Religious Belonging,Religious Agency,and Women's Autonomy in Mozambique

Women's autonomy has frequently been linked with women's opportunities and investments, such as education, employment, and reproductive control. The association between women's autonomy and religion in the developing world, however, has received less attention, and the few existing studies make comparisons across major religious traditions. In this study, we focus on variations in levels of female decision‐making autonomy within a single religious tradition—Christianity. Using unique survey data from a predominantly Christian area in Mozambique, we devise an autonomy scale and apply it to compare women affiliated with different Christian denominations as well as unaffiliated women. In addition to affiliation, we examine the relationship between autonomy and women's religious agency both within and outside their churches. Multivariate analyses show that women belonging to more liberal religious traditions (such as Catholicism and mainline Protestantism) tend to have higher autonomy levels, regardless of other factors. These results are situated within the cross‐national scholarship on religion and women's empowerment and are interpreted in the context of gendered religious dynamics in Mozambique and similar developing settings.     

A Religious Profile of American Entrepreneurs

The entrepreneur is a celebrated figure in American society. These innovative risk‐takers hold an influential place in the economy and in popular culture. Substantial research has gone into identifying characteristics associated with these individuals, but research on entrepreneurs and religion is surprisingly sparse and inconsistent. Using national survey data, we examine religious affiliation, belief, and behavior for Americans who have started or are trying to start a business. American entrepreneurs appear no different than nonentrepreneurs in religious affiliation, belief in God, or religious service attendance. They do tend to see God as more personal, pray more frequently, and are more likely to attend a place of worship that encourages business activity. A discussion of implications concludes the research note.     

Religious Identity-Inconsistent Attending: Its Correlates and Political Implications

The foundation of religious measurement in surveys presumes that individual religious affiliation (“What is your present religion, if any?”) accurately describes the religious community in which respondents are involved. But what if it doesn't? In a recent survey of 4,000 Americans, we asked whether their current congregation matches their religious identity and about a fifth of Americans indicated that it does not. We document the degree of this inconsistency, its correlates, and its implications, focusing primarily on the politics that congregants are exposed to from clergy and the attitudes they hold about salient political matters. The identity-inconsistent attenders often vary significantly from identity-consistent attenders, which serves to introduce considerable measurement error in the use of a religious tradition measure to depict American religion. The results suggest that salient disagreement induces a sizable population to migrate to a congregation outside their religious identity.     

How Religion Predicts Pet Ownership in the United States

Over 60 percent of Americans have some sort of family pet. Although studies have explored the personality and demographic correlates of pet ownership, none have considered whether religious characteristics may influence not only pet ownership, but the kind of pet Americans own. Drawing on data from the 2018 General Social Survey, we examine the religious antecedents of pet ownership in general as well as owning a cat or a dog, taking into account factors previously associated with owning certain pets (e.g., urban vs. rural residence, political affiliation). Although religious tradition and biblical literalism generally do not predict pet ownership, frequent worship attendees and the most conservative evangelicals report owning fewer pets. Religious characteristics also predict Americans’ ownership of particular pets. Most notably, we find a strong, negative association between worship attendance and cat ownership. We theorize potential mechanisms. On the one hand, certain personality types might simultaneously attract some Americans toward religious participation and away from pets, and cats in particular. Alternatively, to the extent that pet ownership is a partial substitute for human bonding and interaction, Americans more deeply embedded within a religious community may have less need (or time) for pets generally, and specifically more independent “roommate pets,” like cats.     

Immigrant students’ educational expectations: the role of religious affiliation and practice

A body of scholarly work has emerged on educational expectations. More recently, the relationship between educational expectations and immigrant background in Western Europe has been investigated. Although the results of this type of inquiry show that students with an immigrant background tend to have higher educational expectations, potential explanations of this relationship remain unarticulated. In this article, we investigate whether religious affiliation and practice help explain the relationship between immigrant background and educational expectations. We use the Flemish survey data from the 2009 wave of the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS). In comparison with students who claimed to have no religious affiliation, students with a Muslim and other religious affiliation were more likely to have these expectations. This relation does not hold for the students with a Christian religious affiliation. However, the effect of religious affiliation disappears when the effects of religious participation were included. We also found that the more religiously active, the higher the educational expectations are for the students. This effect diminished when we controlled for talking with parents about political or social issues. The relationship between immigrant background and educational expectations is partially explained by the level of religious practice and religious affiliation of students.     

The Politics of Religious Nones

Americans with no religious affiliation (aka religious “Nones”) are not a politically homogeneous community. Just as there are political differences between groups of Christians, there are political differences between groups of religious Nones. I use nationally representative survey data to examine the political activities and perspectives of atheists, agnostics, and those who are “nothing in particular.” Results show that Americans who report that their religion is nothing in particular are relatively uninterested in politics and unlikely to be politically active; atheists are relatively liberal and likely to experience political conflict and follow political news; and agnostics are particularly likely to vote and feel politically isolated from their families. In many ways, the “softer” secularism of those who are nothing in particular is politically more similar to religious affiliates than the “harder” secularism of agnostics and especially atheists. These results have important implications for the future of American politics as Nones now have the potential to rival evangelical Protestants as a politically relevant constituency.     

At the intersection of culture and religion: a cultural analysis of religion's implications for secondary control and social affiliation

Religion helps people maintain a sense of control, particularly secondary control-acceptance of and adjustment to difficult situations--and contributes to strengthening social relationships in a religious community. However, little is known about how culture may influence these effects. The current research examined the interaction of culture and religion on secondary control and social affiliation, comparing people from individualistic cultures (e.g., European Americans), who tend to be more motivated toward personal agency, and people from collectivistic cultures (e.g., East Asians), who tend to be more motivated to maintain social relationships. In Study 1, an analysis of online church mission statements showed that U.S. websites contained more themes of secondary control than did Korean websites, whereas Korean websites contained more themes of social affiliation than did U.S. websites. Study 2 showed that experimental priming of religion led to acts of secondary control for European Americans but not Asian Americans. Using daily diary methodology, Study 3 showed that religious coping predicted more secondary control for European Americans but not Koreans, and religious coping predicted more social affiliation for Koreans and European Americans. These findings suggest the importance of understanding sociocultural moderators for the effects of religion.     

The Effects of Education on Americans’ Religious Practices,Beliefs, and Affiliations

I challenge the scholarly contention that increases in education uniformly lead to declines in religious participation, belief, and affiliation. I argue that education influences strategies of action, and these strategies of action are relevant to some religious beliefs and activities but not others. Analysis of survey data shows that (1) education negatively affects exclusivist religious viewpoints and biblical literalism but not belief in God or the afterlife; (2) education positively affects religious participation, devotional activities, and emphasizing the importance of religion in daily life; (3) education positively affects switching religious affiliations, particularly to a mainline Protestant denomination, but not disaffiliation; (4) education is positively associated with questioning the role of religion in secular society but not with support for curbing the public opinions of religious leaders; and (5) the effects of education on religious beliefs and participation vary across religious traditions. Education does influence Americans’ religious beliefs and activities, but the effects of education on religion are complex.     

Asynchrony in Attitudes Toward Abortion and Gay Rights: The Challenge to Values Alignment

Political commentators tend to assume that Americans who share a particular religious affiliation think similarly about values issues and that values questions are aligned. Although religious affiliation is a strong predictor of attitudes toward abortion and gay rights, there is differentiation within denominational subgroups with respect to both; for example, while majorities of mainline Protestants and Catholics favor gay marriage, many of their respective co‐religionists do not. Further, aggregate survey data shows asynchrony in within‐group attitudes on abortion and gay rights; for example, whereas Hispanic Catholics are more likely to support gay marriage than legal abortion, black Protestants are more likely to support legal abortion than gay marriage. Abortion and gay equality are discrete issues and give rise to divergent attitudes based on the lived reality of different ethnoreligious groups. These findings challenge the utility of the construct of the “values voter,” and underscore that abortion and gay rights should be recognized as separate public policy domains.     

Are religious ‘nones’ secular? The case of the nones in Australia

The number of people with no religious affiliation (religious ‘nones’) is growing in the west. However, little is known about the religiosity – or non-religiosity – of these people. Using representative survey data, this report examines the levels of religious belief and practice among Australian religious nones and compares this with those who identify with a religion. It is found that there is a deep congruence with no religious affiliation and other ways of being considered non-religious.     

Social Class and Finding a Congregation: How Attendees are Introduced to Their Congregations

Despite the large numbers of Americans switching religious congregations each year, social scientists know relatively little about how people are introduced to new religious congregations. In this research note, I use multiple surveys of congregants??two surveys of Presbyterians in the 1990s and a survey of attendees from a random sample of congregations in 2001??to examine the effects of education and income on how attendees are introduced to their religious congregations. Results show that education and income are key predictors of how attendees find their congregations. In general, Americans with low levels of education and income are disproportionately likely to be introduced to their congregations through their social networks while those with higher levels of education and income are more likely to rely on denominational affiliation. These results address fundamental assumptions underlying theories of social class and religion and also provide religious leaders with valuable insight into the factors that influence how people are introduced to new religious congregations.     

The Social Context of Organized Nonbelief: County‐Level Predictors of Nonbeliever Organizations in the United States

Many recent social scientific studies have noted that the percentage of Americans with no religious affiliation is on the rise, but few have examined the nonbeliever organizations that some of these “nones” might join. This study uses an original data set, the first attempt at documenting the population of local nonbeliever organizations in the United States, to explore where these groups are more likely to flourish. Though one might assume that less religious counties, as measured by the percentage of those with no stated religious affiliation, would be more likely to contain nonbeliever organizations, this article provides evidence that they emerge more frequently and in greater numbers in counties with proportionally more evangelical Protestants. The percentage of evangelicals among a county's population is strongly associated with both the existence (dichotomously coded) and the number of nonbeliever organizations, even when controlling for a range of demographic and institutional factors.     

Religion and Drinking in the Retirement Community

ABSTRACT

The effect of religiosity on drinking patterns of retirement community residents is examined. Based on a systematic random sample, residents of seven West Coast retirement communities were interviewed. Data on religiosity were categorized into social religious activity, and personal religious behavior. It was found that retirement community residents drink more than senior Americans living in other locations; conservative Protestants, identified as those claiming affiliation with denominations that prohibit alcohol consumption, drink less than Roman Catholics or liberal Protestants; and those who score low on religiosity drink more than those who score high on religiosity regardless of denominational affiliation. It was also shown that for conservative Protestants private religiosity predicts drinking behavior, and for liberal Protestants social religious behavior is a predictor variable. The influence of religiosity on drinking behavior was found to be significant.     

Religion and Public Opinion Toward Same‐Sex Relations,Marriage, and Adoption: Does the Type of Practice Matter?

This study examines how religion's impact on Americans’ attitudes toward same‐sex practices varies by the type of practice being considered. We theorize that same‐sex romantic and family practices such as sexual relations, marriage, and adoption represent distinct practice types, differing in degrees of legality, cultural legitimacy, and in their internal power dynamics. Consequently, we expect that Americans view each practice type somewhat differently and their opinions on each may be influenced by religion in distinctive ways. Drawing upon national‐level data, we estimate and compare the relative net effects of a comprehensive battery of religious measures on support for gay sex, marriage, and adoption, both for the full sample and across religious traditions. Analyses demonstrate that public opinion toward gay sexual relations is more strongly related to religious practice and theological conservatism compared to attitudes regarding same‐sex marriage or adoption. Moreover, frequent religious practice and conservative theological beliefs about the Bible tend to be more strongly associated with attitudes toward same‐sex relationships for evangelicals, compared to mainline Protestants and, to a lesser extent, Catholics. Findings ultimately affirm that the type of same‐sex practice being considered (sex, marriage, or adoption) serves to moderate religions’ impact on Americans’ support for such practices.     

Religious Right,Religious Left,Both, or Neither? Understanding Religio‐Political Identification

In this article we analyze the effects of religious, political, socioeconomic, and demographic variables on religious Americans’ propensity to identify with religio‐political movements. Using data from the 2013 Economic Values Survey collected by the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), we sort nonsecular Americans into four categories: religious right, religious left, both religious right and religious left, or neither religious right nor the religious left. We estimate a multinomial logit model in which we depict religio‐political identification as a function of religious affiliation, worship attendance, religious embeddedness, religious convictions, political attitudes, and socioeconomic and demographic controls. We find that a wide range of religious, political, and socioeconomic/demographic variables affect individuals’ identification with the religious right and/or religious left. Our empirical results also permit us to analyze the seeming paradox of identifying with both the religious right and the religious left. We find that individuals who identify with both movements come from the ranks of the highly religious, those who believe that being moral requires one to believe in God, Tea Party supporters, strong partisans, those with lower education and income, older individuals, and blacks and Hispanics.     

Protestant and Catholic Distinctions in Secularization

Differences between Protestants and Catholics in religious beliefs and behavior are revisited in the light of growing theoretical and empirical evidence for stages of secularization and a remaining religious core in Western societies. To what extent are remaining Protestants more religious than before and compared with remaining Catholics? Analyzing repeated cross-sectional survey data from 1985 to 2012 in the US, Canada, and Great Britain, we find that, in most cases, Protestant affiliation has declined more significantly than Catholic affiliation. Yet, individuals who declare themselves as belonging to a Protestant denomination have higher rates of regular service attendance, prayer, and Christian beliefs than those previously. They have also surpassed these same rates among Catholics in both the US and Canada and are on track to do so in Britain in the coming years.     

The Religious Origins and Destinations of Individuals Identifying as a Sexual Minority

Religion has been, and continues to be, a source of external hostility and internal struggle for many sexual minorities. This has potential implications for the observed religious origins and current religious affiliations of individuals identifying as a sexual minority. Regarding origins, self-identified sexual minorities might be less likely than heterosexuals to have come from religious traditions that have tended to be hostile to minority sexualities, as individuals raised within those traditions might be hesitant to identify as a sexual minority even if they have same-sex attractions. Regarding destinations, self-identified sexual minorities might be more likely than heterosexuals to switch away from religious traditions that have tended to be hostile to minority sexualities. We examine these expectations using nationally representative survey data from the 2008 to 2014 General Social Surveys. The analysis shows that sexual minorities do not significantly differ from heterosexuals by the religious traditions in which they were raised. Sexual minorities are, however, more likely than heterosexuals to move away from Christian traditions and towards disaffiliation or reaffiliation with “other” traditions that include Judaism, Buddhism, and liberal nontraditional religions such as Unitarian Universalism. For gay and lesbian individuals, these patterns of disaffiliation and reaffiliation can be attributed to higher on average education and lower likelihood of being married and having children; however, these sociodemographic factors do not explain the disaffiliation and reaffiliation of bisexual individuals. Further research should explore the different religious experiences of sexual minority sub-groups.     

Explaining Religious Effects on Distress Among African Americans

This study applies Smith's (2003a) theory of religious effects to account for the link between religiosity and distress. Using a latent-variable structural equation modeling approach, we analyze survey data from a nationally representative sample of African-American adults and find empirical support for our hypotheses. In terms of anger, depression, and anxiety, religiously committed African Americans exhibit lower levels of distress than their less religious or nonreligious counterparts. Highly religious African Americans report higher levels of sense of control and social support, which consequently reduces distress. We also find that the indirect and salutary effects of religiosity via social support are due to support from family and friends as well as from other religious people.     

A WAY FORWARD FOR SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON SCIENCE AND RELIGION: A REVIEW AND A RIFF

John Evans’s new book Morals Not Knowledge pushes scholars to rethink contemporary debates about religion and science by moving past the rhetoric of societal elites to examine the perspectives of everyday Americans, identifying the moral conflicts at the heart of debates. We review Evans’s key contributions while also extending and challenging his arguments, urging consideration of how renewed moral debates might be informed by a broader set of U.S. “publics.” Drawing on empirical research, we highlight four sets of voices that are missing from Evans’s analysis. Specifically, we highlight the voices of racial and ethnic minorities, religious communities (as opposed to individuals), members of minority religious traditions, and everyday religious scientists. Through doing so we offer avenues for future research on these diverse publics that will help facilitate a broader set of better and more informed debates about moral conflict between religious and scientific communities.