Empirical,Logical and Philosophical Arguments Against Cigarette Smoking as a Pharmacologically Compelled Act

The fundamental hypothesis of the disease model of nicotine addiction states that, following a regime of chronic smoking, further smoking becomes a pharmacologically compelled rather than a chosen act. Despite it’s public and professional popularity as an explanation for why people continue to smoke in spite of a deteriorating quality of life, the validity of this hypothesis has been critically undermined by the state of evidence in four domains: inconclusive empirical evidence of withdrawal severity as a potent predictor of quit outcome; methodological problems concerning the measurement of factors which maintain smoking; logical problems with the interpretation of factors which maintain smoking, in particular, failures to discriminate reflexive and mediated actions in explanations of why people smoke; and philosophical problems with conceptualisations of human action as determined rather than willed. In light of these problems, it is argued that evidence on the nature of nicotine addiction is not well explained by the disease model, but rather, posits smoking primarily as a decision-making process influenced peripherally by the pharmacologic effects of nicotine on the brain and body.

Visibility of Brief Images: The Dual-Process Approach

If successive, brief visual images are exposed for recognition or for psychophysical ratings, various effects and phenomena of fast dynamics of conscious perception such as mutual masking, metacontrast, proactive enhancement of contrast, proactive speed-up of the latency of subjective visual experience, the Fröhlich Effect, the Tandem Effect, attentional facilitation by visuospatial precuing, and some others have been found. The theory proposed to deal with these phenomena proceeds from the assumption that two types of brain processes are necessary in order to consciously recognize visual stimuli: (1) fast, specific processes of encoding that allocate and reactivate the stimulus representation which is based on the activity of selected cortical neurons and (2) relatively slower processes of facilitation of the activity of this specific representation that are mediated by the excitatory modulation of the EPSPs of those selected cortical neurons by the ascending input from nonspecific thalamus. Theperceptual retouchconstruct is proposed in order to characterize and analyze the interaction of (1) and (2). The neurophysiological characteristics of this bifunctional system of afference help to put forward several predictions that are found to be consistent with the empirical regularities of the above-described perceptual-attentional phenomena. These data form a body of converging evidence that is consistent with the predictions of the perceptual retouch approach.     

Advances,Problems, and Challenges in the Study of Emotion Regulation: A Commentary

As observed by Zinbarg and Mineka (American Psychologist 62:259–261, 2007), the study of emotion regulation faces significant challenges that need to be addressed. In reviewing the articles in the present issue, we comment upon how researchers have attempted, with varying degrees of success, to meet these challenges. We suggest that the articles in the present volume demonstrate important conceptual and methodological advances in emotion regulation research, but that the most central problems noted by Zinbarg and Mineka have yet to be fully remedied. In highlighting both the progress made and problems faced by the field of emotion regulation, we suggest new directions for future research in this area.     

Wellbeing as a Wicked Problem: Navigating the Arguments for the Role of Government

Governments in a number of countries have shown increasing interest in seeking to elevate happiness or wellbeing as an explicit policy goal. This interest has led to fierce debates both within and, increasingly, beyond academe about the appropriate role for government in this area. It is difficult to adjudicate between the various arguments surrounding the issue as they often take very different starting points, either metatheoretical or disciplinary. In seeking to steer a course through these arguments we take the distinction between ‘wicked’ and ‘tame’ problems as a reference point, arguing that wellbeing should be categorised as the former. The seminal discussion of this distinction (Rittel and Webber in Policy Sci 4:155–169, 1973) resonates sharply with current debates on wellbeing and indeed is located within similar debates in the past. We argue that understanding wellbeing as a wicked problem steers us towards deliberation and scrutiny as central to the agenda and cautions us against expecting to find a panacea. However, this understanding can take us beyond irresolvable disputes by pointing to the need for pragmatic and legitimate government action. In developing our arguments we ground them mainly in relation to empirical research on developments in the UK, where the connection between wellbeing and public policy is seen as relatively advanced. However, we suggest these arguments apply to other contexts where wellbeing is gaining increasing traction as a potential goal of government policy.     

Accounting for Dependence: Relative Consilience as a Correction Factor in Cumulative Case Arguments

I propose a measure of dependence that relates a set of items of evidence to an hypothesis H and to H's negation. I dub this measure relative consilience (RC) and propose a method for using it as a correction factor for dependence among items of evidence. Using RC, I examine collusion and testimonial independence, the value of diverse evidence, and the strengthening of otherwise weak or non-existent cases. RC provides a valuable tool for formal epistemologists interested in analyzing cumulative case arguments.     

The World as Representation: Schopenhauer's Arguments for Transcendental Idealism

In this paper, I discuss Spinoza's conception of the cosmological argument for the existence of God (hereafter CA), as it can be reconstructed taking departure from Letter 12. By a CA, I understand, quite broadly, an argument which infers a posteriori the existence of a necessary being, usually identified as God, from the experience that there exists some other being, often oneself, the existence of which is contingent upon the existence of this necessary being. The difference between various versions of the CA stems from differences in the way in which the relation of existential dependence is understood. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct a version of the CA which would be valid on Spinoza's principles. I argue that such a version must be understood in the context of Spinoza's causal rationalism. By such causal rationalism, I mean a doctrine committed to the idea that everything is rational and thus explicable and that causal explanations are somehow fundamental. Moreover, I hold that, in Spinoza's causal rationalism, there is one form of causation through which all other types of causation are ultimately understood. This ‘archetype’ of causation is self-causation.     

Pragmatic and Transcendental Arguments for Theism: a Critical Examination

Commenting upon some recent literature on the topic, this paper examinestwo strategies by means of which one might try to defend theism: (1) a pragmatic (Jamesian) strategy, which focuses on the idea that religiousbelief has beneficial consequences in the believer's life, and (2) a transcendental (Kantian) strategy, according to which theism is requiredas a condition of our self-understanding as ethically oriented creatures.Both strategies are found unsatisfactory, unless synthesized and thussupported by each other. While no argument, either pragmatic ortranscendental, can demonstrate the existence of God, a pragmatictranscendental argument might have a legitimate role to play in thephilosophy of religion. The problem of relativism arises, however. It isconcluded that it remains unclear whether a religious believer could justifyher or his beliefs to anyone who does not already share those beliefs.     

Sellars's Two Images as a Philosopher's Tool

The distinction between the manifest and the scientific image of man‐in‐the‐world is widely seen as crucial to Wilfrid Sellars's philosophical work. The present essay agrees with this view. It contends, however, that precisely because the distinction is important, we should not hurry to a quick and superficial understanding of it. The essay identifies several oversimplifications that can be found in the literature on the topic and argues that they are at least partly rooted in too rigid a view of the role that the two‐image distinction plays in Sellars's philosophy. It shows that this rigid approach is quite common in the secondary literature, either explicitly or by implication. It then presents a more cautious, flexible approach to the problem of the two images and explains why this approach is fruitful on the basis of textual evidence, along with the overall advantages of interpreting Sellars's thought as a whole.