Phenomenological constraints: a problem for radical enactivism

This paper does two things. Firstly, it clarifies the way that phenomenological data is meant to constrain cognitive science according to enactivist thinkers. Secondly, it points to inconsistencies in the ‘Radical Enactivist’ handling of this issue, so as to explicate the commitments that enactivists need to make in order to tackle the explanatory gap. I begin by sketching the basic features of enactivism in sections 1–2, focusing upon enactive accounts of perception. I suggest that enactivist ideas here rely heavily upon the endorsement of a particular explanatory constraint that I call the structural resemblance constraint (SRC), according to which the structure of our phenomenology ought to be mirrored in our cognitive science. Sections 3–5 delineate the nature of, and commitment to, SRC amongst enactivists, showing SRC’s warrant and implications. The paper then turns to Hutto and Myin’s (2013) handling of SRC in sections 6–7, highlighting irregularities within their programme for Radical Enactivism on this issue. Despite seeming to favour SRC, I argue that Radical Enactivism’s purported compatibility with the narrow (brain-bound) supervenience of perceptual experience is in fact inconsistent with SRC, given Hutto and Myin’s phenomenological commitments. I argue that enactivists more broadly ought to resist such a concessionary position if they wish to tackle the explanatory gap, for it is primarily the abidance to SRC that ensures progress is made here. Section 8 then concludes the paper with a series of open questions to enactivists, inviting further justification of the manner in which they apply SRC.     

Debunking enactivism: a critical notice of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism

In this review of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism, I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Second, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Last, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an account of choice and action.     

From deed to word: gapless and kink-free enactivism

In their most recent book, Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content (MIT 2017), Dan Hutto and Eric Myin claim to give a complete and gapless naturalistic account of cognition, but it comes with a kink. The kink being that content-involving cognition has special properties found nowhere else in nature, making it the case that minds capable of contentful thought differ in kind, in this key respect, from more basic minds. Contra Hutto and Myin, I argue that content-involving practices are themselves simply a further extension of action and do not therefore warrant being called ‘different in kind’ or ‘kinky’. With the help of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John V. Canfield, I show that Enactivism meets the challenge of explaining higher-level cognition; and, contra continuity sceptics, offer ‘a philosophically cogent and empirically respectable account’ of how human minds can emerge from nonhuman minds.

     

Tigers are something else: A case for family play

This paper is an attempt to bridge the two worlds of family therapy and filial play therapy, introducing the complementary idea of play in therapy. Family play therapy challenges the idea that play is only useful in the treatment of children. Clinical examples are given and uses of play are discussed, including evaluation, play as a therapeutic tool, and the development of themes. The authors believe that therapists who are willing to be playful offer their clients a new world of therapeutic experiences.     

Pragmatism,enactivism, and ecological psychology: towards a unified approach to post-cognitivism

This paper argues that it is possible to combine enactivism and ecological psychology in a single post-cognitivist research framework if we highlight the common pragmatist assumptions of both approaches. These pragmatist assumptions or starting points are shared by ecological psychology and the enactive approach independently of being historically related to pragmatism, and they are based on the idea of organic coordination, which states that the evolution and development of the cognitive abilities of an organism are explained by appealing to the history of interactions of that organism with its environment. It is argued that the idea of behavioral or organic coordination within the enactive approach gives rise to the sensorimotor abilities of the organism, while the ecological approach emphasizes the coordination at a higher-level between organism and environment through the agent’s exploratory behavior for perceiving affordances. As such, these two different processes of organic coordination can be integrated in a post-cognitivist research framework, which will be based on two levels of analysis: the subpersonal one (the neural dynamics of the sensorimotor contingencies and the emergence of enactive agency) and the personal one (the dynamics that emerges from the organism-environment interaction in ecological terms). If this proposal is on the right track, this may be a promising first step for offering a systematized and consistent post-cognitivist approach to cognition that retain the full potential of both enactivism and ecological psychology.

     

Habituation and dishabituation during object play in kennel-housed dogs

Domestic dogs are reported to show intense but transient neophilia towards novel objects. Here, we examine habituation and dishabituation to manipulable objects by kennel-housed dogs. Labrador retrievers (N?=?16) were repeatedly presented with one toy for successive 30-s periods until interaction ceased. At this point (habituation), a different toy was presented that contrasted with the first in both colour and odour (since the dog’s saliva would have accumulated on the first), colour alone, or odour alone. No effect of the type of contrast was detected in the number of presentations to habituation, the difference in duration of interaction between the first presentation of the first toy and the presentation of the second toy (recovery), or the duration of interaction with the second toy (dishabituation). Varying the time interval between successive presentations of the first toy up to habituation between 10?s and 10?min had no effect on the number of presentations to habituation, nor did it alter the extent of dishabituation. Varying the delay from habituation to presentation of the second toy, between 10?s and 15?min, affected neither the recovery nor the dishabituation. Overall, the study indicates that loss of interest in the object during object-orientated play in this species is due to habituation to the overall stimulus properties of the toy rather than to any single sensory modality and is also atypical in its insensitivity to the interval between presentations.     

The development of representational play in chimpanzees and bonobos: Evolutionary implications,pretense, and the role of interspecies communication

This research investigates the development of symbolic or representational play in two species of the genus Pan, bonobos (Pan paniscus) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). The participants varied not only by species, but also as to whether they had become proficient in communicating with humans via a set of arbitrary visual symbols, called lexigrams. Using a developmental sequence of representational play based on McCune, we found every level that children manifest to be constructed by Pan. The most robust and regular ontogenetic sequence for both bonobos and chimpanzee was not McCune's five-level progression, but a three-step ontogenetic sequence: Level 1 (no representation, no pretense) precedes Levels 2–4 (representation but no pretense), which in turn precedes Level 5 (includes pretense as well as representation). A linguistic system for interspecies communication was necessary for Level 5 representational play and “true” pretense. Human scaffolding produced developmental progress within sequences for all the apes, except the bonobo who lacked a system of interspecies communication. This evidence suggests that the potential for representational play and its social stimulation were present in the common ancestor of bonobos, chimpanzees and humans five million years ago.     

On the role of social interaction in social cognition: a mechanistic alternative to enactivism

Researchers in the enactivist tradition have recently argued that social interaction can constitute social cognition, rather than simply serve as the context for social cognition. They contend that a focus on social interaction corrects the overemphasis on mechanisms inside the individual in the explanation of social cognition. I critically assess enactivism??s claims about the explanatory role of social interaction in social cognition. After sketching the enactivist approach to cognition in general and social cognition in particular, I identify problems with an enactivist taxonomy of roles for social interaction in the explanation of social cognition (contextual, enabling, and constitutive). In particular, I show that this enactivist taxonomy does not clearly distinguish between enabling conditions and constitutive elements, which would make them in danger of committing the coupling-constitution fallacy found in some attempts to extend cognition. I explore resources enactivism has to more clearly demarcate constitutive parts of a cognitive system, but identify problems in applying them to some of the main cases of social cognition enactivists characterize as being constituted by social interaction. I offer the mechanistic approach to explanation as an alternative that captures much of what enactivists want to say about the relations between social and individual levels, but views social interactions from the perspective of embedded cognition rather than as being constitutive of social cognition.     

The case for causal influences of action videogame play upon vision and attention

Over the past decade, exciting findings have surfaced suggesting that routine action videogame play improves attentional and perceptual skills. Apparently, performance during multiple-object tracking, useful-field-of-view tests, and task switching improves, contrast sensitivity and spatial-resolution thresholds decrease, and the attentional blink and backward masking are lessened by short-term training on action videogames. These are remarkable findings showing promise for the training of attention and the treatment of disorders of attentional function. While the findings are interesting, evidence of causal influences of videogame play is not as strong as is often claimed. In many studies, observers with game play experience and those without are tested. Such studies do not address causality, since preexisting differences are not controlled for. Other studies investigate the training of videogame play, with some evidence of training benefits. Methodological shortcomings and potential confounds limit their impact, however, and they have not always been replicated. No longitudinal studies on videogame training exist, but these may be required to provide conclusive answers about any benefits of videogame training and any interaction with preexisting differences. Suggestions for methodological improvement are made here, including recommendations for longitudinal studies. Such studies may become crucial for the field of attentional training to reach its full potential.     

Assessing different aspects of pretend play within a play setting: Towards a standardized assessment of pretend play in young children

The present study suggests a method with which to assess the interrelations between different types of pretend play. In contrast to standard methods in this area, the various types of pretend play were measured within an interactive play scenario. The pretend play tasks were included in a semi‐structured play sequence and presented to young children between 24 and 30 months of age (N=30). Self‐ and doll‐directed pretence, object substitution, pretence with realistic objects, and self‐initiated pretend play, as well as the understanding that an object had been given two identities was tested. The capacity for dual representation was assessed by asking for the real and pretend identity of an object. Age differences were found in the overall score for elicited pretence but not for all items separately. Individual items also differed in difficulty and thus are of potential use for assessing intraindividual differences in pretend play. Findings are discussed in the context of current theories and methods concerning the development and assessment of pretend play.     

Improving solitary play with a typically developing preschooler

We evaluated the effects of delivering specific instructions (e.g., “Here are some puzzles. Complete two of them while I read.”) on solitary play with a typically developing 3‐year‐old. We gradually increased the response requirements described in the specific instruction and found that specific instructions improved the number of solitary play responses and the duration of engagement. During a treatment extension, improvements in solitary play were observed with the classroom teacher and a novel toy. The father, teacher, and preschool director found the treatment to be highly effective and acceptable.     

The child-psychoanalytic play interview: a technique for studying thematic content.

Child psychoanalysts have long viewed play as a reflection of children's inner lives and have used the themes children represent in play for diagnostic and therapeutic work. Given the central role children's play has for clinical work, few studies have addressed play empirically. This paper presents a technique for studying the thematic content of children's play as it emerges during a play session with a child analyst. We report the steps involved in developing this investigative technique and describe the interobserver agreement among four rates using the technique with videotaped play sessions. Implications for future research using such an approach are discussed.