The fate of completed intentions

The goal of this research was to determine whether and how people deactivate prospective memory (PM) intentions after they have been completed. One view proposes that PM intentions can be deactivated after completion, such that they no longer come to mind and interfere with current tasks. Another view is that now irrelevant completed PM intentions exhibit persisting activation, and continue to be retrieved. In Experiment 1, participants were given a PM intention embedded within the ongoing task during Phase 1, after which participants were told either that the PM task had been completed or suspended until later. During Phase 2, participants were instructed to perform only the ongoing task and were periodically prompted to report their thoughts. Critically, the PM targets from Phase 1 reappeared in Phase 2. All of our measures, including thoughts reported about the PM task, supported the existence of persisting activation. In Experiment 2, we varied conditions that were expected to mitigate persisting activation. Despite our best attempts to promote deactivation, we found evidence for the persistence of spontaneous retrieval in all groups after intentions were completed. The theoretical and practical implications of this potential dark side to spontaneous retrieval are discussed.     

Sex difference trends in completed suicide

The recent suicide literature increasingly has contained statements suggesting that the differences in completed suicide between the sexes are lessening. A compilation of official suicide data for 1933-1980 verifies such a trend from the 1950s through 1971. However, increased differences (as measured by the ratio of male to female rates) were consistently observed from 1971 to 1980. These trends were found for data for the nation, for whites and nonwhites, for numbers of suicides, for crude rates, and for age-adjusted rates. Decreased sex differences were obtained for those 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and for 65+ years of age, but increased sex differences were observed for those aged 15-24 and 25-34. Possible explanations for these findings are presented.     

Conditional theories

This paper introduces conditional logic, that is, a variant of free logic where the existence condition of a function is defined by a formula of the formal language. Syntax and semantics are developed. A completeness theorem is given.     

Method choice, intent, and gender in completed suicide

Women who commit suicide use less violent methods, such as drugs and carbon monoxide poisoning, than do men, who more often use violent methods such as guns and hanging. Theories that attempt to explain this finding focus on gender differences in suicidal intent, socialization, emotions, interpersonal relationships, orientation and access to methods, and neurobiological factors. Data from a psychological autopsy study were used to test the theory that women who commit suicide use less violent means because they are less intent on dying. Although women were significantly less likely to use a violent method than men, there was no difference in the lethality of their suicidal intent.     

Association between tryptophan hydroxylase 2 gene polymorphism and completed suicide

The association between suicide and a single nucleotide polymorphism (rs1386483) was examined in the recently identified tryptophan hydroxylase 2 (TPH2) gene. Blood samples of 143 suicide victims and 162 age- and sex-matched controls were examined. The frequency of the TT genotype in the TPH2 polymorphism was higher in suicide victims than in controls (17.5% vs. 8.6%; p = 0.02), particularly in those with a history of repeated suicide attempts (53.3% vs. 8.6%; p < 0.0001). The examined TPH2 polymorphism was found to be associated with suicide. This genetic marker may be particularly important in understanding risk of multiple suicide attempts. Further analyses are needed to confirm these results.     

Functionalism and type-type identity theories

Conclusion Token-token identity theorists do not and need not deny that it may frequently be the same (kind of) brain state which on different occasions fills the functional rôle definitive of a given mental state. That is not at issue. What is at issue is whether functionally-oriented identity theorists should make two claims or three claims.The two claims they customarily make are, first, that each instance of a mental state is an instance of a brain state, and, secondly, that being in a mental state is having in one a state filling the relevant functional rôle. But to be in a mental state is to have that state in one. To be in pain is to have pain, to desire water is to have desire for water, and so on; just as to be poisoned is to have poison in you. (It is to have what is poison for you at the time, of course; and likewise for pain, desire and so on.)Our paper has been about a third sort of claim — relating particularly not to being in a mental state, nor to instances of that state, but to the mental state itself. We have argued that functionally-oriented identity theorists can and should make, in addition to the first two claims, the third type-type identity claim that mental states are brain states. Consequently a token brain state is a token of pain in a derivative sense. What makes it a token of pain is that it is a token of the type of brain state which realizes the pain-rôle for the organism at the time.