Self‐Objectification and Lower Income Pregnant Women's Breastfeeding Attitudes1

The purpose of this exploratory study was to examine self‐objectification as a correlate of pregnant women's concerns about public breastfeeding and the impact of breastfeeding on body shape and sexuality. Fifty‐two pregnant women enrolled in the Women, Infants, and Children Program responded to telephone questions regarding concerns about breastfeeding, attitudes toward breastfeeding, and self‐objectification. Women who scored higher on measures of self‐objectification reported more concern about the impact of breastfeeding on their bodies and sexuality and were less comfortable with the idea of breastfeeding in public than were women with lower self‐objectification scores. Self‐objectification was not associated with more negative attitudes toward breastfeeding or weaker intentions to breastfeed. Implications for the promotion of breastfeeding for low‐income women are discussed.     

Promoting Self‐Advocacy Among Minority Students in School Counseling

This article presents self‐advocacy competencies developed to promote the academic, career, and personal/social success of minority students. The authors discuss challenges faced by minority students in today's educational environment and review principles of self‐advocacy. Competencies for developing self‐advocacy awareness, knowledge, and skills are discussed along with school counseling strategies for promoting self‐advocacy among minority students.     

Self‐legislation,Respect and the Reconciliation of Minority Claims

It is a widely supported claim that liberal democratic institutions should treat citizens with equal respect. I neither dispute nor champion this claim, but investigate how it could be fulfilled. I do this by asking, as a sort of litmus test, how liberal democratic institutions should treat with respect citizens holding minority convictions, and thereby dissenting from a deliberative output. The first step of my argument consists in clarifying the sense in which liberal democracies have a primary concern for the respectful treatment of citizens qua self‐legislating persons. Taking the second step, I address critically the common tendency in the literature to concentrate on what I have termed the ex ante legem phase, focusing solely on the structure of institutionalized decision‐making processes. I submit, rather, that the principle of equal respect for persons demands more of liberal democratic institutions to enhance citizens' chances to give voice to their consciences and influence, on that ground, the formulation of the rules to which they should conform. Fulfilling this commitment requires democratic theorizing to go beyond the ex ante legem phase and regard forms of ex post legem contestation as an extension of citizens' right to political participation. Against this backdrop, I take the third and last step and argue that a promising way forward consists in the adoption of an ex post legem version of conscientious exemptionism, granting citizens a conditional moral right to request exemptions on the grounds of conscience from certain controversial legal and political provisions.     

Systematic Review of Self‐Report Family Assessment Measures

A systematic review of self‐report family assessment measures was conducted with reference to their psychometric properties, clinical utility and theoretical underpinnings. Eight instruments were reviewed: The McMaster Family Assessment Device (FAD); Circumplex Model Family Adaptability and Cohesion Evaluation Scales (FACES); Beavers Systems Model Self‐Report Family Inventory (SFI); Family Assessment Measure III (FAM III); Family Environment Scale (FES); Family Relations Scale (FRS); and Systemic Therapy Inventory of Change (STIC); and the Systemic Clinical Outcome Routine Evaluation (SCORE). Results indicated that five family assessment measures are suitable for clinical use (FAD, FACES‐IV, SFI, FAM III, SCORE), two are not (FES, FRS), and one is a new system currently under‐going validation (STIC).     

Reflections on Past Behavior: A Self‐Report Index of Habit Strength1

We argue that habit is a psychological construct, rather than simply past behavioral frequency. In 4 studies, a 12‐item index of habit strength (the Self‐Report Habit Index, SRHI) was developed on the basis of features of habit; that is, a history of repetition, automaticity (lack of control and awareness, efficiency), and expressing identity. High internal and test‐retest reliabilities were found. The SRHI correlated strongly with past behavioral frequency and the response frequency measure of habit (Verplanken, Aarts, van Knippenberg, & van Knippenberg, 1994). The index discriminated between behaviors varying in frequency, and also between daily vs. weekly habits. The SRHI may be useful as a dependent variable, or to determine or monitor habit strength without measuring behavioral frequency.     

Self‐Report and Psychophysiological Responses to Fear Appeals

This study was designed to assess the relationship between self‐report and psychophysiological responses to fear appeals and behavioral changes elicited by these. Ninety‐two subjects watched one of four messages that varied in level of threat (high vs. low) and efficacy (high vs. low). Concomitantly, psychophysiological measures (heart rate and skin conductance) were registered. Perceived threat and efficacy varied according to the characteristics of the message. High‐threat messages elicited significantly different levels of autonomic arousal than low‐threat messages. Following of behavioral recommendation was higher among subjects who were exposed to the high threat / high efficacy stimulus, those who reported high perceived threat, and for those who showed an autonomic response pattern related to the facilitation of attentional processes.     

Mirror Self‐Recognition and Self‐Identification

That great apes are the only primates to recognise their reflections is often taken to show that they are self‐aware—however, there has been much recent debate about whether the self‐awareness in question is psychological or bodily self‐awareness. This paper argues that whilst self‐recognition does not require psychological self‐awareness, to claim that it requires only bodily self‐awareness would leave something out. That is that self‐recognition requires ‘objective self‐awareness’—the capacity for first person thoughts like ‘that's me’, which involve self‐identification and so are vulnerable to error through misidentification. This objective self‐awareness is distinct from bodily or psychological self‐awareness, requires cognitive sophistication and provides the beginnings of a more conceptual self‐representation which might play a role in planning, mental time travel and theory of mind.     

Double Rating as a Method to Encourage Candid Responses to Self‐Report Instruments1

This paper investigates the double‐rating method (DRM) as a way to reduce test takers' social desirability response set. This involves the introduction of a pre‐assessment task, in which respondents indicate how others would probably answer the test or survey questionnaire presented. Two studies conducted in Hong Kong and Canada evaluate the effectiveness of the DRM. Results show that social desirability responses obtained using this method are significantly less frequent than those obtained under a conventional instruction. The pre‐assessment task induces test takers to realize that other people will probably respond truthfully, and report some socially undesirable information. The test takers subsequently conform to this frankness in their own self‐report. The merits and limitations of this method are discussed.     

Secondary Qualities and Self‐Location1

There is a strong pull to the idea that there is some metaphysically interesting distinction between the fully real, objective, observer‐independent qualities of things as they are in themselves, and the less‐than‐fully‐real, subjective, observer‐dependent qualities of things as they are for us. Call this (putative) distinction the primary/secondary quality distinction. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is philosophically interesting because it is (a) often quite attractive to draw such a distinction, and (b) incredibly hard to spell it out in any kind of satisfying and sensible way. I attempt such a spelling‐out after first trying to pin down in more detail what we want from the primary/secondary quality distinction, and saying a bit about why that is such a hard thing to get.     

Prejudice as Self‐Control Failure1

Research has suggested that whereas stereotypical attitudes may be automatically activated, the response to these stereotypes can be controlled. Anything that interferes with self‐control may result in more biased behavior. The ego strength model hypothesizes that after exerting self‐control, subsequent self‐control performance will suffer. Hence, depletion of ego strength may lead to increased prejudice. In 2 studies, depletion was found only to affect individuals who normally try to control their prejudicial responses. Participants who do not normally try to control their use of stereotypes were equally prejudiced, regardless of their level of ego strength. The results have implications for prejudice and stereotyping, as well as models of self‐control.     

The Role of Cognitive Ability in Self‐Efficacy and Self‐Assessed Test Performance1

Research has shown that test takers are often unable to assess their own test performance accurately. However, the role of cognitive ability in assessing one's test performance has not been explored. We examined whether high cognitive ability participants were better than low cognitive ability participants in assessing their performance on a video‐based situational judgment test (SJT) of customer‐service skills. Results indicated a strong relationship between actual and perceived SJT performance for high cognitive ability participants, but no relationship for those low in cognitive ability. The discussion focuses on implications for metacognitive theory, test perceptions, and providing feedback to applicants.     

Addiction and Self‐Deception: A Method for Self‐Control?

Neil Levy argues that while addicts who believe they are not addicts are self‐deceived, addicts who believe they are addicts are just as self‐deceived. Such persons accept a false belief that their addictive behaviour involves a loss of control. This paper examines two implications of Levy's discussion: that accurate self‐knowledge may be particularly difficult for addicts; and that an addict's self‐deceived belief that they cannot control themselves may aid their attempts at self‐control. I argue that the self‐deceived beliefs of addicts in denial and of self‐described addicts differ in kind. Unlike the self‐deception of an addict in denial, that of the self‐described addict allows them to acknowledge their behaviour. As such, it may aid an addict to develop more self‐control. A paradoxical implication is that this self‐deception may allow an addict more self‐knowledge.     

Self‐Compassion,Self‐Esteem,and Well‐Being

This article focuses on the construct of self‐compassion and how it differs from self‐esteem. First, it discusses the fact that while self‐esteem is related to psychological well‐being, the pursuit of high self‐esteem can be problematic. Next it presents another way to feel good about oneself: self‐compassion. Self‐compassion entails treating oneself with kindness, recognizing one’s shared humanity, and being mindful when considering negative aspects of oneself. Finally, this article suggests that self‐compassion may offer similar mental health benefits as self‐esteem, but with fewer downsides. Research is presented which shows that self‐compassion provides greater emotional resilience and stability than self‐esteem, but involves less self‐evaluation, ego‐defensiveness, and self‐enhancement than self‐esteem. Whereas self‐esteem entails evaluating oneself positively and often involves the need to be special and above average, self‐compassion does not entail self‐evaluation or comparisons with others. Rather, it is a kind, connected, and clear‐sighted way of relating to ourselves even in instances of failure, perceived inadequacy, and imperfection.     

Skill Level,Self‐Views and Self‐Theories as Sources of Error in Self‐Assessment

People's impressions of the quality of their performances are often surprisingly inaccurate. In this paper, I discuss three specific factors that contribute to error in self‐assessment. First, at a most basic level, individuals must possess a certain level of knowledge to simply distinguish weak from strong performances. Thus, a lack of skill can contribute to erroneous self‐assessments. Second, even those who possess skill might rely on the wrong information to evaluate their performances. I discuss how relying on preexisting self‐views can lead estimates of one's performance astray. Third, I discuss how motivational forces can play an indirect role in overconfidence. In particular, theories of intelligence that inspire people to think well of themselves also inspire behaviors that contribute to overconfident impressions of how well one has performed on a task. Finally, I discuss how we can draw on this research to improve accuracy in self‐assessments.     

A Self‐Report Measure of Productive Thinking in Solving Insight Problems

There is broad agreement among executives on the importance of innovation and creativity in organizations. The paper aimed to provide information on the effectiveness of a new cognitive style inventory, the Productive‐Reproductive Thinking Inventory (P‐R), in identifying people with creative problem‐solving potential. Participants completed the P‐R Inventory, Kirton's Adaption‐Innovation Inventory (KAI), the Assimilator‐Explorer Inventory, self‐rating of insight problem‐solving, and a battery of insight problem‐solving tasks under controlled conditions. The P‐R scale was a significant predictor of problem‐solving performance and insight self‐ratings and correlated significantly with KAI and AE scores. In addition, the results supported distinguishing two types of reproductive thinking which are differentially associated with insight performance. The distinction was supported by confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation models. Using controlled conditions may limit the generality of the findings and further research should be carried out in applied settings. The P‐R inventory is short and easily administered and may provide HR professionals with a useful screening tool for assessing creative problem‐solving potential. The measure differs from the KAI in several ways that may offer advantages for creativity researchers in that it is non‐proprietary, based on well‐established psychological constructs, and is more particularly applicable to insight problem‐solving.