安萨里论斋戒

斋戒是穆斯林积极履行的功修之一,但很多穆斯林对斋戒真正的内在意义却疏于理解。伊斯兰著名学者安萨里对斋戒的真知灼见,对我们重新认识斋戒有莫大的启发。赞颂真主,他给予仆人巨大的援助,为他们抵挡恶魔的诡计与欺害,使恶魔无计可施,失望而归,那是因为真主使斋戒成为他们的堡垒与盾牌。真主因斋     

真主的确喜欢行善的人

<正>奉普慈特慈的真主之名仁慈的真主在《古兰经》中教导我们说:行一个小蚂蚁重的善事者,将见其善报;作一个小蚂蚁重的恶事者,将见其恶报。(99:7)还说:如果你们行善,那么你们是为自己而行善。(17:7)慈善是一种精神理念,慈善是一种道德行为,慈善是一种社会责任。敬主爱人、共襄善举、倡导慈善、力行     

真主的仆人——伊斯兰教理想人格北大核心

伊斯兰教的理想人格是“阿布杜拉”(真主的仆人),它建立在“认主独一”的信仰基础之上,这一理想人格是以崇拜真主的超绝性和效法先知穆圣的现实性,来完美地实现理想人生与现实人生的统一,成为宗教理想人格模式的一个典范。 有这样一则“圣训”:据艾布·沃布海卜的传述:“穆圣说:你们应取先知的名字,而真主最爱者为阿布杜拉(真主的仆人)阿布顿赖罕曼(慈主之仆人)”。这段“圣训”既表明了穆圣对穆斯林新生儿取名方面的要求,也体现了穆圣对信士们殷切的希望。同样,这则“圣训”也一语道出了伊斯兰教在塑造理想人格上的主张——即做“真主的仆人”。     

礼拜真主的真正意义

礼拜真主的真正意义张迁穆斯林每天有五次礼拜的义务，其主要意义就在于礼拜不单纯是祈福祛祸、渴望赦免、企盼恩赐的仪式，也不同于我国古代的祭祀。它是最集中的体现伊斯兰教信仰哲学的具体表现。伊斯兰教认为：真主是宇宙万物的创造者，这是不以人的思维判断来决定的，...     

托马斯·阿奎那与安萨里经济思想的传承与比较

中世纪阿拉伯文化的西传是西欧经院哲学繁盛的重要因素.阿拉伯文化的西传是全方位的,其中包括经济思想.西欧经院学派对阿拉伯经济思想的吸收,一个典型的例子就是阿奎那对安萨里思想进行的借鉴.在经济思想上他们的观点和论述方法非常相似,主要表现在诚信、高利贷、货币、公平价格、限制商业利润等问题上.     

法轮功宗教属性与邪教本质

法轮功是中国当代的邪教组织,与世界上其他邪教一样都表现出强烈的反社会性。尽管如此,仍有一些痴迷深陷其中。为了有效地治理邪教法轮功,挽救痴迷,就必须从社会心理学的角度,对其宗教属性和邪教本质进行深入地研究,并据此寻找相应的对策。     

伊斯兰教关于身心健康的理念

真主说:凡枉杀一人的,如杀众人;凡救活一人的,如救活众人。我的众使者。确已昭示他们许多迹象。此后,他们中许多人,在地方上确是过分的。(5:32)又说:你们不要自杀,真主确是怜恤你们的。(4:29)又说:你们不要自投于灭亡。(2:195)穆圣说:从前有一个人,负伤后不忍疼痛而割腕自杀,真主说:‘我的仆人先我而取了自己的命,我禁止他进入天堂。     

论伊斯兰教的妇女观

论伊斯兰教的妇女观安徽省蚌埠市旅蚌清真寺穆华芬各位朵斯提，色兰！我作为穆斯林女性，参加这次全国首届＂卧尔兹＂演讲比赛感到很高兴，我愿借此机会就伊斯兰教关于妇女的社会地位问题作如下演讲，并同大家一起探讨交流。大家都知道，妇女是家庭的主要成员，是社会建设...     

穆斯林妇女的楷模——法图麦北大核心

在伊斯兰教史上,有一位伟大的女性被先知穆罕默德(愿真主赐福他)称为“天园中的妇女之王”,她就是穆圣的爱女,穆斯林妇女的楷模——法图麦。     

El,Baal, and Allah

This article compares the appropriations of the divine names El and Baal into the Yahwistic faith in ancient Israel with the Christian use of the word “Allah” in contemporary Indonesia. This study finds that, like El and Baal, “Allah” can function as both an appellative and personal name in contemporary Indonesia. However, the term “Allah” in Indonesia is at a crossroads to develop either to be more generic, like El, or to be more personal, like Baal. Learning from the peaceful appropriation of El as a generic name and the polemical appropriation of Baal as a personal name in ancient Israel, Indonesian Christians need to advocate the use of the name Allah as an appellative because it may prevent unnecessary conflicts in the Christian–Muslim relationship in Indonesia. Furthermore, the use of the common word “Allah” in Indonesia to refer to the supreme being is crucial for promoting interreligious dialogue between Islam and Christianity.     

The Essence of Essence

Despite its appeal and popularity, the view that membership in a natural kind is essential to an individual is unsupported by the logic of essences and has no compelling reflective support. While the view has strong intuitive and empirical support this is insufficient to establish it. There are advantages to abandoning the view that kind membership is essential to individuals. One of these advantages is that it allows for a reconfiguring of the problem of material constitution in a way that removes much of the paradox.     

Wittgenstein on Essence

In the Investigations, #s 371 and 373, Wittgenstein said: “Essence is expressed by grammar” and “Grammar tells what kind of object anything is …”. Those passages, which commit Wittgenstein to holding that things have essences and which offer an account of what essences consist in, have been ignored by commentators, chiefly because it is thought that in #65ff (family resemblances) Wittgenstein rejected essentialism. The aim of this paper is to straighten out the story of Wittgenstein's thought on the subject of essence and to show that he produced (somewhat following in Kant's footsteps) a major change in the conception of an essence.     

Artifact and Essence

An essential property is a property that an object possesses in every possible world in which that object exists. An individual essence is a property (or set of properties) that an object possesses in every world in which that object exists, and that no other object possesses in any possible world. Call the claim that some artifacts possess an individual essence ‘artifactual essentialism’. I will argue that artifactual essentialism is true. In doing so, I will be responding to two recent arguments by Penelope Mackie against artifactual essentialism (Mackie (2006), esp. ch. 3.). In “Individual Essence Properties”, I will rehearse the qualifications that any property must meet if it is to constitute an individual essence, and in “Artifacts and the Recycling Problem” and “Artifacts and the Tolerance Problem”, I will rehearse Mackie’s arguments against artifactual essentialism. In “Artifacts and Weak Unshareability?” and “Artifacts and Strong Unshareability?”, I will show why both of these arguments fail. In “Mona Lisa’s Essence”, I will defend the interesting claim that some artifacts possess an individual essence. In the final section I will entertain some objections to my proposal.     

Essence and Necessity

Journal of Philosophical Logic - What is the relation between metaphysical necessity and essence? This paper defends the view that the relation is one of identity: metaphysical necessity is a...