The contempt expression and the relativity thesis

Ekman and Freisen (1986) reported a highly recognizable, pancultural facial expression unique to contempt. This article reports three studies in which the emotion inferred from that expression, a unilaterally raised and tightened lip, varied with the context of judgment. Different contexts of judgment were created by asking subjects to judge zero, one, or six other facial expressions posed by different actors before judging the lip curl. The lip curl was labeledcontempt in one context,disgust in another, andsadness in a third. Ekman and Friesen's result was replicated, but only when the specific anchoring context used in the original studies was reinstituted. People's judgments as to which emotion is conveyed by a particular facial expression can therefore be influenced by the method of gathering judgments.This study was funded by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I thank Dee-Ann Matsugu, Lara Weick, and Lisa Wong for their careful work on this study. I especially thank Darrin Lehman for his advice.     

The accessibility of the term “contempt” and the meaning of the unilateral lip curl

Four studies are reported investigating the conditions under which various proposed facial expressions of contempt are labelled “contempt”. Only under forced-choice conditions are any of these expressions labelled “contempt” above chance; free responses are at or below chance. Contrary to predictions from Rosenberg and Ekman's (1995) explanation of poor free-response performance, participants demonstrating the best understanding of “contempt”, and those primed by prior tasks to have the concept readily accessible did not do better than other subjects. Using the forced-choice paradigm, supposedly neutral expressions were labelled “contempt” by 70% of respondents. It is concluded that poor performance in free-response studies is not due to inaccessibility or unfamiliarity of “contempt”, that the unilateral lip curl included in the JACFEE set of expressions of basic emotions (Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988) is not decoded as contempt, and that good performance in forced-choice studies results from artifacts of the method.     

Conceptual and methodological issues in the judgment of facial expressions of emotion

In two studies, subjects judged a set of facial expressions of emotion by either providing labels of their own choice to describe the stimuli (free-choice condition), choosing a label from a list of emotion words, or choosing a story from a list of emotion stories (fixed-choice conditions). In the free-choice condition, levels of agreement between subjects on the predicted emotion categories for six basic emotions were significantly greater than chance levels, and comparable to those shown in fixed-choice studies. As predicted, there was little to no agreement on a verbal label for contempt. Agreement on contempt was greatly improved when subjects were allowed to identify the expression in terms of an antecedent event for that emotion rather than in terms of a single verbal label, a finding that could not be attributed to the methodological artifact of exclusion in a fixed-choice paradigm. These findings support two conclusions: (1) that the labels used in fixed-choice paradigms accurately reflect the verbal categories people use when free labeling facial expressions of emotion, and (2) that lexically ambiguous emotions, such as contempt, are understood in terms of their situational meanings.This research was supported in part by a Research Scientist Award from the National Institute of Mental Health (MH 06091) to Paul Ekman.     

The relationship among expressions, labels, and descriptions of contempt

This article reports 4 studies that demonstrate that the contempt expression is reliably associated with situations that elicit contempt and that the inability to label the contempt expression reflects a problem with its label or concept and not with the relationship between its expression and emotion. In Study I, the labeling of contempt in fixed-choice judgment tasks did not occur because of a process of elimination. In Studies 2 and 3, the contempt expression was associated with situations that elicit contempt, but participants did not label the situations in an open-ended response. In Study 3, participants also more reliably labeled the contempt expression with situations rather than with labels and did not generate contempt situations from labels. In Study 4, participants reported using, hearing, and reading about contempt the least among 7 emotions tested.     

Forced-choice response format in the study of facial expression

This article is a methodological note on a potential problem with a forced-choice response scale in the study of facial expressions of emotion. For example, a majority of subjects categorized Matsumoto and Ekman's (1988) reported facial expression of anger as contempt when using one forced-choice format, as disgust, with another format, and as frustration, with a third. When shown the anger expression and given a choice amonganger, frustration, and other labels, few subjects (12.5% on average) selectedanger. Ifcontempt, digust, andfrustration are considered wrong answers, then forced choice can yield consensus on the wrong answer; ifanger is the right answer, then forced choice can fail to yield consensus on the right answer.This study was funded by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.I thank Dee-Ann Matsugu, Lara Weick, and Lisa Wong for their work on this study.     

Do community and autonomy moral violations elicit different emotions?

According to one important set of theories, different domains of immorality are linked to different discrete emotions—panculturally. Violations against the community elicit contempt, whereas violations against an individual elicit anger. To test this theory, American, Indian and Japanese participants (N = 480) indicated contempt and anger reactions (with verbal rating and face selection) to both the types of immorality. To remedy method problems in previous research, community and autonomy violations were created for the same story‐frame, by varying the target to be either the community or an individual. Community and autonomy violations did not differ significantly in the emotion elicited: overall, both types of violations elicited more anger than contempt (and more negative emotion of any kind than positive emotion). By verbal rating, Americans and Indians reported more anger than contempt for both types of violation, whereas Japanese reported more contempt than anger for both types. By face selection, the three cultural groups selected anger more than contempt for both types of violation. The results speak against defining distinct domains of morality by their association with distinct emotions.     

Emotional reactions to crime across cultures

Information about the emotions experienced by observers when they witness crimes would have important theoretical and practical implications, but to date no study has broadly assessed such emotional reactions. This study addressed this gap in the literature. Observers in seven countries viewed seven videos portraying actual crimes and rated their emotional reactions to each using 14 emotion scales. Observers reported significantly high levels of negative emotions including anger, contempt, disgust, fear and sadness‐related emotions, and anger, contempt and disgust were the most salient emotions experienced by viewers across all countries. Witnesses also reported significantly high levels of positive emotions as well (compared to not feeling the emotion at all), which was unexpected. Country moderated the emotion ratings; post‐hoc analyses indicated that masculine‐oriented cultures reported less nervousness, surprise, excitement, fear and embarrassment than feminine cultures.     

The universality of a contempt expression: A replication

Two experiments replicated Ekman and Friesen's finding of an expression that signals contempt across cultures. The subjects, from West Sumatra, Indonesia, were members of a culture that differs in a number of ways from Western cultures. In one experiment the subjects judged photographs of Japanese and American faces, both males and females, which showed many different emotions. There was very high agreement about which expressions signaled contempt in preference to anger, disgust, happiness, sadness, fear, or surprise. In a second experiment the Indonesian subjects judged expressions shown by members of their own culture, and again there was very high agreement about which expression signals contempt.This study was supported by a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health (MH 41100). Paul Ekman's work is also supported by a Research Scientist Award from the National Institute of Mental Health (MH 06092). Karl G. Heider's work was supported by a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health (MH 38221). We are grateful to Maureen O'Sullivan for her many helpful comments on this report.     

Congruence of meaning between facial expressions of emotion and selected emotion terms

How similar are the meanings of facial expressions of emotion and the emotion terms frequently used to label them? In three studies, subjects made similarity judgments and emotion self-report ratings in response to six emotion categories represented in Ekman and Friesen's Pictures of Facial Affect, and their associated labels. Results were analyzed with respect to the constituent facial movements using the Facial Action Coding System, and using consensus analysis, multidimensional scaling, and inferential statistics. Shared interpretation of meaning was found between individuals and the group, with congruence between the meaning in facial expressions, labeling using basic emotion terms, and subjects' reported emotional responses. The data suggest that (1) the general labels used by Ekman and Friesen are appropriate but may not be optimal, (2) certain facial movements contribute more to the perception of emotion than do others, and (3) perception of emotion may be categorical rather than dimensional.     

The effects of incidental anger,contempt, and disgust on hostile language and implicit behaviors

Recent studies have suggested that the combination of the emotions anger‐contempt‐disgust (ANCODI) is associated with intergroup hostility. This study examined if incidental elicitation of this emotion combination causally produces hostile cognitions, language, and behaviors. Members of political groups were primed with either ANCODI, fear + sadness, or no emotion, and then engaged in creativity task in relation to their opponent or a non‐opponent outgroup. The ANCODI mix produced more hostile cognitions, language, and implicit behaviors associated with hostility, in some cases specifically toward their opponent outgroups, than individuals primed with other emotions. Multiple mediation analyses indicated that the three emotions and their interactions mediated many of the effects.     

Understanding emotional display rules at work and outside of work: The effects of country and gender

This study examined the long-held, but empirically untested assumption that emotional display rules at work are different from more general display rules. We examined whether the effect of context (work vs. non-work) on display rules depended on rater gender, rater country (i.e., Singapore, United States), and discrete emotion (anger, contempt, disgust, fear, sadness, and happiness). Results revealed that display rules at work involved less expressivity of emotion than did display rules outside of work for all six emotions. Further, display rules in Singapore involved less expressivity of anger, sadness, and fear than display rules in the US, with no country differences being observed for the emotions of happiness, contempt, and disgust. These results were qualified by significant country-by-gender interactions for anger, contempt, and disgust, a significant country-by-context interaction for fear, and a three-way interaction (i.e., country-by-gender-by-context) for sadness.     

More evidence for the universality of a contempt expression

Since its publication in 1986, Ekman and Friesen's (1986) discovery of a universal facial expression unique to contempt has received considerable attention (e.g., see Ekman & Friesen, 1988; Ekman & Heider, 1988; Ekman, O'Sullivan, & Matsumoto, 1991a, 1991b; Izard & Haynes, 1988; Russell, 1991a, 1991b; Ricci Bitti, Brighetti, Garotti, Boggi-Cavallo, 1989). Actually, much of this argument began before there was adequate sampling of contempt photographs across many cultures. In order to address this concern, this study reports judgment data on all 12 photos used in previous studies depicting the contempt expression from four non-American cultures. The data provide a strong replication of Ekman and Friesen's (1986) and Ekman and Heider's (1988) findings for a universal expression of contempt.The research reported in this article was supported in part by a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health (MH 42749-01), and by a Faculty Award for Creativity, Scholarship, and Research from San Francisco State University. I would like to thank Veronica Ton for her aid in the collection of the Vietnamese data; Valerie Hearn for her aid in the collection of the Polish and Hungarian data; Masami Kobayashi, Fazilet Kasri, Deborah Krupp, Bill Roberts, and Michelle Weissman for their aid in my research program on emotion; and William Irwin for his aid in the data analysis.     

Anxiety and disgust: Evidence for a unidirectional relationship

This paper reports the results of three studies using mood induction procedures (MIPs) designed to investigate the relationship between anxiety and disgust. Study 1 used guided imagery vignettes (i.e., asking participants to imagine themselves in a series of described situations) and music (Mayer, Allen, & Beauregard, 1995). Study 2 used video clips (Gross & Levenson, 1995). Study 3 used autobiographical recall and music (Blagden & Craske, 1996). In order to be as sure as possible that target moods were being induced, and that manipulation checks provided good evidence of mood induction, Studies 1 and 2 measured six moods (anxiety, sadness, happiness, anger, disgust, and contempt) on visual analogue scales. In addition, Study 3 included two further mood measures: a 30-adjective rating scale measuring 10 emotions, the Differential Emotion Scale (DES; Izard, 1972) and a free label questionnaire, allowing participants to record how they feel without any prior imposed structure. Results from all three studies demonstrated that induced anxiety will produce increases in reported disgust, but there was no evidence for an effect of induced disgust on reported anxiety. These findings were independent of the type of MIP (guided imagery vignette and music, video clips, and autobiographical recall and music), and the type of dependent mood measure used (visual analogue scale, differential emotion scale or a free label questionnaire). The findings have important implications for the putative role of disgust in anxious psychopathologies, and suggest that if disgust does have a causal influence in some anxious psychopathologies, this influence is not mediated simply by experienced disgust facilitating experienced anxiety.     

Contradictions in the study of contempt: What's it all about? Reply to Russell

A number of methodological problems make it difficult to draw any conclusions from Russell's studies of contempt, including a task which may maximize the influence of unfamiliarity with the task, and instructions which may encourage observers to rate many rather than few emotions. We raise questions also about ecological validity, and the appropriateness of using still photographs to study the influence of context on the jugments of emotion.     

The face of chauvinism: How prejudice expectations shape perceptions of facial affect

Are individuals who chronically expect to be treated prejudicially biased toward perceiving rejecting emotions in the faces of out-group others? In two studies, participants watched a series of computer-generated movies showing animated faces morphing from expressions of rejection (i.e., contempt and anger) to acceptance, and indicated when the initial expression of rejection changed. We also assessed stigma consciousness. Study 1 tested the connection between gender-based stigma consciousness and perceptions of contempt in male vs. female faces among female participants. Study 2 examined this connection for both men and women and for perceptions of contempt as well as anger. Results show that prejudice expectations lead individuals to interpret out-group faces as more rejecting than in-group faces, but only for female perceivers, and not for males. Further, our results suggest that prejudice expectations affect perceptions of contempt, but not anger. These results are discussed in relation to intergroup relations and emotion.     

Beat them or ban them: the characteristics and social functions of anger and contempt

This article reports 3 studies in which the authors examined (a) the distinctive characteristics of anger and contempt responses and (b) the interpersonal causes and effects of both emotions. In the 1st study, the authors examined the distinction between the 2 emotions; in the 2nd study, the authors tested whether contempt could be predicted from previous anger incidents with the same person; and in the 3rd study, the authors examined the effects of type of relationship on anger and contempt reactions. The results of the 3 studies show that anger and contempt often occur together but that there are clear distinctions between the 2 emotions: Anger is characterized more by short-term attack responses but long-term reconciliation, whereas contempt is characterized by rejection and social exclusion of the other person, both in the short-term and in the long-term. The authors also found that contempt may develop out of previously experienced anger and that a lack of intimacy with and perceived control over the behavior of the other person, as well as negative dispositional attributions about the other person, predicted the emergence of contempt.     

The automaticity of emotion recognition

Evolutionary accounts of emotion typically assume that humans evolved to quickly and efficiently recognize emotion expressions because these expressions convey fitness-enhancing messages. The present research tested this assumption in 2 studies. Specifically, the authors examined (a) how quickly perceivers could recognize expressions of anger, contempt, disgust, embarrassment, fear, happiness, pride, sadness, shame, and surprise; (b) whether accuracy is improved when perceivers deliberate about each expression's meaning (vs. respond as quickly as possible); and (c) whether accurate recognition can occur under cognitive load. Across both studies, perceivers quickly and efficiently (i.e., under cognitive load) recognized most emotion expressions, including the self-conscious emotions of pride, embarrassment, and shame. Deliberation improved accuracy in some cases, but these improvements were relatively small. Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for the cognitive processes underlying emotion recognition.     

Do proposed facial expressions of contempt, shame, embarrassment, and compassion communicate the predicted emotion?

Shame, embarrassment, compassion, and contempt have been considered candidates for the status of basic emotions on the grounds that each has a recognisable facial expression. In two studies (N=88, N=60) on recognition of these four facial expressions, observers showed moderate agreement on the predicted emotion when assessed with forced choice (58%; 42%), but low agreement when assessed with free labelling (18%; 16%). Thus, even though some observers endorsed the predicted emotion when it was presented in a list, over 80% spontaneously interpreted these faces in a way other than the predicted emotion.