God is not a person (an argument via pantheism)

This paper transforms a development of an argument against pantheism into an objection to the usual account of God within contemporary analytic philosophy (’Swinburnian theism’). A standard criticism of pantheism has it that pantheists cannot offer a satisfactory account of God as personal. My paper will develop this criticism along two lines: first, that personhood requires contentful mental states, which in turn necessitate the membership of a linguistic community, and second that personhood requires limitation within a wider context constitutive of the ’setting’ of the agent’s life. Pantheism can, I argue, satisfy neither criterion of personhood. At this point the tables are turned on the Swinburnian theist. If the pantheist cannot defend herself against the personhood-based attacks, neither can the Swinburnian, and for instructively parallel reasons: for neither doctrine is God in the material world; in the pantheist case God is identical with the world, in the Swinburnian case God transcends it. Either way both the pantheist and the Swinburnian are left with a dilemma: abandon divine personhood or modify the doctrine of God so as to block the move to personhood.

     

Old processes,new perspectives: Familiarity is correlated with (not independent of) recollection and is more (not equally) variable for targets than for lures

According to dual-process models of memory, recognition is subserved by two processes: recollection and familiarity. Many variants of these models assume that recollection and familiarity make stochastically independent contributions to performance in recognition tasks and that the variance of the familiarity signal is equal for targets and for lures. Here, we challenge these ‘common-currency’ assumptions. Using a model-comparison approach, featuring the Continuous Dual Process (CDP; Wixted & Mickes, 2010) model as the protagonist, we show that when these assumptions are relaxed, the model’s fits to individual participants’ data improve. Furthermore, our analyses reveal that across items, recollection and familiarity show a positive correlation. Interestingly, this across-items correlation was dissociated from an across-participants correlation between the sensitivities of these processes. We also find that the familiarity signal is significantly more variable for targets than for lures. One striking theoretical implication of these findings is that familiarity—rather than recollection, as most models assume—may be the main contributor responsible for one of the most influential findings of recognition memory, that of subunit zROC slopes. Additionally, we show that erroneously adopting the common-currency assumptions, introduces severe biases to estimates of recollection and familiarity.     

The glass ceiling is not fragile: A response to Odum (2000)

Odum (2000) criticized our recent conclusions about the participation of women in the experimental analysis of behavior (McSweeney & Swindell, 1998). We address her criticisms here. We argue against the need for statistical tests. We show that our conclusions still apply to all journals except the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior even when we include the senior editorial staff along with members of the editorial board. We argue that the data that Odum provides to show gender equity are limited, inconsistent with past findings, and hard to interpret in the absence of other data. Finally, we argue that Odum failed to address our most convincing argument for gender inequity and misinterpreted our suggestions for improvements.     

Why g is not an adaptation: a comment on Kanazawa (2004)

In S. Kanazawa's evolutionary theory of general intelligence (g), g is presented as a species-typical information-processing mechanism. This conceptualization of g departs radically from the accepted conceptualization of g as a source of individual differences that is manifest in the positive manifold. Kanazawa's theory is thus problematic in the sense that it concerns a purely hypothetical, and empirically unsupported, conceptualization of g. The authors argue that an evolutionary account of g should address it as a source of individual differences--that is, in a manner that is consistent with the empirical support for g.     

A bird is a bird is a bird: Making reference within and without superordinate categories

Adults with localized cerebral insult often err in their use of a word to refer to an object or an idea. It is important to assess, then, the patients' appreciation of what a word can refer to, and the way in which they may violate the borders around a referential field. Nonfluent aphasics, fluent aphasics, and nonaphasic patients with insult to the right hemisphere were asked to provide names of items which could be referred to by familiar superordinate terms like “bird.” The principal results revealed that the nonfluent aphasics are anchored to the central portions of a superordinate's referential field (naming items like “robin” and “sparrow,” for instance). While fluent aphasics often violate the borders around a referential field (e.g., providing “beaver” in response to “birds”), it was nevertheless possible to characterize some limits to their choice of a superordinate's referents. These findings were independent both of the absolute number of responses provided and the frequency of occurrence of the response. Further, the patients with insult to the left hemisphere produce few consecutive items whose referents hold attributes in common. When these clusters are produced by aphasics, they consist primarily of subordinates whose referents exhibit many overlapping features (e.g., “bald eagle, black eagle, golden eagle” in response to “bird”). The right-hemisphere-damaged subjects, in contrast, produce many clusters of related items. These consist of less central, basic object level words whose referents hold less obvious features in common (e.g., “albatross, crane, gull” in response to “bird”). Aphasics, then, may be limited in their ability to analyze referents for critical features. Taken together, these data contribute to a more precise characterization of the nonfluent aphasics' and the fluent aphasics' referential deficits, and lend support specifically to the notion that neither group of aphasics relies on definition-like features to determine what a word can refer to.     

A putatively general factor of personality (GFP) is not so general: A demonstration with the NEO PI-R

Recent research suggests that a general factor of personality (GFP) represents the zenith of a hierarchy of personality structure. For a roommate sample of 602 students, we evaluate the presence and validity of a general factor of personality in a Big Five measure. Findings indicate that a first factor, similar to what has been putatively labeled a GFP, can be extracted from self-report and observer-report, that this self-report first factor has validity for predicting an alleged observer-report GFP, and that this validity is not attributable to socially desirable responding. However, despite the existence of a valid first factor, it is not a general factor of personality because it fails to summarize adequately the complete systematic variance in the structure of personality.     

Attention switching is not a fatigable process: methodological comments on Axelrod and Guzy (1972)

Guzy and Axelrod investigated auditory attention switching by means of the click-counting paradigm and concluded that attention switching is a fatigable process. In the present comment it is shown that this conclusion is based on a faulty analysis of the data: The scores subjected to the analysis of variance were transformed such that they were no longer linear combinations of the factorial effects. Reanalyzing the data in the correct way renders perfectly linear conting functions that deviate from theoretical fatigue functions. It is concluded that the attention-switching mechanism is not fatigable.     

Refinement of the MMPI-2 F(p) scale is not necessary: a response to Gass and Luis

Gass and Luis (2001) reported that four MMPI-2 Lie scale items contained on the F(p) scale do not measure symptom exaggeration but measure defensiveness. They hold that elimination of the four Lie scale items improves the utility of the F(p) scale in the identification of exaggeration in VA samples. To directly address the assertion that removal of the L scale items from the F(p) scale enhances the predictive validity of F(p), data derived from a previously published study where 74 psychiatric inpatients were asked to retake the MMPI-2 and either feign psychopathology or respond in an honest manner were reanalyzed. The intact F(p) scale demonstrated a stronger correlation with group membership, increased incremental validity, and superior classification rates compared with the F(p) scale without the 4 Lie scale items. Consequently, the F(p) refinement recommended by Gass and Luis is unnecessary.     

A new look at social attention: Orienting to the eyes is not (entirely) under volitional control

People tend to look at other people's eyes, but whether this bias is automatic or volitional is unclear. To discriminate between these two possibilities, we used a "don't look" (DL) paradigm. Participants looked at a series of upright or inverted faces, and were asked either to freely view the faces or to avoid looking at the eyes, or as a control, the mouth. As previously demonstrated, participants showed a bias to attend to both eyes and mouths during free viewing. In the DL condition, participants told to avoid the eyes of upright faces were unable to fully suppress the tendency to fixate on the faces' eyes, whereas participants told to avoid the mouth of upright faces successfully eliminated their bias to overtly attend to that feature. When faces were inverted, participants were equally able to suppress looks to the eyes and mouth. Together, these results suggest that the tendency to look at the eyes reflects orienting that is both volitional and automatic, and that the engagement of holistic or configural face processing mechanisms during upright face viewing has an influence in guiding gaze automatically to the eyes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Why amnesia and the law is not a useful topic

This brief note suggests that amnesia and the law (or any other behavioral condition and the law) is not a jurisprudentially interesting topic because such behavioral conditions do not require distinct legal critera and procedures. Rather, the issues that each raises are examples of more general normative issues, such as the proper criteria for competence or responsibility, that should be addressed more generally and directly. Distinct behavioral conditions are simply factors that should be used as evidence when the law adjudicates or develops more general doctrines.     

Paw preference is not affected by postural demand in a nonprimate mammal (Felis silvestris catus)

Previously, it has been thought that handedness is unique to humans. Recently, it has been found that hand or paw preferences are common among a variety of vertebrate species. Different models have been put forth to describe the evolution of primate handedness. In this study we aimed to explore whether these models can also be used to predict manual laterality in nonprimate mammalian groups. The cat (Felis silvestris catus) is a good nonprimate model for manual laterality, as cats frequently use paws to catch and hold prey. Cats were exposed to two standardized manual laterality tasks, differing in postural demand. Subjects (N = 28) were forced to use either a stable or unstable body posture (i.e., sitting or standing vs. vertical clinging) to extract food items from a plastic box attached at two different heights. We revealed that cats exhibited paw preferences at an individual level with about 40% left, 30% right, 30% nonlateralized subjects. Postural demand was linked to task difficulty: the unstable body posture was found to be significantly more difficult than the stable body posture. However, these differences in postural demand and task difficulty did not lead to differences in direction or strength of paw preference. Findings suggested that nonprimate mammals differ from primates in their sensitivity to task related factors, such as postural demand. Results coincide with those of some prosimians, providing support for the hypothesis that postural demand and the associated task complexity became influencing factors on manual laterality in the course of primate evolution.     

Bottom-up attention capture with distractor and target singletons defined in the same (color) dimension is not a matter of feature uncertainty

In visual search, attention capture by an irrelevant color-singleton distractor in another feature dimension than the target is dependent on whether or not the distractor changes its feature: Capture is present if the irrelevant color distractor can take on different features across trials, but absent if the distractor takes on only one feature throughout all trials. This influence could be due to down-weighting of the entire color map. Here we tested whether a similar effect could also be brought about by down-weighting of specific color channels within the same maps. We investigated whether a similar dependence of capture on color certainty might hold true if the distractor were defined in the same (color) dimension as the target. At odds with this possibility, in the first and third blocks—in which feature uncertainty was absent—an irrelevant distractor of a certain color captured attention. In addition, in a second block, varying the distractor color created feature uncertainty, but this did not increase capture. Repeating the exact same procedure with the same participants after one week confirmed the stability of the results. The present study showed that a color distractor presented in the same (color) dimension as the target captures attention independent of feature uncertainty. Thus, the down-weighting of single irrelevant color channels within the same feature map used for target search is not a matter of feature uncertainty.     

Replication is not coincidence: Reply to Iverson, Lee, and Wagenmakers (2009)

Iverson, Lee, and Wagenmakers (2009) claimed that Killeen’s (2005) statistic prep overestimates the “true probability of replication.” We show that Iverson et al. confused the probability of replication of an observed direction of effect with a probability of coincidence—the probability that two future experiments will return the same sign. The theoretical analysis is punctuated with a simulation of the predictions of prep for a realistic random effects world of representative parameters, when those are unknown a priori. We emphasize throughout that prep is intended to evaluate the probability of a replication outcome after observations, not to estimate a parameter. Hence, the usual conventional criteria (unbiasedness, minimum variance estimator) for judging estimators are not appropriate for probabilities such as p and p_rep.