When ostracism leads to aggression: The moderating effects of control deprivation

We hypothesized that increasing or decreasing levels of control in an ostracized individual could moderate aggressive responding to ostracism. Participants were either ostracized or included in a spontaneous game of toss, and then exposed to a series of blasts of aversive noise, the onsets over which they had either control or no control. Aggression was defined as the amount of hot sauce participants allocated to a stranger, knowing the stranger did not like hot foods, but would have to consume the entire sample. Ostracized participants without control allocated more than four times as much sauce as any other group; ostracized participants who experienced restored control were no more aggressive than either of the groups who were included. Aggressive responding to ostracism may depend on the degree to which control needs are threatened in the target, and is discussed in terms of Williams’s (2001) needs threat model of ostracism.     

Mood acknowledgment and correction for the mood-congruency bias in social judgment

Past research has revealed a mood-congruency bias wherein people evaluate other individuals more positively when they are experiencing good moods than when they are experiencing bad moods. At times, however, people may attempt to prevent their transient mood states from biasing their evaluations of other people. It was proposed that the capacity to attend openly to one’s moods is an important precursor to such mood correction efforts. Two studies supported this hypothesis. People who were encouraged to attend to their feelings (Study 1), as well as people who are naturally inclined to acknowledge their feelings (Study 2), were more likely than their counterparts to prevent their positive and negative moods from biasing their judgments of a target person.     

Second-order beliefs about intention and children's attributions of sociomoral judgment

Predicting how another person will evaluate the intention underlying an action involves consideration of second-order mental states. Children (ages 5-10 years) and college students (N=105) predicted an observer's belief about an actor's intention and evaluated the actor from both their own perspectives and the perspective of the observer. Younger children were more likely than older children and adults to attribute a belief to the observer that mismatched the actor's prior intention. Attributed beliefs about intention were more likely to match negative prior intentions than to match positive prior intentions and were also more likely to match prior intentions when the observer knew the actor's prior intention than when the observer did not know the actor's prior intention. The judgments attributed to the observer were based on the beliefs about intention attributed to the observer, showing use of second-order mental states to infer another's sociomoral judgments.     

Perception through a perspective-taking lens: Differential effects on judgment and behavior

In contrast to the view that social perception has symmetric effects on judgments and behavior, the current research explored whether perspective-taking leads stereotypes to differentially affect judgments and behavior. Across three studies, perspective-takers consistently used stereotypes more in their own behavior while simultaneously using them less in their judgments of others. After writing about an African-American, perspective-taking tendencies were positively correlated with aggressive behavior but negatively correlated with judging others as aggressive. Similarly, after writing about an elderly man, perspective-takers walked more slowly and became more conservative, but judged others as less dependent. These divergent effects of perspective-taking on judgment and behavior occurred regardless of whether perspective-taking was manipulated or measured, whether judgments were measured before or after behavior, the stereotype that was activated, and participants’ culture (American, Singaporean). These findings support theorizing that judgments and behavior can diverge when individuals’ social strategies are geared towards establishing and maintaining social bonds, as well as provide insight into how perspective-taking helps individuals manage diversity.     

The interaction of distress tolerance and intolerance of uncertainty in the prediction of symptom reduction across CBT for social anxiety disorder

Distress tolerance (DT) and intolerance of uncertainty (IU) have been identified as transdiagnostic processes that predict symptom severity across a range of distinct anxiety disorders. However, the joint effect of these two variables on therapeutic outcome has not yet been examined. It is possible that DT and IU may both impact on treatment response to cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) in clients with anxiety, as clients with weak DT and strong IU may be less likely to engage in exposure and cognitive restructuring tasks across treatment due to their associated distress. The purpose of this study was to examine the interaction of DT and IU as predictors of post-treatment symptom severity and treatment response to group CBT in participants with primary DSM-IV-TR diagnosed social anxiety disorder (SAD). Participants (N = 95) with SAD completed 12 weeks of manualized group CBT. Results of multilevel longitudinal analysis demonstrated an interaction effect, such that lower DT and higher IU predicted higher SAD symptom severity across the course of therapy. The findings are discussed in terms of clinical implications for the disorder-specific and transdiagnostic treatment of anxiety disorders.     

Mood effects on eyewitness memory: Affective influences on susceptibility to misinformation

Does mood influence the accuracy of eyewitness recollections, and people’s susceptibility to misleading information in particular? Based on recent affect-cognition theories and research on eyewitness memory, three experiments predicted and found that positive affect promoted, and negative affect inhibited the incorporation of misleading information into eyewitness memories. This effect was obtained for both positive and negative events (Experiment 1), and for recorded as well as real-life incidents (Experiment 2). Participants had no meta-cognitive awareness of these mood effects, and affect-control instructions were ineffective in preventing them (Experiment 3). The cognitive mechanisms responsible for mood effects on eyewitness memories are discussed, and the implications of these findings for everyday memories, forensic practice and for current affect/cognition theorizing are considered.     

Character Disposition and Behavior Type: Influences of Valence on Preschool Children's Social Judgments

The authors studied the influences of valence information on preschool children's (n = 47) moral (good or bad), liking (liked or disliked by a friend), and consequence-of-behavior (reward or punishment) judgments. The authors presented 8 scenarios describing the behavior valence, positive valence (help, share), negative valence (verbal insult, physical aggression), and disposition valence (nice or mean) of characters in social interaction with a friend. Overall, character disposition and behavior valence significantly influenced children's judgments. Moral, liking, and consequence-of-behavior judgments varied significantly by character disposition for both positive behavior scenarios. In contrast, there were fewer significant findings as a function of character disposition for negative behavior scenarios, suggesting that the negative behavior cue somewhat diminished the effect of character disposition on children's judgments. The authors discuss preschool students’ coordination of information about valence of behavior and character disposition and the students’ reluctance to judge that misbehavior warrants punitive consequence.     

Children’s social cognition about proactive aggression

In this study, 6- and 9-year-old children (N = 258) observed two instances of proactive aggression (one relational and the other direct aggression) that were committed by members of a group toward out-group members. Participants were either members of the group or independent observers. Analyses of participants’ social cognition about the aggressor and the aggression (cause of aggression, moral judgment of aggression, attitudes toward the aggressor, and exclusion of the aggressor) indicated that, overall, group members were more positive toward aggressors than were independent observers. Although intergroup competition was perceived to be the cause of the aggression, participants disapproved of both types of aggression (especially direct aggression), disapproval increased with age, and girls disapproved of relational aggression more than did boys. Group members’ social cognition about the aggressor and the aggression comprised a coherent cognitive process for both types of aggression, but the observers’ process was simpler and differed by aggression type.     

Self-other similarity judgment asymmetries reverse for people to whom you want to be similar

People typically judge themselves to be less similar to others than others are to themselves. The selective accessibility model [Mussweiler, T. (2003). Comparison process in social judgement: mechanical consequences. Psychological Review, 110, 472-489.] suggests that the direction of this self-other similarity asymmetry could reverse for comparison others to whom people want to be more similar. Motivation to be more similar is thought to prompt a focal hypothesis of similarity as opposed to dissimilarity, which influences the amount and kind of information accessed when making the judgment. A study found a typical asymmetry for comparison others to whom participants did not wish to be more similar, and a reversed asymmetry for comparison others to whom participants did wish to be more similar. The direction of the asymmetry was not dependent on whether participants knew a lot or a little about the comparison other.     

Ambiguous comparative judgment: Fuzzy set model and data analysis

Abstract:  This paper proposed two types of fuzzy set models for ambiguous comparative judgments, which did not always hold transitivity and comparability properties. The first type of model was a fuzzy theoretical extension of the additive difference model for preference that was used to explain ambiguous preference strength. The second was a fuzzy logic model for explaining ambiguous preference in which preference strength was bounded, such as a probability measure. In both models, multi-attribute weighting parameters and all attribute values were assumed to be asymmetric fuzzy L-R numbers. For each model, a method of parameter estimation using fuzzy regression analysis was proposed. Numerical examples were also provided for comparison. Finally, the theoretical and practical implications of the proposed models were discussed.     

Exploring metaphor's epistemic function: Uncertainty moderates metaphor-consistent priming effects on social perceptions

Consistent with conceptual metaphor theory's claim that metaphors operate at a conceptual, and not just linguistic, level, prior research shows that priming perceptions related to concrete concepts influences perceptions related to dissimilar, more abstract concepts in metaphor-consistent ways. However, the theory's claim that metaphors function to reduce uncertainty about abstract concepts has yet to be experimentally assessed. Two studies tested whether situational variation in uncertainty moderates metaphor-consistent priming effects. Study 1 focused on the metaphor life is a path and showed that priming path perceptions (vs. literal representations) increased perceived autobiographical continuity only if uncertainty about personal identity was salient. Study 2 focused on verticality metaphors and showed that vertical orientation primes influenced satisfaction with the decision to attend one's current university in both directions (up is good, bad is down) only if uncertainty about the value of the college experience was salient.     

A tool for thought! When comparative thinking reduces stereotyping effects

Stereotypes have pervasive, robust, and often unwanted effects on how people see and behave towards others. Undoing these effects has proven to be a daunting task. Two studies demonstrate that procedurally priming participants to engage in comparative thinking with a generalized focus on differences reduces behavioral and judgmental stereotyping effects. In Study 1, participants who were procedurally primed to focus on differences sat closer to a skinhead - a member of a negatively stereotyped group. In Study 2, participants primed on differences ascribed less gender stereotypic characteristics to a male and female target person. This suggests that comparative thinking with a focus on differences may be a simple cognitive tool to reduce the behavioral and judgmental effects of stereotyping.     

Social presence effects on the stroop task: Boundary conditions and an alternative account

Two studies investigated boundary conditions of an effect of social presence on the Stroop task and its interpretation in terms of an attentional view (P. Huguet, M. P. Galvaing, J. M. Monteil, & F. Dumas, 1999). In this view, social presence leads to attentional focusing, enhancing participants’ ability to screen out the distracting features of Stroop stimuli. As predicted, Stroop interference was found to be reduced by social presence, but an alternative account in which social presence exerts an effect on task selection received more support.     

Implicit self-esteem and social anxiety: differential self-favouring effects in high and low anxious individuals

This study was designed to investigate the role of negative self-image in social phobia. Participants were 19 high and 19 low socially anxious women. Because self-report measures of self-esteem are sensitive to self-presentation and impression management strategies, an implicit association test (IAT) was used to assess participants' self-esteem as well as their general evaluation of others ('other-esteem'). Socially anxious women displayed relatively low levels of self-esteem on self-report measures. However, at the implicit level, low and high anxious women were characterised by a similar, highly positive self-image. Both groups displayed a relatively low 'other-esteem'. Yet, this self-favouring effect was considerably weaker in high than in low anxious participants. The results provide no unequivocal support for the idea that low self-esteem plays an important role in social anxiety. Yet, rather than by low self-esteem per se, socially anxious people are characterised by a small discrepancy between esteem of self and others, and it may be this reduced tendency to self-favouring that is pivotal to social anxiety.     

词频、易接近性和词表序列成分对近因效应影响的实验研究

本研究目的探讨词频、易接近性和词表序列成分对近因效应的影响及其原因。两个实验以不同词频和不同易接近性的中文词为材料,运用直接自由回忆程序和操纵词表的组成成分,探讨近因效应的特点。实验结果表明：词频对近因效应的作用受词表序列成分的影响,对于纯的词表,高频词回忆的比例比低频词更高,对于混合词表,低频词回忆的比例比高频词更高,但是词的易接近性不影响近因效应且不受词表序列成分影响。文章最后对近因效应的性质进行了讨论。     

Let there be no mistake! On assessment mode and the transference effect in social perception

We examined the possibility that assessment regulatory mode orientation affects the tendency to exhibit transference effects in social perception. Based on a social cognitive methodological paradigm devised by Andersen and colleagues [e.g., Andersen, Glassman, Chen, & Cole, 1996], we find that the transference effect is more pronounced when individuals’ (chronic) assessment orientation is low (vs. high). These results suggest that transference is more likely to occur when less attention is directed towards the target of perception.     

Domain-general contributions to social reasoning: theory of mind and deontic reasoning re-explored

Using older adults and dual-task interference, we examined performance on two social reasoning tasks: theory of mind (ToM) tasks and versions of the deontic selection task involving social contracts and hazardous conditions. In line with performance accounts of social reasoning, evidence from both aging and the dual-task method suggested that domain-general resources contribute to performance of these tasks. Specifically, older adults were impaired relative to younger adults on all types of social reasoning tasks tested; performance varied as a function of the demands these tasks placed on domain-general resources. Moreover, in younger adults, simultaneous performance of a working memory task interfered with younger adults' performance on both types of social reasoning tasks; here too, the magnitude of the interference effect varied with the processing demands of each task. Limits placed on social reasoning by executive functions contribute a great deal to performance, even in old age and in healthy younger adults under conditions of divided attention. The role of potentially non-modular and modular contributions to social reasoning is discussed.     

Wrongness in different relationships: Relational context effects on moral judgment

ABSTRACT

Morality primarily serves social-relational functions. However, little research in moral psychology investigates how relational factors impact moral judgment, and a theoretically grounded approach to such investigations is lacking. We used Relational Models Theory and Moral Foundations Theory to explore how varying actor-victim relationships impacts judgment of different types of moral violations. Across three studies, using a diverse range of moral violations and varying the experimental design, relational context substantially influenced third-party judgment of moral violations, and typically independent of several factors strongly associated with moral judgment. Results lend novel but mixed support to Relationship Regulation Theory and provide some novel implications for Moral Foundations Theory. These studies highlight the importance of relational factors in moral psychology and provide guidelines for exploring how relational factors might shape moral judgment.     

Not so above average after all: When people believe they are worse than average and its implications for theories of bias in social comparison

Recent research calls into question the generally accepted conclusion that people believe themselves to be better than average. This paper reviews the new theories that have been proposed to explain the fact that better-than-average effects are isolated to common behaviors and abilities, and that people believe themselves to be below average with respect to rare behaviors and uncommon abilities. These new theories are then used to revisit prior findings of better-than-average effects. When viewed in light of recent work, the evidence suggests that prior findings overstated the degree to which people engage in self-enhancement by believing that they are better than others when in fact they are not. Prior studies have often confounded desirability with commonness and have used subjective measures of comparative judgment that capitalize on people’s tendency to conflate relative with absolute self-evaluation.