共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Jordi Fernández 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2016,92(3):620-644
Does memory only preserve epistemic justification over time, or can memory also generate it? I argue that memory can generate justification based on a certain conception of mnemonic content. According to it, our memories represent themselves as originating on past perceptions of objective facts. If this conception of mnemonic content is correct, what we may believe on the basis of memory always includes something that we were not in a position to believe before we utilised that capacity. For that reason, memory can produce justification for belief through the process of remembering. This is why a subject may be justified in believing a proposition on the basis of memory even if, in the past, she was not justified in believing it through any other source. The resulting picture of memory is a picture wherein the epistemically generative role of memory turns out to be grounded on its intentionally generative role. 相似文献
2.
Accepting Testimony 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Matthew Weiner 《The Philosophical quarterly》2003,53(211):256-264
I defend the acceptance principle for testimony (APT), that hearers are justified in accepting testimony unless they have positive evidence against its reliability, against Elizabeth Fricker's local reductionist view. Local reductionism, the doctrine that hearers need evidence that a particular piece of testimony is reliable if they are to be justified in believing it, must on pain of scepticism be complemented by a principle that grants default justification to some testimony; I argue that (APT) is the principle required. I consider two alternative weaker principles as complements to local reductionism; one yields counter–intuitive results unless we accept (APT) as well, while the other is too weak to enable local reductionism to avoid scepticism. 相似文献
3.
Endre Begby 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2021,102(3):515-530
As a general rule, whenever a hearer is justified in forming the belief that p on the basis of a speaker’s testimony, she will also be justified in assuming that the speaker has formed her belief appropriately in light of a relevantly large and representative sample of the evidence that bears on p. In simpler terms, a justification for taking someone’s testimony entails a justification for trusting her assessment of the evidence. This introduces the possibility of what I will call “evidential preemption.” Evidential preemption occurs when a speaker, in addition to offering testimony that p, also warns the hearer of the likelihood that she will subsequently be confronted with apparently contrary evidence: this is done, however, not so as to encourage the hearer to temper her confidence in p in anticipation of that evidence, but rather to suggest that the (apparently) contrary evidence is in fact misleading evidence or evidence that has already been taken into account. Either way, the speaker is signalling to the hearer that the subsequent disclosure of this evidence will not require her to significantly revise her belief that p. Such preemption can effectively inoculate an audience against future contrary evidence, and thereby creates an opening for a form of exploitative manipulation that I will call “epistemic grooming.” Nonetheless, I argue, not all uses of evidential preemption are nefarious; it can also serve as an important tool for guiding epistemically limited agents though complex evidential scenarios. 相似文献
4.
DAN O'BRIEN 《希帕蒂亚:女权主义哲学杂志》2010,25(3):632-652
Hume is usually taken to have an evidentialist account of testimonial belief: one is justified in believing what someone says if one has empirical evidence that they have been reliable in the past. This account is impartialist: such evidence is required no matter who the person is, or what relations she may have to you. I, however, argue that Hume has another account of testimony, one grounded in sympathy. This account is partialist, in that empirical evidence is not required in order for one to be justified in believing some of the assertions of one's friends. 相似文献
5.
ALEXANDER JACKSON 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2011,82(3):564-593
One might think that its seeming to you that p makes you justified in believing that p. After all, when you have no defeating beliefs, it would be irrational to have it seem to you that p but not believe it. That view is plausible for perceptual justification, problematic in the case of memory, and clearly wrong for inferential justification. I propose a view of rationality and justified belief that deals happily with inference and memory. Appearances are to be evaluated as ‘sound’ or ‘unsound.’ Only a sound appearance can give rise to a justified belief, yet even an unsound appearance can ‘rationally require’ the subject to form the belief. Some of our intuitions mistake that rational requirement for the belief’s being justified. The resulting picture makes it plausible that there are also unsound perceptual appearances. I suggest that to have a sound perceptually basic appearance that p, one must see that p. 相似文献
6.
R. L. Hall 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2017,81(3):247-261
Can religious experience justify belief in God? We best approach this question by splitting it in two: (1) Do religious experiences give their subjects any justification for believing that there is a God of the kind they experience? And (2) Does testimony about such experiences provides any justification for believing that there is a God for those who are not the subject of the experience? The most popular affirmative answers trace back to the work of Richard Swinburne, who appeals to the Principle of Credulity and the Principle of Testimony. Since then, development of his line of reasoning has gone in a number of distinct directions. Here I propose yet another development. I argue first that the Principle of Credulity is false on the grounds that it has several implausible commitments. I then offer a Phenomenal Conservative perspective on the epistemology of religious experience suggesting a categorically affirmative answer to (1) but a nuanced answer to (2) which allows the possibility of reasonable disagreement about religious experience. 相似文献
7.
Daniele Sgaravatti 《Philosophical Studies》2014,168(2):439-455
The paper starts by describing and clarifying what Williamson calls the consequence fallacy. I show two ways in which one might commit the fallacy. The first, which is rather trivial, involves overlooking background information; the second way, which is the more philosophically interesting, involves overlooking prior probabilities. In the following section, I describe a powerful form of sceptical argument, which is the main topic of the paper, elaborating on previous work by Huemer. The argument attempts to show the impossibility of defeasible justification, justification based on evidence which does not entail the (allegedly) justified proposition or belief. I then discuss the relation between the consequence fallacy, or some similar enough reasoning, and that form of argument. I argue that one can resist that form of sceptical argument if one gives up the idea that a belief cannot be justified unless it is supported by the totality of the evidence available to the subject—a principle entailed by many prominent epistemological views, most clearly by epistemological evidentialism. The justification, in the relevant cases, should instead derive solely from the prior probability of the proposition. A justification of this sort, that does not rely on evidence, would amount to a form of entitlement, in (something like) Crispin Wright’s sense. I conclude with some discussion of how to understand prior probabilities, and how to develop the notion of entitlement in an externalist epistemological framework. 相似文献
8.
Chris Ranalli 《European Journal of Philosophy》2020,28(1):142-163
An epistemologist tells you that knowledge is more than justified true belief. You trust them and thus come to believe this on the basis of their testimony. Did you thereby come to know that this view is correct? Intuitively, there is something intellectually wrong with forming philosophical beliefs on the basis of testimony, and yet it's hard to see why philosophy should be significantly epistemically different from other areas of inquiry in a way that would fully prohibit belief by testimony. This, I argue, is the puzzle of philosophical testimony. In this paper, I explore the puzzle of philosophical testimony and its ramifications. In particular, I examine the case for pessimism about philosophical testimony—the thesis that philosophical belief on the basis of testimony is impossible or is in some way illegitimate—and I argue that it lacks adequate support. I then consider whether the source of the apparent intellectual wrongness of testimonial‐based philosophical belief is grounded in non‐epistemic norms and goals of philosophical practice itself and argue that such norms are implausible, don't conflict with testimonial‐based philosophical belief, or else are mere disciplinary norms, lacking substantial normative force that would make it wrong to form testimonial‐based philosophical belief. 相似文献
9.
Matthew Frise 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2019,100(4):1047-1054
Process reliabilism is a theory about ex post justification, the justification of a doxastic attitude one has, such as belief. It says roughly that a justified belief is a belief formed by a reliable process. It is not a theory about ex ante justification, one's justification for having a particular attitude toward a proposition, an attitude one might lack. But many reliabilists supplement their theory such that it explains ex ante justification in terms of reliable processes. In this paper, I argue that the main way reliabilists supplement their theory fails. In the absence of an alternative, reliabilism does not account for ex ante justification. 相似文献
10.
Michael Hunter 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》1999,80(4):346-357
When one recalls that P, how is one justified in believing that P? I refute the three most natural answers to this question: a memory belief is not justified by a belief in the reliability of memory; a memory experience does not provide a new, foundational justification for a belief; and memory does not merely preserve the same justification a belief had when first adopted. Instead, the justification of a memory belief is a product of both the initial justification for adopting it and the justification for retaining it provided by seeming memories. 相似文献
11.
David Alexander 《Philosophia》2012,40(3):497-521
Inferential Internalists accept the Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ), according to which one has justification for believing P on the basis of E only if one has justification for believing that E makes probable P. Richard Fumerton has defended PIJ by appeal to examples, and recently Adam Leite has argued that this principle is supported by considerations regarding the nature of responsible belief. In this paper, I defend a form of externalism against both arguments. This form of externalism recognizes what I call the phenomenon of reflective defeat: if one is justified in not believing that E makes probable P, then this defeats whatever justification one has for believing P upon the basis of E. I argue that this modified version of externalism has the virtue of accommodating the intuitions that motivate internalism, without the cost of the vicious regress that makes internalism so unattractive. 相似文献
12.
Matthew McGrath 《Philosophical Studies》2016,173(4):897-905
According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the “capacity view.” In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically relevant features of experiences. I argue we would. The second is whether Schellenberg’s appeal to factive and phenomenal evidence accommodates the intuitive verdicts about the bad case that she claims it does. I argue it does not. The third is whether Schellenberg’s account of factive evidence is adequate to capture nuances concerning the justification for singular but nondemonstrative perceptual beliefs, such as the belief that’s NN, where NN is a proper name. I argue it is not. If I am right, these points suggest a mental-state-first account of perceptual justification, rather than a capacity-first account, and one which treats the good and bad cases alike in respect of justification and complicates the relation between perceptual content and what one is justified in believing. 相似文献
13.
Brian Davies 《Philosophical Investigations》2007,30(3):219-244
In this paper I try briefly to say why I think that what D.Z. Phillips had to say about belief in God can be defended against certain familiar criticisms, and why I think that his treatment could have been improved. I note passages in his writings which might be thought not to reflect what belief in God amounts to, but I argue that these passages can be read as reflecting belief in God as we find it in biblical authors and in writers like Thomas Aquinas. Having noted that Phillips rejects attempts to do natural theology on largely Humean grounds, I argue against these grounds as echoed by Phillips and draw attention to a tradition of natural theology not subject to Humean objections, a tradition to which Phillips might have paid more attention than he did. 相似文献
14.
Colin Cheyne 《Ratio》2009,22(3):278-290
The following principles may plausibly be included in a wide range of theories of epistemic justification:
I argue that it follows from these three individually plausible claims that an agent's belief may be both justified and unjustified. I consider how theories may avoid this paradox, and conclude that deontological theories of epistemic justification face considerable, perhaps insurmountable, difficulties. 相似文献
- (1)
There are circumstances in which an agent is justified in believing a falsehood,
- (2)
There are circumstances in which an agent is justified in believing a principle of epistemic justification,
- (3)
Beliefs acquired in compliance with a justifiably-believed epistemic principle are justified.
I argue that it follows from these three individually plausible claims that an agent's belief may be both justified and unjustified. I consider how theories may avoid this paradox, and conclude that deontological theories of epistemic justification face considerable, perhaps insurmountable, difficulties. 相似文献
15.
Hamid Vahid 《Synthese》2010,176(3):447-462
Beliefs can be evaluated from a number of perspectives. Epistemic evaluation involves epistemic standards and appropriate
epistemic goals. On a truth-conducive account of epistemic justification, a justified belief is one that serves the goal of
believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. Beliefs are also prompted by non-epistemic reasons. This raises the question of
whether, say, the pragmatic benefits of a belief are able to rationalize it. In this paper, after criticizing certain responses
to this question, I shall argue that, as far as beliefs are concerned, justification has an essentially epistemic character.
This conclusion is then qualified by considering the conditions under which pragmatic consequences of a belief can be epistemically
relevant. 相似文献
16.
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio 《Erkenntnis》2010,72(2):205-231
My starting point is some widely accepted and intuitive ideas about justified, well-founded belief. By drawing on John Pollock’s
work, I sketch a formal framework for making these ideas precise. Central to this framework is the notion of an inference
graph. An inference graph represents everything that is relevant about a subject for determining which of her beliefs are
justified, such as what the subject believes based on what. The strengths of the nodes of the graph represent the degrees
of justification of the corresponding beliefs. There are two ways in which degrees of justification can be computed within
this framework. I argue that there is not any way of doing the calculations in a broadly probabilistic manner. The only alternative
looks to be a thoroughly non-probabilistic way of thinking wedded to the thought that justification is closed under competent
deduction. However, I argue that such a view is unable to capture the intuitive notion of justification, for it leads to an
uncomfortable dilemma: either a widespread scepticism about justification, or drawing epistemically spurious distinctions
between different types of lotteries. This should worry anyone interested in well-founded belief. 相似文献
17.
Philip Clark 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2020,101(2):308-327
Cognitivists about intention hold that intending to do something entails believing you will do it. Noncognitivists hold that intentions are conative states with no cognitive component. I argue that both of these claims are true. Intending entails the presence of a belief, even though the intention is not even partly the belief. The result is a form of what Sarah Paul calls noninferential weak cognitivism, a view that, as she notes, has no prominent defenders. 相似文献
18.
Harold Langsam 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):79-101
In this paper, I argue that what underlies internalism about justification is a rationalist conception of justification, not
a deontological conception of justification, and I argue for the plausibility of this rationalist conception of justification.
The rationalist conception of justification is the view that a justified belief is a belief that is held in a rational way;
since we exercise our rationality through conscious deliberation, the rationalist conception holds that a belief is justified
iff a relevant possible instance of conscious deliberation would endorse the belief. The importance of conscious deliberation
stems from its role in guiding us in acquiring true beliefs: whereas the externalist holds that if we wish to acquire true
beliefs, we have to begin by assuming that some of our usual methods of belief formation generally provide us with true beliefs, the internalist holds that if
we form beliefs by conscious deliberation, we can be conscious of reasons for thinking that our beliefs are true. Conscious deliberation can make us conscious of reasons because it proceeds via rational
intuitions. I argue that despite the fallibility of rational intuition, rational intuitions do enable us to become conscious
of reasons for belief.
相似文献
Harold LangsamEmail: |
19.
I set out the standard view about alleged examples of failure of transmission of warrant, respond to two cases for the view,
and argue that the view is false. The first argument for the view neglects the distinction between believing a proposition
on the basis of a justification and merely having a justification to believe a proposition. The second argument for the view
neglects the position that one 9s justification for believing a conclusion can be one 9s premise for the conclusion, rather
than simply one 9s justification for the premise. Finally, the view is false since it is inconsistent with the closure of
knowledge as closure is properly understood. 相似文献
20.
Kevin McCain 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2015,53(4):471-480
The “problem of forgotten evidence” is a common objection to evidentialist theories of epistemic justification. This objection is motivated by cases where someone forms a belief on the basis of supporting evidence and then later forgets this evidence while retaining the belief. Critics of evidentialist theories argue that in some of these cases the person's belief remains justified. So, these critics claim that one can have a justified belief that is not supported by any evidence the subject possesses. I argue that these critics are mistaken. 相似文献