4～6岁幼儿经济博弈中的信任行为及其影响因素

本研究通过两个实验考察幼儿是否在博弈任务中表现出对陌生人的信任行为,同时考察可能对幼儿的信任产生影响的因素,包括个体认知因素(观点采择)和环境因素(负性反馈和代际传递)。研究对189名4~6岁幼儿及其家长进行多种任务的测量。实验一通过修订Evans和Krugger(2011)的信任博弈任务,考察幼儿在匿名信任博弈中的信任行为,结果发现与4岁幼儿相比,6岁幼儿对他人的信任更低;实验二考察了幼儿信任的影响因素,结果发现,幼儿在得到负性反馈结果后再次进行信任博弈任务时,他们对他人的信任比前次有所降低,6岁幼儿对他人返还数量的预期比4岁幼儿下降程度更大;6岁幼儿的信任行为(第一次给出意愿)与观点采择能力显著相关;6岁幼儿的信任水平与家长的信任水平显著相关。     

高确定性情绪（开心、愤怒）与低确定性情绪（悲伤）对信任的影响

本研究通过信任游戏的实验范式探讨了在与“受信任者”高/低可信赖性有关的信任线索时,具体情绪的确定性维度对信任行为的影响。实验一发现,当被试被告知“受信任者”在可信赖量表上的得分（高/低）时,个体在高确定性情绪（开心和愤怒）下的信任判断比低确定性情绪（悲伤）下的信任判断上更容易被受信任者的“可信赖性”水平的高低所影响;实验二发现,当告知被试“受信任者”的群体身份（内/外群）时,个体在高确定性情绪（开心和愤怒）下的信任判断比低确定性情绪（悲伤）下的信任判断更容易被受信任者的“内外群”身份所影响。上述结果表明,高确定性的情绪比低确定性的情绪更容易使被试的信任判断受到与“受信任者”是否值得信赖有关的线索所影响。     

Trust maintenance as a function of construal level and attributions: The case of apologies

When do recipients of an apology (“trustors”) base their decision to trust a perpetrator (a “trustee”) on the attributional information embedded in an apology? Attributions provide a detailed account of the trustee's causal involvement in committing a transgression. We therefore argue that trustors in a low construal level mindset use this information in their trusting decision. However, trustors in a high construal level mindset likely consider all apologies as simple statements of regret, regardless of the attributional information they contain. We find support for this argument in four laboratory experiments. This research nuances the idea that to restore trust by means of an apology, the trustee must only use an effective attribution for a negative outcome. We also present a more realistic understanding of the process leading from apologies to trust than has been offered in previous work by simultaneously considering the role of the trustor and that of the trustee in the trust restoration process.     

Is behavioral pro-sociality game-specific? Pro-social preference and expectations of pro-sociality

We observed the behaviors of the same people across five games – two prisoner’s dilemma games, a trust game (in which the subject took on the role of both truster and trustee), a dictator game, and a faith game – any pair of which was separated by an interval of several months to reduce potential carry-over effects, and found strong consistency in behaviors among these games. We also found consistency between the expectations of other players’ behaviors and the player’s own behavior across games. We further found that the consistent behavioral pro-sociality observed across different games was related to the general measures of pro-social value orientation and perceiving the game situations. These findings suggest that individual and cultural differences in game behaviors can reflect both the ways in which people perceive game situations and their general social preferences.     

自恋人格调节信任博弈的结果评价

自恋人格个体表现出亲社会行为的减少和对他人的反馈敏感。信任是人类社会互动行为的基础,自恋人格特质可能影响他们的信任决策。为了探究自恋水平如何影响信任博弈中结果评价的大脑活动,本研究采用事件相关电位技术记录了38名被试完成单次信任博弈时的脑电波。行为结果发现相对高自恋者的信任选择率显著低于相对低自恋者的信任选择率。脑电结果表明,相对高自恋者信任损失反馈减互惠获利反馈所得的FRN差异波(d FRN)显著地大于相对低自恋者,并且相对高自恋者结果评价诱发的P300波幅显著地大于相对低自恋者。本研究提供了自恋人格个体信任博弈中结果评价的初步神经电生理学证据。     

An experimental test of a game‐theoretical model of reciprocity

In this contribution the norm of reciprocity is defined as a basic internal motivation. Using formal tools of game theory, a model of social utility function is presented. The reciprocity model predicts that social actors should reciprocate costs and benefits they receive, even when there are costs in conforming to the norm. Hypotheses about actors' behavior, expectations and evaluations are derived from the model. The hypotheses were tested in an experimental situation, the reciprocity game, consisting of a prisoner's dilemma game (PD) followed by a dictator game (DG). The sample was composed of 74 Italian undergraduate students. In line with the model's predictions, the experimental results showed that participants reciprocate the behavior of the opponent in the PD. In the DG, if the opponent cooperated, participants gave back an almost equal share, whereas if the opponent defected, participants gave a minimal amount. These reciprocity effects are modulated by individual differences in the concern for reciprocity. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Payback: Effects of relationship and cultural norms on reciprocity

This experimental investigation explores differences in reciprocal norms between friends and strangers and the effects of culture on reciprocity. Based on altruistic and strong reciprocity theories, a hybrid trust‐dictator game tested the influence of relationship (i.e. friends vs. strangers), treatment (i.e. positive vs. negative) and culture (i.e. collectivistic vs. individualistic) on reciprocation. The results show that participants reciprocated more positively when treated positively in general. However, the results demonstrate intercultural differences in reciprocal norms, specifically in the negative treatment condition. Participants from the individualistic culture provided stronger punishment to the norm violator, compared to participants from the collectivistic culture. We discuss implications of the impact of relationship and culture on reciprocation with respect to the olive branch response.     

Facial dynamics as indicators of trustworthiness and cooperative behavior

Detecting cooperative partners in situations that have financial stakes is crucial to successful social exchange. The authors tested whether humans are sensitive to subtle facial dynamics of counterparts when deciding whether to trust and cooperate. Participants played a 2-person trust game before which the facial dynamics of the other player were manipulated using brief (<6 s) but highly realistic facial animations. Results showed that facial dynamics significantly influenced participants' (a) choice of with whom to play the game and (b) decisions to cooperate. It was also found that inferences about the other player's trustworthiness mediated these effects of facial dynamics on cooperative behavior.     

我会在谁面前舍弃利益?——博弈对象的能力与社会距离对名利博弈倾向的影响

通过构造虚拟的捐献情境及贸易情境,结合博弈任务,以大学生为被试探讨了名利博弈对象的能力和社会距离对名利博弈中博弈者的博弈行为倾向的影响。结果表明,在捐献情境下,被试在高能力的名利博弈对象面前比在低能力的名利博弈对象面前更倾向于做出接近自己半数报酬的捐献行为,牺牲利益以获取好名声。在贸易情境下存在名利博弈对象的能力与社会距离的交互作用,被试仅在面对低能力的名利博弈对象时会考虑社会距离因素,在社会距离近的名利博弈对象面前比在社会距离远的名利博弈对象面前提出更低的售价,牺牲自己的利益以获得好名声。研究结果初步证实名利博弈对象能力与社会距离对名利博弈具有重要影响以及个体在名利博弈中具有策略性。     

Perceived trustworthiness of faces drives trust behaviour in children

Facial appearances can powerfully influence adults' trust behaviour, despite limited evidence that these cues constitute honest signals of trustworthiness. It is not clear, however, whether the same is also true for children. The current study investigated whether, like adults, 5‐year‐olds and 10‐year‐olds are more likely to place their trust in partners that look trustworthy than those that look untrustworthy. A second, closely related question was whether children also explicitly value the information from face cues when making trust decisions. We investigated these questions using Token Quest: an economic trust game that gave participants the opportunity to make investments with a series of partners who might (or might not) repay their trust with large returns. These interactions occurred under different conditions, including one in which participants were shown the face of each partner and another in which they could ‘purchase’ access to faces with a portion of their investment capital. Results indicated that, like adults, 10‐year‐old children selectively placed their trust in those partners they perceived as looking trustworthy and many were willing to ‘pay’ to purchase access to these face cues during the trust game. We observed a similar profile of trust behaviour in 5‐year‐olds, with no significant group difference in the impact of face cues on behaviour across the three age groups. Together, these findings indicate that the influence of face cues on trust behaviour emerges early, and highlight a capacity for sophisticated social cognition in young children.     

Get angry, get out: The interpersonal effects of anger communication in multiparty negotiation

Research on multiparty negotiation has investigated how parties form coalitions to secure payoffs but has not addressed how emotions may affect such coalition decisions. Extending research on bilateral negotiations which has generally argued that it is beneficial to communicate anger, we argue that it constitutes a considerable risk when there are more than two people present at the negotiation table. Using a computer-mediated coalition game we show that communicating anger is a risky strategy in multiparty bargaining. The main findings of three studies were that participants: (1) form negative impressions of players who communicate anger and therefore (2) exclude such players from coalitions and from obtaining a payoff share, but (3) make considerable concessions on those rare occasions that they choose to form a coalition with an angry player, or (4) when they had to form a coalition with an angry player. We discuss the implications of these results for theorizing on emotions, negotiations, and coalition formation.     

情绪对信任的影响:来自元分析的证据

采用元分析方法探讨情绪对信任的影响。通过中英文献检索,共有21篇文章70个独立样本符合元分析标准（N=4745）。其中积极情绪对信任的影响有47个独立样本,消极情绪对信任的影响有23个独立样本。元分析的结果表明,相对于中性情绪,积极情绪对信任起到一定的促进作用,呈中等效应量（d=0.49）;消极情绪对信任起到一定的抑制作用,呈较小效应量（d=-0.23）。调节效应检验发现,情绪的诱发方式、信任对象熟悉性以及信任测量方式的调节作用均不显著。     

The Joint Impact of Achievement Goals and Performance Feedback on Information Giving

This research examined how performance feedback moderates the effects of individuals' achievement goals on information exchange when carrying out a novel and complex task. Experiment 1 demonstrated that mastery goal individuals who received positive performance feedback gave less modified information about their task performance to their exchange partner relative to both mastery goal individuals who received negative feedback and performance goal individuals (who received either negative or positive feedback). In Experiment 2, we found that relative to performance goals, mastery goals led to a stronger reciprocity orientation and a weaker exploitation orientation. Also, mastery goal individuals provided information of higher quality than performance goal individuals, thereby explaining the observed findings in Experiment 1.     

Personal values and prosocial behaviour in strategic interactions: Distinguishing value‐expressive from value‐ambivalent behaviours

Relying on the framework provided by Schwartz's theory of personal values, we investigated whether values can help explain prosocial behaviour. We first distinguished value‐expressive behaviours from value‐ambivalent behaviours. The former are compatible with primarily one value or with congruent values, the latter with mutually conflicting values. In Study 1, an analysis over all 41 (39 unpublished) samples in which we measured personal values and prosocial behaviour in monetarily incentivized strategic interactions (N = 1289; data collected between 2007 and 2010 in China, Finland, Germany, Israel, and the West Bank) supported our idea that personal values, universalism in particular, predict value‐expressive (prisoner's dilemma cooperation and trust game back‐transfers) but not value‐ambivalent behaviours (trust game transfers and ultimatum game proposals and responses). Study 2 (N = 56) focused on dictator game behaviours, which we expected and found to be strongly value‐expressive. The findings contribute to the ongoing discussion on whether and under which circumstances values shape behaviour. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

重复信任博弈的决策过程与结果评价

“信任他人或者不信任他人?”是社会互动中经常面临一种行为决择, 直接影响着个体的社会生活。作为一种重要的社会信号机制, 信任是建立良好社会关系的基石, 它能够降低社会交易成本, 易化合作行为。为了探究个体在信任互动情境下大脑活动变化的时间动态特征, 采用事件相关电位技术记录了20名健康被试(充当信任者)完成重复性信任博弈任务(repeated Trust Game, rTG)时的脑电成分。行为结果发现个体选择信任的比例显著高于几率水平。电生理学结果表明, 决策阶段中不信任选择比信任选择诱发了更正的P2成分(150~250 ms), 差异波溯源分析定位于额中回(middle frontal gyrus, BA 46)和额下回(inferior frontal gyrus, BA 46)。反馈阶段中损失反馈比获益反馈诱发了更负的FRN成分(200~300 ms), 而获益反馈比损失反馈诱发了更短的P300潜伏期。本研究为理解人类信任博弈过程的动态加工时程提供了初步的神经电生理学证据。     

The implicit cognition of reciprocal exchange: automatic retrieval of positive and negative experiences with partners in a prisoner's dilemma game

Models of reciprocity imply that cheater detection is an important prerequisite for successful social exchange. Considering the fundamental role of memory in reciprocal exchange, these theories lead to the prediction that memory for cheaters should be preferentially enhanced. Here, we examine whether information of a partner's previous behaviour in an interaction is automatically retrieved when encountering the face of a partner who previously cheated or cooperated. In two studies, participants played a sequential prisoner's dilemma game with cheaters and cooperative partners. Alternating with the game blocks, participants were asked to classify the smiling or angry facial expressions of cooperators and cheaters. Both experiments revealed congruence effects, reflecting faster identification of the smiles of cooperators (Experiments 1 and 2) and faster identification of the angry facial expressions of cheaters (Experiment 2). Our study provides evidence for the automatic retrieval of the partner's behaviour in the game, regardless of whether partners cheated or cooperated, and thus provides further evidence against the cheater detection hypothesis.     

Reciprocation of generosity and knowledge of game termination in the decomposed Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Sahlins proposed a model of reciprocity for social interaction citing three forms drawn from observations of kinship systems. The model describes an altruistic form of reciprocity, a balanced or economic form and a negative form in which individuals try to outdo each other. This model was applied to a two-person variation of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game where Ss were presented with a confederate who responded over trials entirely generously, contingently generously or non-generously. Half of the Ss were informed that there would be ten trials while the other half were uninformed. Basically, Ss tended to match the generosity level of the confederate and were less generous when trial number was known. Evidence for Sahlins' model is provided by Ss reports of reasons for their choices in the game. Those in the generous condition gave reasons for reciprocating based on a general feeling of obligation, trust and desire to cooperate. Those in the contingently generous condition gave reasons for reciprocating based on economic exchange and a desire to maintain a balance of resources. Ss in the non-generous condition gave reasons based on a desire to take what profits one could before the other got them. In addition, Ss indicated a significant tendency to exploit the other on the final trial under the informed condition for the contingently generous but not for the generous condition.     

The Hidden Cost of Insurance on Cooperation

A common solution to mitigate risk is to buy insurance. Employing the trust game, we find that buying insurance against the risk of betrayal has a hidden cost: trustees are more likely to act opportunistically when trustors choose to be insured against the breach of trust. Supposedly, trustees are less likely to cooperate when trustors buy insurance because choosing insurance implicitly signals that the trustor expects the trustee to behave opportunistically, paradoxically encouraging trustees not to cooperate. These results shed new light on the potential drawbacks of financial safeguards that are intended to minimize the risky nature of trust taking: the presumed safeguard against the risk of betrayal may, under certain circumstances, increase the probability of betrayal. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Feeling and believing: the influence of emotion on trust

The authors report results from 5 experiments that describe the influence of emotional states on trust. They found that incidental emotions significantly influence trust in unrelated settings. Happiness and gratitude--emotions with positive valence--increase trust, and anger--an emotion with negative valence--decreases trust. Specifically, they found that emotions characterized by other-person control (anger and gratitude) and weak control appraisals (happiness) influence trust significantly more than emotions characterized by personal control (pride and guilt) or situational control (sadness). These findings suggest that emotions are more likely to be misattributed when the appraisals of the emotion are consistent with the judgment task than when the appraisals of the emotion are inconsistent with the judgment task. Emotions do not influence trust when individuals are aware of the source of their emotions or when individuals are very familiar with the trustee.     

Intergroup trust and reciprocity in strategic interactions: Effects of group decision-making mechanisms

I examined the impact of the consensus-making mechanism, where members reach a common decision via an intra-group discussion, on intergroup trust and reciprocity in a strategic setting. Data from a trust game generated the following results. First, compared to individual decision-makers, consensus groups exhibited (a) lower psychological trust, (b) higher behavioral trust, after controlling for psychological trust, and (c) lower reciprocity. Second, compared to decisions made by group-representatives, who are responsible for unilateral decisions on behalf of their groups, group consensus decisions were more trusting but less reciprocating. Thus, the specific decision-making mechanism adopted by groups in a strategic interaction may profoundly change the nature and the interplay of the interaction. Lastly, results show that the level of behavioral trust is driven by reciprocity expectations, while the level of reciprocity behavior, measured as a proportion of the trust received, does not change systematically with the level of trust experienced.