Age differences in source forgetting: effects on reality monitoring and on eyewitness testimony

Age differences in memory for the source of memories were investigated using two different experimental paradigms. Experiment 1 used a reality monitoring paradigm. A series of actions were either performed, imagined, or watched, and subjects were later tested for their ability to recognize the actions and identify their origins. Elderly subjects made more false positive responses than did young subjects, and they made more source confusion errors, attributing actions to the wrong sources. Both new and imagined actions were most often misclassified as watched. Experiment 2 used an eyewitness testimony paradigm. After watching a film, subjects read a written version of the story. A recognition test showed that elderly subjects were more often misled by false information in the story than were the younger subjects, and were more confident that their erroneous responses were correct. The findings suggest that a decline in memory for sources may diminish the accuracy of elderly witnesses.     

Developmental changes in memory source monitoring.

Previous research suggests that children are more likely than adults to confuse memories of actions they imagined themselves performing with memories of actions they actually performed (Realization Judgments), but are not more likely to confuse memories of actions they had imagined performing with memories of actions they saw another person perform (Reality Monitoring). We approach these findings in terms of a theory about the processes by which people identify the sources of their recollections (Source Monitoring). This approach suggests that children may be more likely than adults to confuse memories from different sources whenever the sources are highly similar to one another. Experiments 1 and 2 tested this hypothesis by manipulating the perceptual and semantic similarity of two sources of information and testing 4- and 6-year-old and adult subjects' recollection of the sources of particular pieces of information. Experiment 3 tested the hypothesis that children are more likely than adults to mistakenly identify memories of things they imagined another person doing as memories of things they witnessed that person doing. The findings indicate that (a) people are more likely to confuse memories from similar than dissimilar sources, (b) source monitoring improves during the preschool and childhood years, and (c) children may be especially vulnerable to the effects of source similarity.     

Evaluation and elimination of an avoidance response in a child who stutters: A case study

In this case study, efforts to treat stuttering in a 6-year-old male with cerebral palsy were complicated by frequent replies of “I don't know” that allowed the child to avoid more extensive answers to conversational questions. Following a program of extinction plus differential reinforcement of alternative behavior (DRA), the response “I don't know” was decreased while both speech rate and stuttering increased. Simplified habit reversal (SHR) techniques (controlled breathing) were then applied and resulted in a reduction of stuttering and maintenance of low rates of avoidance. A reversal to baseline resulted in initially high levels of avoidance and low levels of stuttering, with these trends reversing as baseline continued. The SHR treatment for stuttering was then reimplemented and stuttering rates again decreased while avoidance rates remained low, Implications are discussed.     

The role of recollection and partial information in source monitoring

Two experiments were conducted to assess the degree to which source monitoring required recollective details or could be based on vaguer partial information. Source judgments were followed by remember-know judgments during testing. On the authors' assumption that remember judgments are highly correlated with the presence of recollective details, the results showed that accurate source monitoring did not necessarily require such recollective details. Rather, the high proportion of correct source judgments that were associated with know responses suggests that source-monitoring processes can successfully use the partial information that is recorded in vaguer memories. Consequently, source monitoring can be based on recollection but can also effectively use qualitative characteristics that lack clarity and sufficient amounts of details to give rise to the subjective feeling of remembering.     

Long-term memory for performed and observed actions: Retrieval awareness and source monitoring

The self-performed task (SPT) paradigm was employed to investigate incidental memory for action events, focusing on states of awareness at retrieval (Remembering–Knowing) and source monitoring in performed and observed actions, at delays of 1 and 2 weeks. Recognition was better for performed than observed actions, but this effect was visible only after 1 week of retention. Conversely, observed actions were associated with better source memory at both delays. When the source was correctly identified, performed and observed actions were accompanied by equal proportions of Remember judgements. However, when source monitoring was incorrect, performed actions were more frequently associated with a feeling of re-experiencing the original event, thus suggesting an enactment-related recollective superiority, although secondary to the availability of reliable contextual information.     

Long-term memory for performed and observed actions: retrieval awareness and source monitoring

The self-performed task (SPT) paradigm was employed to investigate incidental memory for action events, focusing on states of awareness at retrieval (Remembering-Knowing) and source monitoring in performed and observed actions, at delays of 1 and 2 weeks. Recognition was better for performed than observed actions, but this effect was visible only after 1 week of retention. Conversely, observed actions were associated with better source memory at both delays. When the source was correctly identified, performed and observed actions were accompanied by equal proportions of Remember judgements. However, when source monitoring was incorrect, performed actions were more frequently associated with a feeling of re-experiencing the original event, thus suggesting an enactment-related recollective superiority, although secondary to the availability of reliable contextual information.     

Developmental changes in preschoolers' ability to distinguish memories of performed,pretended, and imagined actions

The goals of the research presented in this article were to: a) examine changes in pre-schoolers' ability to distinguish among memories of performed, pretended, and imagined episodes, and b) use source monitoring as a tool for inferring the nature of preschoolers' conceptualizations of pretense. The participants, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds, performed, pretended, and imagined performing actions. After a short delay, they identified the origin of their memories in a 3-alternative, forced-choice procedure. Results showed significant improvements between ages 3 and 4 in the ability to distinguish: a) performed actions from imagined actions, and b) performed actions from pretended actions. However, 4- and 5- year-olds confused memories of pretended and imagined actions. These results were replicated in a second experiment with 3- and 4-year-olds, using a simpler 2-alternative, forced-choice format. The findings suggest that, by age 4, children represent both pretense and imagination in memory according to cognitive operation features associated with generating a fictional mental state. Thus, 4-year-olds may recognize that constructing a mental, alternative reality is an important part of pretense.     

Source misattributions may increase the accuracy of source judgments

Misattribution of remembered information from one source to another is commonly associated with false memories, but we demonstrate that it also may underlie memories that accord with past events. Participants imagined drawings of objects in four different locations. For each, a drawing of a similarly shaped object was seen in the same location, a different location, or not seen. When tested on memory for objects' origin (seen/imagined) and location, more false "seen" responses, but also more correct location responses, were given to imagined objects if a similar object had been seen, versus not seen, in the same location. We argue that misattribution of feature information (e.g., shape, location) from seen objects to similar imagined ones increased false memories of seeing objects but also increased correct location memories, provided the misattributed location matched the imagined objects' location. Thus, consistent with the source-monitoring framework, imperfect source-attribution processes underlie false and true memories.     

Memory characteristics of recently imagined events and real events experienced previously

In two experiments, we evaluated the memory characteristics of real and imagined events as they changed over time. Memories of real events were richer than memories of imagined events, and memories of recent events were richer than of events from a week earlier. These differences interacted such that memories of real events performed in week 1 were very similar to memories of events that were imagined in week 2. Source monitoring was tested and implications for the repressed or recovered memory debate are considered.     

Defending and reducing belief in memories: An experimental laboratory analogue

When receiving disconfirmatory social feedback about recollected events, people sometimes defend and sometimes reduce their belief that the event genuinely occurred. To improve estimates of the rates of memory defense and reduction, and of the magnitude of the change in belief in occurrence that results, in the present studies we examined the effect of disconfirmatory social challenges made to correctly recalled memories for actions performed in the lab. Adult participants performed, imagined, or heard action statements and imagined some of the initial actions multiple times. One week later, they completed a source-monitoring test and rated the actions on belief in their occurrence, recollection, visual detail, vividness, and reexperiencing. Four of the correctly recalled performed actions were challenged either prior to making the ratings during the test (Study 1, N = 44) or after making initial ratings after completing the test, following which the ratings were taken again (Study 2, N = 85). Across both studies, challenges were associated with lower belief-in-occurrence and recollection ratings on average than for control items, and belief in occurrence was affected to a greater extent than recollective features. Challenges that occurred during the test produced more instances of defense, whereas challenges that occurred after the test produced more instances of reduction. A closer analysis showed that some participants always defended, some always reduced, and some both defended and reduced belief. Responses to the first challenge positively predicted the responses to subsequent challenges. In addition, the procedure in Study 2 produced a variety of types of nonbelieved memories.     

The development of metamemory monitoring during retrieval: the case of memory strength and memory absence

This research examined the development of the ability to monitor memory strength and memory absence at retrieval. In two experiments, 7-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults enacted and imagined enacting a series of bizarre and common actions. Two weeks later, they completed a memory test in which they were asked to determine whether each action had been enacted, had been imagined, or was novel and to provide a confidence judgment for each response. Results showed that participants across age groups successfully monitored differences in strength between memories for enacted actions and memories for imagined actions. However, compared with 10-year-olds and adults, 7-year-olds exhibited deficits in monitoring of differences in memory strength among imagined actions as well as deficits in monitoring memory absence. Results underscore metamemory developments that have important implications for memory accuracy.     

A contribution to the study of phenomenal causation

In his studies of the perception of causality, Michotte describes a number of “impressions” concomitant with precisely defined experimental conditions, of which “Launching” and “Triggering” are two of the most important. Two major factors influencing the nature of the impressions are the relative speeds of the two rectangles representing objects participating in dynamic inter-relationships, and the length of path of the more passive of the two objects. This investigation was an attempt to discover the quantitative relationships obtaining between these two independent variables and the dependent variable of the subjects' responses to the experimental conditions.     

The schema provokes a disparity of false recollection between actions and objects in an everyday scene

We explored the effect of the schema on recognition memories and subjective experiences for actions and objects in an everyday scene. At first, participants watched slides of a man cooking in a kitchen. The man performed schema‐consistent actions, and schema‐consistent objects were left. After watching the slides, participants completed a recognition test, a remember/know test, and a Perception/Thought/Emotion/Context questionnaire. We confirmed three main results. First, participants made more false recognitions for schema‐consistent distracters than for schema‐inconsistent distracters with more “remember” judgments accompanied by perceptual, thought, and contextual details, and with more “know” judgments. Second, participants made more false recognitions for schema‐consistent object distracters than for schema‐consistent action distracters. Third, participants more frequently recognized schema‐consistent action targets than schema‐consistent object targets with more “remember” judgments. Both action memory and object memory were reconstructed under the schema, provoking false recognitions for schema‐consistent distracters. However, the memories of schema‐consistent action targets were so recollective that they could prevent false recognitions for schema‐consistent action distracters.     

External source monitoring in a real‐life event: developmental changes in ability to identify source persons

The present study investigated young children's and adults' external source‐monitoring abilities with respect to facial identification accuracy for complex live events. Five‐ to 6‐ year‐olds and adults watched a magic show in which three different female magicians (i.e. source persons) performed three different kinds of magic tricks each. After approximately 1 month, the participants were asked to recognize what kinds of magic tricks had been performed, to make face identifications as to which magician had performed those magic tricks and to recognize those magicians' attributes. Results showed that both young children and adults had more difficulty with identifying source persons than recognizing them in a real‐life event in which a number of persons appeared. Especially for young children, low credibility was shown not only for the source memories but also for the recognition memories of the source person attributes. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of two types of outcome on storage and retrieval processes in memory

Two experiments are reported which demonstrate the typical finding of better performance on responses given positive outcomes as compared to performance on resiponses given negative and neutral outcomes. These effects of reinforcement are studied in more detail in the context of storage and retrieval processes. “Right” or “wrong” and monetary gain or loss were used as outcomes in the experiments. Both these types of outcome were found to have similar effects on storage, while the former tended to affect retrieval more than the latter outcomes did. The results clearly reject the notion that an outcome is stored along with the response to facilitate retrieval. A prerequisite for such a facilitation is a presentation of cues for retrieval at the time of test.     

Age-related deficits in reality monitoring of action memories

The authors describe 3 theoretical accounts of age-related increases in falsely remembering that imagined actions were performed (A. K. Thomas & J. B. Bulevich, 2006). To investigate these accounts and further explore age-related changes in reality monitoring of action memories, the authors used a new paradigm in which actions were (a) imagined only, (b) actually performed, or (c) both imagined and performed. Older adults were more likely than younger adults to misremember the source of imagined-only actions, with older adults more often specifying that the action was imagined and also that it was performed. For both age groups, illusions that the actions were only performed decreased as repetitions of the imagined-only events increased. These patterns suggest that both older and younger adults use qualitative characteristics when making reality-monitoring judgments and that repeated imagination produces richer records of both sensory details and cognitive operations. However, sensory information derived from imagination appears to be more similar to that derived from performance for older adults than for younger adults.     

Qualities of memories for performed and imagined actions

When people imagine performing simple actions they can sometimes become confused about whether they actually performed the actions or only imagined doing so. In the present study participants performed, imagined, and heard groups of actions. During a second session participants imagined some of the earlier actions as well as some entirely new actions. On a later memory test participants sometimes falsely indicated that they had performed actions that they had only imagined and this tendency was a positive function of number of imaginings. We also found that true and false memories differed in terms of degree of perceptual detail, associated thoughts, emotions, contextual information, and kinesthetic detail. Differences between true and false memories were smaller when the action was imagined five times but were not entirely eliminated. These findings suggest that false memories produced in this paradigm can be both compelling and yet subtly different from true memories. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Collaboration in Recall: Do Pairs of People Cross-cue Each Other to Produce New Memories?

When people collaborate over their recall of a shared experience, it might be expected that they could “cross-cue” each other so as to produce new memories not available to either member of the pair on their own. In a previous series of experiments (Meudell et al., 1992), we found that pairs of people always recalled more than one person, but we failed to show that social interaction facilitated performance so as to produce such “emergent” new memories. However, a phenomenon akin to cross-cuing was employed by Tulving and Pearlstone (1966) in their classic study of the availability and accessibility of memories; accordingly, in this study, we repeated Tulving and Pearlstone's work directly in a social context. So as to assess whether new memories emerged in collaborating pairs, a sequential design was employed. People learned categorized lists of words, and then all the subjects recalled the items strictly on their own. Subjects then recalled again in pairs (collaboratively) or once more on their own. The results showed that even when the opportunity for cross-cuing was directly manipulated through the provision of categorized lists, no additional new memories emerged in the collaborating groups. Possible mechanisms for the results are considered.