Contributive Justice and Meaningful Work

The dominant focus of thinking about economic justice is overwhelmingly distributive, that is, concerned with what people get in terms of resources and opportunities. It views work mainly negatively, as a burden or cost, or else is neutral about it, rather than seeing it as a source of meaning and fulfilment—a good in its own right. However, what we do in life has at least as much, if not more, influence on whom we become, as does what we get. Thus we have good reason also to be concerned with what Paul Gomberg has termed contributive justice, that is, justice as regards what people are expected and able to contribute in terms of work. Complex, interesting work allows workers not only to develop and exercise their capacities, and gain the satisfaction from achieving the internal goods of a practice, but to gain the external goods of recognition and esteem. As Gomberg’s analysis of the concept of contributive justice in relation to equality of opportunity shows, as long as the more satisfying kinds of work are concentrated into a subset of jobs, rather than shared out among all jobs, then many workers will be denied the chance to have meaningful work and the recognition that goes with it. In this paper I examine the contributive justice argument, suggest how it can be further strengthened, arguing, inter alia, that ignoring contributive injustice tends to support legitimations of distributive inequality.

Disaggregated pluralistic theories of global distributive justice – a critique

Pluralistic theories of global distributive justice aim at justifying a plurality of principles for various subglobal contexts of distributive justice. Helena de Bres has recently proposed the class of disaggregated pluralistic theories, according to which we should refrain from defending principles that apply to the shared background conditions of such subglobal contexts. This article argues that if one does not justify how these background conditions should be regulated by principles of a just global basic structure, then the (apparent) realization of the principles that are justified for the subglobal contexts of distributive justice can erode and undermine justice over time. For example, the realization of justice in international trade might undermine climate justice, at least if climate justice requires increasing tariffs (in order to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions) but justice in international trade calls for reducing tariffs (in order to create a level playing field). Principles of a just global basic structure would have to ensure that such justice-eroding spillover effects from one to another context of justice do not occur. Finally, the article responds critically to de Bres’ objections that an account of a just global basic structure is too idealistic, not action guiding, and superfluous.     

When does priming justice promote forgiveness? On the importance of distributive and procedural justice for self and others

Two studies show that thinking about justice can both enhance and impede forgiveness, depending on whether thoughts about distributive and procedural justice for self and others are activated. In Study 1 (n = 197), participants expressed more forgiveness towards a prior transgressor when primed to think about justice for self or procedural justice for others, and less forgiveness when primed to think about distributive justice for others. Study 2 (n = 231) used an alternate priming method and replicated these effects by inducing an interpersonal transgression and measuring forgiveness intentions, emotions and behavior. Study 2 also showed that priming justice influences forgiveness especially when the perceived severity of an interpersonal offense is high. The current research shows that activating justice cognitions can enhance or impinge on forgiveness in predictable ways. We discuss contributions to emerging justice theory, potential implications, and future directions.     

Distributive Justice and Co-Operation in a World of Humans and Non-Humans: A Contractarian Argument for Drawing Non-Humans into the Sphere of Justice

Various arguments have been provided for drawing non-humans such as animals and artificial agents into the sphere of moral consideration. In this paper, I argue for a shift from an ontological to a social-philosophical approach: instead of asking what an entity is, we should try to conceptually grasp the quasi-social dimension of relations between non-humans and humans. This allows me to reconsider the problem of justice, in particular distributive justice. Engaging with the work of Rawls, I show that an expansion of the contractarian framework to non-humans causes an important problem for liberalism, but can be justified by a contractarian argument. Responding to Bell’s and Nussbaum’s comments on Rawls, I argue that we can justify drawing non-humans into the sphere of distributive justice by relying on the notion of a co-operative scheme. I discuss what co-operation between humans and non-humans can mean and the extent to which it depends on properties. I conclude that we need to imagine principles of ecological and technological distributive justice.     

Distributive Justice for Others,Collective Angst,and Support for Exclusion of Immigrants

Harsh treatment of others can reflect an underlying motivation to view the world as fair and just and also a dispositional tendency to believe in justice. However, there is a critical need to refine and expand existing knowledge, not only to identify underlying psychological processes but also to better understand how justice may be implicated in support for exclusionary policies. Across two studies, we show that support for policies that restrict immigrants is exclusively associated with thoughts about fair outcomes for other people (distributive justice for others). In Study 1, Americans' dispositional tendency to believe in distributive justice for others was associated with greater support for a policy proposing to further restrict immigrant job seekers' capacity to gain employment in the United States. In Study 2, we experimentally primed thoughts about justice in a sample of U.S. police officers. Support for a policy that mandated stricter policing of illegal immigration was strongest among officers who first thought about fair outcomes for other people, relative to other unique justice primes. Across both studies, distributive justice for others was associated with greater collective angst—perceived threat towards the future existence of Americans. Moreover, collective angst mediated the link between distributive justice for others and support for restrictive policies. Overall, this research suggests that thoughts about distributive justice for others can especially diminish compassion towards immigrants and other underprivileged groups via support for exclusionary policies. In addition, merely thinking about distributive justice for others may be sufficient to amplify social callousness.     

L’influence longitudinale de la justice organisationnelle sur le bien-être psychologique au travail : quels types de justice sont déterminants ?

Regarding the relationship between perceived organizational justice and psychological well-being at work, few studies compare the influence of the four organizational justice facets, and even fewer do so longitudinally. The objective of this study is to evaluate the longitudinal relationships between these facets and psychological well-being at work. Social exchange theory suggests that distributive, interpersonal, and informational justices are better predictors of well-being than procedural justice. A sample of 192 Canadian workers from a diversity of occupations completed two self-reported questionnaires at a six-month interval. Results support the importance of rewards allocation (distributive justice) and information given on this allocation (informational justice) to promote workers’ well-being.     

Nationalism and Immigration

Can states' immigration policies favor groups with whom they are culturally and historically tied? I shall answer this question here positively, but in a qualified manner. My arguments in support of this answer will be of distributive justice, presupposing a globalist rather than a localist approach to justice. They will be based on a version of liberal nationalism according to which individuals can have fundamental interests in their national culture, interests which are rooted in freedom, identity, and especially in ensuring the meaningfulness of their endeavor. The prevalent means for protecting these interests is the right to national self-determination. Many believe that this right should be conceived of as a right to a state. I shall show that this conception of self-determination implies purely nationalist immigration policies. I shall present reasons for rejecting such policies, reasons which together with other reasons form a strong case against the statist interpretation of the right to self-determination. They form a strong case in favor of understanding self-determination as a bundle of privileges to which nations are entitled within the states dominating their homelands. Some of these privileges have to do with immigration policies. I shall argue for three principles which should regulate these immigration privileges and discuss the relation between them and Israel's Law of Return.     

Procedural and Distributive Justice Beliefs for Self and Others: Multilevel Associations with Life Satisfaction and Self-Rated Health

Personal happiness and well-being are associated with a dispositional tendency to believe in the existence of justice. In addition, research suggests that links between justice beliefs and well-being are best revealed when utilizing distinctions between a belief in justice for one’s self versus others, and also a belief in procedural versus distributive justice. Using multilevel modeling, we examined whether individual-level links to personal well-being are moderated by higher-order (county-level) justice climates. Michigan (United States) residents (N = 497) were recruited through a statewide survey to complete measures of procedural and distributive justice beliefs for self and others, life satisfaction, and self-rated health. Individual-level beliefs in justice for both self and for others were more strongly associated with life satisfaction and health in climates where beliefs about justice for others were robust. In addition, an individual-level belief in distributive justice was more strongly linked to self-rated health in high distributive justice climates, and in low procedural justice climates. Taken together, these cross-level interactions suggest that higher-order justice climates may alter relationships between individual-level justice beliefs and personal well-being. We discuss implications for justice theory and directions for continued research on well-being and happiness.     

Nationality, Distributive Justice and the Use of Force

To whom do we owe obligations of distributive justice? In the last decade a number of distinguished political theorists — such as David Miller and Yael Tamir — have defended a nationalist account of our distributive obligations. This paper examines their account of distributive justice. In particular, it analyses their contention (a) that individuals owe special obligations to fellow-nationals, (b) that these obligations are obligations of distributive justice and (c) that these obligations are enforceable. Miller and Tamir's justifications, I argue, do not support these claims. Moreover, I argue, (a) and (c) should only be accepted in a greatly qualified form and (b) should be rejected altogether. The paper thus concludes that the nationalists' preferred account of distributive justice is untenable.     

The moderating effect of perceived organizational support on the relationships between organizational justice and objective measures of cardiovascular health

This paper builds on a recent meta-analytic review on the relationships between organizational justice and health. Specifically, we examine the moderating role of perceived organizational support (POS) on the relationships between organizational justice and three objective cardiovascular health measures, namely, heart rate, systolic blood pressure, and diastolic blood pressure, among a population of 290 public construction workers. The interaction between justice and POS was statistically significant using procedural justice, demonstrating that procedural justice is associated with improvements in the three health outcomes only when POS is relatively high. In other words, higher levels of both procedural justice and POS were needed for reduced heart rate and reduced systolic and diastolic blood pressure. However, the interaction between distributive justice and POS did not significantly relate to the health outcomes. This study makes a contribution to the field by focusing the effects of psychosocial workplace variables on measures of cardiovascular health, and demonstrating an important boundary condition of the relationships between procedural justice and cardiovascular risk factors.     

Public Opinion and Political Philosophy: The Relation between Social-Scientific and Philosophical Analyses of Distributive Justice

This paper considers the relation between philosophical discussions of, and social-scientific research into popular beliefs about, distributive justice. The first part sets out the differences and tensions between the two perspectives, identifying considerations which tend to lead adherents of each discipline to regard the other as irrelevant to its concerns. The second discusses four reasons why social scientists might benefit from philosophy: problems in identifying inconsistency, the fact that non-justice considerations might underlie distributive judgments, the way in which different principles of justice can yield the same concrete distributive judgments, and the ambiguity of key terms. The third part distinguishes and evaluates three versions of the claim that normative theorising about justice can profit from empirical research into public opinion: that its findings are food for thought, that they amount to feasibility constraints, and that they are constitutive of normatively justified principles of justice. The view that popular opinion about justice has a strongly constitutive role to play in justifying principles of distributive justice stricto sensu is rejected, but it is argued that what the people think (and what they can reasonably be expected to come to think) on distributive matters can be an important factor for the political theorist to take into account, for reasons of legitimacy, or feasibility, or both.     

A Theory of Providence for Distributive Justice

Distributive justice assumes a morally critical judgment of nature, which typically contradicts providential conceptions. Hence, simple conceptions of divine Providence cannot support distributive justice. This essay analyzes and develops a complex strand of theorizing about Providence within Jewish philosophy that is compatible with distributive justice. According to this conception, the actions of divine Providence express different and mutually exclusive considerations of justice. Therefore, the moral value of outcomes is intransitive between the situations of different people. And while each providential action is justified from an ethical perspective, the total outcome is distinct from God's ultimate desire. Human ethics responds to this disparity by redistribution. This conception of Providence also contributes to the additional issue of intergenerational justice through the concomitant idea of life missions. The classical rendering of missions creates problems, however, for distributive justice. I conclude by formulating a conception of life missions that is compatible with both distributive and intergenerational justice.     

Moral Uncertainty and Distributive Sufficiency

According to the sufficiency principle, distributive justice requires that everyone have some sufficient level of resources or well-being, but inequalities above this threshold have no moral significance. This paper defends a version of the sufficiency principle as the appropriate response to moral uncertainty about distributive justice. Assuming that the appropriate response to moral uncertainty is to maximize expected choiceworthiness, and given a reasonable distribution of credence in some familiar views about distributive justice (including libertarianism, sufficientarianism, and egalitarianism), a version of the sufficiency principle strikes the optimal balance between the competing moral risks posed by implementing these views. In particular, it avoids the moral risk posed by views like Nozick’s libertarianism, which forbid redistributive taxation even for the sake of helping to provide for people’s basic needs: failing to do the latter, if it turns out that justice does require it, would be very morally wrong. This “uncertainty argument” has the advantage of minimizing reliance on controversial intuitions about distributive justice, helps to specifying a non-arbitrary threshold for sufficiency, and shows that the substantive moral implications of moral uncertainty are not limited to high-stakes applied ethics issues such as abortion and vegetarianism but instead extend to an issue at the heart of political philosophy.

     

Fons Iustitiae: Justice in the City of God

This article seeks to account for the nature of human justice in the City of God. I argue that finite justice, for Augustine, is participatory; it always ‘refers’ itself to the font of justice from which it overflows; it is always received by participation in Christ’s justice. This claim implicates both of Augustine’s central adversaries in the City of God, namely, imperial paganism and Pelagianism. Attention to how Augustine weaves the two major polemical antagonists of the City of God, imperial paganism and Pelagianism, into the same cloth reveals a unified claim about justice in the City of God. Both of Augustine’s antagonists are guilty of claiming a self‐referential and self‐manufactured conception of justice. Pagans and Pelagians do not confess justice as a gift received; they instead treat it as something constructed on the tottering foundation of collective or personal virtue. Justice in both cases fails and finds its end in self‐glorification and pride. Finally, I propose that Augustine’s participatory account of justice has implications for a vexed twentieth‐century debate about the City of God, namely the question of what allegiance, responsibilities and loves citizens of the heavenly city ought to have towards the earthly city in which they live as pilgrims.     

Do procedures really matter when rewards are more important? A Pakistani perspective on the effects of distributive and procedural justice on employee behaviors

Introduction

Researchers agree that procedural justice and distributive justice interact so that high procedural fairness reduces the negative consequences of distributive unfairness.

Hobbes's Account of Distributive Justice as Equity

This paper examines the rationale for and grounds and implications of Hobbes's redefinition of distributive justice as equity. I argue that this unprecedented reformulation served to ensure the justness of distributive laws. Hobbes acknowledges that the sovereign can distribute rights and goods iniquitously by failing to treat citizens as equals. However, he insists that improper allocations are not unjust, properly speaking – they do not `wrong' citizens. To support this claim, Hobbes puts forth the un-Aristotelian maxim that merit in distributive justice is due by grace alone. You deserve what the sovereign gives you: there is no desert prior to and independent of his allocation of rights. For Hobbes, distributive justice does not track but create merit. It follows that distributive laws cannot fail to give what is due (which would be unjust). This paper proceeds to analyze the nature of the limits equity sets to the apportionment of goods. I argue that these limits are moral and purely procedural: citizens cannot invoke equity to claim a fair share of the goods distributed. Thanks to Hobbes's redefinition of distributive justice, the justness of the sovereign's conduct, and hence his legal immunity, remains intact.     

The Significance of the Concept of Disease for Justice in Health Care

In this paper, I want to scrutinise the value of utilising the concept of disease for a theory of distributive justice in health care. Although many people believe that the presence of a disease-related condition is a prerequisite of a justified claim on health care resources, the impact of the philosophical debate on the concept of disease is still relatively minor. This is surprising, because how we conceive of disease determines the amount of justified claims on health care resources. Therefore, the severity of scarcity depends on our interpretation of the concept of disease. I want to defend a specific combination of a theory of disease with a theory of distributive justice. A naturalist account of disease, together with sufficientarianism, is able to perform a gate-keeping function regarding entitlements to medical treatment. Although this combination cannot solve all problems of justice in health care, it may inform rationing decisions as well.     

Distributive Justice Beliefs are Guided by Whether People Think the Ultimate Goal of Society is Well-Being or Power

Abstract

Disagreements about how resources should be distributed are often heated, perhaps because people suspect that distributive justice beliefs that clash with their own derive from nefarious motives. In this paper, we consider a less pessimistic explanation for diversity in distributive justice beliefs: such beliefs are influenced by what one considers the primary utility or value of their society in the first place. In five studies (N?=?21,515), we demonstrate the existence of two separable types of distributive justice beliefs, one (Equality/need) influenced by a focus on societal well-being, and the other (Equity/merit) by a focus on societal power. These findings lend insight into how growing tensions rooted in resource allocation might be defuzed.     

Liberal internationalism and global social justice

Theories of global justice have moved from issues relating to crimes against humanity and war crimes or, furthermore, ‘negative duties’ with respect to non-citizens, towards problems of distributive justice and global inequality. Thomas Nagel's Storrs Lectures from 2005, exemplifying Rawlsian internationalism, argue that liberal requirements concerning duties of distributive justice apply exclusively within a single nation-state, and do not extend to duties of this nature between rich and poor countries. Nagel even argues that the demand for global equality is not a demand of justice at all. In the present article I will try to offer a normative basis for the criticism of such a view. Following Kant and more recently Philip Pettit, I locate this normative basis on political freedom conceived as non-domination. Such a conception opens up the possibility of a political cosmopolitanism, which is based not on an empirical interdependence among people at a global level, but on a normative interdependence. Subsequent cosmopolitan duties extend both to the elimination of domination everywhere in the world and to the equal enjoyment of non-dominated choice. Thus, it will be argued that modern republicanism is falsely identified with a particular, bounded community, but supports a political, not simply a moral, cosmopolitanism. This kind of cosmopolitanism conceives of sovereign states neither as useless constructions, nor as mere instruments for realizing the pre-institutional value of justice among human beings. Instead, their existence is what gives the value of justice its application. Cosmopolitanism is not after all about the abolishment of all boundaries, but about the essential capacity to draw and redraw them infinitely under conditions of global justice.     

Realizing Honneth: redistribution,recognition, and global justice

The purpose of this article is to explore the potential contribution of Axel Honneth's critical theory of recognition to empirical and normative debates on global justice. I first present, very briefly, an overview of recent theories of global distributive justice. I argue that theorists of distributive justice do not pay enough attention to sources of self-respect and conditions for identity formation, and that they are blind toward the danger of harming people's sense of self even by well-intentioned redistributive policies. Honneth's theory suffers from complementary shortcomings; it is anti-technocratic but largely oblivious to the global nature of many contemporary justice claims. Given this situation, I seek to broaden the theory's scope by outlining transnational extensions of the recognition principles of love, rights and solidarity identified by Honneth. In conclusion, I show how utilizing a broadened conceptualization of the struggle for recognition allows us to better understand the changing logic of justice-oriented foreign policies.