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Gert Biesta 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(2):141-153
Much work in the field of education for democratic citizenship is based on the idea that it is possible to know what a good
citizen is, so that the task of citizenship education becomes that of the production of the good citizen. In this paper I
ask whether and to what extent we can and should understand democratic citizenship as a positive identity. I approach this
question by means of an exploration of four dimensions of democratic politics—the political community, the borders of the
political order, the dynamics of democratic processes and practices, and the status of the democratic subject—in order to
explore whether and to what extent the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can and should be understood as a particular order.
For this I engage with ideas from Chantal Mouffe and Jacques Rancière who both have raised fundamental questions about the
extent to which the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can be captured as a particular order. In the paper I introduce the figure
of the ignorant citizen in order to hint at a conception of citizenship that is not based on particular knowledge about what
the good citizen is. I introduce a distinction between a socialisation conception of citizenship education and civic learning
and a subjectification conception of citizenship education and civic learning in order to articulate what the educational
implications of such an ‘anarchic’ understanding of democratic politics are. While the socialisation conception focuses on
the question how ‘newcomers’ can be inserted into an existing political order, the subjectification conception focuses on
the question how democratic subjectivity is engendered through engagement in always undetermined political processes. This
is no longer a process driven by knowledge about what the citizen is or should become but one that depends on a desire for
a particular mode of human togetherness or, in short, a desire for democracy. 相似文献
3.
Tobias Rosefeldt 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(3):301-333
This paper argues that ‘that’-clauses are not singular terms (without denying that their semantical values are propositions).
In its first part, three arguments are presented to support the thesis, two of which are defended against recent criticism.
The two good arguments are based on the observation that substitution of ‘the proposition that p’ for ‘that p’ may result
in ungrammaticality. The second part of the paper is devoted to a refutation of the main argument for the claim that ‘that’-clauses
are singular terms, namely that this claim is needed in order to account for the possibility of quantification into ‘that’-clause
position. It is shown that not all quantification in natural languages is quantification into the position of singular terms,
but that there is also so-called ‘non-nominal quantification’. A formal analysis of non-nominal quantification is given, and
it is argued that quantification into ‘that’-clause position can be treated as another kind non-nominal quantification. 相似文献
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Richard Bradley 《Synthese》2007,156(3):513-535
Richard Jeffrey regarded the version of Bayesian decision theory he floated in ‘The Logic of Decision’ and the idea of a probability
kinematics—a generalisation of Bayesian conditioning to contexts in which the evidence is ‘uncertain’—as his two most important
contributions to philosophy. This paper aims to connect them by developing kinematical models for the study of preference
change and practical deliberation. Preference change is treated in a manner analogous to Jeffrey’s handling of belief change:
not as mechanical outputs of combinations of intrinsic desires plus information, but as a matter of judgement and of making
up one’s mind. In the first section Jeffrey’s probability kinematics is motivated and extended to the treatment of changes
in conditional belief. In the second, analogous kinematical models are developed for preference change and in particular belief-induced
change that depends on an invariance condition for conditional preference. The two are the brought together in the last section
in a tentative model of pratical deliberation.
This paper is one of a pair dedicated to Richard Jeffrey and prepared for a workshop held in his memory at the 26th International
Wittgenstein Symposium. My thanks to the organisers of, and the participants in, this workshop and to two anonymous referees
for their comments. 相似文献
6.
Autonomy,Force and Cultural Plurality 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Monica Mookherjee 《Res Publica》2008,14(3):147-168
Within now prolific debates surrounding the compatibility of feminism and multiculturalism in liberal societies, the need
arises for a normative conception of women’s self-determination that does not violate the self-understandings or values of
women of different backgrounds and forms of life. With reference to the recent British debate about forced marriage, this
article proposes an innovative approach to this problem in terms of the idea of ‘plural autonomy’. While the capacity for
autonomy is plural, in the sense of varying across cultures, autonomy in any world-view involves a capacity to ‘endorse’ one’s
decisions in certain crucial spheres of life. Non-endorsement, coercion or force occurs if one risks being alienated from
the (cultural) goods and relationships that structure one’s capacity to act in the world. This approach counsels more caution
than prominent liberal approaches with respect to negotiating the contested boundary between freedom and force in a diverse
society.
相似文献
Monica MookherjeeEmail: |
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Sortal predicates have been associated with a counting process, which acts as a criterion of identity for the individuals
they correctly apply to. We discuss in what sense certain types of predicates suggested by quantum physics deserve the title
of ‘sortal’ as well, although they do not characterize either a process of counting or a criterion of identity for the entities
that fall under them. We call such predicates ‘quantum-sortal predicates’ and, instead of a process of counting, to them is
associated a ‘criterion of cardinality’. After their general characterization, it is discussed how these predicates can be
formally described.
To Patrick Suppes on his 80th birthday. 相似文献
9.
Ingvar Johansson 《Synthese》2008,163(2):217-225
The paper argues, that a direct formalization of the way common sense thinks about the numerical identity of enduring entities,
requires that traditional predicate logic is developed. If everyday language mirrors the world, then persons, organisms, organs,
cells, and ordinary material things can lose some parts but nonetheless remain numerically exactly the same entity. In order
to formalize this view, two new logical operators are introduced; and they bring with them some non-standard syntax. One of
the operators is called ‘the instantiation operator’; it is needed because the existential quantifier and its traditional relatives cannot do the job required. The other operator
is called ‘the form-on-matter operator’, and it allows an individual (an instance of a form) to stay the same even though some of its parts (its constituting matter)
is taken away from it. Also, a certain kind of predicates, called ‘nature terms’, is needed in order to represent what gives a particular its kind of identity. Both the operators and the nature terms introduced can be used in constructions of formal languages and formal systems,
but no such constructions are made in the paper. The paper is structured as a comment on the philosophical problem called
‘the problem of the cats Tibbles and Tib’. 相似文献
10.
John Nolt 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2008,37(3):203-237
Several philosophers—including C. S. Peirce, William James, Hilary Putnam and Crispin Wright—have proposed various versions
of the notion that truth is an epistemic ideal. More specifically, they have held that a proposition is true if and only if
it can be fixedly warranted by human inquirers, given certain ideal epistemic conditions. This paper offers a general critique
of that idea, modeling conceptions of ideality and fixed warrant within the semantics that Kripke developed for intuitionistic
logic. It is shown that each of the two plausible notions of fixed warrant faces difficulties and that, moreover, “truth”
defined in terms of either of them is distressingly dependent upon one’s conception of idealized inquiry and perhaps also
upon one’s standards of warrant. 相似文献
11.
Joel Kenton Press 《Synthese》2008,161(1):119-139
Nearly all of the ways philosophers currently attempt to define the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function’ undermine the scientific
application of those terms by rendering the scientific explanations in which they occur vacuous. Since this is unacceptable,
we must develop analyses of these terms that avoid this vacuity.
Robert Cummins argues in this fashion in Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. He accuses ‘use theories’ of representational content of generating vacuous explanations, claims that nearly all current
theories of representational content are use theories, and offers a non-use theory of representational content which avoids
explanatory vacuity. One task I undertake in this article is to develop an alternative non-use theory which avoids an objection
fatal to that theory.
My second task is to adapt Cummins’ argument to criticize most current analyses of ‘function,’ which undermine scientific
explanation in an analogous way. Though Cummins does not explicitly argue in this manner, his own analysis of ‘function,’
by avoiding any appeal to use, avoids the explanatory vacuity to which they succumb. Consequently, I endorse Cummins’ notion
of function.
However, although use theories fail as analyses of the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function,’ they can still make significant
contributions to the sciences employing these terms. For, while philosophers seeking to define ‘representation’ and ‘function’
must avoid incorporating representational and functional uses into their definitions, scientists must still find a way to
determine which representations and functions are being used. Suitably re-construed use theories of representation and function
may in many cases assist them in this task. 相似文献
12.
The Universal Right to Education: Freedom,Equality and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Fraternity</Emphasis>
Ylva Bergström 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2010,29(2):167-182
The overall aim of the article is to analyse how the universal right to education have been built, legitimized and used. And
more specifically ask who is addressed by the universal right to education, and who is given access to rights and to education.
The first part of the article focus on the history of declarations, the notion of the universal right to education, emphasizing
differences in matters of detail—for example, the meaning of ‘compulsory’, ‘children’s rights’ or ‘parents’ rights’—and critically
examining the right of the child and the right of the parent in terms of tensions between ‘social rights’ and ‘private autonomy
rights’. Despite differences in detail, the iterations of the universal right to education do share to the full in the idea
of education as such. In the second part the attempt to scrutinize the underlying assumptions legitimizing the consensus on
education, focusing again on the notion of the child. In conclusion I argue that a certain notion of what it is to be a human
being is inscribed within the circle of access to rights and education. These notions of what it means to be a child, a parent,
a citizen or a member of the ‘human family’ are notions of enlightenment and humanity and, to my understanding, aspects of
how democracy is configured around freedom, equality and fraternity. 相似文献
13.
The paper defends a combination of perdurantism with mereological universalism by developing semantics of temporary predications
of the sort ’some P is/was/will be (a) Q’. We argue that, in addition to the usual application of causal and other restrictions
on sortals, the grammatical form of such statements allows for rather different regimentations along three separate dimensions,
according to: (a) whether ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are being used as phase or substance sortal terms, (b) whether ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will
be’ are the ‘is’, ‘was’, ‘will be’ of identity or of constitution, and (c) whether ‘Q’ is being used as a subject or predicate
term. We conclude that this latitude is beneficial, as it conforms with linguistic reality (i.e., the multiple uses actually
in place) and also enables one to turn what is ordinarily perceived as a problem for universalist perdurantism viz., a commitment
to all sorts of weird and gerrymandered temporally extended entities, into an advantage, for the richness in questions allows
us to make sense of the many different readings of sentences of the same grammatical form. 相似文献
14.
In the following I take issue with the allegation that liberalism must inevitably be guilty of ‘abstract individualism’. I
treat Michael Sandel’s well-known claim that there are ‘loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the
fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are’ as representative of
this widely held view. Specifically, I argue: (i) that Sandel’s account of the manner in which ‘constitutive’ loyalties function
as reasons for action presupposes the possibility of there being (what I call) ‘underivable particular obligations’, but that
such obligations are, in fact, a logical impossibility; and (ii) that Sandel’s account of the self as necessarily ‘encumbered’
presupposes an account of personal identity which confuses identification with definition, and which is, therefore, fundamentally
flawed.
For their constructive and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the
following: Clare Chambers, Roger Crisp, Cécile Fabre, Paul Kelly, David Lloyd-Thomas. Thanks also go to Res Publica’s two anonymous referees. 相似文献
15.
Adrian Bardon 《Philosophia》2005,33(1-4):69-95
‘Performative’ transcendental arguments exploit the status of a subcategory of self-falsifying propositions in showing that
some form of skepticism is unsustainable. The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between performatively inconsistent
propositions and transcendental arguments, and then to compare performative transcendental arguments to modest transcendental
arguments that seek only to establish the indispensability of some belief or conceptual framework. Reconceptualizing transcendental
arguments as performative helps focus the intended dilemma for the skeptic: performative transcendental arguments directly
confront the skeptic with the choice of abandoning either skepticism or some other deep theoretical commitment.
Many philosophers, from Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas to Jaakko Hintikka, C.I. Lewis, and Bernard Lonergan, have claimed
that some skeptical propositions regarding knowledge, reason, and/or morality can be shown to be self-defeating; that is to
say, they have claimed that the very upholding of some skeptical position is in some way incompatible with the position being
upheld, or with the implied, broader dialectical position of the skeptic in question. Statements or propositions alleged to
have this characteristic also sometimes are called ‘self-falsifying,’ ‘self-refuting,’ ‘self-stultifying,’ ‘self-destructive,’
or ‘pointless.’ However, proponents of the strategy of showing skepticism to be self-defeating have not in general adequately
distinguished between two types of self-defeating proposition: self-falsifying and self-stultifying. In the first part of
this paper I distinguish between self-falsifying and self-stultifying propositions, and introduce the notion of performative
self-falsification. In the second part I discuss classical transcendental arguments, ‘modest’ transcendental arguments, and
objections to each. In the third part I introduce two types of transcendental argument—each labeled “performative”—corresponding
to two types of performatively self-falsifying proposition, and I compare them to modest transcendental arguments. 相似文献
16.
E.J. Lowe 《Erkenntnis》1998,48(2-3):191-208
I propose a fourfold categorisation of entities according to whether or not they possess determinate identity-conditions and
whether or not they are determinately countable. Some entities – which I call ‘individual objects’ – have both determinate
identity and determinate countability: for example, persons and animals. In the case of entities of a kind K belonging to
this category, we are in principle always entitled to expect there to be determinate answers to such questions as ‘Is x the
same K as y?’ and ’How many Ks are there satisfying condition C?’, even if we may sometimes be unable in practice to discover
what these answers are. But other entities apparently lack either determinate identity, or determinate countability, or both.
In these terms I try to explain certain important ontological differences between familiar macroscopic objects and various
rather more esoteric entities, such as the ‘particles’ of quantum physics, quantities of material stuff, and tropes or property
instances.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
17.
David E. Cooper 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2008,27(2-3):79-87
Some tendencies in modern education—the stress on ‘performativity’, for instance, and ‘celebration of difference’—threaten
the value traditionally placed on truthful teaching. In this paper, truthfulness is mainly understood, following Bernard Williams,
as a disposition to ‘Accuracy’ and ‘Sincerity’—hence as a virtue. It is to be distinguished from truth (a property of beliefs),
and current debates about the nature of truth are not relevant to the issue of the value of truthfulness. This issue devolves
into the question of whether truthfulness is a distinctive virtue of teachers, which they have a special obligation to exercise
in the face of competing aims. This paper defends the idea of distinctive professional duties and considers two conceptions
of teaching which ascribe a central place to truthfulness. The first conceives of teaching as a personal relationship within
which trust, and hence, it is claimed, truthfulness, are paramount. This claim is challenged, and the paper concludes by sympathetically
considering a second conception of teaching, articulated by Oakeshott and Heidegger. In this conception, teaching is a ‘releasement’
from ‘the daily flux’ of pupils’ lives through a truthful initiation into the alternatives to this ‘daily flux’ found within
‘the civilized inheritance of mankind’. 相似文献
18.
Andrew Moon 《Synthese》2012,184(3):287-297
Let ‘warrant’ denote whatever precisely it is that makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. A current
debate in epistemology asks whether warrant entails truth, i.e., whether (Infallibilism) S’s belief that p is warranted only
if p is true. The arguments for infallibilism have come under considerable and, as of yet, unanswered objections. In this
paper, I will defend infallibilism. In Part I, I advance a new argument for infallibilism; the basic outline is as follows.
Suppose fallibilism is true. An implication of fallibilism is that the property that makes the difference between knowledge
and mere belief (which I dub ‘warrant*’) is the conjunctive property being warranted and true. I show that this implication of fallibilism conflicts with an uncontroversial thesis we have learned from reflection on
Gettier cases: that nonaccidental truth is a constituent of warrant*. It follows that infallibilism is true. In the second
part of the paper, I present and criticize a new argument against infallibilism. The argument states that there are plausible
cases where, intuitively, the only thing that is keeping a belief from counting as knowledge is the falsity of that belief.
Furthermore, it is plausible that such a belief is warranted and false. So, the argument goes, infallibilism is false. I show
that this argument fails. 相似文献
19.
The idea of the “nation” has played only a small role in modern political philosophy because of its apparent irrationalism
and amoralism. David Miller, however, sets out to show that these charges can be overcome: nationality is a rational element
of one’s cultural identity, and nations are genuinely ethical communities. In this paper I argue that his project fails. The
defence against the charge of irrationalism fails because Miller works within a framework of ethical particularism which leads
to a position of metaethical relativism. A consequence of this relativism is that a community’s moral principles and boundaries
of exclusion cannot be rationally justified to those constructed as “outsiders”. The defence against the charge of amoralism
fails because Miller does not so much provide an argument to show that nations are ethical communities as assume they are;
we are therefore left without resources to discriminate between ethical and unethical nations. I apply these problems to Miller’s
treatment of the question of immigration, arguing that it shows that his version of “liberal” nationalism has a tendency to
collapse towards a conservative position on such issues. This should not give us any great confidence that the nation, as
Miller presents it, should be embraced by modern political philosophy.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
20.
Andrew B. Irvine 《Sophia》2011,50(4):603-624
Enrique Dussel has developed a sweeping philosophical critique of the eurocentricity of Western habits of thought and action,
with the aim of articulating an ‘ethics of liberation’ that takes the part distinctively of ‘the victims’ of the world system.
The heart of Dussel’s effort is an ostensibly new method, ‘analectic’ or ‘anadialectic,’ which comes about through the ‘revelation’
of the other, and goes beyond the self-enclosure that, Dussel asserts, typifies dialectic in Western ontology. Thus, he takes
his position to have gone beyond ontology: it is a trans-ontology, a genuine meta-physics. I question whether analectic does
go beyond Western thinking of being, and propose an ontological critique that is classically Western or, as I would prefer
to say, historically Western yet (along with its analogues in other philosophical traditions) classically relevant even in
our ‘age of globalization and exclusion.’ 相似文献