The foundations of probability and quantum mechanics

Taking as starting point two familiar interpretations of probability, we develop these in a perhaps unfamiliar way to arrive ultimately at an improbable claim concerning the proper axiomatization of probability theory: the domain of definition of a point-valued probability distribution is an orthomodular partially ordered set. Similar claims have been made in the light of quantum mechanics but here the motivation is intrinsically probabilistic. This being so the main task is to investigate what light, if any, this sheds on quantum mechanics. In particular it is important to know under what conditions these point-valued distributions can be thought of as derived from distribution-pairs of upper and lower probabilities on boolean algebras. Generalising known results this investigation unsurprisingly proves unrewarding. In the light of this failure the next topic investigated is how these generalized probability distributions are to be interpreted.     

Embracing the other: Revisiting the epistemological foundations of family systems therapy

Family systems therapy originated in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s through the work of innovative thinkers and clinicians. However, despite the creative contributions of the mentioned colleagues and of later innovations in family therapy theory and practice, it seems as though the dominant culture of establishment psychiatry in the United States (and in most Western countries) to this day has not seriously incorporated relationships, social context, or community connectedness into the treatment of individuals with psychiatric diagnoses. For the “psychiatric” patients diagnosed according to the DSM-5, the dominant underlying epistemological perspective is the medical “scientific” paradigm. Within this approach there is a dearth of reflections about the truthfulness of so-called “empirical facts” and a lack of skepticism about the techniques of “measurement” of the psychiatric illness. The alternative, relationship-oriented, context-sensitive, and community-connected thinking paradigm is highlighted here in contrast to the “psychiatric” foundation. This paradigm consists of (a) the awareness that all human Subjects (including “psychiatric” clients) are constituted as such by their relational connection to others; (b) the awareness of our sensitivity to and embeddedness in a socio-economic, cultural, and racial context; and (c) the awareness of our involvement in and connectedness with many kinds of communities.     

De Finetti's earliest works on the foundations of probability

Bruno de Finetti's earliest works on the foundations of probability are reviewed. These include the notion of exchangeability and the theory of random processes with independent increments. The latter theory relates to de Finetti's ideas for a probabilistic science more generally. Different aspects of his work are united by his foundational programme for a theory of subjective probabilities.This work would not have been possible in its present form without the generous help of Prof. Maria Carla Galavotti. For several years, she has unfailingly answered all my requests for papers difficult of access, and discussed the details of interpretation as well as the philosophy of probability in general. To her I express my gratitude for everything.     

The development of epistemological understanding

We propose the coordination of the subjective and objective dimensions of knowing as the essence of what develops in the attainment of mature epistemological understanding. Initially, the objective dimension dominates, to the exclusion of subjectivity; subsequently, the subjective dimension assumes an ascendant position and the objective is abandoned, and, finally, the two are coordinated. This progression, we further postulate, tends to occur in a systematic order across different judgment domains (personal taste, aesthetic, value, and truth), with the orders the reverse of one another in the two major transitions that constitute this progression. These predictions are supported among a sample of seven groups of children, adolescents, and adults varying in age, education, and life experience. Subjectivity is most readily acknowledged in personal taste and aesthetic judgments and least readily in truth judgments. Once subjectivity is accepted and becomes dominant, objectivity is reintegrated in the reverse order, i.e., most readily with respect to truth judgments. Not predicted, however, was the finding that for a number of individuals, both transitions proved most difficult in the values domain.     

The epistemological basis of selfhood

Multiple definitions and conceptualizations of selfhood have appeared in psychological literature over the years. A fundamental debate that had risen as a result is whether the self is made of universal properties that transcend local factors or whether it is a construction particular to specific conditions of history, culture and individuality. This article begins with a review of different ways by which the self has been understood and construed; it then proceeds to suggest an epistemological framework that generates four distinct types of selves: monolithic-monoformal, relativistic-relational, dialectical-deconstructive, and integral-inclusive. It is claimed that these basic structures consist of much of the cross-cultural and intra-cultural variation in the construction of selfhood.     

The epistemological import of morphological content

Morphological content (MC) is content that is implicit in the standing structure of the cognitive system. Henderson and Horgan claim that MC plays a distinctive epistemological role unrecognized by traditional epistemic theories. I consider the possibilities that MC plays this role either in central cognition or in peripheral modules. I argue that the peripheral MC does not play an interesting epistemological role and that the central MC is already recognized by traditional theories.     

Psychology,progress, and the problem of reflexivity: A study in the epistemological foundations of psychology

Buss's thesis that, throughout the history of psychology, psychological theories have alternated between two contradictory models of human nature is examined and supported. One model sees humans as actively constructing themselves; the other model sees humans as constructed from the outside. The thesis that the inherent reflexive quality of psychological inquiry is the cause of this alternation is then examined. Three different hypotheses as to how “reflexivity” might explain this alternation are offered. Finally, brief attention is given to the question of whether psychology can be seen as progressing if it is as philosophically indecisive as the analysis suggests.     

The epistemological objection to modal primitivism

Modal primitivists hold that some modal truths are primitively true. They thus seem to face a special epistemological problem: how can primitive modal truths be known? The epistemological objection has not been adequately developed in the literature. I undertake to develop the objection, and then to argue that the best formulation of the epistemological objection targets all realists about modality, rather than the primitivist alone. Furthermore, the moves available to reductionists in response to the objection are also available to primitivists. I conclude by suggesting that extant theories of the epistemology of modality are not sensitive to the question of primitivism versus reductionism.

     

The epistemological status of a naturalized epistemology

Philosophically inclined psychologists and psychologically inclined philosophers often hold that the substantive discoveries of psychology can provide an empirical foundation for epistemology. In this paper it is argued that the ambition to found epistemology empirically faces certain unnoticed difficulties. Empirical theories concerned with knowledge‐gaining abilities have been historically associated with specific epistemological views such that the epistemology gives preferential support to the substantive theory, while the theory empirically supports the epistemology. Theories attribute to the subject just those epistemic abilities which associated epistemologies attribute to the scientist. The concept of epistemological significance is introduced as the significance a psychological theory can have for modifying the epistemological suppositions with which the theory was originally associated. Substantive psychological theories are strongly constrained by the epistemologies used in their development; the endorsement an epistemology receives from its associated theory should carry no weight. The alliance between psychology and epistemology is not progressive to the development of either field. Alternative sources of progress in epistemology and psychology are suggested.     

The ontological and epistemological superiority of hylomorphism

Materialism—the view that all of reality is wholly determined by the very, very small—and extreme nominalism—the view that properties, kinds, and qualities do not really exist—have been the dominant view in analytic philosophy for the last 100 years or so. Both views, however, have failed to provide adequate accounts for the possibility of intentionality and of knowledge. We must therefore look to alternatives. One well-tested alternative, the hylomorphism of Aristotle and the medieval scholastics, was rejected without being refuted and so deserves further examination. I will argue that Aristotelian hylomorphic provides a markedly superior account of knowledge, cognitive normativity, and intentionality.

     

The quantitative epistemological content of Bohr's Correspondence Principle

The basic dynamical quantities of classical mechanics, such as position, linear momentum, angular momentum and energy, obtain their fundamental epistomological content by means of their intimate relationship to the symmetries of the space-time manifold which is the arena of physics. The program of canonical quantization can be understood as a two stage process. The first stage is Bohr's Correspondence Principle, whereby the basic dynamical quantities of the quantum theory are required to retain precisely the same relationship to the symmetries of the space-time manifold as do their classical counterparts, thereby preserving their epistemological, as well as measurement-theoretic, significance. Having so identified the basic dynamical variables, functions of these may now be used to identify the subtler symmetries of the proper canonical group. The second and determining stage of the quantization program requires the establishment of a correspondence between some of these subtler symmetries of the classical theory and related symmetries of the quantum theory, the relationship being determined by a common algebraic form for their defining functions.Supported in part by the U.S. Air Force under Grant No. AFOSR-816-67.     

Elusive epistemological justification

What does it take for some epistemological thinking to be epistemically justified? Indeed, is that outcome even possible? This paper argues that it is not possible: no epistemological thinking can ever be epistemically justified. A vicious infinite regress of epistemological reflection is the price that would have to be paid for having some such justification. Clearly, that price would be too high.     

The outlook for policy-making: An epistemological perspective

Improving the quality of public policy-making is a matter of great importance for nearly everyone. Significant improvements, however, require major (and unlikely?) changes in the epistemological foundations accepted by social inquirers—changes that make possible a conception of “policy” that can be used to achieve real world purposes reliably. A theory of knowledge adequate for that purpose is outlined, and some of its major implications for inquiry (and for policy-making) are explored very briefly.     

The foundations of Quine's philosophy

Tensions in Two Dogmas of Empiricism are not resolved in Quine's later writings. The role of simplicity remains mysterious. Naturalized epistemology is wrongly presented as the only alternative to phenomenalism, and no attempt is made to answer the objection that judgements of the rationality of human activities have no place within a naturalistic philosophy. The attempt to develop an empiricism without experience leads to an implausible behaviorism and to an unsuccessful naturalistic account of observation sentences.A part of an earlier version of this paper was read at the Annual Conference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy, (August, 1973), and a part at the Annual Conference of the New Zealand Division, (May, 1975). I have been helped by the encouragements and criticisms offered by M. C. Bradley, G. C. Nerlich, J. J. C. Smart, and the Editor.