Studies of higher nervous activity in functional psychoses

Psychiatric illnesses can be conceived of as experiments of nature, providing a variety of pathopsychological mechanisms which may elucidate normal psychological processes. Clinically the reactive psychoses are predominantly psychogenic reaction types. They present disturbances of higher nervous activity, similar to those of the neuroses. The unconditional reflex activity is practically as in normal controls, and the most outstanding finding was the large effect of psychodynamic complex structures. This is a physiological parallel to the clinical manifestations with great concern over experienced mental trauma. In the manic-depressive psychoses the most characteristic feature is a marked disturbance of unconditional reflex activity. This factor may be an important physiological mechanism underlying the more biological than psychodynamic reaction type and partly explain the changes of mood and associated interferences with sleep, body weight, sexual activity, aggression and other instinctual and vegetative functions. Schizophrenic psychoses also present changes of unconditional reflex activity, predominantly in the direction of inhibition of response. In addition there are severe dissociations within and between the three levels of unconditional reflexes and the two signaling systems. It is suggested that schizophrenia represents a functional maladaptation, which can be explained from the principles of autokinesis and schizokinesis established by Gantt in animal experiments. Prognostic models based on experimentally established impairment of performances were shown to predict long-term risks of schizophrenic defects just as well as models based on constellations of clinical symptoms. I would predict that psychophysiology and experimental psychology will become increasingly more important for establishing diagnosis and prognosis in the functional psychoses. The data of this article point toward a basis for a prophylactic psychiatry.     

Schilder and Pavlov's theory of higher nervous activity. A critique and apologia

In the late 1920s, the Viennese psychoanalyst Paul Schilder, after performing a conditioning experiment with human subjects, criticized I. P. Pavlov's concept of "experimental neurosis." Schilder maintained that subjective reports by conditioned human subjects were more informative than the objectively observed behavior of conditioned dogs. In 1932, Pavlov published a rejoinder to Schilder's critique in the Journal of the American Medical Association. Pavlov maintained that Schilder misunderstood the value and implications of the scientific, objective method in the study of experimental neurosis. In 1934, Schilder subjected Pavlov's theory of higher nervous activity to an incisive critique in a 1935 article in Imago. Schilder objected to Pavlov's narrow, reductionist conceptualization of the conditional reflex. Schilder reiterated his view that the psychological, subjective explanation of the conditional reflex is preferable to the physiological, objective explanation, and that the inference of cortical phenomena from experimental findings might be improper. Neither Pavlov nor any of his disciples replied to Schilder. The author provides an apology for the Pavlovian position, suggesting that Schilder was unfamiliar with early and late writings of Pavlov.     

Measurement of neo-Pavlovian properties of higher nervous activity by motor reaction-time tasks

Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science - A preliminary study involving 80 paid subjects, 40 of each sex, investigated the usefulness of motor response-time tasks as measures of three...     

The action of antidepressants and convulsive treatment upon the higher nervous activity in depressive states

In a sample of 81 depressive patients the state of the higher nervous activity (HNA) has been evaluated by means of a test battery before starting and once weekly during the treatment course by ECT, amitryptiline, nialamide and Levomepromazine. A good remission in 41 patients, and in 40 patients a moderate remission was achieved. Every treatment method exercises quite a different action upon the HNA of depressive patients. The excitatory process is most enhanced by amitryptiline, least by nialamid. The internal inhibition is markedly amended under Levomepromazine and nialamide, least by ECT. The equilibrium of cortical nervous processes improves most under amitryptiline. The specific pattern of action of different therapeutic methods obviously can be used as supplementary criteria for choosing the most effective method for each patient.     

Protopopov's ideas on habit formation and their relation to the Pavlovian theory of higher nervous activity

In 1929 Viktor P. Protopopov began to replicate E. L. Thorndike's animal experiments on habit acquisition. To determine the conditions necessary for habit formation, Protopopov used the natural experiment method, in which dogs encountered environments that prevented them from reaching a stimulus-bait. Not all dogs acquired the behavior necessary for obtaining the bait. Explaining the results within the framework of the Pavlovian theory of higher nervous activity, Protopopov concluded that habits were acquired when an active animal provoked by a bait-stimulus encountered an environmental barrier. The dogs tried a series of phylogenetic behaviors until the stimulus-bait was reached. The latter movements were retained, forming an ontogenetic habit. The dogs also learned not to produce the unsuccessful movements. In accord with the Pavlovian theory, individual differences in habit formation were related to temperament types. A critique of the Thorndikian Law of Effect is provided in terms of the Pavlovian theory of higher nervous activity.     

Physiological-behavioral coupling research in the soviet science of higher nervous activity: A visitation report

Behavioral research paradigms presently used by Soviet scientists to explore relations between behavioral and physiological activities are discussed. Each laboratory represented was physically visited by the author during a six month exchange visit to the Soviet Union. Research ranging from central concommitants of language and meaning to biofeedback and peripheral autonomic functions are described.     

Higher nervous activity in psychiatric patients

A review is presented of studies of higher nervous activity in psychiatric patients. In neuroses and reactive psychoses the basic pathology appears to be centered around the psychogenic complex structures. In addition, neuroses as well as reactive psychoses reveal general disturbances of higher nervous activity. In the schizophrenic and manic depressive psychoses there are indications of disturbances in deep-lying brain structures. Both types of psychoses are heterogeneous groups of clinical conditions. An important task for future experimental studies is to establish the types of disturbances of higher nervous activity in well-defined clinically homogenous groups. The final section deals with prophylactic psychiatry, with special emphasis on Gantt’s suggestions for an international project.     

Consciousness and self-reference

Reflection on the self's way of being in consciousness yields two arguments for a theory of self-reference not based inany wayat all on self-cognition. First, I show that one theory of self-reference predicts an experience of the self because the theory inadequately analyzes the semantical facts about indexicality. I construct a dilemma for this cognitivism, which it cannot get out of, for it requires evensolitary self-reference to be based on some original self-knowledge, which is not available. I describe my kinetic model of unspoken self-reference, and I show how it fits the facts of four forms of consciousness, all of which presuppose self-reference, rather than yield it. Second, aspeaker uses the first person pronoun in sentences because she is aware of the unmediated role in agency of the beliefs she would express, and not because she is aware of herself in their content. The cognitive model, in contrast, succumbs to a vicious regress and is exposed as an obstacle to an understanding of consciousness.A version of this essay was read at Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta (February 1985), University of North Bengal (March 1985) and Jadavpur University (March 1985). My thanks to S. Basu and S. Chakraborty at Rabindra Bharati, and to M. Ghosh and S. K. Sen at North Bengal, and to Ch. Gupta and P. K. Sen of Jadavpur University. Jadavpur's Prof. Sen's extensive comments in support of the cognitive model of reference led me to revise the essay thoroughly. North Bengal University may have published a version of this essay. I also thank Kent Baldner and the referees of this journal for insightful comments forcing further revisions.