自我肯定方式降低高威胁后的消极情绪

通过两个研究考察肯定内部核心品质和肯定外部成就两种不同自我肯定方式对威胁后个体的影响。研究1发现,无论高威胁还是低威胁情境下,选择内部自我肯定的被试均显著多于选择外部自我肯定的被试。研究2发现,内部自我肯定能够在边缘显著水平上降低高威胁感知被试的自我消极情绪,并能够显著降低高威胁感知被试的一般消极情绪,而外部自我肯定不能达到相似效果。上述结果表明,无论在高威胁还是低威胁情境下,个体都更倾向于选择内部自我肯定;与外部自我肯定相比,内部自我肯定对降低个体高威胁情境下的消极情绪有积极作用。     

Selective exposure to information and cognitive dissonance

Despite numerous attempts, the selective exposure prediction of Festinger's (A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957) theory of cognitive dissonance has not been consistently demonstrated. In previous studies, this failure can be attributed to design deficiencies, and other related problems. The present study manipulated dissonance by having subjects write a counterattitudinal essay under conditions of high or low choice. Information in the form of pamphlets and discussion groups was offered to the subjects such that they could choose information that was consonant and dissonant with the decision to write the essay. The information was offered either before or after an attitude measure on the essay topic, as the attitude measure could also be a source of dissonance reduction. The results indicate that the high choice manipulation yielded greater attitude change than the low-choice manipulation. High-choice subjects desired consonant information more and dissonant information less than did low-choice subjects. This effect was found for both measures of information desire (pamphlets and discussion groups). Low-choice subjects who received the attitude questionnaire before the information measures wanted information more than if offered the information before the attitude questionnaire, implying a sensitizing effect produced by the attitude questionnaire for the low-choice subjects. The various effects are discussed as providing support for predictions from Festinger's dissonance theory.     

Exchange delays and impulsive choice in adult humans.

Choice responding by adult humans in a discrete-trial task was examined as a function of conditions that manipulated either the delay to point delivery or the delay between points and their exchange for money. In point-delay conditions, subjects chose between an "impulsive" alternative that provided a small amount of points immediately and a "self-control" alternative that provided a larger amount of points delayed by 15, 30, or 60 s. Points were exchanged for money immediately following the session. Subjects preferred the self-control alternative. In exchange-delay conditions, subjects chose between a small amount of points exchangeable for money immediately following the session and a larger amount of points exchangeable for money after 1 day, 3 weeks, or 6 weeks. A self-control preference observed for all subjects in the 1-day exchange-delay condition reversed to exclusive impulsive preference for 4 of the 6 subjects when choice conditions involved exchange delays of 3 or 6 weeks. These results show that human choice is sensitive to the manipulation of exchange delays and that impulsive preference can be obtained with exchange delays on the order of weeks.     

敬则不逐物——敬畏对炫耀性消费倾向的抑制：小我的中介作用

以往炫耀性消费研究多囿于自尊补偿视角,本文着眼于驱动炫耀性消费动机的自我增强属性,提出敬畏的自我超越属性可以降低个体对自身目标重要性的评估（即提升“小我”水平）,进而降低炫耀性消费倾向。四个研究采用三种炫耀性消费倾向测量方式,通过测量特质敬畏（研究1a）和操纵状态敬畏（研究1b）均验证了敬畏对炫耀性消费倾向的抑制作用。研究2表明敬畏不影响非炫耀性消费倾向。研究3发现“小我”在敬畏与炫耀性消费倾向之间起到了中介作用。     

Seeing approach motivation in the avoidance behavior of others: implications for an understanding of pluralistic ignorance

Four studies tested the hypothesis that observers tend to interpret others' actions as approach motivated even when they recognize that their own identical choices were motivated by avoidance. Study 1 found that voters in the 2000 U.S. Presidential election who chose a candidate primarily because of their aversion to the alternative thought that others who voted for the same candidate liked him more than they themselves did. In Studies 2, 3, and 4 participants who learned that others made the same choice as themselves between 2 unappealing flavors of soda orjelly beans estimated that the others would pay more than they would for their common choice. The relevance of these findings for an understanding of pluralistic ignorance is discussed.     

Prior expectancy and behavioral extremity as determinants of attitude attribution

In an experiment on attitude attribution, subjects were instructed to estimate the “true attitude” of a target person after reading an essay in which he took one or the other side of a controversial issue (legalization of marijuana). Four independent variables were manipulated: the direction of the essay (pro- versus anti-legalization), its extremity (strong versus weak), freedom to choose position versus assignment to position (choice versus no choice), and prior expectancy (expect pro versus expect anti). All experimental predictions were confirmed by the results. When the essay was strong: (1) attitudes were attributed more in line with behavior under choice than under no choice conditions; (2) even under no choice conditions, the target person was seen as believing to some extent in the arguments of his essay; (3) the role of choice was especially prominent when the position of the essay was unexpected. In both strong and weak essay conditions, (4) the behavior was ignored in favor of prior expectancy in no choice conditions, but a contrast effect was observed in the choice conditions. When the essay was weak: (5) subjects attributed the opposite attitude under no choice conditions; under choice conditions, the weak essay was construed as moderate endorsement. As in previous experiments, there was considerable variability in those conditions in which the target person wrote an essay under no choice instructions endorsing the position he presumably opposed. In a second experiment, attempting to determine what produced this variability, it was found that subjects with generalized expectancies of internal control (Rotter, 1966) were more sensitive to variations in choice than were subjects whose expectancies were externalized. Under no choice conditions, “internals” were more inclined to ignore the essay and go by their prior expectancies in attributing attitude; “externals” seemed more impressed by the essay itself.     

On the relation between justification of solution method and correctness of solution in statistical problem solving

The relation between the justification of a choice of solution method and the correctness of that choice in statistical problem solving was investigated. In the first of two studies 16 subjects were asked to think aloud while solving two statistical problems. The results showed that an incorrect choice of solution method was more common when subjects did not justify their choice of solution as compared to when they justified their choice with domain-specific knowledge. Study 2 employed an experimental design. A group of 20 subjects were instructed to provide a justification for each choice of solution method, while another group of 20 subjects received no such instructions. The results showed no difference between the groups with respect to number of correct choices of solution method. A qualitative analysis of the justifications in the instructed group showed that the justifications for incorrect solution methods were more often incorrect than subjects' justifications for correct solution methods. The results in Study 2 suggested that the association found between incorrect choice of solution method and lack of justification in Study 1 was not in the first place due to a strategical deficiency on the part of the subjects but due to a lack of domain-specific knowledge.     

Inhibitory control and response selection in problem solving: how cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) overcome a bias for selecting the larger quantity of food

When presented with a choice between 1 and 3 pieces of food in a type of reversed contingency task, 4 cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) consistently chose the 3 pieces of food and received nothing, even though the choice of 1 piece would have yielded 3. However, in a task in which the tamarins received the 1 piece of food when they chose it, all subjects learned to select 1 over 3. Thus, the tamarins' prior failure on the reversed contingency task did not result entirely from an inherent inability to suppress the prepotent response of reaching to the larger of 2 quantities of food. After the experience of selecting the smaller quantity and receiving it, all of the tamarins solved the version of the reversed contingency task that they failed initially. These results suggest that the tamarins' initial failure may have reflected a difficulty with selecting an alternative response option.     

Theory of Mind in Children's Naming of Drawings

Research suggests that children engage in mentalistic reasoning in their identification of drawings and other artifacts. To explore this phenomenon further, in 2 studies 4-year-olds, 7-year-olds, and adults chose names for drawings based on either the artist's intention, the drawing's resemblance to an object, or (in Study 1) a causal relation between the drawing and an object. When intention was directly pitted against resemblance or causality, participants generally chose resemblance-based or causality-based names, but when resemblance was ambiguous, participants tended to choose intention-based names. Thus, although intention was used to identify drawings when the drawings were ambiguous, participants seemed to reject a purported intention when it directly conflicted with resemblance. In addition, for older participants, the artist's knowledge of the intended referent affected the extent to which they took intention into account.     

Assessing unit-price related remifentanil choice in rhesus monkeys

Given a commodity available at different prices, a unit-price account of choice predicts preference for the cheaper alternative. This experiment determined if rhesus monkeys preferred remifentanil (an ultra-short-acting micro-opioid agonist) delivered at a lower unit price over a higher-priced remifentanil alternative (Phases 1 and 3). Choice between equal-priced alternatives also was assessed (Phase 2). A discrete-trials procedure was arranged in which three monkeys chose between two remifentanil alternatives by responding on one of two levers. Different prices were arranged by manipulating drug dose (0.3 and 0.1 microg/kg/injection) and/or the ratio requirement. Monkeys usually chose the larger-dose alternative even when it was more expensive. Only when unit prices were relatively high (e.g., large response requirements) did monkeys choose the cheaper (or equally priced) smaller-dose alternative. Employing larger doses (0.9 and 0.3 microg/kg/injection) attenuated the larger-dose preference. The results demonstrate that choice was not determined simply by unit price. An alternative model that employs demand-function analysis to generate choice predictions is proposed.     

Counterfactual seeking: The scenic overlook of the road not taken

Decision makers faced with an opportunity to learn the outcome of a foregone alternative must balance anticipated regret, should that information be unfavorable, with the potential benefits of this information in reducing experienced regret. Counterfactual seeking, the choice to learn more about foregone alternatives, may be a functional, regret-regulating strategy for individuals already experiencing regret. Counterfactual seeking increases in response to dissatisfying outcomes (Studies 1 and 2). Counterfactual seeking is generally able to reduce dissatisfaction (Study 2), regardless of whether individuals personally chose to view this information or were randomly assigned to do so (Study 3). Moreover, both imaginative (vs. factual) thoughts about the foregone option and upward (vs. downward) counterfactual thoughts play a role in this improvement in satisfaction (Study 4). Regret thus has a complex influence in how individuals engage with counterfactual information.     

A comparison of delays and ratio requirements in self-control choice.

In a discrete-trial procedure, pigeons could choose between 2-s and 6-s access to grain by making a single key peck. In Phase 1, the pigeons obtained both reinforcers by responding on fixed-ratio schedules. In Phase 2, they received both reinforcers after simple delays, arranged by fixed-time schedules, during which no responses were required. In Phase 3, the 2-s reinforcer was available through a fixed-time schedule and the 6-s reinforcer was available through a fixed-ratio schedule. In all conditions, the size of the delay or ratio leading to the 6-s reinforcer was systematically increased or decreased several times each session, permitting estimation of an "indifference point," the schedule size at which a subject chose each alternative equally often. By varying the size of the schedule for the 2-s reinforcer across conditions, several such indifference points were obtained from both fixed-time conditions and fixed-ratio conditions. The resulting "indifference curves" from fixed-time conditions and from fixed-ratio conditions were similar in shape, and they suggested that a hyperbolic equation describes the relation between ratio size and reinforcement value as well as the relation between reinforcer delay and its reinforcement value. The results from Phase 3 showed that subjects chose fixed-time schedules over fixed-ratio schedules that generated the same average times between a choice response and reinforcement.     

Of wealth and death: materialism, mortality salience, and consumption behavior

Theoretical work suggests that feelings of insecurity produce materialistic behavior, but most empirical evidence is correlational in nature. We therefore experimentally activated feelings of insecurity by having some subjects write short essays about death (mortality-salience condition). In Study 1, subjects in the mortality-salience condition, compared with subjects who wrote about a neutral topic, had higher financial expectations for themselves 15 years in the future, in terms of both their overall worth and the amount they would be spending on pleasurable items such as clothing and entertainment. Study 2 extended these findings by demonstrating that subjects exposed to death became more greedy and consumed more resources in a forest-management game. Results are discussed with regard to humanistic and terror-management theories of materialism.     

Self-control in male and female rats

Eight male and 8 female Wistar rats were exposed to a discrete-trial procedure in which they chose between the presentation of a small (one pellet) or a large (three pellets) reinforcer. The delay to the small and large reinforcer was 6.0 s in the first condition of Experiment 1. Subjects consistently chose the large reinforcer. When the delay to the small reinforcer was decreased to 0.1 s in the next experimental condition, all subjects continued to choose the large 6.0-s delayed reinforcer. When the contingencies correlated with the two levers were reversed in the next experimental condition, the majority of subjects (5 males and 6 females) still chose the large delayed reinforcer over the small immediately presented reinforcer. The delay to the small reinforcer was maintained at 6.0 s, but the delay to the large reinforcer was varied among 9.0, 15.0, 24.0, and 36.0 s in Experiment 2, in which 4 males and 4 females participated. Most subjects consistently chose the large increasingly delayed reinforcer, although choice for the small 6.0-s delayed reinforcer developed in some females when the large reinforcer was delayed for 24.0 or 36.0 s. These choice patterns were not predicted from a literal application of a model that says choice should favor the alternative correlated with the higher (amount/delay) ratio.     

The power of being heard: The benefits of ‘perspective-giving’ in the context of intergroup conflict

Although hundreds of dialogue programs geared towards conflict resolution are offered every year, there have been few scientific studies of their effectiveness. Across 2 studies we examined the effect of controlled, dyadic interactions on attitudes towards the ‘other’ in members of groups involved in ideological conflict. Study 1 involved Mexican immigrants and White Americans in Arizona, and Study 2 involved Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East. Cross-group dyads interacted via video and text in a brief, structured, face-to-face exchange: one person was assigned to write about the difficulties of life in their society (‘perspective-giving’), and the second person was assigned to accurately summarize the statement of the first person (‘perspective-taking’). Positive changes in attitudes towards the outgroup were greater for Mexican immigrants and Palestinians after perspective-giving and for White Americans and Israelis after perspective-taking. For Palestinians, perspective-giving to an Israeli effectively changed attitudes towards Israelis, while a control condition in which they wrote an essay on the same topic without interacting had no effect on attitudes, illustrating the critical role of being heard. Thus, the effects of dialogue for conflict resolution depend on an interaction between dialogue condition and participants' group membership, which may reflect power asymmetries.     

The durations of attention to alternatives and re-evaluation in choices with two and three alternatives

In two experiments on choice the durations of attention to the alternatives were measured. In experiment 1 each subject chose one from two pictures; in experiment 2 the choice was one from three pictures. In both experiments the subjects understood that they would acquire the picture that they selected. In each experiment higher and lower conflict conditions were induced by offering subjects a choice between alternatives that had been evaluated either equally or disparately. In both experiments a significant relationship appeared between duration of attention and preference order with most subjects looking longest at the alternative that was preferred. In the comparison between conditions this effect was found to be stronger under lower conflict than under higher conflict; this difference reached a significant level in experiment 2. These results are contrary to findings by Gerard (1967), and this matter is discussed. The relevance of the results to other theories is examined. Inferences were drawn from dissonance theory about re-evaluation effects after decision, and evaluation changes were measured in the experiments. After adjustment for measurement regression, the data failed to reveal a significant chronic re-evaluation effect. Contrary to dissonance theory, the re-evaluation effect was weaker in the three-alternative choice experiment than in the two-alternative choice experiment.     

Procrastination by pigeons: preference for larger, more delayed work requirements.

In three experiments, pigeons chose between alternatives that required the completion of a small ratio schedule early in the trial or a larger ratio schedule later in the trial. Completion of the ratio requirement did not lead to an immediate reinforcer, but simply allowed the events of the trial to continue. In Experiment 1, the ratio requirements interrupted periods in which food was delivered on a variable-time schedule. In Experiments 2 and 3, each ratio requirement was preceded and followed by a delay, and only one reinforcer was delivered, at the end of each trial. Two of the experiments used an adjusting-ratio procedure in which the ratio requirement was increased and decreased over trials so as to estimate an indifference point--a ratio size at which the two alternatives were chosen about equally often. These experiments found clear evidence for "procrastination"--the choice of a larger but more delayed response requirement. In some cases, subjects chose the more delayed ratio schedule even when it was larger than the more immediate alternative by a factor of four or more. The results suggest that as the delay to the start of a ratio requirement is increased, it has progressively less effect on choice behavior, in much the same way that delaying a positive reinforcer reduces it effect on choice.     

Token reinforcement, choice, and self-control in pigeons.

Pigeons were exposed to self-control procedures that involved illumination of light-emitting diodes (LEDs) as a form of token reinforcement. In a discrete-trials arrangement, subjects chose between one and three LEDs; each LED was exchangeable for 2-s access to food during distinct posttrial exchange periods. In Experiment 1, subjects generally preferred the immediate presentation of a single LED over the delayed presentation of three LEDs, but differences in the delay to the exchange period between the two options prevented a clear assessment of the relative influence of LED delay and exchange-period delay as determinants of choice. In Experiment 2, in which delays to the exchange period from either alternative were equal in most conditions, all subjects preferred the delayed three LEDs more often than in Experiment-1. In Experiment 3, subjects preferred the option that resulted in a greater amount of food more often if the choices also produced LEDs than if they did not. In Experiment 4, preference for the delayed three LEDs was obtained when delays to the exchange period were equal, but reversed in favor of an immediate single LED when the latter choice also resulted in quicker access to exchange periods. The overall pattern of results suggests that (a) delay to the exchange period is a more critical determinant of choice than is delay to token presentation; (b) tokens may function as conditioned reinforcers, although their discriminative properties may be responsible for the self-control that occurs under token reinforcer arrangements; and (c) previously reported differences in the self-control choices of humans and pigeons may have resulted at least in part from the procedural conventions of using token reinforcers with human subjects and food reinforcers with pigeon subjects.     

Tests of transitivity in choices between fixed and variable reinforcer delays.

This experiment tested for transitivity in pigeons' choices between variable-time (VT) and fixed-time (FT) schedules. In a discrete-trials procedure, a subject chose between two alternatives by making a single key peck. Each choice was between a "standard alternative," which was the same schedule throughout a condition, and an "adjusting alternative," in which the delay to reinforcement was systematically increased or decreased many times a session. These adjustments enabled an approximate indifference point to be identified--the value of the adjusting delay at which the subject chose each alternative about equally often. Each test of transitivity involved four conditions. In one, the standard alternative was a variable-time schedule with a 2-s reinforcer, and the adjusting alternative also delivered a 2-s reinforcer. A second condition was similar except that the adjusting alternative delivered a 5-s reinforcer. The indifference point from each of these conditions was then converted to a fixed-time schedule for subsequent comparisons in the third and fourth conditions, respectively. Each of these last two conditions compared one of the fixed-time schedules (based upon the previous conditions and including their different reinforcer durations) with an adjusting schedule that delivered the alternative reinforcer duration, to determine whether the obtained indifference points would be those predicted from the prior alternative-duration comparisons with the VT schedule. There was little evidence for intransitivity of choice: Averaged across subjects and replications, the obtained indifference points deviated from perfect transitivity by less than 8%, and these deviations were not statistically significant. These results contrast with those of Navarick and Fantino (1972), who found frequent violations of transitivity between periodic and aperiodic schedules using a concurrent-chains procedure with variable-interval schedules in the initial links.     

Alan Baron: A pioneer in translational science

Primates take longer to choose between alternatives with smaller differences in value. This effect—a particular instance of the distance effect in symbolic comparisons—has not been replicated in birds. Instead, birds appear to respond independently to each alternative, such that the latency to choose depends primarily on the alternative of highest value. Three experiments tested for the distance effect in pigeons under conditions not previously considered. Experiment 1 presented pigeons with forced‐ and binary free‐choice trials, where each alternative was one of three possible delays to reinforcement (4, 8, and 16 s). Pigeons were exposed to the choice stimuli for different amounts of time and with different sample response requirements prior to the choice response. Experiment 2 added a fourth (0‐s delay) alternative. Experiment 3 substituted the 16‐s delay with a second 4‐s delay. In all experiments, pigeons systematically chose the shortest delay to reinforcement. Latency to choose the 4‐s delay did not vary when choosing against the 8‐s or 16‐s delay, regardless of whether choice stimuli were exposed for the duration of nine pecks (Experiment 1), or whether a 0‐s delay alternative was sometimes present (Experiment 2). Latency to choose the preferred of two identical alternatives (4‐s vs. 4‐s) was shorter than the latency to choose between different alternatives (4‐s vs. 8‐s; Experiment 3); this is the opposite of a distance effect. These results show no evidence of a distance effect in pigeon choice, consistent with the hypothesis that pigeons respond independently to each choice alternative.