Domestic dogs’ (Canis familiaris) choices in reference to agreement among human informants on location of food

When interacting with others, informants may offer conflicting information or information of varying accuracy. Recent research suggests that young children do not trust all informants equally and are selective in both whom they solicit for information and whose claims they support. We explored whether domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) are similarly sensitive to agreement among informants. To this end, we utilized a common human gesture, pointing, to which recent research suggests dogs are sensitive. We conducted two experiments in which an experimenter secretly hid food in one of two clear containers while the dog was distracted. Next, a small group moved to indicate the food's location using stationary points positioned above the containers. In Experiment 1, two experimenters moved to stand behind the non-baited container, while a third experimenter moved to stand behind the baited container. Then, all directed one static point at the container in front of them. Experiment 2 exactly resembled Experiment 1 with the exception that the single experimenter standing behind the baited container directed two static points at the container (one with each hand). Dogs chose the container indicated by the majority in Experiment 1 significantly more often than chance, but chose the container indicated by the minority in Experiment 2 significantly more often than chance. This suggests that the number of points, not the number of people, more strongly influenced dogs' choices.     

Does the A-not-B error in adult pet dogs indicate sensitivity to human communication?

Recent dog-infant comparisons have indicated that the experimenter's communicative signals in object hide-and-search tasks increase the probability of perseverative (A-not-B) errors in both species (Topál et al. 2009). These behaviourally similar results, however, might reflect different mechanisms in dogs and in children. Similar errors may occur if the motor response of retrieving the object during the A trials cannot be inhibited in the B trials or if the experimenter's movements and signals toward the A hiding place in the B trials ('sham-baiting') distract the dogs' attention. In order to test these hypotheses, we tested dogs similarly to Topál et al. (2009) but eliminated the motor search in the A trials and 'sham-baiting' in the B trials. We found that neither an inability to inhibit previously rewarded motor response nor insufficiencies in their working memory and/or attention skills can explain dogs' erroneous choices. Further, we replicated the finding that dogs have a strong tendency to commit the A-not-B error after ostensive-communicative hiding and demonstrated the crucial effect of socio-communicative cues as the A-not-B error diminishes when location B is ostensively enhanced. These findings further support the hypothesis that the dogs' A-not-B error may reflect a special sensitivity to human communicative cues. Such object-hiding and search tasks provide a typical case for how susceptibility to human social signals could (mis)lead domestic dogs.     

Do dogs get the point? A review of dog–human communication ability

In recent years evidence has accumulated demonstrating that dogs are, to a degree, skilful in using human forms of communication, making them stand out in the animal kingdom. Neither man's closest relative, the chimpanzee, nor dog's closest living relative, the wolf, can use human communication as flexibly as the domestic dog. This has led to the hypothesis that dogs’ skills in this domain may be a result of selection pressures during domestication, which have shaped dogs’ skills tremendously. One hypothesis, the so-called by-product hypothesis, suggests that dogs have been selected against fear and aggression and as a by-product this paved the way for the evolution of generally more flexible social cognitive skills, which surpassed those of their ancestor, the wolf. Another hypothesis, the adaptation hypothesis, has claimed that dogs may have been specifically selected for certain tasks for which using human forms of communication was necessary. As of yet, the mechanism underlying dogs’ understanding of human forms of communication is not fully understood. We argue here that understanding the mechanism involved will also shed light on possible evolutionary scenarios. We argue that the evidence to date suggests that dogs’ understanding of human forms of communication may be more specialized than was predicted by some and may be best explained as the result of a special adaptation of dogs to the specific activities humans have used them for.     

What is the point of helping?

Philosophical Studies - In some cases, a group of people can bring about a morally bad outcome despite each person’s individual act making no difference with respect to bringing that outcome...     

What’s wrong with human extinction?

Abstract

This paper explores what could be wrong with the fact of human extinction. I first present four reasons why we might consider human extinction to be wrong: (1) it would prevent millions of people from being born; (2) it would mean the loss of rational life and civilization; (3) it would cause existing people to suffer pain or death; (4) it would involve various psychological traumas. I argue that looking at the question from a contractualist perspective, only reasons (3) and (4) are admissible. I then consider what implications this limitation on reasons has for the wrongfulness of various forms of human extinction.     

What’s Going to Happen to Me? Prognosis in the Face of Uncertainty

Topoi - Reasoning in medicine requires the critical use of a clinical methodology whose validity must be evaluated as well as its limits. In the last decade, an increasing amount of evidence has...     

Sociability modifies dogs’ sensitivity to biological motion of different social relevance

Preferential attention to living creatures is believed to be an intrinsic capacity of the visual system of several species, with perception of biological motion often studied and, in humans, it correlates with social cognitive performance. Although domestic dogs are exceptionally attentive to human social cues, it is unknown whether their sociability is associated with sensitivity to conspecific and heterospecific biological motion cues of different social relevance. We recorded video clips of point-light displays depicting a human or dog walking in either frontal or lateral view. In a preferential looking paradigm, dogs spontaneously viewed 16 paired point-light displays showing combinations of normal/inverted (control condition), human/dog and frontal/lateral views. Overall, dogs looked significantly longer at frontal human point-light display versus the inverted control, probably due to its clearer social/biological relevance. Dogs’ sociability, assessed through owner-completed questionnaires, further revealed that low-sociability dogs preferred the lateral point-light display view, whereas high-sociability dogs preferred the frontal view. Clearly, dogs can recognize biological motion, but their preference is influenced by their sociability and the stimulus salience, implying biological motion perception may reflect aspects of dogs’ social cognition.     

What’s to be done?

All of culture, philosophy included, is a huge trick on nature, and nature will eventually catch on and reassert itself. But for right now, if one lives in a free society, it's a wonderful time to be a philosopher: so much to read, so much to think and write about.     

What’s the point? Golden and Labrador retrievers living in kennels do not understand human pointing gestures

In many studies that have investigated whether dogs’ capacities to understand human pointing gestures are aspects of evolutionary or developmental social competences, family-owned dogs have been compared to shelter dogs. However, for most of these studies, the origins of shelter dogs were unknown. Some shelter dogs may have lived with families before entering shelters, and from these past experiences, they may have learned to understand human gestures. Furthermore, there is substantial variation in the methodology and analytic approaches used in such studies (e.g. different pointing protocols, different treatment of trials with no-choice response and indoor vs. outdoor experimental arenas). Such differences in methodologies and analysis techniques used make it difficult to compare results obtained from different studies and may account for the divergent results obtained. We thus attempted to control for several parameters by carrying out a test on dynamic proximal and distal pointing. We studied eleven kennel dogs of known origin that were born and raised in a kennels with limited human interaction. This group was compared to a group of eleven dogs comparable in terms of breed, sex and age that had lived with human families since they were puppies. Our results demonstrate that pet dogs outperform kennel dogs in their comprehension of proximal and distal pointing, regardless of whether trials where no-choice was made were considered as errors or were excluded from statistical analysis, meaning that dogs living in kennels do not understand pointing gestures. Even if genetic effects of the domestication process on human–dog relationships cannot be considered as negligible, our data suggest that dogs need to learn human pointing gestures and thus underscore the importance of ontogenetic processes.     

Infants’ sensitivity to the depth cue of shading

Five- and 7-month-old infants were tested for sensitivity to the depth cue of shading. Infants were presented with two displays: a surface in which a convexity and a concavity were molded and a photograph in which shading specified a convexity and a concavity. Each display was presented under both monocular and binocular viewing conditions. Reaching was observed as the dependent measure. Infants in both age groups reached preferentially for the actual convexity in both the monocular and binocular viewing conditions. In the monocular photograph condition, the 7-month-olds reached preferentially for the apparent convexity specified by shading, indicating that they perceived it to be an actual convexity. These infants showed no significant reaching preference in the binocular photograph condition. This finding rules out interpretations of the infants’ reaching not based on perceived depth. The results therefore suggest that the 7-month-olds perceived depth from shading. The 5-month-olds showed no significant reaching preferences when viewing the photograph; thus, they showed no evidence of depth perception from shading. These findings are consistent with the results of a number of studies that have investigated infants’ sensitivity to pictorial depth cues. Together, these studies suggest that the ability to perceive depth from pictorial cues may first develop between 5 and 7 months of age.     

Domestic dogs’ (Canis familiaris) choices in reference to information provided by human and artificial hands

Even young humans show sensitivity to the accuracy and reliability of informants’ reports. Children are selective in soliciting information and in accepting claims. Recent research has also investigated domestic dogs’ (Canis familiaris) sensitivity to agreement among human informants. Such research utilizing a common human pointing gesture to which dogs are sensitive in a food retrieval paradigm suggests that dogs might choose among informants according to the number of points exhibited, rather than the number of individuals indicating a particular location. Here, we further investigated dogs’ use of information from human informants using a stationary pointing gesture, as well as the conditions under which dogs would utilize a stationary point. First, we explored whether the number of points or the number of individuals more strongly influenced dogs’ choices. To this end, dogs encountered a choice situation in which the number of points exhibited toward a particular location and the number of individuals exhibiting those points conflicted. Results indicated that dogs chose in accordance with the number of points exhibited toward a particular location. In a second experiment, we explored the possibility that previously learned associations drove dogs’ responses to the stationary pointing gesture. In this experiment, dogs encountered a choice situation in which artificial hands exhibited a stationary pointing gesture toward or away from choice locations in the absence of humans. Dogs chose the location to which the artificial hand pointed. These results are consistent with the notion that dogs may respond to a human pointing gesture due to their past-learning history.     

Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology: What’s the Question?

Alvin Plantingas Warranted Christian Belief is without questionone of the central texts of the Reformed epistemology movement. Critiques of Plantingas defence have been both multiple and varied. As varied as these responses are, however, it is my contention that many of them amount to the same thing. It is the purpose of this paper to offer an overview of the main lines of attack that have been directed as Plantingas project, and thereafter to show how many, if not most, of these objections can be understood as versions or aspects of the same criticism, what I call the Inadequacy Thesis.     

Children’s sensitivity to pictorial depth information

Children, ranging in age from 3 years, 4 months to 5 years, 4 months, were tested for sensitivity to interposition, height in field, linear perspective, and retinal size under either restricted (monocular, head motionless) or unrestricted (binocular, head free) picture surface viewing conditions. All of the subjects’ relative depth responses (near vs. far) to two toy houses were remarkably accurate with interposition and or height in field pictorial depth information. Retinal size had relatively little control over their responses, and the addition of linear perspective resulted in no significant improvement. Performance was nearly equivalent under the two viewing conditions, indicating young children’s ability to take a “pictorial attitude.”     

What does it mean to be human? How salience of the human category affects responses to intergroup harm

Two studies explore how salience of the human category influences responses to intergroup harm and how different images of humanity modify these effects. In Study 1, British participants (n = 86) contemplated acts of terrorism against their group. When the human category (versus intergroup distinctions) was salient and when the prevailing image of humanity was malevolent (versus benevolent), participants were not only more understanding of terrorism, blamed this less on religious group memberships, but also more strongly endorsed the use of extreme force by countries to defend their boarders, preserve the peace and prevent future attacks. In Study 2, British participants (n = 83) contemplated the torture of Iraqi prisoners by British soldiers. When the human category was salient and the prevailing image of humanity was malevolent, participants experienced less guilt and justified torture more. We conclude that the effects of human category salience on interpretations of intergroup harm depend on what it means to be human. When human nature is perceived negatively, thinking in terms of the human category can normalise intergroup harm regardless of whether the outgroup or the ingroup is the perpetrator. Implications for re‐categorisation approaches to conflict reduction are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does the social concerns component of the anxiety sensitivity index belong to the domain of anxiety sensitivity or the domain of negative evaluation sensitivity?

The present study utilized an exploratory factor-analytic approach (i.e. principal-components analysis; PCA) to investigate whether the Social Concerns component of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI [Peterson, R. A., & Reiss, S. (1992). Anxiety Sensitivity Index manual (2nd ed.). Worthington, OH: International Diagnostic Systems.]) is best conceptualized as belonging to the domain of anxiety sensitivity (AS) and/or the domain of negative evaluation sensitivity (NES). A sample of university students (N = 216) was administered measures of both NES (i.e. Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation scale; Leary, 1983) and AS (i.e. ASI). Participants' responses to the items comprising these measures were subjected to a PCA with oblique rotation. Factors representing the NES construct and the three lower-order AS constructs (i.e. AS Physical, Psychological and Social Concerns) were obtained. Subscales derived from these four factors were positively and significantly correlated with one another and loaded on a single higher-order factor labeled Threat Sensitivity. Thus, the present findings suggest that the AS Social Concerns factor is distinct from NES and the other lower-order components of AS. However, correlational analyses and higher-order PCA indicated that the AS Social Concerns factor taps a blend of AS and NES as well as something unique and distinct from both global AS and NES.     

What’s New about the New Induction?

The problem of underdetermination is thought to hold important lessons for philosophy of science. Yet, as Kyle Stanford has recently argued, typical treatments of it offer only restatements of familiar philosophical problems. Following suggestions in Duhem and Sklar, Stanford calls for a New Induction from the history of science. It will provide proof, he thinks, of “the kind of underdetermination that the history of science reveals to be a distinctive and genuine threat to even our best scientific theories” (Stanford 2001, p. S12). This paper examines Stanford’s New Induction and argues that it – like the other forms of underdetermination that he criticizes – merely recapitulates familiar philosophical conundra.     

What’s the matter with Huck Finn?

This paper explores some key commitments of the idea that it can be rational to do what you believe you ought not to do. I suggest that there is a prima facie tension between this idea and certain plausible coherence constraints on rational agency. I propose a way to resolve this tension. While akratic agents are always irrational, they are not always practically irrational, as many authors assume. Rather, “inverse” akratics like Huck Finn fail in a distinctively theoretical way. What explains why akratic agents are always either theoretically or practically irrational? I suggest that this is true because an agent’s total evidence determines both the beliefs and the intentions it is rational for her to have. Moreover, an agent’s evidence does so in a way such that it is never rational for the agent to at once believe that she ought to Φ and lack the intention to Φ.