Why do Qualia and the Mind Seem Nonphysical?

In this article, I discuss several of the factors that jeopardize our understanding of the nature of qualitative experiences and the mind. I incorporate the view from neuroscience to clarify the naïve view from the first person perspective. I suggest that the most misleading factor in the understanding the nature of the mind and conscious processes is the transparency of experiences and the imperceptibility of the neurobiological processes that realize them. Transparency reflects the biological advantages provided to organisms by avoiding the proliferation of superfluous sensing and the regress implied in sensing the sensors and analyzers ad infinitum. The downside of simplicity and the price for biological efficiency is that through introspection, we cannot perceive the inner workings of the brain. Thus, the view from the first person perspective creates the pervasive illusion that the mind is nonphysical. Sensing the environment requires encoding information into neural surrogates, which I conceive as contingent processes that when incorporated into conscious processes become qualitative experiences. They are cognitive shortcuts with a variable degree of isomorphism, which partially falsify reality. Thus, the what-it-is-like is not the what-it-is. The first person perspective seemings should be corrected by the objective approach provided by neuroscience. To compensate for the contingency of experiences, organisms learn to rely on the aboutness of associated phenomenal concepts. Experiences have high biological value, because even in the absence of language, they allow organisms to make intelligent choices. Qualia are also necessary to ground words and language, which are essential to develop higher forms of cognition.     

How do changes in speed affect the perception of duration?

Six experiments investigated how changes in stimulus speed influence subjective duration. Participants saw rotating or translating shapes in three conditions: constant speed, accelerating motion, and decelerating motion. The distance moved and average speed were the same in all three conditions. In temporal judgment tasks, the constant-speed objects seemed to last longer than the decelerating objects, which in turn seemed to last longer than the accelerating stimuli. In temporal reproduction tasks, the difference between accelerating and decelerating stimuli disappeared; furthermore, watching an accelerating shape lengthened the apparent duration of the subsequent (static) display. These results (a) suggest that temporal judgment and reproduction can dissociate for moving stimuli because the stimulus influences the apparent duration of the subsequent interval, and (b) constrain theories of time perception, including those which emphasize memory storage, those which emphasize the existence of a pacemaker-accumulator timing system, and those which emphasize the division of attention between temporal and non-temporal information processing.     

Why did he do it? attribution of obedience and the phenomenon of dispositional bias

Two studies are reported which demonstrate the influence of perceptual or ‘perspective’ variables in mediating attribution processes. In both studies subjects first observed a re-enactment of Milgram's (1963) experiment of obedience in which a ‘teacher’ obeys an experimenter's request to deliver dangerously high levels of shock. They were then asked to make judgements concerning the magnitude of situational forces acting upon the teacher and also to make inferences about his personality dispositions. Study I showed that passage of time can lead observers to assume more situational control when they were required to think and write about the witnessed re-enactment of the Milgram situation compared with observers who had no time to contemplate or who were prevented from doing so. Study II did not support the notion that focus of attribution is a simple function of what one pays attention to, or a function of the differing perspectives which actors and observers employ. Both of these results seriously challenge Jones and Nisbett's (1972) contention that the differences in attribution tendencies between actors and observers arise from the difference in perspective, Moreover, considerable evidence suggests that changes in situational and dispositional attributions may not follow a simple ‘zero-sum’ model, and that subjects seem to be unwilling to treat the two sources of control as if they were inversely correlated.     

Why do People Disagree? Explaining and Endorsing the Possibility of Partiality in Judgments

The current study examines developing changes in children's intuitions about why disagreements about decisions might occur, focusing on what children understand about partiality and how it may vary depending on the context. Eighty children ages 6 to 13 years old and 20 adults were presented with stories in which there was a disagreement with the judge about who the winner of a contest should be. Participants were asked to generate their own explanations for why the disagreement may have occurred and to evaluate the plausibility of different explanations provided by the experimenter. Even 6-year-olds generated and endorsed partiality as a possible explanation for disagreement, although they did so at a lower rate than older children. A richer understanding of how context influences both the reasons for disagreement and the likelihood of partiality seems to develop over childhood.     

Why do women underperform under stereotype threat? Evidence for the role of negative thinking

This study investigated the role of negative thinking as a potential mediator of performance deficits under stereotype threat. After being assigned to a stereotype-threat or a no-threat condition, 60 female participants were asked to complete a difficult math task. Using the thought-listing technique, women under stereotype threat reported a higher number of negative thoughts specifically related to the test and to mathematics compared with women in the no-threat condition. Moreover, women under stereotype threat also showed a sharp decrease in performance that (a) was most pronounced in the second half of the test and (b) was mediated by the increase in negative thinking.     

Comparing static and dynamic measures of affect intensity and affective lability: do they measure the same thing?

This was the first study to our knowledge to examine whether dispositional scales of affect intensity and affective lability map on to corresponding momentary affective dynamics. Specifically, we assessed whether the Affect Intensity Measure (AIM) and Affective Lability Scale (ALS) are differentially associated with mean, variability, and instability of negative affect (NA) and positive affect (PA). Young adults (n?=?135) completed the AIM, ALS, and 7 days of experience sampling assessments. Higher scores on the AIM were associated with variability and instability of NA and PA whereas the ALS was associated with mean levels of NA and PA. Neither the AIM nor the ALS were associated with reactivity to stressful, negative, or positive experiences in the moment. The AIM and ALS accounted for little variance in momentary affective dynamics and effects were generally small. Findings highlighted that static measures of dynamic phenomena poorly map onto momentary measures of affect in daily life. Theoretical and methodological implications are discussed.

     

An “outside-in” processing strategy in the perception of form

The discriminability of line segments in a number of different geometric forms was examined. The procedure used was to have one of the lines within a given form drawn thinner than the other lines. The location of the thin line varied randomly within the form, and subjects were required to detect its location. Three observations were made. First, outer line elements were discriminated more accurately than inner line elements. Second, the outer line advantage appeared to reflect an attentional strategy: By presenting inner and outer lines independently, and informing subjects in advance as to whether target lines would be in the inner or outer area of the form, the outer line advantage could be eliminated. Third, consonant with a global attentional strategy, and in opposition to any retinally tied, peripheral-to-central scanning process, an outer-line advantage was evident regardless of whether the fixation point was positioned within or outside the forms, or whether outer lines were more peripheral than inner lines.     

Does the philosophy of medicine exist?

There has been a great deal of discussion, in this journal and others, about obstacles hindering the evolution of the philosophy of medicine. Such discussions presuppose that there is widespread agreement about what it is that constitutes the philosophy of medicine.Despite the fact that there is, and has been for decades, a great deal of literature, teaching and professional activity carried out explicitly in the name of the philosophy of medicine, this is not enough to establish that consensus exists as to the definition of the field. And even if consensus can be obtained as to what constitutes the philosophy of medicine, this does not mean that it exists as a field.     

In the eye of the beholder? Universality and cultural specificity in the expression and perception of emotion

Do members of different cultures express (or “encode”) emotions in the same fashion? How well can members of distinct cultures recognize (or “decode”) each other's emotion expressions? The question of cultural universality versus specificity in emotional expression has been a hot topic of debate for more than half a century, but, despite a sizeable amount of empirical research produced to date, no convincing answers have emerged. We suggest that this unsatisfactory state of affairs is due largely to a lack of concern with the precise mechanisms involved in emotion expression and perception, and propose to use a modified Brunswikian lens model as an appropriate framework for research in this area. On this basis we provide a comprehensive review of the existing literature and point to research paradigms that are likely to provide the evidence required to resolve the debate on universality vs. cultural specificity of emotional expression. Applying this fresh perspective, our analysis reveals that, given the paucity of pertinent data, no firm conclusions can be drawn on actual expression (encoding) patterns across cultures (although there appear to be more similarities than differences), but that there is compelling evidence for intercultural continuity in decoding, or recognition, ability. We also note a growing body of research on the notion of ingroup advantage due to expression “dialects,” above and beyond the general encoding or decoding patterns. We furthermore suggest that these empirical patterns could be explained by both universality in the underlying mechanisms and cultural specificity in the input to, and the regulation of, these expression and perception mechanisms. Overall, more evidence is needed, both to further elucidate these mechanisms and to inventory the patterns of cultural effects. We strongly recommend using more solid conceptual and theoretical perspectives, as well as more ecologically valid approaches, in designing future studies in emotion expression and perception research.     

Why do gorillas make sequences of gestures?

Great ape gestures have attracted considerable research interest in recent years, prompted by their flexible and intentional pattern of use; but almost all studies have focused on single gestures. Here, we report the first quantitative analysis of sequential gesture use in western gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla), using data from three captive groups and one African study site. We found no evidence that gesture sequences were given for reasons of increased communicative efficiency over single gestures. Longer sequences of repeated gestures did not increase the likelihood of response, and using a sequence was seldom in reaction to communicative failure. Sequential combination of two gestures with similar meanings did not generally increase effectiveness, and sometimes reduced it. Gesture sequences were closely associated with play contexts. Markov transition analysis showed two networks of frequently co-occurring gestures, both consisting of gestures used to regulate play. One network comprised only tactile gestures, the other a mix of silent, audible and tactile gestures; apparently, these clusters resulted from gesture use in play with proximal or distal contact, respectively. No evidence was found for syntactic effects of sequential combination: meanings changed little or not at all. Semantically, many gestures overlapped massively with others in their core information (i.e. message), and gesture messages spanned relatively few functions. We suggest that the underlying semantics of gorilla gestures is highly simplified compared to that of human words. Gesture sequences allow continual adjustment of the tempo and nature of social interactions, rather than generally conveying semantically referential information or syntactic structures.     

Why do we punish? Deterrence and just deserts as motives for punishment

One popular justification for punishment is the just deserts rationale: A person deserves punishment proportionate to the moral wrong committed. A competing justification is the deterrence rationale: Punishing an offender reduces the frequency and likelihood of future offenses. The authors examined the motivation underlying laypeople's use of punishment for prototypical wrongs. Study 1 (N = 336) revealed high sensitivity to factors uniquely associated with the just deserts perspective (e.g., offense seriousness, moral trespass) and insensitivity to factors associated with deterrence (e.g., likelihood of detection, offense frequency). Study 2 (N = 329) confirmed the proposed model through structural equation modeling (SEM). Study 3 (N = 351) revealed that despite strongly stated preferences for deterrence theory, individual sentencing decisions seemed driven exclusively by just deserts concerns.     

Why do narcissists take more risks? Testing the roles of perceived risks and benefits of risky behaviors

Much prior research demonstrates that narcissists take more risks than others, but almost no research has examined what motivates this behavior. The present study tested two potential driving mechanisms of risk-taking by narcissists (i.e., heightened perceptions of benefits and diminished perceptions of risks stemming from risky behaviors) by administering survey measures of narcissism and risk-taking to a sample of 605 undergraduate college students. Contrary to what might be expected, the results suggest that narcissists appreciate the risks associated with risky behaviors just as much as do less narcissistic individuals. Their risk-taking appears to instead be fueled by heightened perceptions of benefits stemming from risky behaviors. These results are consistent with a growing body of evidence suggesting that narcissists engage in some forms of potentially problematic behaviors, such as risk-taking, because of a surplus of eagerness rather than a deficit of inhibition.     

Why do you play? The development of the motives for online gaming questionnaire (MOGQ)

Although the majority of research focuses on the risks and disadvantages of online gaming, the present authors suggest that online games also represent new ways of satisfying basic human needs within the conditions of modern society. The aim of our present study was to reveal and operationalize the components of the motivational basis of online gaming. A total 3,818 persons (90.6% males; mean age 20.9 years, SD = 5.81) were recruited through websites providing online games. A combined method of exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis was applied. The results confirmed our preliminary model as we identified seven motivational factors (social, escape, competition, coping, skill development, fantasy, and recreation), which were used to develop the 27-item Motives for Online Gaming Questionnaire (MOGQ). The seven dimensions identified seem to cover the full range of possible motives for gaming, and the MOGQ proved to be an adequate measurement tool to assess these motives.     

Why do fear and anger look the way they do? Form and social function in facial expressions

The origins of the appearances of anger and fear facial expressions are not well understood. The authors tested the hypothesis that such origins might lie in the expressions' resemblance to, respectively, mature and babyish faces in three studies. In Study 1, faces expressing anger and fear were judged to physically resemble mature and babyish faces. Study 2 indicated that characteristics associated specifically with babyishness are attributed to persons showing fear, whereas characteristics associated with maturity are attributed to persons showing anger. In Study 3, composite faces were used to minimize the possibility that the attributions were based on associations to the anger and fear emotions alone rather than to the physical resemblance of the expressions to static facial appearance cues. These results suggest that fear and anger expressions may serve socially adaptive purposes for those who show them, similar to the social adaptations associated with a babyish or mature facial appearance.     

How do visual and postural cues combine for self-tilt perception during slow pitch rotations?

Self-orientation perception relies on the integration of multiple sensory inputs which convey spatially-related visual and postural cues. In the present study, an experimental set-up was used to tilt the body and/or the visual scene to investigate how these postural and visual cues are integrated for self-tilt perception (the subjective sensation of being tilted). Participants were required to repeatedly rate a confidence level for self-tilt perception during slow (0.05°·s^− 1) body and/or visual scene pitch tilts up to 19° relative to vertical. Concurrently, subjects also had to perform arm reaching movements toward a body-fixed target at certain specific angles of tilt. While performance of a concurrent motor task did not influence the main perceptual task, self-tilt detection did vary according to the visuo-postural stimuli. Slow forward or backward tilts of the visual scene alone did not induce a marked sensation of self-tilt contrary to actual body tilt. However, combined body and visual scene tilt influenced self-tilt perception more strongly, although this effect was dependent on the direction of visual scene tilt: only a forward visual scene tilt combined with a forward body tilt facilitated self-tilt detection. In such a case, visual scene tilt did not seem to induce vection but rather may have produced a deviation of the perceived orientation of the longitudinal body axis in the forward direction, which may have lowered the self-tilt detection threshold during actual forward body tilt.     

On the general form of Stevens’ law for loudness and softness

The loudness of a 1000-Hz tone at weak sound pressures and its softness at intense ones were scaled by the method of magnitude estimation. Estimates of loudness plotted as a function of sound pressure on double logarithmic coordinates showed the well-documented steepening near threshold. A similar steepening occurred in the softness function at high intensities. Stevens’ law, which is linear on these coordinates, could be recovered either by translating the pressure scale to a new origin, or by translating the response scale. Translations of the response scale were preferred because they produced functions in which loudness and softness were reciprocally related, whereas transformations of the stimulus made the softness function almost three times as steep as the loudness function.     

What are the prospects for a higher-order stimulus theory of perception?

Abstract.— Gibson has advocated a pure higher-order stimulus theory of perception. Johansson has agreed that the stimuli for perception are higher order variables of stimulation. However, unlike Gibson, Johansson assigns an important role to decoding principles in determining perception. Evidence is reviewed to show that percept-percept relations are involved in perception. On this ground it was argued that the prospects for a successful pure-stimulus theory are poor and that Johansson's views should be elaborated to include various types of decoding principles.