Can ‘Big’ Questions be Begged?

Traditionally, logicians construed fallacies as mistakes in inference, as things that looked like good (i.e., deductively valid) arguments but were not. Two fallacies stood out like a sore thumb on this view of fallacies: the fallacy of many questions (because it does not even look like a good argument, or any kind of argument) and the fallacy of petitio principii (because it looks like and is a good argument). The latter is the concern of this paper. One possible response is to say that the tradition is right about the concept of fallacy but wrong about its extension: petitio principii is not a fallacy. If the only proper ways to criticize an argument are to say that it is invalid or that it is unsound, and petitio principii is not criticisable on either of these counts, then calling it a fallacy is tantamount to saying we should prefer invalid or unsound arguments Robinson (Analysis, 31(4): 114 ,1971). I will present a third way to logically criticize arguments and show that fallacious instances of petitio principii are so criticisable while other instances of petitio principii are non-fallacious; hence, this fallacy is not a reductio of the Standard Treatment. It is not my intention in this paper to come out on the side of any of the competing theories—the Standard Treatment, the dialectical theories, and the epistemic theories—as general theories of fallacy. I show only that petitio principii can be handled by something closely resembling the Standard Treatment in so far as that, on entirely logistical principles, there can be made a distinction such that circular arguments form at best a degenerate kind of argument. Circular arguments look like good arguments but are not, not because they are deductively invalid (which they are not) but because they do not deserve to be called arguments at all.     

Moral Questions and Amoral Answers: Who Decides?

ABSTRACT Researchers have examined moral thought using selected philosophical standards without showing that such standards represent moral thinking. Recently, we examined the extent to which assumed standards actually organize moral knowledge (Quinn, Houts, & Graesser, this issue). We found dimensions not accounted for by previous theories. In his response (this issue), Shaffer misrepresents the aims of our research, and he overlooks the implications of assessing naturalistic rather than prescribed dimensions of morality.     

Democratic Answers to Complex Questions – An Epistemic Perspective

This paper addresses a problem for theories of epistemic democracy. In a decision on a complex issue which can be decomposed into several parts, a collective can use different voting procedures: Either its members vote on each sub-question and the answers that gain majority support are used as premises for the conclusion on the main issue (premise based-procedure, pbp), or the vote is conducted on the main issue itself (conclusion-based procedure, cbp). The two procedures can lead to different results. We investigate which of these procedures is better as a truth-tracker, assuming that there exists a true answer to be reached. On the basis of the Condorcet jury theorem, we show that the pbp is universally superior if the objective is to reach truth for the right reasons. If one instead is after truth for whatever reasons, right or wrong, there will be cases in which the cbp is more reliable, even though, for the most part, the pbp still is to be preferred.     

“Brands as Intentional Agents”: Questions and extensions

The notion that consumers' relationships with brands can be characterized in ways that resemble their relationships with people is gaining considerable ground in the areas of consumer behavior and branding. Kervyn, Fiske and Malone's “Brands as Intentional Agents” offers additional support for this basic proposition. The authors argue that the ability to translate research on human social interaction relationships with brand relationships provides useful insights into brand positioning and brand communications. This author, while raising a few general questions about the SCM and BIAF models, identifies additional research questions in the consumer behavior and branding domains that might be informed by the basic components of the SCM model.     

Blowing in the Wind: ‘70s Questions for Millennial Therapists

ABSTRACT

Psychotherapy came in for a drubbing by the Women’s Liberation Movement of the 1960s. Indeed, some movement members declared that Feminist Therapy was an oxymoron. Despite the antipathy, feminists in the mental health professions borrowed practices, ethical ideals, principles, and goals from the Women’s Liberation Movement to create innovative models of therapy. This progressive impetus came to an abrupt halt with the sweeping re-medicalization of psychiatry in 1980s and the corporatization of medicine that followed thereafter. As the landscape of psychotherapy changed, so too did the founders’ vision of Feminist Therapy. Drawing on interviews with feminist therapists, I examine some of these changes. I close by asking about the conditions of possibility for feminism in therapy today.     

Why So Many Questions? Measurement Issues and the Attitudinal Self-Control Scale

The Grasmick et al. (1993) scale is one of the most frequently used measures in criminology. Regardless of how commonly the scale is used, questions remain about its dimensionality and the nature of forming a composite measure from its 24 individual components. This study examines whether a composite measure is the most effective method for using the scale with a series of analyses using different approaches to combining—or not combining—these measures. Based on data from a sample of over 1,500 college students, the results indicate that a single-factor composite of the 24 items is the least effective approach in predicting crime/deviance. These results, instead, suggest using the individual components separately, multiple factors, or a composite measure made from just three of the original items lead to significant improvements over the one-factor solution.     

Do Police Officers' Beliefs About Emotional Witnesses Influence the Questions They Ask?

High emotional arousal associated with witnessing a crime promotes memory error. Police are trained to use open‐ended questioning (i.e., Cognitive Interview) to guard against contaminating fragile witness memory, but do they follow this protocol? We investigated whether officers' belief about arousal's impact on crime scene memory influenced their questioning procedures. Officers read crime scenarios describing the witness/victim as either emotionally distraught or calm, and then they chose among open‐ended and close‐ended question options for witness interviews. Results showed that emotionally aroused witnesses were asked more closed questions by officers who believed arousal did not hurt memory, while officers who believed arousal negatively impacted memory accuracy asked more open‐ended questions. This relationship was not influenced by police experience. Results suggest that regardless of training and empirical findings, beliefs about the arousal–memory relationship may guide the questioning technique that officers employ, potentially contaminating already vulnerable witness memory. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Feminism as a Radical Ethics? Questions for Feminist Researchers in the Humanities

A feminist perspective on selfhood – bound to a perspective on otherness – is the main concern of this article. The resonance of this notion of selfhood both with ethical philosophy and with the language of humanism enables a deeper understanding of a feminist ethics as well as its internal tensions. The article considers the relationship of feminism and humanism as one of “paradoxical fluidity” rather than antithetical polarization, to explore the ways in which feminism’s alliance with contemporary ethics exemplifies its paradoxical relation to humanism. The study then underlines the vital contribution of feminist discourse to an ethical understanding of selfhood and intersubjectivity. Finally, it examines the work of experimental Canadian poet Lola Lemire Tostevin, who reveals the importance of an ethical, feminist version of selfhood that highlights the insufficiency as well as the potential of both humanist and postmodern versions of subjectivity.     

Forensic Interviewing Aids: Do Props Help Children Answer Questions About Touching?

The belief that props help children report abuse has fostered the widespread use of anatomical dolls and body diagrams in forensic interviews. Yet studies involving alleged abuse victims, children who have experienced medical examinations, and children who have participated in staged events have failed to find consistent evidence that props improve young children's ability to report key information related to bodily contact. Because props elevate the risk of erroneous touch reports, interviewers need to reconsider the belief that props are developmentally appropriate in forensic interviews, and researchers need to explore new approaches for eliciting disclosures of inappropriate touching.     

Education, Schooling, Derrida’s Marx and Democracy: Some Fundamental Questions

Beginning with a reconsideration of what the school is and has been, this paper explores the idea of the school to come. Emphasizing the governmental role of education in modernity, I offer a line of thinking that calls into question the assumption of both the school and education as possible conduits for either democracy or social justice. Drawing on Derrida’s spectral ontology I argue that any automatic correlation of education with democracy is misguided: especially within redemptive discourses that seek to liberate education from its present enclosure. This rereading of the field of education in the light of an account of the fundamental ontology of its key institution problematizes all rhetorics of education as social salvation. Education, it proposes, cannot be conceived as the ideal soul of a corrupted or as yet defective body, the school. Education—having taken on the character of an ontotheological principle—has become a governmental instrument as much as its specific institutions. This ontological condition can be understood within various accounts of the nature of contemporaneity. This paper considers the monstrous proposal that education be abandoned as the grounds for social, ethical and cultural redemption. The good news is that this abandonment opens the possibility for thinking beyond education, a beyond that is also beyond the strictures of instrumental rationality.     

‘Philosophy in India’ or ‘Indian Philosophy’: Some Post-Colonial Questions

Mode of philosophizing in post-colonial India is deeply influenced by two centuries of British rule (1757–1947), wherein a popular divide emerged between doing classical Indian philosophy and Western philosophy. However, a closer look reveals that the divide is not exclusive, since there are several criss-cross modes of philosophizing shaped by the forces of colonialism and nationalist consciousness. Contemporary challenges lie in raising new philosophical questions relevant to our time, keeping in view both what has been inherited and what has been imbibed in these centuries-old civilizational journeys. One needs to recognize India’s rich intellectual traditions based on cultural diversity, and at the same time raise fundamental questions that are transcendental in nature, yet historically rooted in our temporal presence. The challenge to articulate the nature of Indian philosophy (as anviksiki or darsana) has remained one of the daunting tasks for scholars of philosophy. Contemporariness of Indian philosophy is another issue to be deliberated. Contemporariness lies not only in raising new questions to classical Indian philosophies, but also in finding newness in old questions. It should further include engaging the classical philosophies with new methodological questions, be it Western philosophical methods or ones internally generated. Contemporariness will include narrating new stories driven by the dynamics of the present, where drive for questioning comes from the authentic philosophical issues of our time.     

The Answering System to Yes–No Truth-Functional Questions in Korean–English Bilingual Children

This study presents an experiment that explores the patterns of answers to yes–no truth-functional questions in English and Korean. The answering patterns are examined from 12 Korean–English bilingual children and 10 Korean-monolingual children. Four types of sentences in relation to given situations (Wason in Br J Psychol 52:133–142, 1961) were provided as questions such as true affirmative (TA), true negative (TN), false affirmative (FA), and false negative (FN). The bilingual children’s answers were observed in separate language settings, English and Korean. The results by the bilingual in the Korean setting were compared with those by the monolinguals. The results show that bilingual children can process two systems rather successfully by providing correct responses to the given questions. But difficulty patterns, measured from error rates in each setting, are found different in two languages. The bilinguals’ difficulty patterns in English and Korean, however, show deviation from monolinguals’ difficulty patterns suggested in previous studies (Wason in Br J Psychol 52:133–142, 1961, Akiyama in Dev Psychol 20:219–228, 1984, Kim in Dev Psychol 21(3):462–472, 1985, Choi in Dev Psychol 29(3):407–420, 1991). The present work also shows that negatives are not uniformly reported with more errors than affirmatives when the truth condition and the answering system are further involved. All in all, the current study suggests that bilingual children have two separate processing systems for yes–no truth-functional questions. However, the two systems cannot be understood as a simple coexistence of two monolingual systems. Interaction of the two competing linguistic systems is discussed further.     

What’s Different,Ethically, About Nanotechnology?: Foundational Questions and Answers

Whether nanotechnology is ethically unique and “nanoethics” should be treated as a field in its own right remain important, contested issues. This essay seeks to contribute to the debates on these issues by exploring several foundational questions about the relationship of ethics and nanotechnology. Ethical issues related to nanotechnology exist and adoption of a defeasible presumption that such issues amount to old ethical wine in new technological bottles appears justified. Such issues are not engendered solely by intrinsic features of the nanotechnology field, but also by contingent features of the social contexts in which work in the field unfolds. The sets of factors that engender ethical issues related to nanotechnology are combinations of social-contextual and technical elements. While there do not appear to be any qualitatively new nanotechnology-related ethical issues, nanotechnology is different, ethically, from other fields of technical inquiry in at least two ways. To avoid diluting ethical concern about nanotechnology and revival of the noxious notions of autonomous technology and technological determinism, thinking, writing, and speaking about ‘nanoethics’ should yield to thinking, writing, and speaking about ‘ethical issues related to nanotechnology in society.’ Finally, nanotechnology practitioners should become familiar with the ethical dimension of their work.