Facework and Rhetorical Strategies in Intercultural Argumentative Discourse

Intercultural discourse (especially via a lingua franca when interlocutors have a false impression that they are speaking one and the same language) adds a new dimension – facework (the establishment of culture-sensitive politeness strategies) – to the theory and practice of argumentation from a number of perspectives: its specificity as compared to ordinary argumentational discourse, the interpretation of the concept of incommensurability, and the conduct of international negotiations. Politeness systems relevant for different cultures are not unpredictable, but represent linguistically and cognitively a highly generalised universal system which can be adopted by interlocutors and used in practical discourse. Politeness expressions are governed by linguistic components – by language forms of a certain type and by specific discourse patterns. The proper choice of language forms and discourse patterns adds a special dimension to argumentative schemata. The politeness-relevant packaging of discourse adds a zero-step to the normative stages of an argumentative discussion (establishing hierarchical relations as such), and needs permanent alignment of these relations, by using correct language forms and discourse patterns.     

The dynamic relation between organizational and professional commitment of highly educated research and development (R&D) professionals

Researchers of the work-related commitment of professionals have investigated the possibility of conflict between organizational and professional forms of commitment. Drawing on the organizational socialization literature, the authors hypothesized that both forms of commitment would change with increasing organizational tenure. Specifically, the authors proposed that the patterns of change of the 2 forms of commitment would be complementary: Organizational commitment would take a U-shaped pattern of change, whereas professional commitment would take an inverse U-shaped pattern. The results, based on data collected from a sample of 204 research and development (R&D) professionals with PhDs, confirmed the U-shaped pattern of organizational commitment and the complementary relation between the 2 forms of commitment during the first 14 months after organizational entry. These findings suggest the importance of maintaining a balance between organizational and professional commitment and provide a method for identifying the critical period for interventions designed to increase retention of R&D professionals during their early organizational socialization.     

Talking as doing: Language forms and public language

I discuss language forms as the primary means that language communities provide to enable public language use. As such, they are adapted to public use most notably in being linguistically significant vocal tract actions, not the categories in the mind as proposed in phonological theories. Their primary function is to serve as vehicles for production of syntactically structured sequences of words. However, more than that, phonological actions themselves do work in public language use. In particular, they foster interpersonal coordination in social activities. An intriguing property of language forms that likely reflects their emergence in social communicative activities is that phonological forms that should be meaningless (in order to serve their role in the openness of language at the level of the lexicon) are not wholly meaningless. In fact, the form-meaning “rift” is bridged bidirectionally: The smallest language forms are meaningful, and the meanings of lexical language forms generally inhere, in part, in their embodiment by understanders.     

How to Read Wittgenstein

"How to Read Wittgenstein" is a discussion of some misinterpretations that arise when Ludwig Wittgenstein's later works are read, not in their historical context, but as though they were written for a generation of philosophers influenced by G.E. Moore and ordinary language philosophy. The criticisms are directed primarily at Oswald Hanfling's "Critical Notice" in Philosophical Investigations 19:2 (April, 1996).     

What Lies Outside Language?

The paper aims to make out the incoherence of the distinction between and rigid separation of 'the linguistic' and 'the extra-linguistic' as well as to absolve Wittgenstein from any commitment to it. Insistence on a descent from the abstract to a concrete discussion allows a connection to be made between Tractatus positions such as: 'The limits of my language indicate the limits of my world.' and 'The world and life are one.' and the Investigations : 'What has to be accepted is - so one could say - forms of life .' From this a picture is developed of the intimate interconnection between language, practical life, and world.     

Must we measure what we mean?

This paper excavates a debate concerning the claims of ordinary language philosophers that took place during the middle of the last century. The debate centers on the status of statements about ‘what we say’. On one side of the debate, critics of ordinary language philosophy argued that statements about ‘what we say’ should be evaluated as empirical observations about how people do in fact speak, on a par with claims made in the language sciences. By that standard, ordinary language philosophers were not entitled to the claims that they made about what we would say about various topics. On the other side of the debate, defenders of the methods of ordinary language philosophy sought to explain how philosophers can be entitled to statements about what we would say without engaging in extensive observations of how people do in fact use language. In this paper, I defend the idea that entitlement to claims about what we say can be had in a way that doesn’t require empirical observation, and I argue that ordinary language philosophers are (at least sometimes) engaged in a different project than linguists or empirically minded philosophers of language, which is subject to different conditions of success.     

Propositions and Reasoning in Russell and Frege

Both Russell and Frege were inclined to think that there is nothing essentially linguistic about thought: any actual reliance of ours upon language is a mere psychological contingency. If so then it should be possible to formulate logic in such a way that logical relationships are not represented or expressed as principles pertaining to linguistic forms. Russell and Frege take pains to achieve this, but fail. I explain this by looking at some features of Grundgesetz and Principia . Their failure, I suggest, is due to the nature of the case.     

Getting it right by getting it wrong: When learners change languages

When natural language input contains grammatical forms that are used probabilistically and inconsistently, learners will sometimes reproduce the inconsistencies; but sometimes they will instead regularize the use of these forms, introducing consistency in the language that was not present in the input. In this paper we ask what produces such regularization. We conducted three artificial language experiments, varying the use of determiners in the types of inconsistency with which they are used, and also comparing adult and child learners. In Experiment 1 we presented adult learners with scattered inconsistency - the use of multiple determiners varying in frequency in the same context - and found that adults will reproduce these inconsistencies at low levels of scatter, but at very high levels of scatter will regularize the determiner system, producing the most frequent determiner form almost all the time. In Experiment 2 we showed that this is not merely the result of frequency: when determiners are used with low frequencies but in consistent contexts, adults will learn all of the determiners veridically. In Experiment 3 we compared adult and child learners, finding that children will almost always regularize inconsistent forms, whereas adult learners will only regularize the most complex inconsistencies. Taken together, these results suggest that regularization processes in natural language learning, such as those seen in the acquisition of language from non-native speakers or in the formation of young languages, may depend crucially on the nature of language learning by young children.     

Ordinary language in memoriam

Taking as a point of departure a recently published collection of representative contributions from various philosophers who claim to ‘proceed from ordinary language’, this article examines ordinary language philosophy in the light of some of the claims made by these philosophers. The claims are criticized mainly for failing to account for the variability of the use of terms in respect both of depth of intention and special contexts. These factors are such as to render the claims in question false when interpreted as significant assertions about language, but trivial when they are interpreted as reasonable and true.     

Is Wittgenstein's Resort to Ordinary Language an Appeal to Empirical facts?

There are two widely held views in the literature as regards Wittgenstein's philosophy. One says that Wittgenstein in his later work appeals to ordinary language in his effort to show how the philosophical problems can be dissolved, and the other says that his investigation is a grammatical one. This paper undertakes to examine what is meant by a grammatical investigation, especially in view of the fact that this investigation relies on empirical facts that have to do with linguistic usage. The examination is carried out by concentrating on what Wittgenstein has to say on the issue of knowledge – in particular, how the way we use the word contributes to the dismissal of Moore's answer to the challenge of scepticism. The conclusion is that Wittgenstein's resort to ordinary language is not typically empirical. The examples of ordinary usage that he cites may be contingent, but they could not have been different given the language games they are part of. The correct use of words Wittgenstein appeals to is not fixed by some kind of essence, but neither is it decided by a majority rule. It gets entrenched in a complex nexus of practices. Wittgenstein's reference to "use" instead of 'usage"and to "linguistic facts" instead of "sociological facts" lends support more to a logical than to an empirical investigation.     

ISLAM AND SCIENCE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL GROUNDS FOR A GENUINE DEBATE

What does it take for Islam and science to engage in a genuine conversation with each other? This essay is an attempt to answer this question by clarifying the conditions which make having such a conversation possible and plausible. I will first distinguish between three notions of conversation: the trivial conversation (which requires sharing a common language and the meaning of its ordinary expressions), superficial conversation (in which although the language is shared, the communicators fail to share the meaning of their theoretical terms), and genuine conversation (which implies sharing the language and the meaning of ordinary as well as theoretical terms). I will then argue that our real concern with regard to the exchange between Islam and science is to be to specify the conditions under which their proponents can engage in a genuine conversation with each other and that such a conversation to take place essentially requires sharing a common ontology. Following Quine, I will argue that Muslims, like the followers of any religion, would have no other choice but to work from within science. Doing so, however, would not prevent Muslims from having a genuine conversation with the proponents of other worldviews because when the shared ontology fails to offer any potentially testable answer to our remaining questions about the world, the Islamic viewpoint can appear as a genuine alternative among other underdetermined ones, deciding between which would be a matter of pragmatic criteria.     

Doing philosophy with words

This paper discusses the coverage of ordinary language philosophy in Scott Soames' Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. After praising the book's virtues, I raise three points where I dissent from Soames' take on the history. First, I suggest that there is more to ordinary language philosophy than the rather implausible version of it that Soames sees to have been destroyed by Grice. Second, I argue that confusions between analyticity, necessity and priority are less important to the ordinary language period than Soames takes them to be. Finally, I claim that Soames' criticisms of Ryle turn in part on attributing reductionist positions to Ryle that Ryle did not hold. Contribution to Symposium on Scott Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, volume 2     

Involved,Loyal, Alienated,and Detached. The Commitment of Pastors

This article deals with the commitment of pastors to their profession. An empirical inquiry among Roman Catholic and Protestant pastors reveals that two types of commitment play an important role in the pastoral profession: affective commitment and cost commitment. Affective commitment concerns positive emotional ties with the pastoral profession. Cost commitment refers to the problems that pastors expect to encounter were they to quit their profession. Both forms of commitment are connected to the pastors' religious orientation and their job satisfaction. The conclusion discusses the influence of commitment to the pastoral profession on staying on as pastor. It also reviews the effects of commitment on the pastors' dedication to their jobs and their general well-being.     

The ordinary

This paper discusses Peter Lomas's work in the context of the concepts of ‘ordinary people’ and ‘ordinary language’. Obsessions about whether a person is ordinary or not tend to occur in people who are disturbed. Psychoanalysts use the special language of mechanics to explain the phenomena they observe in the consulting room. In this paper it is argued that ordinary language, our mother tongue, is a better way of understanding people. In his work as a psychotherapist and writer, Peter Lomas found more insight in the ordinary language of literature than he did in theory.     

Employee commitment in context: The nature and implication of commitment profiles

It is well established that employee commitment can take different forms (e.g., affective, normative, and continuance), yet it is only recently that theory has been advanced to explain how these different forms combine to influence behavior (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001). We tested this theory with data from employees in three human services organizations (N = 403). Using latent profile analyses, we identified six distinct profile groups and found that they differed on measures of need satisfaction, regulation, affect, engagement, organizational citizenship behavior, and well-being. The observed differences are consistent with the notion that a commitment profile provides a context that determines how the individual components are experienced (Gellatly, Meyer, & Luchak, 2006). We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this context effect.     

Using Cognitive Dissonance to Encourage Water Conservation1

In a field experiment on water conservation, we aroused dissonance in patrons of the campus recreation facility by making them feel hypocritical about their showering habits. Using a 2 × 2 factorial design, we manipulated subjects “‘mindfulness” that they had sometimes wasted water while showering, and then varied whether they made a “public commitment” urging other people to take shorter showers. The “hypocrisy” condition-in which subjects made the public commitment after being reminded of their past behavior-was expected to be dissonance-arousing, thereby motivating subjects to increase their efforts to conserve water. The results were consistent with this reasoning. Compared to controls, subjects in the hypocrisy condition took significantly shorter showers. Subjects who were merely reminded that they had wasted water, or who only made the public commitment, did not take shorter showers than control subjects. The findings have implications for using cognitive dissonance as means of changing behavior in applied settings, especially those in which people already support the desired goal, but their behavior is not consistent with those beliefs.     

Searching for salvation: An analysis of US religious searching on the World Wide Web

Ministerial itinerancy is characteristic of, although not exclusive to, the British Methodist Church. Rational choice theorists Finke and Starke have claimed that, historically, itinerancy has served to promote and reinforce instrumental commitment to the local church. This article develops and assesses a rational choice analysis of the effects of ministerial itinerancy on the organisational commitment of Methodist congregations and their ministers. It concludes that rational choice theory can only offer a partial analysis and fails to take into account less instrumental forms of organisational commitment. The article surveys the current debate within the Methodist Church about the future of ministerial itinerancy and suggests that the Church may be in the process of recognising that ‘moving ministers’ is not necessarily good at ‘moving congregations’ to embrace the national Church's priorities. The article predicts that itinerancy will remain an important feature, but not a defining characteristic, of the Methodist ministry and will no longer tend to ‘go with the job’.     

No Ethics Without Things

Just as recognition and pursuit of the human good take place in language and action, so too do they unfold in encounter with the material and visual. The ethical crises, projects, and striving we see in everyday religious life are worked out not just in the intersubjective play and politics of language but also in encounter with, in dwelling with, material and visual substances and forms. This essay considers the material conditions that make possible the “ethical pleasures” sought by Indonesian painter A. D. Pirous in making and displaying contemporary works of “Islamic art,” most especially works that make “visual recitation” of passages from the Qur'an.     

Laying down a path in talking

This paper aims to provide a starting point for a non-representational approach to language. It will do so by undoing some of the reifying tendencies that are at the heart of the ontology of scientific psychology. Although non-representational theories are beginning to emerge, they remain committed to giving explanations in terms of ontological structures that are independent of human activity. If they maintain this commitment it is unlikely that they will displace representationalism in domains such as language. By following some of Wittgenstein’s remarks on language, I explain the phenomenon of reification by carefully considering the formative, situational flow of language—thus without invoking representations. In this way, the paper sketches a direction of approach for a non-representational theory of language, undercutting the most important assumptions that justify an explanatory ontology devoid of human activity.     

Motivations and attitudes affecting high school students' choice of foreign language

There are some foreign languages that enjoy great status in the United States, while other foreign languages are rarely represented at the high school level. The present study explored the following questions: Why do students choose to take a particular foreign language? Do students gravitate toward it because it is widely thought to be the easiest language to learn or because they perceive greater career opportunities with proficiency in this particular language, or is it simply because there are more classes offered? As long as foreign language study is elective in high schools and as long as a variety of languages are offered, the answers to these questions will remain important for foreign language educators, especially in schools where the various language programs compete with one another for student enrollments and the programs' ultimate survival.