A review of the animate-inanimate distinction in infancy: Implications for models of social and cognitive knowing

The ability to distinguish people from things sheds light on an important theoretical question: how is the development of social cognition related to the development of physical cognition? According to Piaget (1954), cognition is unitary and the processes used in dealing with the physical world are the same as those employed in the social world. This statement should be questioned. Although people and objects share certain fundamental properties (size, shape, etc.), only people can communicate, act independently and have feelings and intentions. Thus, people seem much more complex to deal with than things. If all cognitive development derives from the growth of a unitary system, then knowledge about animate objects should lag behind that of inanimate objects. The present paper explores this idea by examining what infants know about the attributes that distinguish people from things. It is concluded that the onset of this distinction begins early in life. Even 2-month-old infants treat people and objects differently when confounding variables of the stimuli are controlled. Rather than lagging behind, the infants' understanding of people appears precocious. The infants' recognition of the crucial distinction between the two classes suggests that a conceptual system is beginning to be formed soon after birth. This conceptual system appears different for social and non-social objects and serves as a foundation from which infants might come to understand the distinctive properties of animate and inanimate objects.     

How to (and how not to) think about top-down influences on visual perception

The question of whether cognition can influence perception has a long history in neuroscience and philosophy. Here, we outline a novel approach to this issue, arguing that it should be viewed within the framework of top-down information-processing. This approach leads to a reversal of the standard explanatory order of the cognitive penetration debate: we suggest studying top-down processing at various levels without preconceptions of perception or cognition. Once a clear picture has emerged about which processes have influences on those at lower levels, we can re-address the extent to which they should be considered perceptual or cognitive. Using top-down processing within the visual system as a model for higher-level influences, we argue that the current evidence indicates clear constraints on top-down influences at all stages of information processing; it does, however, not support the notion of a boundary between specific types of information-processing as proposed by the cognitive impenetrability hypothesis.     

Walking through doorways causes forgetting: environmental integration

Memory for objects declines when people move from one location to another (the location updating effect). However, it is unclear whether this is attributable to event model updating or to task demands. The focus here was on the degree of integration for probed-for information with the experienced environment. In prior research, the probes were verbal labels of visual objects. Experiment 1 assessed whether this was a consequence of an item-probe mismatch, as with transfer-appropriate processing. Visual probes were used to better coordinate what was seen with the nature of the memory probe. In Experiment 2, people received additional word pairs to remember, which were less well integrated with the environment, to assess whether the probed-for information needed to be well integrated. The results showed location updating effects in both cases. These data are consistent with an event cognition view that mental updating of a dynamic event disrupts memory.     

Walking through doorways causes forgetting: Event structure or updating disruption?

According to event cognition theory, people segment experience into separate event models. One consequence of this segmentation is that when people transport objects from one location to another, memory is worse than if people move across a large location. In two experiments participants navigated through a virtual environment, and recognition memory was tested in either the presence or the absence of a location shift for objects that were recently interacted with (i.e., just picked up or set down). Of particular concern here is whether this location updating effect is due to (a) differences in retention intervals as a result of the navigation process, (b) a temporary disruption in cognitive processing that may occur as a result of the updating processes, or (c) a need to manage multiple event models, as has been suggested in prior research. Experiment 1 explored whether retention interval is driving this effect by recording travel times from the acquisition of an object and the probe time. The results revealed that travel times were similar, thereby rejecting a retention interval explanation. Experiment 2 explored whether a temporary disruption in processing is producing the effect by introducing a 3-second delay prior to the presentation of a memory probe. The pattern of results was not affected by adding a delay, thereby rejecting a temporary disruption account. These results are interpreted in the context of the event horizon model, which suggests that when there are multiple event models that contain common elements there is interference at retrieval, which compromises performance.     

基于物体的注意的机制与影响因素

视觉选择性注意的研究是认知心理学领域的热点之一。注意选择的表征不仅可以基于空间, 也可以基于物体。基于物体的注意(object-based attention, OBA)的研究范式主要有双矩形提示范式和侧干扰范式, 有关基于物体的注意的机制的理论有感觉增强理论、注意优先理论和注意转换理论。影响基于物体的注意效应的因素主要有刺激本身的特征(如刺激呈现时间)、其它知觉过程和经验因素等。视觉物体的概念既包括格式塔知觉组织原则定义的物体, 也包括无意识下的物体、变化之后的物体和自上而下的物体。     

How an unfamiliar thing should be called

An empirical method is described to derive good names for unfamiliar objects. It is based on three principles: (1) The names should be within users' linguistic capacities; (2) names should be informationally efficient; (3) names should form a classification system. The principles lead to a three-step method: (1) Subjects generate names for the objects; (2) a subset of the names, which fulfills the principles, is selected; (3) how good the names are is tested by matching and recall tasks. Steps 2 and 3 are iterated to improve the nnames. The names that result are natural, short, easily matched with their physical referents, and well recalled. The method is generalizable and ought to be useful in a large variety of situations where names for unfamiliar objects are needed.This research was supported by the Office of Naval Research Contract No. N00014-78-C-0433 to the first author. This report is No. 111 of the Institute of Cognitive Science's Technical Report Series.     

Top-down design for a system to control operant choice experiments

STATIONS, a FORTRAN program to control operant choice experiments, was developed based on the principles of top-down design and structured programming. As a consequence, the program consists of modules organized in a hierarchical fashion. Separate modules deal with different types of reinforcement schedules, such as variable ratio (VR) and variable interval (VI). These modules produce specific schedules with different parameters by using sequences of values read in at ran time and then randomly sampled. This form of organization permits modifications to be made via changes confined to one module without global repercussions. The clarity of structure that results from the application of top-down design and structured programming should enable future users to more easily adapt this package to suit their specific needs.     

Reverse-engineering ‘esotericism': how to prepare a complex cultural concept for the cognitive science of religion

The article introduces a framework for preparing complex cultural concepts for the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and applies it to the field of Western esotericism. The research process (‘reverse engineering') rests on a building block approach that, after problematic categories have been deconstructed, seeks to reconstruct new scholarly objects in generic terms that can be operationalized in interdisciplinary contexts like CSR. A four-step research process is delineated, illustrated by a short discussion of previous work on ‘Gnosticism,' ‘magic,' and ‘religion,' before applying it to ‘esotericism.' It is suggested that the implicit scholarly objects of esotericism scholarship can be reconstituted in generic terms as concerned with processes of creating and disseminating ‘special knowledge.' Five definitional clusters are identified in the literature; these provide a basis for formulating research programs on the psychological and cognitive level, drawing on metarepresentational processes, event cognition, and psychological dispositions for altering experience.     

面孔空想性错视及其神经机制

面孔空想性错视, 是指在不存在面孔的物体或抽象图案上看到面孔, 例如在月球表面看到面孔。它受到自下而上信息与自上而下加工的共同影响。近年来, 研究者通过行为实验、事件相关电位技术以及脑成像技术对不同的空想性错视影响因素进行研究。结果发现, 面孔空想性错视的产生取决于刺激是否包含类似面孔结构, 内部面孔模板是否能与当前刺激匹配, 以及有无面孔相关背景。同时也受到个体差异与情绪状态影响。脑成像研究发现, 在发生空想性错视时, 来自额叶区与枕叶视觉区的信息会在FFA进行整合。未来研究可以致力于探索面孔空想性错视中个体差异的行为与神经机制, 以及不同类型的自上而下调节之间的相互影响及其神经机制。     

Evidence-Based Ethical Problem Solving (EBEPS)

ABSTRACT— Although there is usually agreement about the ethical principles that should govern human research, there may be little agreement on how those principles should be interpreted into research procedures in some instances. Empirical research on ethical issues can often elucidate ways to improve on existing research practices and resolve debates with one's institutional review board.     

错认总比错过好——面孔视错觉的发生机制及其应用

面孔视错觉现象表现为个体从其他事物中感知到并不存在的面孔。面孔视错觉要素已广泛应用于艺术、广告及商品中,起到吸引注意、促进消费的作用。同时,先前的研究通过采用各种范式,发现患者在面孔视错觉的产生上同常人的差异,以及视错觉与视幻觉之间的联系。根据视觉加工通路的不同,相关范式可分为视错觉监测范式,以及视错觉辨认范式。前者侧重于基于提取的类面孔特征所做出的快速预测,后者侧重于主观期望引导个体对物体特征的提取,两者最终均会影响到后续的认知判断。日后研究可从面孔视错觉的发生机制出发,结合自上而下和自下而上两种加工通路,为面孔视错觉产生机制提供理论依据,并拓宽该要素在临床诊断及商业广告领域上的应用。     

Keeping the Result in Sight and Mind: General Cognitive Principles and Language‐Specific Influences in the Perception and Memory of Resultative Events

We study how people attend to and memorize endings of events that differ in the degree to which objects in them are affected by an action: Resultative events show objects that undergo a visually salient change in state during the course of the event (peeling a potato), and non‐resultative events involve objects that undergo no, or only partial state change (stirring in a pan). We investigate general cognitive principles, and potential language‐specific influences, in verbal and nonverbal event encoding and memory, across two experiments with Dutch and Estonian participants. Estonian marks a viewer's perspective on an event's result obligatorily via grammatical case on direct object nouns: Objects undergoing a partial/full change in state in an event are marked with partitive/accusative case, respectively. Therefore, we hypothesized increased saliency of object states and event results in Estonian speakers, as compared to speakers of Dutch. Findings show (a) a general cognitive principle of attending carefully to endings of resultative events, implying cognitive saliency of object states in event processing; (b) a language‐specific boost on attention and memory of event results under verbal task demands in Estonian speakers. Results are discussed in relation to theories of event cognition, linguistic relativity, and thinking for speaking.     

Perceptual organization influences visual working memory

Previous studies have demonstrated that top-down factors can bias the storage of information in visual working memory. However, relatively little is known about the role that bottom-up stimulus characteristics play in visual working memory storage. In the present study, subjects performed a change detection task in which the to-be-remembered objects were organized in accordance with Gestalt grouping principles. When an attention-capturing cue was presented at the location of one object, other objects that were perceptually grouped with the cued object were more likely to be stored in working memory than were objects that were not grouped with the cued object. Thus, objects that are grouped together tend to be stored together, indicating that bottom-up perceptual organization influences the storage of information in visual working memory.     

Can new objects override attentional control settings?

Previous research suggests that attentional capture by abrupt onsets is contingent on top-down attentional control settings. Four experiments addressed whether similar contingencies hold for capture elicited by the appearance of new perceptual objects. In a modified spatial cuing task, targets defined by abrupt onset or color were paired with distractors consisting of an abrupt brightening of an existing object or the abrupt appearance of a new object. In Experiments 1 and 2, when subjects searched for an onset target, both distractor types produced evidence of capture. When subjects searched for a color target, however, distractors produced no evidence of attentional capture, regardless of whether they consisted of a new perceptual object or not. Experiments 3-5 showed that the lack of distractor effects in the color-target condition cannot be accounted for by rapid recovery from capture. It was concluded that attentional capture by new objects is subject to top-down modulation by attentional control settings.     

眼动交互中对象排列方式对作业绩效的影响

由于人眼注视的方位能够表达用户的兴趣中心等信息,使得基于眼动的用户界面备受关注,同时眼动也成为攫取当前认知加工过程的一个窗口。本研究采用２排列方式×６目标项位置的被试内设计,主要考察了眼动人机界面中交互对象的不同空间排列方式及目标项位置对选择工效的影响,以期为设计和优化基于视线追踪的人机交互界面的布局提供心理学依据。所获得的主要结论如下：（1）在基于视线追踪的人机交互中,对象水平排列方式优于垂直排列方式;（2）不同对象排列方式影响目标项位置对作业时间的效应模式,对象水平排列时,作业时间随着目标位置右移而线性递增;垂直排列时,作业时间随目标位置下移以非线性方式递增;（3）目标项位置仅影响目标定位时间,目标激活时间不受对象空间排列方式和目标项位置的影响;（4）基于视线追踪的人机交互系统其对象排列方式以水平方式为宜     

Walking through doorways causes forgetting: Further explorations

Previous research using virtual environments has revealed a location-updating effect in which there is a decline in memory when people move from one location to another. Here we assess whether this effect reflects the influence of the experienced context, in terms of the degree of immersion of a person in an environment, as suggested by some work in spatial cognition, or by a shift in context. In Experiment 1, the degree of immersion was reduced by using smaller displays. In comparison, in Experiment 2 an actual, rather than a virtual, environment was used, to maximize immersion. Location-updating effects were observed under both of these conditions. In Experiment 3, the original encoding context was reinstated by having a person return to the original room in which objects were first encoded. However, inconsistent with an encoding specificity account, memory did not improve by reinstating this context. Finally, we did a further analysis of the results of this and previous experiments to assess the differential influence of foregrounding and retrieval interference. Overall, these data are interpreted in terms of the event horizon model of event cognition and memory.     

Walking through doorways causes forgetting: active and passive interaction

ABSTRACT

The current study explored the location updating effect when people passively interacted with an environment. This was assessed experimentally by having one person actively navigate through a virtual environment while picking up and putting objects down. A second person passively viewed the movement. Both participants responded to memory probes for objects they encountered. Probes appeared when the active participant moved halfway across a room or immediately after moving into a new room. Consistent with previous research, a location updating effect was found. That is, memory was worse following a shift to a new room. This effect was found for both active and passive participants but was smaller for the passive group. Thus, the shift from one event to another causes information to be harder to remember, reinforcing the importance of event cognition in memory. However, the more involved a person is in the interactive event, the more pronounced the effects.     

Walking through doorways causes forgetting: Further explorations

Previous research using virtual environments has revealed a location-updating effect in which there is a decline in memory when people move from one location to another. Here we assess whether this effect reflects the influence of the experienced context, in terms of the degree of immersion of a person in an environment, as suggested by some work in spatial cognition, or by a shift in context. In Experiment 1, the degree of immersion was reduced by using smaller displays. In comparison, in Experiment 2 an actual, rather than a virtual, environment was used, to maximize immersion. Location-updating effects were observed under both of these conditions. In Experiment 3, the original encoding context was reinstated by having a person return to the original room in which objects were first encoded. However, inconsistent with an encoding specificity account, memory did not improve by reinstating this context. Finally, we did a further analysis of the results of this and previous experiments to assess the differential influence of foregrounding and retrieval interference. Overall, these data are interpreted in terms of the event horizon model of event cognition and memory.     

认知固执导致持续应激的认知与神经机制

认知固执(Perseverative Cognition, PC)是一种重复或长期的消极认知表征,既能够使用量表测量,也可以通过实验诱发。认知固执会导致持续应激反应,进而影响个体的身心健康。其导致持续应激反应的认知机制体现在个体难以识别安全信号,高认知固执个体会表现出低心率变异性的显著特征;在脑机制方面主要表现为前额叶的抑制控制功能失调、杏仁核与前扣带回的病理性改变以及前额叶-杏仁核的连接减弱。未来研究应深入探讨认知固执的影响因素以及干预措施,同时需要进一步分析内隐认知固执的测量方式及其对个体的影响。     

TRoPICALS: a computational embodied neuroscience model of compatibility effects

Perceiving objects activates the representation of their affordances. For example, experiments on compatibility effects showed that categorizing objects by producing certain handgrips (power or precision) is faster if the requested responses are compatible with the affordance elicited by the size of objects (e.g., small or large). The article presents a neural-network architecture that provides a general framework to account for compatibility effects. The model was designed with a methodological approach (computational embodied neuroscience) that aims to provide increasingly general accounts of brain and behavior (4 sources of constraints are used: neuroscientific data, behavioral data, embodied systems, reproduction of learning processes). The model is based on 4 principles of brain organization that we claim underlie most compatibility effects. First, visual perception and action are organized in the brain along a dorsal neural pathway encoding affordances and a ventral pathway encoding goals. Second, the prefrontal cortex within the ventral pathway gives a top-down bias to action selection by integrating information on stimuli, context, and goals. Third, reaction times depend on dynamic neural competitions for action selection that integrate bottom-up and top-down information. The congruence or incongruence between affordances and goals explains the different reaction times found in the experiments. Fourth, as words trigger internal simulations of their referents, they can cause compatibility effects as objects do. We validated the model by reproducing and explaining 3 types of compatibility effects and showed its heuristic power by producing 2 testable predictions. We also assessed the explicative power of the model by comparing it with related models and showed how it can be extended to account for other compatibility effects.