Conceptual role semantics and the explanatory role of content

Conclusion I've tried to argue that there is more to representational content than CRS can acknowledge. CRS is attractive, I think, because of its rejection of atomism, and because it is a plausible theory of targets. But those are philosopher's concerns. Someone interested in building a person needs to understand representation, because, as AI researchers have urged for some time, good representation is the secret of good performance. I have just gestured in the direction I think a viable theory of representation must take. I hope, however, to have created some advance sympathy for the gesture by distinguishing the problem of representation from the problem of targets on the one hand, and from the problem truth-conditions for the attitudes on the other.     

Antidipsogenic role of the E-prostaglandins

Prostaglandin E1 (PGE1) is antidipsogenic when administered into the lateral cerebral ventricle of the rat. In these experiments PGE1, at a dose of 1 microgram, suppressed water intake induced by centrally administered angiotensin II (AII) or carbachol, subcutaneously administered polyethylene glycol, and water deprivation. Even at this high dose, PGE1 did not reduce water intake due to cellular dehydration. As the dose of PGE1 was reduced, its suppressant effects became more specific to AII-induced drinking, with a dose of 10 ng yielding a significant suppression only in the case of AII-induced drinking. Even at a high dose (1 microgram), the PGE1 suppression of ingestion was specific to water intake. Although PGE1-treated rats reduced food intake if they were not hydrated prior to access to food, no reduction in food intake was seen when they received water by gavage before food presentation. Since PGE-like substances are synthesized in the brain, these data suggest the possibility that the prostaglandin may be involved in the regulation of water balance as a component of a reciprocal system in which water intake initiated by the activation of the renin-angiotensin system is halted by the synthesis and release of PGE.     

Perspectives on the role of the eyewitness expert

Extensive controversy over the appropriate application of expert knowledge regarding issues of eyewitness accuracy led to a conference and a special issue of taw and Human Behavior in 1986. Arguments were presented both in support of and against the eyewitness researcher as expert testifier. The current research explored the views of the general public (N = 50), defense attorneys (N = 14), and prosecutors (N = 10) with regard to the use of eyewitness expertise in each of four roles (court-appointed expert, consultant, researcher, expert tesdfier for the defense). Extensive differences of opinion were found across both samples and expert roles. In general, prosecutors held significantly more negative views of the usefulness of expert witnesses for the defense than did the public or defense attorneys. The role of court-appointed expert was viewed positively by all three groups and may present a useful alternative to the battles of experts that may result from current practices.     

Emerging views of the role of theory

Offers a few broadly evaluative observations about what we have learned from the articles and commentaries contained in this special section. We discuss how--although the contributions contained in this special section might be viewed on one level as suggesting a lack of consensus concerning the role of theory--on a metalevel the contributions are suggestive of movement toward consensus. The emerging consensus seems to be that not only is theory alive and well but it is unlikely that we will ever be able to do without theory. However, our ways of thinking and talking about theory appear to be undergoing change; that is, the trend is in the emergence of theory as a guide for action or action-based epistemology. We conclude with ideas about future directions, including the call for methodological pluralism, theoretical pluralism, and metatheoretical development.     

The role of the lived-body in feeling

Feelings not only have a place, they also have a time. Today, one can speak of a multifaceted renaissance of feelings. This concerns philosophy itself, particularly, ethics. Every law-based morality comes up against its limits when morals cease to be only a question of legitimation and begin to be a question of motivation, since motives get no foothold without the feeling of self and feeling of the alien. As it is treated by various social theories and psychoanalysis, the self is not formed through the mere acquisition or change of roles, but rather through a process that is susceptible to crises, a process shaped by affective bonds and separations. Learning, which is the theme of pedagogy, loses its hold whenever it is confronted by disinterest and listlessness. In neurobiology, the increased significance of those zones of the brain that are connected with the realization of feelings makes the brain, accordingly, no mere apparatus that processes data, but a living organ that selects and “evaluates” what is “important.” Finally, cross-cultural comparison shows the extent to which the one-sided preference for understanding and willing, which is the mark of Western rationalism, arises from a typical, not to mention a highly masculine attitude toward the world and life, as many different studies on gender difference stress (In reference to this perspective, see Seethaler, Gefühle und Urteilskraft. Ein Plädoyer für die emotionale Vernunft, 1997). The following reflections provide a historical orientation directed toward a new determination of feelings. This new determination of feelings is phenomenological and takes the pathetic character of experience, nourished by the corporeality of experience as its point of departure.     

Reconsidering the role of language in medicine

Background

Despite an expansive literature on communication in medicine, the role of language is dealt with mostly indirectly. Recently, narrative medicine has emerged as a strategy to improve doctor-patient communication and integrate patient perspectives. However, even in this field which is predicated on language use, scholars have not specifically reflected on how language functions in medicine.

Methods

In this theoretical paper, the authors consider how different models of language use, which have been proposed in the philosophical literature, might be applied to communication in medicine. In particular, the authors contrast the traditional, indexical thesis of language with new models that focus on interpretation instead of standardization.

Results

The authors demonstrate how paying close attention to the role of language in medicine provides a philosophical foundation for supporting recent changes in doctor-patient communication. In particular, interpretive models are at the foundation of new approaches such as narrative medicine, that emphasize listening to patient stories, rather than merely collecting information.

Conclusion

Ultimately, debates regarding the role of language which have largely resided in non-medical literatures, have important implications for describing communication in medicine. In particular, interpretive models of language use provide an important rationale for facilitating a more robust dialogue between doctors and patients.

     

Externalist justification and the role of seemings

It’s not implausible to think that whenever I have a justified noninferential belief that p, it is caused by a seeming that p. It’s also tempting to think that something contributes to the justification of my belief only if I hold my belief because of that thing. Thus, given that many of our noninferential beliefs are justified and that we hold them because of seemings, one might be inclined to hold a view like Phenomenal Conservatism, according to which seemings play a crucial role—perhaps the only crucial role—in the justification of our noninferential beliefs. But Phenomenal Conservatism seems to conflict, in a number of ways, with externalist accounts of justification. As a result, the attractiveness of the intuitions appealed to in support of views like Phenomenal Conservatism present something of a challenge to externalism. The purpose of this paper is to deal with that challenge by developing and defending an externalist-friendly account of the role of seemings in the formation and justification of our noninferential beliefs—an account that incorporates what is attractive in views like Phenomenal Conservatism. Because this externalist-friendly account is compatible with both externalist accounts of justification and the plausible elements of views like Phenomenal Conservatism, the challenge to externalism inspired by such views is thereby undermined.