Probabilistic Regresses and the Availability Problem for Infinitism

Recent work by Peijnenburg, Atkinson, and Herzberg suggests that infinitists who accept a probabilistic construal of justification can overcome significant challenges to their position by attending to mathematical treatments of infinite probabilistic regresses. In this essay, it is argued that care must be taken when assessing the significance of these formal results. Though valuable lessons can be drawn from these mathematical exercises (many of which are not disputed here), the essay argues that it is entirely unclear that the form of infinitism that results meets a basic requirement: namely, providing an account of infinite chains of propositions qua reasons made available to agents.     

Positism: The Unexplored Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem

As we trace a chain of reasoning backward, it must ultimately do one of four things: (i) end in an unjustified belief, (ii) continue infinitely, (iii) form a circle, or (iv) end in an immediately justified basic belief. This article defends positism—the view that, in certain circumstances, type‐(i) chains can justify us in holding their target beliefs. One of the assumptions that generates the epistemic regress problem is: (A) Person S is mediately justified in believing p iff (1) S has a doxastic reason q for p and (2) S is justified in believing q. Assumption (A) presupposes that reasoning is only justification transmitting, not justification generating. The article rejects (A) and argues that, in certain circumstances, reasoning itself is justification generating, even if that from which one is reasoning is not itself justified. It concludes by comparing positism with its infinitist, coherentist, and foundationalist rivals, acknowledging what is right about these other views.     

The Need for Justification

Some series can go on indefinitely, others cannot, and epistemologists want to know in which class to place epistemic chains. Is it sensible or nonsensical to speak of a proposition or belief that is justified by another proposition or belief, ad infinitum? In large part the answer depends on what we mean by “justification.” Epistemologists have failed to find a definition on which everybody agrees, and some have even advised us to stop looking altogether. In spite of this, the present essay submits a few candidate definitions. It argues that, although not giving the final word, these candidates tell us something about the possibility of infinite epistemic chains. And it shows that they can short‐circuit a debate about doxastic justification.     

Metaphysical Infinitism and the Regress of Being

This article offers a limited defense of metaphysical “infinitism,” the view that there are, or might be, infinite chains of ontological dependence. According to a widespread presupposition, there must be an ultimate ground of being—most likely, a plurality of fundamental atoms. Contrary to this view, this article shows that metaphysical infinitism is internally coherent. In particular, a parallel with the debate concerning infinitism about epistemic justification is suggested, and an “emergence model” of being is put forward. According to the emergence model, the being of any given entity gradually arises out of an infinite series of progressively less dependent entities—it is not wholly transmitted, as it were, from a basic, ungrounded level to all the dependent ones in a step‐by‐step fashion. Some objections are considered and rebutted.     

Is Klein an infinitist about doxastic justification?

This paper is a response to Peter Klein's “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning” (also in this issue of this journal). After briefly discussing what Klein says about the requirement, for doxastic justification, that a belief be formed in the right way, I'll make the following three points: Klein's solution to the regress problem isn't an infinitist solution, Klein's position on doxastic justification faces a troubling dilemma, and Klein's objection to foundationalism fails.     

The Epistemic Regress Problem,the Problem of the Criterion,and the Value of Reasons

There are important similarities between the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Each turns on plausible principles stating that epistemic reasons must be supported by epistemic reasons but that having reasons is impossible if that requires having endless regresses of reasons. These principles are incompatible with the possibility of reasons, so each problem is a paradox. Whether there can be an antiskeptical solution to these paradoxes depends upon the kinds of reasons that we need in order to attain our epistemic goals. This article explains the problems and considers the ways in which two different conceptions of human flourishing support the value of different kinds of reasons. One conception requires reasons that allow an easy solution to these paradoxes. The other—rational autonomy—requires reasons that depend upon endless regresses. So we cannot have the kinds of fully transparent reasons required for rational autonomy.     

Anscombe and “Hume and Julius Caesar”

This article analyzes Elizabeth Anscombe's short piece “Hume and Julius Caesar” from the standpoint of traditional foundationalist epistemic criteria, and concludes that while Anscombe may be right about finding a mistake in Hume, she has also failed to fill in her own arguments in the way that her overall aim requires. Special allusion is made to the work of J. L. Austin, especially insofar as that work has to do with reformulating sentences so that they appear to meet foundationalist criteria.     

A Quintet,a Quartet,a Trio,a Duo? The Epistemic Regress Problem,Evidential Support,and Skepticism

In his topical article, Andrew Cling claims that the best extant formulation of the so-called epistemic regress problem rests on five assumptions that are too strong. Cling offers an improved version that rests on a different set of three core epistemic assumptions, each of which he argues for. Despite of owing a great deal to Cling’s ideas, I argue that the epistemic regress problem surfaces from more fundamental assumptions than those offered by Cling. There are ultimately two core assumptions—in fact two contradictory strands within the concept of epistemic support—which jointly create a powerful challenge for our pursuit of paramount epistemic values.

The Intertwinement of Propositional and Doxastic Justification

One important distinction in the debate over the nature of epistemic justification is the one between propositional and doxastic justification. Roughly, while doxastic justification is a property of beliefs, propositional justification is a property of propositions. On a rather common view, which accounts for doxastic justification in terms of propositional justification plus the so-called ‘basing relation’, propositional justification is seen as the prior notion, and doxastic justification is explained in terms of it. According to the opposing view, the direction of explanation needs to be reversed, and doxastic justification should be seen as primary. I distinguish between two notions of priority, and I argue that they give different verdicts with respect to the issue of which notion of justification comes first. The lesson may be taken to be that propositional and doxastic justification are in a relation of intertwinement.     

Infinite Epistemic Regresses and Internalism

This article seeks to state, first, what traditionally has been assumed must be the case in order for an infinite epistemic regress to arise. It identifies three assumptions. Next it discusses Jeanne Peijnenburg's and David Atkinson's setting up of their argument for the claim that some infinite epistemic regresses can actually be completed and hence that, in addition to foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, there is yet another solution (if only a partial one) to the traditional epistemic regress problem. The article argues that Peijnenburg and Atkinson fail to address the traditional regress problem, as they don't adopt all of the three assumptions that underlie the traditional regress problem. It also points to a problem in the notion of making probable that Peijnenburg and Atkinson use in their account of justification.     

A Kantian-Brandomian View of Concepts and The Problem of a Regress of Norms

ABSTRACT

According to the Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts, we can understand concepts in terms of norms or rules that bind those who apply them, and the application of a concept requires that the concept-user be sensitive to the norms governing its application. But this view faces some serious objections. In particular, according to Rosen, Glüer and Wikforss, this view leads to a vicious regress of norms. The purpose of this paper is to defend a version of the Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts against this objection. I argue that we can deal with this problem along the lines of a coherentist account of justification.     

The Spirituality of Justification

The doctrine of justification‐by‐faith has gathered enough dust on its shelf in the museum of antiquated doctrines. When we draw justification‐by‐faith out where we can take a good look at it, it glistens like a mirror. It reflects back to us human beings who we are. We are self‐justifiers. In the name of justice, we perpetrate violence. The pursuit of justice does as much damage as the pursuit of injustice, unfortunately. Like a mirror, justification‐by‐faith reveals who we are and announces that God justifies us by grace. This means we do not have to self‐justify. Liberated from self‐justification, the Christian is free to love for the sake of the beloved.     

William Tyndale on Covenant and Justification

Abstract

This article offers a fresh interpretation of William Tyndale’s doctrine of justification with particular reference to his concept of covenant. It resists past scholarly attempts to resolve the apparent tension in his theology between faith and works in favour of either solifidianism or legalism. Instead, a close examination of Tyndale’s publications suggests that he maintained the gracious nature of justification without adopting justification by faith alone in the style of Martin Luther. Tyndale emphasized love for divine law as the essence of Christian righteousness. The gradual development of reciprocity in his concept of covenant came to undergird this formulation. Greater clarity with regard to Tyndale’s own theological position exposes misplaced comparison between Tyndale and Luther whilst encouraging the identification of views shared with Erasmus and the Swiss reformers consistent with certain trends in late-medieval theology.     

Argumentation and Interpersonal Justification

There are distinct but legitimate notions of both personal justification and interpersonal justification. Interpersonal justification is definable in terms of personal justification. A connection is established between good argumentation and interpersonal justification.     

制度正当化理论述评

制度正当化是指个体将现存社会安排合法化的心理过程。制度正当化的理论基础包括谬误意识、公正世界信念理论和认知失调理论。制度正当化理论能够解释人们为什么以及怎样在认知和意识形态上维护和支持现状, 以及由此产生的一些积极和消极后果。制度正当化受到个体因素和情境因素的影响。未来研究应进一步明确制度正当化中“制度”的涵义, 加强制度正当化理论的应用性研究, 以便更好地解释社会转变如何产生。     

Luther and Justification

In this article, I reflect on Luther's doctrine on justification as it came out in different ways in some of his seminal writings between 1518 and 1538, all represented in volume 2 of The Annotated Luther. Discovering the righteousness of God as something already given to humans opened fundamentally new perspectives to Luther.     

(Non)Issues of Infinite Regress in Modeling Motor Behavior

In the past, infinite regress criticisms that have been raised about models of motor behavior have been reserved for executive-type models (e.g., Beek & Meijer, 1988). On the basis of Gödel's (1930/1986) proof that an algorithm cannot prove its own validity, the authors reason that executive- as well as self-organized-type explanatory models of motor behavior have infinite regress difficulties. The conclusion offered in the present article is that judgments on a model's theoretical importance should be based not on issues of infinite regress but on other relevant characteristics, such as its propensity for falsification (Popper, 1959).     

脑死亡立法的伦理辩护

"脑死亡"立法是必要的并可以得到充分的伦理辩护:尊重人,特别是尊重人的自主性是"脑死亡"立法的伦理基础."脑死亡"立法符合有利和公平的伦理原则,符合功利主义伦理学追求社会利益最大化的目的.但我们在立法时,应尽量贯彻不伤害原则,注意保护患者及其亲属的利益.     

Introduction

This introduction presents selected proceedings of a two‐day meeting on the regress problem, sponsored by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) and hosted by Vanderbilt University in October 2013, along with other submitted essays. Three forms of research on the regress problem are distinguished: metatheoretical, developmental, and critical work.