly action-guiding. The response I articulate draws on the distinctive virtue ethical mode of action-guidance: namely, that thinking hard about virtue and what kind of person one aims to be offers the kind of guidance we want (or should want) as we face practical moral problems.     

The Ethics of Enhanced Interrogations and Torture: A Reappraisal of the Argument

This article critically reviews what is known about the ethical status of psychologists’ putative involvement with enhanced interrogations and torture (EITs). We examine three major normative ethical accounts (utilitarian, deontic, and virtue ethics) of EITs and conclude, contra the American Psychological Association, that reasonable arguments can be made that in certain cases the use of EITs is ethical and even, in certain circumstances, morally obligatory. We suggest that this moral question is complex as it has competing moral values involved, that is, the humane treatment of detainee competes with the ethical value/duty/virtue of protecting innocent third parties. We also suggest that there is an ethical duty to minimize harm by making only judicious and morally responsible allegations against the psychologists alleged to be involved in EITs. Finally, we make recommendations regarding completing the historical record, improvements in the professional ethics code, and the moral treatment of individuals accused in this controversy.     

Infinite Responsibility in the Bedpan: Response Ethics,Care Ethics,and the Phenomenology of Dependency Work

Because Levinas understands ethical response as a response to the radical alterity of the other, he contrasts it with justice, for which alterity becomes a question of equality. Drawing upon the practice of dependency work and the insights of feminist care ethics, I argue that the opposition between responding to another's singularity and leveling it via parity‐based principles is belied in the experience of care. Through a hermeneutic phenomenology of caring for my post‐stroke grandfather, I develop an account of dependency work as a material dialectic of embodied response involving moments of leveling, attention, and interruption. Contra much of response ethics’ and care ethics’ respective literatures, this dialectic suggests that they complement each other in ways that productively illuminate themes of each. I conclude by suggesting that when response and care ethics are thought together through the experience of dependency work, such labors produce finite responsibility with infinite hope.     

Contemporary virtue ethics and action-guiding objections

Many defenders of contemporary virtue ethics contend that it directly competes with modern ethical theories such as consequentialism and deontology. One of the most common responses is that contemporary virtue ethics does not compare well because its proponents fail to provide guidance to an agent who is deliberating about what she should do. There are at least four different types of action-guiding objections to an ethical theory. They are based on moral dilemmas, indeterminacy, knowledge, and reasonable judgment. I will show how three current versions of virtue ethics are subject to at least one of those objections.     

The Ethics of Mandatory Personal Psychotherapy for Trainee Psychotherapists

Although the psychotherapist's personal psychotherapy has received considerable research attention in recent years, little systematic investigation of the ethical issues involved has been published. This article provides a rigorous interrogation of mandatory personal psychotherapy (MPP) as a training requirement for mental health professionals, a topic that remains ethically contentious. The article begins with a discussion of why MPP is an explicitly ethical issue, before debating the ethics of MPP under six questions, each worded to capture a salient ethical issue relevant to the appropriateness of making personal treatment a mandatory training requirement. Using principle, virtue, and care ethics perspectives, the arguments for and against MPP are critically investigated. The article concludes with an ethical position statement.     

Hutchesonian Inspired Agent‐Based Virtue Ethics

Francis Hutcheson's moral sense theory is the inspiration for both act utilitarianism and a contemporary virtue ethics approach that Michael Slote calls agent‐based virtue ethics. In this essay, I look at other possibilities for ethical theory that spring from Hutcheson's writings and conclude that the landscape of sentimentalist inspired ethics is richer than many realize. I begin this article with a short explanation of Hutcheson's moral sense theory. I explain that Hutcheson proposes and embraces three distinct criteria of moral evaluation, one of which is concerned with the evaluation of motives and two of which are concerned with the evaluation of acts. Act utilitarianism adopts one of the criteria of act evaluation, and Slote's agent‐based virtue ethics adopts the remaining criterion of act evaluation and the criterion of motive evaluation. Then, after pointing out what I believe are shortcomings of Slote's agent‐based virtue ethics, I propose two Hutchesonian inspired theories, each of which is a compromise between act utilitarianism and agent‐based virtue ethics. The first, which I call hypothetical agent‐based virtue ethics, adopts two of Hutcheson's three criteria and is similar structurally to a virtue ethics theory articulated by Rosalind Hursthouse and Linda Zabzebski. The second, which, for lack of a better name, I call Hutchesonian hybridism, adopts all three of Hutcheson's criteria and is a hybrid combination of Slote's actualist agent‐based virtue ethics and hypothetical agent‐based virtue ethics. I argue that both hypothetical agent‐based virtue ethics and Hutchesonian hybridism overcome the shortcomings (pointed out earlier in this essay) of Slote's actualist agent‐based virtue ethics, and that both of these theories are, therefore, worthy of further consideration.     

THE CHARACTER OF VIRTUE: ANSWERING THE SITUATIONIST CHALLENGE TO VIRTUE ETHICS

Neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics makes essential reference to the notion of a stable, robust character‐trait. It also claims to be constrained by at least a minimal degree of psychological realism. Recent developments in empirical psychology have drawn into question the evidence for the existence of such robust traits, arguing that it rests on what has been called a ‘fundamental attribution error’. Virtue ethics has thus seemingly been made vulnerable to criticisms that it is essentially dependent on an erroneous, folk‐psychological, notion of character and, so, must either abandon their characteristic notion of virtue or forego any pretensions to psychological realism. I develop a two‐pronged response to this objection. First, I argue that there is reason to question much of the empirical evidence and that such evidence as does exist can easily be accommodated by virtue ethics. Next, I argue that even if we allow that neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethical theories does sometimes presuppose a stronger conception of character‐traits than is warranted by the evidence, this does not significantly undermine the virtue ethicist's project.     

The ethical group psychotherapist: a coda

This concluding article of a two-part special section on the ethical group psychotherapist are highlighted: (1) the importance of the cultivation of the skill and knowledge base of the group psychotherapist in terms of pertinent legal statutes and ethical guidelines; (2) the criticalness of certain personality features related to the concept of virtue; (3) a therapist's self-awareness contributes to the capacities to think and respond ethically; (4) ethical decision making is most likely to occur when the group psychotherapist attends comprehensively to all dimensions that define the setting in which a dilemma emerges; and (5) that in the service of positive ethics, attention to the ethical dimensions of group psychotherapy practice should be continuously present. In agreement with other contributions to this section, I conclude that the commitment to the ethical practice of group psychotherapy must be made not only by the individual practitioner but also by educational and training programs and professional organizations.     

Passion and Reason: Aristotelian Strategies in Kierkegaard's Ethics

Both Aristotle and Kierkegaard show that virtues result, in part, from training which produces distinctive patterns of salience. The "frame problem" in AI shows that rationality requires salience. Salience is a function of cares and desires (passions) and thus governs choice in much the way Aristotle supposes when he describes choice as deliberative desire. Since rationality requires salience it follows that rationality requires passion. Thus Kierkegaard is no more an irrationalist in ethics than is Aristotle, though he continues to be charged with irrationalism. The compatibility of an Aristotelian reading of Kierkegaard with the "suspension of the ethical" and general problems with aretaic ethical theories are treated briefly. The author argues that it is possible to preserve a realist ethics in the face of the "tradition relativism" which threatens the version of virtue ethics here attributed to Kierkegaard.     

Virtue Ethics,Applied Ethics and Rationality twenty-three years after After Virtue

Abstract

In evaluating the merits and shortcomings of virtue ethics I focus on some central differences between virtue ethics and rival theories such as deontology and utilitarianism. Virtue ethics does not prescribe strict rules of conduct. Instead, the virtue ethical approach can be understood as an invitation to search for standards, as opposed to strict rules, that ought to guide the conduct of our individual lives. This requires a particular method. The importance of this approach in present times will become clear when we investigate the relation between virtue ethics and postmodernity. In our postmodem age moral concepts are no longer perceived as deriving their meaning from larger frameworks. Instead, their meanings are perceived as being derived from the contingencies that define our particular existences. Thus ongoing grassroots moral engagement is required, and virtue ethics is the appropriate moral framework for doing this. This results in a broadening of rationality insofar as the full richness of our situated lives are factored into our accounts of rationality. At the same time virtue ethics prevents relativism, mainly because it does justice to the social embeddedness of human activities. In order to illustrate the virtue ethical approach I will discuss two key concepts in our moral vocabulary: responsibility and integrity. We will see how these basic concepts can be properly understood only if one takes into consideration the contingencies, inherent paradoxes and tensions in human life.     

Pastoral Theological Implications of the Aging Process

Pastoral care of the aged must deliberately attend to spiritual-theological issues involved in the aging process. As clinical, empirical, and practical pastoral experiences demonstrate, these spiritual-theological problems are as varied as the range of overall problems faced by the elderly. In an attempt to focus on major issues, however, it may be helpful to examine the three epochs of aging i.e., young~ldm, iddle-old, and old-old, in order to determine the spiritual and theological issues which are particularly relevant to each epoch. This paper proposes that each of the three developmental epochs has a main spiritual-theological concem which can be expressed in a question: young-old: "What shall I do with my life?"; middleaid: "What about my dying?"; old-old: "Why must I suffer so?" Pastoral ministry is called to further examine the validity of these assertions and draw practical applications in response to these spiritual-theological issues which face older persons.     

New Directions in Ethics: Naturalisms, Reasons and Virtue

This paper discusses three topics in contemporary British ethical philosophy: naturalisms, moral reasons, and virtue. Most contemporary philosophers agree that 'ethics is natural' - in Section 1 I examine the different senses that can be given to this idea, from reductive naturalism to supernaturalism, seeking to show the problems some face and the problems others solve. Drawing on the work of John McDowell in particular, I conclude that an anti-supernatural non-reductive naturalism plausibly sets the limits on what we can do in ethics. Moral reasons are widely discussed - in Section 2 I describe some of the criteria that used to distinguish moral practical reasons, and note possibilities and problems. Drawing on the work of Elizabeth Anscombe in particular, I suggest that an inclusive, minimalist account of moral reasons may be most fruitful. There has been a revival of philosophical interest in virtue ethics, which I take to be linked to the emergence of non-reductive naturalisms - in Section 3 I describe three points where virtue ethics has an especially significant contribution to make: learning, motivational self-sufficiency, and the question of whether virtues can be reasons. The naturalism of Section 1 constrains the accounts of moral reasons considered in Section 2, and depends upon an account of virtue as learned second nature, discussed in Section 3.     

Foucault, Ethical Self-concern and the Other

In his later writings on ethics Foucault argues that rapport à soi – the relationship to oneself – is what gives meaning to our commitment to ‘moral behaviour’. In the absence of rapport à soi, Foucault believes, ethical adherence collapses into obedience to rules (‘an authoritarian structure’). I make a case, in broadly Levinasian terms, for saying that the call of ‘the other’ is fundamental to ethics. This prompts the question whether rapport à soi fashions an ethical subject who is unduly self-concerned. Here we confront two apparently irreconcilable pictures of the source of moral demands. I describe one way of trying to reconcile them from a Foucaultian perspective, and I note the limitations in the attempt. I also try to clear away what I think to be a misunderstanding on Foucault’s part about what is at stake in the choice between these pictures. To clarify my critique of Foucault, I also relate it to a similar recent critique of virtue ethics by Thomas Hurka.

A Preliminary Survey of Relationships Between Counselor Educators' Ethics Education and Ensuing Pedagogy and Responses to Attractions With Counseling Students

Literature suggests that counselor education does not consistently teach ethics and that ethical violations currently occur between trainees and faculty. The literature also suggests that ethical dilemmas during training strongly influence later ethical counseling practice. A survey examined the ethics training of counselor educators and ensuing attitudes and actions in professional practice. The author discovered that ethics pedagogy during training was related to later pedagogical strategies and to reactions to attraction with students. Furthermore, no single pedagogical strategy seems to guarantee best teaching or ethical professional practice. This survey reinforces the need for ethics education for counselor educators and suggests directions for research.     

Protecting confidentiality rights: the need for an ethical practice model

All psychologists must uphold the same ethical standards about confidentiality even though each state imposes different legal limits on their ability to protect clients' confidences. The resulting ethical-legal confusion is exacerbated by legally based confidentiality training that treats legal exceptions as if they were the rule and fosters the impression that attorneys are now the only real experts about this aspect of practice. This article provides an ethics-based confidentiality practice model that clarifies the ethical rule and puts its legal exceptions into ethical perspective. Like the Confidentiality section of the American Psychological Association's (2002) Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, this outline would apply to all psychologists regardless of state laws, but the details of its implementation would vary according to role and setting. It can be used as a universal training outline, a consultation and supervision tool, a guide to professional practice, and a basis for clearer ongoing conversation about the ethics of "conditional confidentiality." Psychologists can use this practice model to regain their status as experts about the confidentiality ethics of their own profession.     

德性伦理论要

德性伦理强调以人类自身的内在品质作为人的一切生活的出发点,这不仅使德性伦理在人类伦理思想的起源处规避着人类伦理生活的方向,而且在现代人类遭遇道德困境的形势下,又指示着人类伦理生活所应该采取的态度。德性伦理最终的理论指向便是将成就德性与明其规范统一起来,从而真正实现人自身的价值。在现代社会价值多元化的背景下,对传统德性伦理资源的挖掘,显得尤为重要。无论是亚里士多德的德性传统,还是原始儒家的德性传统,都可以为现代伦理理论的建设提供丰富的智性资源。