Hope,Self-Transcendence and Environmental Ethics

Environmental ethicists often hold that organisms, species, ecosystems, and the like have goods of their own. But, even given that such goods exist, whether we ought to value them is controversial. Hence an environmental philosophy needs, in addition to an account of what sorts of values there are, an explanation what, how and why we morally ought to value—that is, an account of moral valuing. This paper presents one such an account. Specifically, I aim to show that unless there are eternal goods (and maybe even if there are), we have a duty of self-transcendence toward nature—that is, a duty to value nature's goods as ends. This duty is owed, however, not to nature, but to ourselves. It is grounded in what I call an imperative of hope. The argument, in a nutshell, is that we have a duty to ourselves to (in a certain sense) optimize hope. This optimization requires self-transcendence toward entities whose goods are more diverse and enduring than any human goods. But unless there are eternal goods, such goods occur only in nature.     

A Genetic Counselor’s Journey from Provider to Patient: A Mother’s Story

As genetic counselors, we frequently offer support and information while shielding ourselves emotionally from the heartbreaking situations faced by our patients. To experience such circumstances firsthand changes our perspective on the world, ourselves, our relationships, and, inevitably, our role as genetic counselors. No one asks to be in the position of having to make a decision about one’s pregnancy, but such experiences may help us, as a profession, reflect on and improve our counseling. It is my hope that this personal account will provide other counselors with a real-life example they may draw upon when supporting patients in crisis. Here is my story.     

Pluralistic folk psychology and varieties of self-knowledge: an exploration

Turning the techniques we use to understand other people onto ourselves can provide an insight into the types of self-knowledge that may be possible for us. Adopting Pluralistic Folk Psychology, according to which we understand others not primarily by thinking about invisible beliefs and desires that cause behavior, but instead by modeling others as people - with rich characters, relationships, past histories, cultural embeddedness, personality traits, and so forth. A preliminary investigation shows that we understand ourselves at least in terms of our phenomenal states, informational states, perceptual states, traits, desires, and beliefs. I then appeal to empirical research to examine the accuracy of our sense of self-understanding in these ways, and argue that these are often non-veridical. Moreover, in our folk practices, we do not take our statements of self-understanding as infallible, but we allow others to help us see ourselves. While there is room for some improvement in our acurarcy, I conclude that our sense of self is largely a joint construct of self and others, and that looping effects play a significant role in what one’s self turns out to be. The self is a fluid thing that we are constantly creating through our actions and self-constituting thoughts, but it is a creation we do not make alone. Others help to create us, as we help to create them.     

Glass Panels and Peepholes: Nonhuman Animals and the Right to Privacy

In this paper, I defend the claim that many sentient nonhuman animals have a right to privacy. I begin by outlining the view that the human right to privacy protects our interest in shaping different kinds of relationships with one another by giving us control over how we present ourselves to others. I then draw on empirical research to show that nonhuman animals also have this interest, which grounds a right to privacy against us. I further argue that we can violate this right even when other animals are unaware that we are watching them.     

THE HUMAN WORLD

We do not have to choose between belief in a divinely ordained cosmic moral order and the arbitrariness of our moral commitments. The alternative is a secular view that accepts that there is a natural cosmic order, denies that the order is moral, and relies on the values of the human world to provide a moral order by which we can reasonably live. These values are human constructions. Reliance on them is reasonable if they have passed the test of critical reflection. Our well-being depends on living according to the values that passed that test. Natural necessities, the contingencies of life, and our fallibility, however, limit the extent to which we can control how we live. We cannot free ourselves from necessities, but we can reduce the extent to which we are vulnerable to contingencies, and we can, within limits, increase the control we have by correcting mistakes we make when we are insufficiently critical of our attitudes, commitments, and values.     

Demandingness and Boundaries Between Persons

ABSTRACT

Demandingness objections to consequentialism often claim that consequentialism underestimates the moral significance of the stranger/special other distinction, mistakenly extending to strangers demands it is proper for special others to make on us, and concluding that strangers may properly demand anything of us if it increases aggregate goodness. This argument relies on false assumptions about our relations with special others. Boundaries between ourselves and special others are both a common and a good-making feature of our relations with them. Hence, demandingness objections that rely on the argument in question fail. But the same observations about our relations with special others show that there are many demands special others may not properly make, and since we cannot be more guilty of unjustified partiality in insisting on boundaries between ourselves and strangers than on boundaries between ourselves and special others, there are – as demandingness objections maintain – some demands strangers may not properly make on us.     

'Do be my enemy for friendship's sake' (Blake)

The author explores our psychological need for enemies and the contribution this makes to overt conflicts in the external world. Enemies serve as an opposite from which we can differentiate ourselves, either as an individual or as a group; they help us to define our physical and psychological boundaries. Enemies provide a target and an outlet for our aggression and also for the projection of the shadow. They also provide the stimulus to individuation, through the heroic encounter with the enemy in the unfamiliar world outside the home, particularly in adolescence. The psychic integration of 'self' and 'enemy' is explored as the outcome of individuation.     

Human Enhancement and Communication: On Meaning and Shared Understanding

Our technologies have enabled us to change both the world and our perceptions of the world, as well as to change ourselves and to find new ways to fulfil the human desire for improvement and for having new capacities. The debate around using technology for human enhancement has already raised many ethical concerns, however little research has been done in how human enhancement can affect human communication. The purpose of this paper is to explore whether some human enhancements could change our shared lifeworld so radically that human communication as we know it would not be possible any longer. After exploring the kinds of communication problems we are concerned with as well as mentioning some possible enhancement interventions that could bring about such problems, we will address some of the ethical implications that follow from these potential communication problems. We argue that because of the role that communication plays in human society, this issue deserves attention.     

Terminator or Super Mario: Human/Computer Hybrids, Actual and Virtual

Abstract: Is a human/computer hybrid feasible: If so, in what ways would such hybridization affect our concept of what it means to be human? There are two forms of such hybridization, the actual and the virtual. Actual hybridization involves the implantation of mechanical devices in the human body. In actual hybridization the computer comes to us and to our body to enhance our functioning in our world. In virtual hybridization we go to the computer, projecting our minds into the world of cyberspace and being formed there. Perhaps the most common form of virtual hybridization is the immersion our children experience in the world of video games. Both forms of hybridization encourage us to think of ourselves only in terms of function, just when most of our theologians find that humans reflect the image of God through our relationships. This emphasis on function best serves the military, but leaves us in the theological community with a dissatisfying concept of what it means to be human.     

The Problematic Role of Responsibility in Contexts of Distributive Justice

It would be surprising if our idea of ourselves as responsible agents did not have a significant place in our understanding of one another as members of a political community with common claims and obligations. We see this idea at work, for example, in disputes about the extent to which the poor are or are not responsible for their lot or smokers for their ill-health. Its most common use, it seems, is to explain and justify differences in shares of economic and other social goods. We see this use implicitly in the following letter to the Editor during the recent Presidential campaign. The author of the letter declares:     

Activating the Mind: Descartes' Dreams and the Awakening of the Human Animal Machine

In this essay I argue that one of the things that matters most to Descartes' account of mind is that we use our minds actively. This is because for him only an active mind is able to re‐organize its passionate experiences in such a way that a genuinely human, self‐governed life of virtue and true contentment becomes possible. To bring out this connection, I will read the Meditations against the backdrop of Descartes' correspondence with Elisabeth. This will reveal that in Descartes' writings there is a crucial connection between the conception of ourselves as dreamers and the idea that we fail to realize our true potential as self‐determined, active agents. Dreams, as Descartes conceives them, are passively received mental states that inhibit our freedom to use reason at will. To awaken here takes the form of activating our thoughts, which holds the key to freeing ourselves from the stimulus‐response patterns that Descartes takes to be at work in animal conduct. Applied to the Meditations, these insights suggest that this work engages in questions far beyond the epistemological agenda. By activating the mind, the Meditations teach us how to realize our true human potential as virtuous thinkers and passionate agents.     

The Context of Social Identity: Domination, Resistance, and Change

The task of social psychology is to explain the flexibility of human beings in creating and relating to their social worlds. Social identity and self-categorization theories provide a thoroughgoing interactionist framework for achieving such a task. However, in order to do so, it is necessary to avoid reductionist misreadings of the theories that would explain human social action simply by reference to psychological processes, without examining how the play of process depends on the cultural and structural settings in which they occur. More specifically, to the extent that self-categories shape social action, flexibility is achieved through the categories to which we belong, the others with whom we compare ourselves, and the dimensions along which such comparisons occur. These are not a fixed aspect of the human condition but are a focus for argument precisely because of their world-making consequences.     

Psychosomatic medicine and the philosophy of life

Basing ourselves on the writings of Hans Jonas, we offer to psychosomatic medicine a philosophy of life that surmounts the mind-body dualism which has plagued Western thought since the origins of modern science in seventeenth century Europe. Any present-day account of reality must draw upon everything we know about the living and the non-living. Since we are living beings ourselves, we know what it means to be alive from our own first-hand experience. Therefore, our philosophy of life, in addition to starting with what empirical science tells us about inorganic and organic reality, must also begin from our own direct experience of life in ourselves and in others; it can then show how the two meet in the living being. Since life is ultimately one reality, our theory must reintegrate psyche with soma such that no component of the whole is short-changed, neither the objective nor the subjective. In this essay, we lay out the foundational components of such a theory by clarifying the defining features of living beings as polarities. We describe three such polarities:

Genetics and human agency: comment on Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011)

Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011) decried genetic essentialism without denying the importance of genetics in the genesis of human behavior, and although I agree on both counts, a deeper issue remains unaddressed: how should we adjust our cognitions about our own behavior in light of genetic influence, or is it perhaps not necessary to take genetics into account at all? I suggest that the genetics of behavior does have important implications for how we understand ourselves, the differences among us, and the ethical implications of our actions, but that the usual metric for these considerations, the heritability coefficient, is not the correct one. I propose an alternative.     

Placebo: Its action and place in health research today* — Summary and conclusions

Conclusion The material presented at this conference pointed to a new dimension in the prosecution of activities that seek to relieve people of disease. While the simple instrument of the placebo may show those interested in the efficacy of physiologically active chemicals the extent to which the chemical of interest is actually active, the surprising outcome of such studies is that the placebo per se is worthy of more general study. This, when taken further, points to the ways in which mind can influence the matter of the body. Of course, mind itself is an activity of matter, so we may retain the experimental approach that has told us about the world outside ourselves to examine the world that is inside our brains. New techniques and approaches to these once intractable problems are now in train. Where they will lead us we cannot predict, but as with the emergence of all new tools, we have to adopt those ethics that will carry us forward with the expectation that we will maximise benefits and minimise harms. An International Conference held in Warsaw, April 12–13, 2003, entitled ‘Placebo: Its Action and Place in Health Research Today’ was attended by some 200 individuals who heard 25 presentations delivered by participants from the wider Europe and North America.     

Kantian constructivism and the authority of others

I argue that Christine Korsgaard's Kantian constructivism cannot accommodate our obligations to others. Because she holds that all of our obligations are grounded in our obligating ourselves, she is committed to the view that our obligations to others are grounded in corresponding obligations to ourselves. Yet this conclusion is objectionable on substantive moral grounds. The problem is that she embraces an egocentric conception of authority, on which we originally have the authority to obligate ourselves whereas others only have the authority to obligate us because we grant it to them. The solution is to adopt a more thoroughly social conception of authority and autonomy.     

NO ONE IS GUILTY: CRIME, PATRIARCHY, AND INDIVIDUALISM*

Let us begin with a fundamental realization: No amount of thinking and no amount of public policy have brought us any closer to understanding and solving the problem of crime. The more we have reacted to crime, the farther we have removed ourselves from any understanding and any reduction of the problem. In recent years, we have floundered desperately in reformulating the law, punishing the offender, and quantifying our knowledge. Yet this country remains one of the most crime-ridden nations. In spite of all its wealth, economic development, and scientific advances, this country has one of the worst crime records in the world.
With such realization, we return once again—as if starting anew—to the subject of crime, a subject that remains one of our most critical indicators of the state of our personal and collective being. If what is to be said seems outrageous and heretical, it is only because it is necessarily outside the conventional wisdom both of our understanding of the problem and of our attempt to solve it.     

Viewing Manners Through a Wider Lens

I take up reflections on my book, On Manners, by Professors Van Norden, Cline, and Olberding. In response to Professor Van Norden, I further explain and defend my employment of Kant, arguing that Kantianism offers distinctive and valuable resources for thinking about manners. I suggest similarities between Kant and Xunzi 荀子. In response to Professor Cline, I take up the question of the developmental function of manners and explore in further detail the ways in which our social roles both give us standing to perform certain ritual actions and also make demands on us about whether and how we perform them. In response to Professor Olberding, I revisit one of the themes from the book, virtuous hospitality. I argue that we may have moral reason to adapt ourselves and our practices to certain aesthetic standards for domestic activities, rather than adjust the standards to suit our individual tastes.     

The threat of logical inversion and our need for philosophical attention: from thought-expression to discourse and discussion

Thought-expressions are not simply good; instead, they become good for us when they make sense, empower action, and support health. From time to time, we may need to (re)consider the difference between thought-expression and discourse, or thought-expression that really makes sense, and the difference between discourse and discussion, or a discourse-situation that makes genuine agreement or disagreement possible for us. In this essay, I explore a problem that D. Z. Phillips and Randy Ramal have termed “logical inversion,” and I argue that wherever logical inversions have gained a foothold in our thought-expressions, they threaten to render us incapable of authentic discourse and discussion by ensuring that we misunderstand the understandings of others such that we deceive ourselves and others by picturing the knowledge and truth of our perspective against an unreal background of conceivable falsehoods which we have falsely attributed to the perspectives of others. Where this has taken place, practices of philosophical attention and conceptual clarification are needed to help us move from a situation of endless thought expression toward authentic discourse and discussion.